Maravelias v. Coughlin et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Paul Maravelias,
Plaintiff
v. 	Case No. 19-cv-143-SM-SM
Opinion No. 2019 DNH 188
Hon. John J. Coughlin;
Attorney General Gordon J. MacDonald;
Patricia G. Conway, Esq.; Town of Windham;
and the Windham Police Department,
Defendants
O R D E R
Pro se plaintiff, Paul Maravelias, brings this action
challenging the constitutionality of a stalking order entered
against him by the New Hampshire Circuit Court. 	He also asks
the court to declare that the state statute pursuant to which
that stalking order was issued is both facially overbroad and
void for vagueness. 	He seeks injunctive and declaratory relief,
invalidating the stalking order and preventing defendants from
enforcing the terms of that stalking order. 	As defendants,
Maravelias has named the state court judge who entered the
stalking order, and various people and organizations he fears
may enforce that order against him: the New Hampshire Attorney
General, the Rockingham County Attorney, the Town of Windham,
and the Windham Police Department.
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Defendants move to dismiss Maravelias’s amended complaint
asserting, among other things, that this court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction to entertain his claims under the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine. 	Maravelias objects. 	For the reasons
discussed, defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted and the
case is dismissed.
Background
This case has been extensively litigated over the years and
the relevant factual background has been set forth at length in
earlier judicial opinions. 	See, e.g., DePamphilis v.
Maravelias, No. 2018-0483 (N.H. Jan. 16, 2019) (document no. 26-
1). 	See also DePamphilis v. Maravelias, 2017 WL 3468651 (N.H.
July 28, 2017). 	That background need not be recounted in detail
here. 	It is sufficient to note that those opinions describe a
history of disturbing behavior by Maravelias, stemming from his
years-long obsession with a young woman named Christina, who is
significantly younger than he - an obsession that began when
Christina was only 11 years old. 1
1 	At a hearing before the state circuit court, Maravelias
revealed that he still possesses photographs and at least one
video of Christina from when she was only 12 years old (in fact,
he introduced them as exhibits to prove his claim that, even at
that young age, Christina was “flirtatious” with him and dressed
in a manner he described as “scantily clad.”) 	See DePamphilis
v. Maravelias, No. 2018-0483, slip op. at 6 (N.H. Jan. 16,
2019).
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Maravelias’s obsession with Christina has not abated over
the years and has been punctuated by events that include, for
example, his attempt to give Christina a new Maserati sports car
when she was a sophomore in high school - an offer that was
rejected in unambiguous terms. 	Subsequently, Maravelias either
wrote or, as he claims, merely “aided the composition” of, an
“anonymous” letter that was sent to Christina. 	The New
Hampshire Supreme Court described that letter as containing
“graphic allegations concerning sexual behavior” and what can
best be described as ranting, abusive, and vulgar language
attacking Christina, her mother, and her father. 	See
DePamphilis v. Maravelias, No. 2018-0483, slip op. at 4 (N.H.
Jan. 16, 2019). 	More recently, Maravelias sent an email to four
teachers at Christina’s high school, demanding that she be
removed from the school’s chapter of the National Honor Society
and accusing Christina of various criminal and anti-social
behaviors. 	It is sufficient to note that Christina has a well-
founded fear for her personal safety. 	Indeed, she testified
that she was afraid that Maravelias’s fixation on her had turned
“from a love obsession to now a hate obsession.” 	DePamphilis v.
Maravelias, No. 2018-0483, slip op. at 6 (N.H. Jan. 16, 2019).
By January of 2018, Maravelias was already subject to a
civil stalking order that had been issued by the New Hampshire
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Circuit Court, pursuant to N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. (“RSA”) 633:3-a.
That order prevented Maravelias from, among other things, having
any contact with Christina. 	Maravelias challenged that order
when it was first issued (resulting in an appeal that was denied
on the merits by the New Hampshire Supreme Court) and he pushed
the restrictions embodied in that order to their very limits.
On January 5, 2018, Christina moved the state court to extend
the stalking order for another year. 	Following a three-day
evidentiary hearing (at which Maravelias appeared, pro se, and
extensively cross-examined Christina), the court granted
Christina’s motion and extended the protective order.
