Lindsay v. Mulliens

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Anthony Lindsay
v. 	Case No. 19-cv-1101-PB
Warden, Federal Correctional
Institution, Berlin, New Hampshire
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The respondent, the Warden of Federal Correctional
Institution, Berlin, New Hampshire (“FCI Berlin”), has moved to
dismiss Anthony Lindsay’s § 2241 petition for writ of habeas
corpus on the grounds that the court lacks jurisdiction to grant
habeas relief. 	Doc. No. 8. 	Lindsay initially filed his
petition in October 2019 while incarcerated at FCI Berlin. 	Doc.
No. 1. 	In September 2020, however, he was “redesignated” and
transferred to the United States Penitentiary in Bruceton Mills,
West Virginia (“USP Hazelton”). 1 	See Cheryl Magnusson Decl.
(Doc. No. 8-1). 	In light of Lindsay’s transfer, the court lacks
jurisdiction to grant the habeas relief Lindsay seeks.
Accordingly, the district judge should grant the Warden’s motion
and dismiss Lindsay’s habeas petition without prejudice.
1 In November 2020, Lindsay requested additional time to respond
to the Warden’s motion because he was “in transit” and not
permanently redesignated to USP Hazelton. 	Doc. No. 9. 	The BOP
Inmate Locator (available at www.bop.gov) indicates that Lindsay
has since been transferred to the Federal Transfer Center in
Oklahoma City, OK, where he currently remains incarcerated.
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I. 	Jurisdiction
“‘Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,’
possessing ‘only that power authorized by Constitution and
statute.’” 	Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (quoting
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377
(1994)). 	If jurisdiction is lacking, a court can proceed no
further in a case. 	Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 83 (1st Cir.
2010).
Two jurisdictional rules limit a district court’s authority
to grant writs of habeas corpus. 	See Parker v. Hazelwood, No.
17-CV-484-LM, 2019 WL 4261832, at *2, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
152910, at *4 (D.N.H. Sept. 9, 2019). 	First, the “immediate-
custodian rule” provides that the proper respondent in a habeas
challenge to physical confinement is “the warden of the facility
where the prisoner is being held, not the Attorney General or
some other remote supervisory official.” 	Rumsfeld v. Padilla,
542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004). 	“This rule derives from the text of
28 U.S.C. § 2242, which provides that the proper respondent is
‘the person who has custody over’ the petitioner.” 	Parker, 2019
WL 4261832 at *2, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152910, at *5 (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 2242); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (stating that the
court should direct a writ to “the person having custody of the
person detained”). 	Second, the “territorial-jurisdiction rule” 2
2 This rule is also referred to as the “district of confinement
rule.” 	Parker, 2019 WL 4261832, at *2 n.2, 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 152910, at *5 n.2 (citing Padilla, 542 U.S. at 446–47).
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requires that the court issuing the writ “have personal
jurisdiction over the person who holds the petitioner in
custody.” 	Vasquez v. Reno, 233 F.3d 688, 690 (1st Cir. 2000);
see also Padilla, 542 U.S. at 442; 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (limiting
district courts to granting habeas relief “within their
respective jurisdictions”).
“Ordinarily, a petitioner can satisfy the immediate-
custodian and territorial-jurisdiction rules by naming his [or
her] warden as the respondent and filing his [or her] petition
in the district of his [or her] confinement.” 	Parker, 2019 WL
4261832, at *3, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152910, at *7 (citing
Padilla, 542 U.S. at 447). 	Nevertheless, a petition for habeas
relief can subsequently be rendered “moot” if the petitioner is
transferred to a federal facility and to the custody of a warden
outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction. 	See, e.g., id.
(noting limited exceptions to these jurisdictional rules);
Gonzalez v. Grondolsky, 152 F. Supp. 3d 39, 44 (D. Mass. 2016).
Here, given Lindsay’s transfers, the court lacks the
requisite jurisdiction over his immediate custodian to order the
relief Lindsay seeks. 	Though Lindsay complied with the
immediate-custody and territorial jurisdiction rules at the time
he filed his petition, his immediate custodian is now the Warden
of FTC Oklahoma City, who is not properly identified as a
respondent and, more importantly, is not within the territorial
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reach of this federal New Hampshire court. 	See Padilla, 542
U.S. at 446-47 (rejecting a “long-arm approach to habeas
jurisdiction”). 	Accordingly, were this court to issue any writ
in Lindsay’s favor, it would be ineffectual against the persons
who actually maintain day-to-day control over him and could
produce him in court, if ordered to do so. 	See Vasquez, 233
F.3d at 691.
As noted in Parker, every district court in the First
Circuit that has confronted similar circumstances — 	a transfer
of a petitioner to a facility outside of the court’s territorial
jurisdiction during the pendency of habeas proceedings – has
held that it should not hear the merits of the transferred
petitioner’s claims. 	Parker, 2019 WL 4261832, at *4, 2019 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 152910, at *11 (citing, among other examples,
Gonzalez, 152 F. Supp. 3d at 44 (finding petition moot pursuant
to immediate-custodian rule); Mendez v. Martin, C.A. No. 15-
408ML, 2016 WL 2849598, at *4 (D.R.I. Apr. 19, 2016), R&R
adopted, No. CV 15-408 ML, 2016 WL 2732182 (D.R.I. May 10, 2016)
(same)). 	Consistent with these rulings, the district judge
should dismiss Lindsay’s petition, without prejudice to his
ability to refile his claims in a court with proper
jurisdiction. 3
3 Though, in the interest of efficiency, the court might have
been inclined to transfer this case to the Western District of
Oklahoma, rather than dismiss it, this court lacks the authority
to do so under the transfer statutes, because when Lindsay filed
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II. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district judge should grant
the Warden’s motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 8) and dismiss
Lindsay’s petition (Doc. No. 1), without prejudice to his
ability to refile claims against a proper respondent in the
district in which he is incarcerated. 	Any objections to this
Report and Recommendation must be filed within fourteen days of
receipt of this notice. 	See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). 	The
fourteen-day period may be extended upon motion. 	Failure to
file specific written objections to the Report and
Recommendation within the specified time waives the right to
appeal the district court’s order. 	See Santos-Santos v. Torres-
Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016)
_______________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
February 26, 2021
cc: 	Anthony Lindsay, pro se
Seth R. Aframe, Esq.
his petition, he could not have brought this action in Oklahoma.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1406(a), 1631 (limiting inter-district
transfers to a district where the action could have been brought
when it was initially commenced).
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