Hannon v. NH, State of

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Florence Hannon
v. 	Case No. 19-cv-823-JD
State of New Hampshire
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Florence Hannon, appearing pro se, seeks monetary
relief and other restitution from the State Of New Hampshire,
alleging that a state marital master violated her right to
religious freedom by unilaterally re-opening her closed divorce
case in 2003. 	See Complaint & Addendum (Doc. Nos. 1 & 4). 	The
complaint is before this magistrate judge for preliminary
review, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and LR 4.3(d)(1).
For the reasons that follow, the district judge should dismiss
this lawsuit.
Preliminary Review Standard
The magistrate judge conducts a preliminary review of
pleadings, like Hannon’s, which are filed in forma pauperis.
See LR 4.3(d). 	The magistrate judge may recommend to the
district judge that one or more claims be dismissed if, among
other things, the court lacks jurisdiction, a defendant is
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immune from the relief sought, or the complaint fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. 	See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2); LR 4.3(d). 	In conducting its preliminary review,
the court construes pro se complaints liberally. 	See Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). 	The complaint
must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief.’” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (citation omitted). 	The court treats as true all
well-pleaded factual allegations, and construes reasonable
inferences in plaintiff’s favor. 	See Ocasio-Hernández v.
Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011).
Background1
In October 2002, plaintiff filed a divorce action in New
Hampshire state court. Plaintiff and her husband then reconciled
before the end of 2002. 	In April 2003, local police issued an
order of protection against plaintiff’s husband. 	Plaintiff
points out that the precipitating incident for the protection
order was a threat, rather than physical violence. Plaintiff
alleges that she requested the court to arrange for therapy to
1 The facts recited in this section are drawn from the complaint
(Doc. No. 1), an addendum (Doc. No. 4) and various documents
attached thereto. 	See Foley v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 772 F.3d
63, 72 (1st Cir. 2014).
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“mend” the couple’s marriage at a hearing to address the
protection order. 	Instead, she asserts, the hearing master re-
opened the closed divorce file, essentially ordering the couple
to divorce. 	Plaintiff alleges that since 2014 she has written
to two governors and the New Hampshire Attorney General,
unsuccessfully seeking to “settle” the matter. Finally, she
alleges that in July 2019, the New Hampshire Superior Court
rejected her request to investigate her claim of an invalid
divorce.2
Discussion
Plaintiff alleges that by ordering she and her husband to
divorce, and thus end her Christian marriage, the State of New
Hampshire violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq.3 	Several factors militate
2 It appears that request was made in the context of an
interpleader action filed by a bank seeking to disburse proceeds
of an account in her former husband’s name. 	See Wells Fargo
Bank v. Heirs, Devisees & Legal Representative of James T.
Hannon, Jr., No. 218-2-17-CV-01301 (N.H. Super., filed Nov. 9,
2017).
3 The RFRA provides:
(a) In general
Government shall not substantially burden a person's
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a
rule of general applicability, except as provided in
subsection (b).
(b) Exception
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in favor of the district judge dismissing this case for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
First, the RFRA only applies to federal actors. 	In City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997), the Supreme Court
held that Congress exceeded its power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment in attempting to apply RFRA to the
activities of state and local governments. Congress has since
amended RFRA to apply only to “federal law and the
implementation of that law,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–3 (Supp. 2002).
Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to state a viable claim for
relief under the RFRA.
Next, even if the court broadly construes plaintiff’s claim
as an alleged violation of her due process rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, the act she complains of – unilaterally re-
Government may substantially burden a person's
exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that
application of the burden to the person--
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling governmental interest.
(c) Judicial relief
A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in
violation of this section may assert that violation as
a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain
appropriate relief against a government. Standing to
assert a claim or defense under this section shall be
governed by the general rules of standing under
article III of the Constitution.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.
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opening her divorce – occurred in 2003, well outside the
applicable statute of limitations. 	Section 1983 cases borrow
the relevant limitations period applied in personal injury cases
in the state where the claim arose. 	In New Hampshire, that
period is three years. 	See Gorelik v. Costin, 605 F.3d 118, 121
(1st Cir. 2010); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4.
Next, the Eleventh Amendment bars plaintiff’s suit. 	The
only named defendant is the State of New Hampshire. 	The
Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing claims
for damages and injunctive relief asserted against a state. 	See
New Hampshire v. Ramsey, 366 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2004) (“A
state’s immunity under the Eleventh Amendment applies whether a
private plaintiff’s suit is for monetary damages or some other
type of relief.”).
Finally, to the extent that plaintiff grounds her complaint
on the New Hampshire Superior Court’s failure, in 2018, to
“investigate her claim of an invalid divorce” (Doc. No. 1 at 2),
any such claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Generally speaking, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents a
losing party in state court from seeking subsequent federal
court review of that state court judgment by asserting that the
state court judgment violated the loser’s federally-protected
rights. 	See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416
(1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
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U.S. 462, 476 (1983). 	Review of such state-court judgments can
only be obtained in the United States Supreme Court. 	See
Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476. 	See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1257.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district judge should
dismiss plaintiff’s complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Any
objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed
within fourteen days of receipt of this notice. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b)(2). The fourteen-day period may be extended upon
motion. Failure to file specific written objections to the
Report and Recommendation within the specified time waives the
right to appeal the district court’s order. 	See Santos-Santos
v. Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016).
_____________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
November 22, 2019
cc: 	Florence B. Hannon, pro se
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