Maravelias again pushed the limits of that order, prompting
Christina to petition the court to modify it by imposing greater
limitations on Maravelias (including restrictions that prevent
him from accessing, possessing, and disseminating materials from
Christina’s social media accounts). 	Maravelias objected,
asserting numerous claims, including: (1) that the proposed
restrictions would violate his free speech rights under the
state and federal constitutions; (2) that the modification was
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; and, (3) if entered, the
modified stalking order would deny him due process. 2
2 	Maravelias also raised what might fairly be viewed as a
threat against the judge, asserting that the judge “would incur
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The court (Coughlin, J. - a named defendant in this
litigation) rejected Maravelias’s arguments and, on August 7,
2018, granted Christina’s request to modify the stalking order.
That order (the “Modified Stalking Order”) is the subject of
this litigation.
Maravelias appealed the Modified Stalking Order to the New
Hampshire Supreme Court, where he challenged the substance,
scope, and constitutionality of the order itself, as well as the
constitutionality of the statute under which it had been issued
(RSA 633:3-a). 	His various claims were extensively briefed, in
both his original appellate brief and his reply brief. 	In a
lengthy order dated January 16, 2019, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court rejected Maravelias’s legal arguments and affirmed both
the trial court’s extension of the pre-existing stalking order,
as well as its subsequent decision to enter the Modified
Stalking Order. 	DePamphilis v. Maravelias, No. 2018-0483 (N.H.
Jan. 16, 2019).
It does not appear that Maravelias filed a petition seeking
certiorari review in the United States Supreme Court. 	Instead,
liability in federal - let alone state-level - lawsuits for
damages on the grounds of willful, reckless First Amendment
transgression.” 	Objection to Modified Stalking Order (document
no. 22-2) at para. 21. 	See also id. at paras. 22 and 41.
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it would seem, he proceeded directly to this court, raising
essentially the same claims he pressed in state court and
seeking a judicial declaration that the Modified Stalking Order:
(1) violates his free speech rights, as guaranteed by both the
state and federal constitutions; (2) violates both his
procedural and substantive due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment; (3) violates his equal protection rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment; (4) violates the Ex Post Facto
clause of the Constitution; and (5) exceeds the statutory
authority vested in state courts by RSA 633:3-a. 	Also, in an
apparent attempt to avoid the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
Maravelias’s amended complaint includes a request that the court
declare RSA 633:3-a both unconstitutionally broad and
unconstitutionally vague on its face. 	Finally, as noted above,
he seeks an injunction preventing any of the named defendants
from enforcing the terms of the Modified Stalking Order against
him.
Discussion
While each of Maravelias’s claims appears to be frivolous,
meritless, and misguided, this court lacks jurisdiction to
address them on the merits, given the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Generally speaking, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents a
losing party in state court - like Maravelias - from seeking
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subsequent federal court review of that state court judgment by
asserting that the state court judgment violated the loser’s
federally-protected rights. 	See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals
v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983). 	See also Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)
(“The Rooker–Feldman doctrine, we hold today, is confined to
cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name:
cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district
court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review
and rejection of those judgments.”). 	Review of such state-court
judgments can only be obtained in the United States Supreme
Court. 	See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476. 	See generally 28 U.S.C. §
1257. 3
Here, the thrust of Maravelias’s lawsuit is undeniably an
effort to invalidate the Modified Stalking Order that was upheld
by the state supreme court before Maravelias instituted this
action. 	Indeed, his prayer for relief makes that abundantly
clear: he seeks a judicial declaration that the Modified
3 	Congress may, of course, vest federal district courts with
appellate jurisdiction over certain state-court judgments, as it
has done in the case of habeas corpus petitions. 	See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(a). 	This is not such a case.
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Stalking Order is invalid and unconstitutional, and he also
seeks an injunction preventing any of the named defendants from
enforcing its terms against him. 	Under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, this court plainly lacks subject matter jurisdiction
to entertain those claims, since doing so would necessarily
involve a review of the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s judgment
upholding the validity and enforceability of both the extended
stalking order and the Modified Stalking Order. 	See generally
Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. 280; Sinapi v. R.I. Bd. of Bar
Examiners, 910 F.3d 544, 549 (1st Cir. 2018); Klimowicz v.
Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 907 F.3d 61, 64-65 (1st Cir. 2018);
McKenna v. Curtin, 869 F.3d 44, 47-48 (1st Cir. 2017); Miller v.
Nichols, 586 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir. 2009).
