Rogers v. NH Circuit Court, 4th Circuit, Family Division-Laconia et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Kevin J. Rogers
v. Civil No. 16-cv-107-JL
New Hampshire Circuit Court,
4th Circuit, Family Division-Laconia;
Chief Judge Kevin Gordon;
Court Clerk Michelle Brown; and
Presiding Judge Michael Garner
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pro se plaintiff, Kevin J. Rogers, has filed a complaint,
entitled “Verified Complaint for an Ex-Parte Temporary
Restraining Order” (doc. no. 1). That complaint is before the
court for preliminary review pursuant to LR 4.3(d)(2) and 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The request for a preliminary injunction
set forth in that filing was previously denied. See Mar. 22,
2016, Order (doc. no. 3).
Preliminary Review Standard
The magistrate judge in this court conducts a preliminary
review of complaints filed in forma pauperis. See LR 4.3(d)(2).
The magistrate judge may recommend to the district judge that
claims be dismissed if, among other things, the court lacks
jurisdiction, a defendant is immune from the relief sought, or
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the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In conducting its
preliminary review, the court construes pro se complaints
liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per
curiam). The complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief.’” See Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted).
Background
This case arises out of a contested divorce proceeding,
Case No. 650-2015-DM-0195 (N.H. Cir. Ct., 4th Cir., Family Div.-
Laconia) (“divorce case”). Plaintiff asserts that his wife did
not correctly serve the divorce petition upon him in that case,
and that scheduling orders and other orders adverse to his
interests in the divorce case have violated his due process
rights and his rights under Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Plaintiff has requested only
injunctive relief in this case.
Plaintiff’s ADA Title II and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims are
based on plaintiff’s assertions that, because of his frequent
hospitalizations and medical appointments, heart problems, and
bronchiectasis, he was unable to keep up with discovery requests
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and motion practice in the divorce case, and could not conduct
sufficient discovery to establish his own claims and defenses,
prior to the hearing that was scheduled for March 23, 2016.
Plaintiff further asserts that the family court judge appears to
have been biased against him, and denied the extensions of time
Rogers requested. Rogers asserts that he intends to appeal
rulings in that case to the New Hampshire Supreme Court, but
believes that the procedural requirements for such appeals are
onerous, and that the state appellate process will not prevent
irreparable harm.
The docket in Rogers’s divorce case indicates that counsel
appeared on Rogers’s behalf in a hearing that was held on March
23, 2016. The March 23 proceeding was not the last evidentiary
hearing in that case; a final hearing in that matter was
scheduled for May 5, 2016. Following the May 5 hearing, the
family court issued an interim order. As of May 24, 2016, the
divorce case remained pending in the state court.
Discussion
I. Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
A. Claims against Judges
Rogers’s claims concerning violations of his Fourteenth
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Amendment rights in the divorce case are construed as intending
to state claims against the presiding judge in the divorce case
and the Chief Judge of the court in which that case is being
litigated, for injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Section 1983 bars claims for injunctive relief asserted against
judges for actions taken in their judicial capacity, “unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Adames v. Fagundo, 198
F. App’x 20, 22 (1st Cir. 2006). Rogers has not shown that any
declaratory decree has been violated, or that declaratory relief
is unavailable. Accordingly, Rogers’s injunctive relief claims
asserted under § 1983 against the judges should be dismissed.1
B. Eleventh Amendment
Rogers has named the New Hampshire Circuit Court, 4th
1Rogers has not asserted a § 1983 claim for damages against
the judges he has named as defendants. Nor could he, based on
the allegations at issue. Absolute immunity, precluding a suit
at the outset, applies to “any normal and routine judicial act”
undertaken within the scope of the judge’s jurisdiction, “no
matter how erroneous the act may have been, how injurious its
consequences, how informal the proceeding, or how malicious the
motive.” Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1989); see
also Slotnick v. Garfinkle, 632 F.2d 163, 166 (1st Cir. 1980)
(court clerk entitled to absolute immunity, derivative of judge’s
immunity, where clerk is alleged to be liable for carrying out
judge’s directives); Atherton v. D.C. Office of Mayor, 567 F.3d
672, 682 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (absolute immunity applied to court
clerk “accused of issuing a false order against a pro se
plaintiff barring his access to the court” (citation omitted)).
