Coleman v. State of New Hampshire

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Richard Coleman
v. 	Civil No. 16-cv-498-LM
State of New Hampshire, et al.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pro se plaintiff Richard Coleman moves to amend his
complaint to include claims against defendant Thomas Dronsfield
for fraud, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, false
arrest, and violations of his Fourth Amendment right to privacy.
Doc. no. 61. 	Dronsfield objects to that motion, arguing that
the proposed amendments are barred by the law of the case
doctrine or, alternatively, by the relevant statutes of
limitations. 	Doc. no. 65. 	Coleman moves to dismiss
Dronsfield’s objection. 	Doc. no. 71. 	Both motions have been
referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for report and
recommendation. 	For the reasons that follow, the district judge
should deny Coleman’s motion to amend and, to the extent that
recommendation is adopted, deny Coleman’s motion to dismiss
Dronsfield’s objection as moot.
“[L]eave to amend should be ‘freely given’ in circumstances
in which ‘justice so requires.’” 	Calderon-Serra v. Wilmington
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Trust Co., 715 F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 2013) (brackets omitted)
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2)). 	This does not mean,
however, that “‘a trial court must mindlessly grant every
request for leave to amend.’” 	Id. (quoting Aponte–Torres v.
Univ. of P.R., 445 F.3d 50, 58 (1st Cir. 2006)). 	A court may
deny a motion to amend “when the request is characterized by
‘undue delay, bad faith, futility, or the absence of due
diligence on the movant’s part.’” 	Id. (brackets and ellipsis
omitted) (quoting Palmer v. Champion Mortg., 465 F.3d 24, 30
(1st Cir. 2006)). 	A request can similarly be denied if the
proposed amendment “‘would serve no useful purpose.’” 	Id.
(quoting Aponte–Torres, 445 F.3d at 58).
The court turns first to Coleman’s request to amend his
complaint to include malicious prosecution claims against
Dronsfield. 	Coleman currently has Fourth Amendment and state-
law malicious prosecution claims pending against Dronsfield as
part of this action. 	Those claims survived preliminary review,
see doc. no. 19 at 10, and Dronsfield’s subsequent motion to
dismiss, see doc. no. 44, based on the allegations in the
complaint. 	Coleman’s motion merely rehashes, oftentimes
verbatim, those same allegations. 	Compare doc. no. 61 with doc.
no. 9. 	Thus, allowing Coleman to amend his complaint to state
malicious prosecution claims “would serve no useful purpose,” as
the same claims, based on the same facts, are already pending in
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this matter.
Coleman also seeks to amend his complaint to allege claims
against Dronsfield for fraud, false imprisonment, false arrest,
and violations of his Fourth Amendment right to privacy.
Coleman alleged similar, if not identical, claims against
Dronsfield as part of his original complaint. 	Upon preliminary
review, the court determined that those claims were barred by
the three-year statute of limitations applicable under both 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and New Hampshire Revised Statute Annotated §
508:4, as they were based on events that occurred on or about
March 10, 2012, and Coleman did not bring this action until
February 1, 2016. 	See doc. no. 19 at 6-7.1 	To the extent the
claims in Coleman’s motion to amend are not mere restatements of
those previous claims, they are likewise barred by the statute
of limitations, as each is again based on events occurring on or
around March 10, 2012, and none was brought within three years
of that date. 	It would therefore be futile to allow these
claims to proceed. 	See id. (discussing in greater detail the
statute of limitations issue).
Because Coleman’s motion to dismiss Dronsfield’s objection
merely counters arguments raised in that objection, the court
1 The court recommended that the district judge dismiss
those claims as untimely, doc. no. 19 at 8, and the district
judge approved that recommendation over Coleman’s objection, see
doc. no. 25.
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recommends that it be denied as moot should the district judge
deny the motion to amend. 	The court nevertheless briefly
addresses one argument raised in that motion. 	Coleman argues
that his fraud, false imprisonment, false arrest, and Fourth
Amendment privacy claims are not barred by the three-year
limitations periods because they did not become ripe until
January 16, 2015, when the criminal charges against him were
dropped. 	In making this argument, Coleman overlooks a key
distinction between these claims and his malicious prosecution
claims. 	Because malicious prosecution requires proof that a
criminal proceeding terminated in the plaintiff’s favor, see
Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91, 101 (1st Cir. 2013);
Ojo v. Lorenzo, 164 N.H. 717, 727 (2013), the limitations period
for Coleman’s malicious prosecution claims here did not begin to
run until the charges against him were dropped. 	In contrast,
the limitations periods began to run on Coleman’s other claims
when he knew or had reason to know of the injury on which those
claims were based. 	See April 18, 2017 Report and Recommendation
(doc. no. 19) at 6-8. 	As all of those claims relate to events
occurring on or around March 10, 2012, the limitations periods
began to run no later than that date. 	See id. 	Thus, as
discussed, those claims are untimely.2
2 Coleman also suggests in his motion to dismiss
Dronsfield’s objection that he wishes to “delete” Natasha
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For the foregoing reasons, the court recommends that the
district judge deny Coleman’s motion to amend. 	Doc. no. 61.
Should this recommendation be approved, the court further
recommends that Coleman’s motion to dismiss Dronsfield’s
objection to the motion to amend (doc. no. 71) be denied as
moot. 	Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be
filed within fourteen days of receipt of this notice. 	See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). 	The fourteen-day period may be extended
upon motion. 	Failure to file specific written objections to the
Report and Recommendation within the specified time waives the
right to appeal the district court’s order. 	See Santos-Santos
v. Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(2).
__________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
April 3, 2018
cc: 	Richard Coleman, pro se
Charles P. Bauer, Esq.
Matthew Vernon Burrows, Esq.
Cormier as a defendant in this case. 	See doc. no. 71 ¶ 16. 	It
is unclear what specific relief Coleman seeks with respect to
Cormier. 	To the extent Coleman wishes to have default judgment
entered against Cormier, the court reiterates that this matter
will not be taken up until the claims against Dronsfield have
been resolved. 	See doc. no. 54; doc. no. 60. 	If Coleman now
wishes to voluntarily dismiss Cormier from this action, he may
seek to do so consistent with the requirements of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 41.
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