It should be noted that Maravelias’s efforts to circumvent
the jurisdictional bar imposed by Rooker-Feldman - that is, by
bringing a constitutional challenge to the facial validity of
RSA 633:3-a (the state statute that authorizes the entry of
stalking orders) - is unavailing. 	See, e.g., Tyler v. Supreme
Judicial Court of Mass., 914 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2019). 	In Tyler,
as in this case, the losing state court litigant did not file a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. 	Instead, like
Maravelias, she brought an action in federal district court
asserting that a recent decision by the Massachusetts Supreme
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Judicial Court (in a case to which she was a party) had violated
her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 	The Court of
Appeals noted that, “[t]he record makes plain that Tyler came to
federal court seeking an end-run around the SJC’s 2017 decision.
. . . And the complaint does indeed request that the district
court ‘declare the Supreme Judicial Court’s decision
unconstitutional.’ 	The complaint also repeatedly identifies the
SJC’s 2017 decision as the exclusive cause of Tyler’s injury.”
Id. at 50. 	The court concluded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
precluded the district court from exercising subject matter
jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims.
Moreover, and more to the point, the court held that the
plaintiff’s alternative argument (one also advanced by
Maravelias) - that she was not seeking a reversal of the state-
court judgment, but rather presenting an independent, general
challenge to the constitutionality of state law - was
insufficient to avoid Rooker-Feldman’s bar to the exercise of
subject matter jurisdiction.
It is true that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not
bar a general attack on the constitutionality of a
state law that does not require review of a judicial
decision in a particular case. 	If a federal plaintiff
“presents an independent claim,” it is not an
impediment to the exercise of federal jurisdiction
that the same or a related question was earlier aired
between the parties in state court. 	But that
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exception does not apply if the relief sought in
federal court is directed towards undoing the prior
state judgment. 	As we have explained, the relief
Tyler seeks is entirely predicated on her insistence
that the SJC erred in the 2017 adjudication of her
case. 	Her attempt to reframe the case as an
independent challenge to the Massachusetts law is
therefore felled by her own complaint.
Tyler v. Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 914 F.3d 47,
51–52 (1st Cir. 2019) (emphasis supplied) (citations and
internal punctuation omitted). 	So it is in this case with
respect to Maravelias’s efforts to vacate the Modified Stalking
Order by undermining the validity of its statutory source, RSA
633:3-a.
And, finally, the court notes that Maravelias’s efforts to
demonstrate that Rooker-Feldman does not apply because the
stalking order remains subject to renewal and, therefore, there
has been no “final judgment” in the case, are equally
unpersuasive and meritless. 	See, e.g., Tyler, 914 F.3d at 52
(rejecting plaintiff’s claims that the state court proceedings
had not yet ended and could, at least in theory, continue for
another 10 years). 	Here, as in Tyler, there is no suggestion
that the state courts will again consider the federal questions
presented by the Modified Stalking Order. 	The New Hampshire
Supreme Court’s affirmance of the trial court’s decision to
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enter the Modified Stalking Order was final and Maravelias’s
constitutional challenges to that order will not be revisited.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in
the legal memoranda submitted by defendants, it is plain that
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes this court from exercising
subject matter jurisdiction over Maravelias’s claims. 4
Accordingly, defendants' motions to dismiss (documents no. 24,
26, 27, and 28) are granted. 	Those motions to dismiss filed
prior to plaintiff’s submission of his amended complaint
(documents no. 10, 11, 12, and 18) are denied as moot.
The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in accordance with
this order and close the case.
4 	It is equally plain that a number (if not all) of
Maravelias’s claims, were they addressed on the merits, would be
barred by res judicata, by virtue of the state supreme court’s
final judgment in his appeal related to the Modified Stalking
Order. 	DePamphilis v. Maravelias, No. 2018-0483 (N.H. Jan. 16,
2019). 	And, of course, Judge Coughlin is entitled to the
protections afforded by judicial immunity. 	See generally Zenon
v. Guzman, 924 F.3d 611, 616–17 (1st Cir. 2019) (providing what
the court called a “primer on judicial immunity”).
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SO ORDERED.
____________________________
Steven J. McAuliffe
United States District Judge
November 4, 2019
cc: 	Paul Maravelias, pro se
Nancy J. Smith, Esq.
Anthony Galdieri, Esq.
Samuel R.V. Garland, Esq.
Christopher Cole, Esq.
Eric Alexander Maher, Esq.
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