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Circuit, Family Division-Laconia, as a defendant. That court is
an agency of the State judiciary, and is immune from suit under
§ 1983, brought by private parties in federal court. See
Stegeman v. Georgia, 290 F. App’x 320, 322-23 & n.4 (11th Cir.
2008). Accordingly, Rogers’s claims asserted under § 1983
against the state court should be dismissed.
II. Younger Abstention
Under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971),
federal courts are required to abstain from enjoining
ongoing state court proceedings absent extraordinary
circumstances. . . . Under Younger, a federal court must
abstain “if (1) there is an ongoing state judicial
proceeding involving the federal plaintiff that (2)
implicates [certain] important state interests and (3)
provides an adequate opportunity for the federal plaintiff
to assert his federal claims.”
Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Medley, 572 F.3d 22, 26 (1st
Cir. 2009) (citations omitted); see also Sprint Commc’ns, Inc.
v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 591 (2013) (Younger may apply in
“‘civil proceedings involving certain orders . . . uniquely in
furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their
judicial functions’” (citation omitted)). When Younger applies,
abstention is mandatory, and the federal court is deprived of
any discretion to grant injunctive relief. See Colo. River
Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 816 n.22
(1976).
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The Younger abstention doctrine applies here, as the relief
plaintiff seeks is an injunction directing the state court to
alter the schedule of that case, including hearings, filing
deadlines, and discovery deadlines. See Sobel v. Prudenti, 25
F. Supp. 3d 340, 355 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (court abstained under
Younger in case in which parent claimed that rulings in state
child support case violated her rights under ADA Title II and
due process); Braverman v. New Mexico, No. CIV. 11-0829 JB/WDS,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155677, at *93, 2012 WL 5378292, at *26
(D.N.M. Sept. 30, 2012) (court abstained under Younger where
plaintiff filed federal lawsuit to obtain damages and injunctive
relief against judge, special master, and state court in ongoing
divorce proceeding, based on allegations that defendants had
violated ADA Title II and her rights to due process in divorce
proceeding). Rogers’s request for injunctive relief would
target, and substantially interfere with, the procedures
established by the family court for disposing of matters before
it, implicating important state interests in domestic relations
and the division of property between the parties in a divorce
proceeding. Plaintiff has an adequate opportunity in that case
to raise his federal constitutional claims of discrimination
and/or due process violations, and he can appeal adverse orders
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to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. Furthermore, Rogers has not
shown an inability to raise the ADA Title II issues presented
here, and request the accommodations sought here, in the state
proceedings, where the requested accommodation is in the nature
of a motion to alter the timing of discovery and the schedule of
trial proceedings.
The family court has inherent power to control its
proceedings and to issue orders for the purpose of ensuring that
all parties have a full and fair opportunity to advance claims
and defenses. See In re O’Neil, 159 N.H. 615, 622, 992 A.2d
672, 677 (2010). Such inherent authority of the judiciary
logically includes the capacity to make rulings regarding the
case schedule that may be necessary to ensure a party’s full
participation, despite health issues or a disability. Rogers
can appeal adverse orders relating to the case schedule to the
New Hampshire Supreme Court, and he may litigate ADA claims in
the state courts. Rogers has failed to make a sufficient
showing of bad faith or other extraordinary circumstances that
would warrant this court’s exercise of its equitable powers in a
manner that would alter the orders issued in that case.
Because all three Younger factors are present in the
instant case, this court’s abstention is mandatory. Rogers’s
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claims for injunctive relief, seeking to stay or otherwise
enjoin the family court’s disposition of the divorce case,
should be dismissed.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district judge should
dismiss this action in its entirety. Any objections to this
Report and Recommendation must be filed within fourteen days of
receipt of this notice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure
to file objections within the specified time waives the right to
appeal the district court’s order. See Garayalde-Rijos v. Mun.
of Carolina, 747 F.3d 15, 21-22 (1st Cir. 2014).
__________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
June 3, 2016
cc: Kevin J. Rogers, pro se
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