Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
CAMILA FORY MINA,
Petitioner,
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official
capacity as President of the United States;
KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity as
Secretary of the United States Department of
Homeland Security; ALLEN GILL, in his
official capacity as Field Office Director of
Omaha office of United States Immigration
and Customs Enforcement; PAMELA
BONDI, in her official capacity as Attorney
General of the United States; TODD M.
LYONS, in his official capacity as Acting
Director of the United States Immigration
and Customs Enforcement; PETER BERG,
in his official capacity as St. Paul Field
Office Director for Enforcement and
Removal Operations, United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and
ROBERT SORENSON, in his official
capacity as Cass County Sheriff, Official of
the Cass County Detention Center,
Respondents.
8:25CV583
MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER
On September 24, 2025, petitioner Camila Fory Mina (“Mina”) filed a Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Filing No. 1) against Donald J. Trump, in
his official capacity as President of the United States; Kristi Noem, in her official capacity
as Secretary of the United States Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”); Allen Gill,
in his official capacity as Omaha Field Office Director of United States Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“USCIS”); Pamela Bondi, in her official capacity as Attorney
General of the United States; Todd M. Lyons, in his official capacity as Acting Director of
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United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”); Peter Berg, in his official
capacity as the St. Paul Field Office Director for Enforcement and Removal Operations for
ICE (together, the “federal respondents”); and Robert Sorenson 	(“Sorenson”), 	in his
official capacity as Sheriff of Cass County, Nebraska, and Official of the Cass County
Detention Center1 (together, “respondents”).
That same day, the Court issued an order for respondents to show cause why the
petition should 	not be granted (Filing 	No. 4). 	After the Court granted the federal
respondents’ unopposed motion for an extension of time to file a responsive pleading
(Filing No. 13), they responded on October 10, 2025 (Filing No. 20). 	Mina replied on
October 16, 2025 (Filing No. 23). The Court held a hearing on November 4, 2025 (Filing
No. 27) with counsel for Mina and the federal respondents present. 	For the reasons that
follow, Mina’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.
I. 	BACKGROUND2
This case has a tortured procedural history. The parties also disagree on some basic
facts which hinders the Court’s ability to navigate that history and decide the important
issues raised by Mina’s petition. Mina is a native and citizen of Colombia who entered the
1 Sorenson, who has not entered an appearance in this case, is the Sheriff of Cass
County, Nebraska. 	The Cass County Sheriff’s Office and Cass County Jail are within the
geographical boundaries of the District of Nebraska. The Court assumes Mina is detained
at the Cass County Jail and that Sorenson is the actual custodian, while DHS and ICE have
legal custody of Mina. 	As the party alleged to have physical custody of Mina, the Court
would expect him to play a role in her § 2241 petition, but the parties don’t discuss him
outside of naming him in the initial petition. 	Nor have they indicated that Sorenson has
been served. And since Sorenson has not been served, the Court “may not exercise power
over [him.]” 	Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999); see
id. at 347 (noting it is a “bedrock principle” 	that “an individual or entity named as a
defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought
under a court’s authority, by formal process”).
2 The background facts are taken from the parties’ statements of fact and Mina’s
immigration paperwork that the parties have submitted.
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United States on August 1, 2022.3 	According to Mina’s DHS “Form I-213, Record of
Deportable/Inadmissible 	Alien,” she was arrested upon crossing the border near Eagle
Pass, Texas (Filing No. 22-1). 	She was processed for expedited removal with a positive
credible-fear determination and released from custody on “Interim Parole” on August 11,
2022 (Filing No. 22-1). 	On October 26, 2022, DHS mailed a Notice to Appear (“NTA”)
to her residence in Des Moines, Iowa, ordering Mina to appear before an Immigration
Judge (“IJ”) with the Department of Justice’s Executive Office for Immigration Review
(“EOIR”) in Omaha, Nebraska on July 24, 2024 (Filing No. 1-7). 	The NTA classified
Mina as “an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled,” and
charged her as removable under Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952 (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and INA § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) (Filing No. 1-7).
On August 4, 2023, while her removal proceedings were pending, Mina filed a
“Form I-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal” (“asylum claim”).
She then appeared pro se before an IJ at the Omaha EOIR on May 29, 2025. Because Mina
had been present in the United States for less than two years before being determined to be
inadmissible, 	DHS moved to dismiss 	the NTA to place Mina 	in expedited removal
proceedings (Filing Nos. 20, 22). 	Mina opposed dismissal, as she wanted to continue
pursuing her defensive asylum claim. 	The IJ granted DHS’s motion to dismiss the NTA
3 The record is not clear on whether Mina entered without inspection or at a port of
entry. 	At the hearing, Mina’s counsel contended, without support, that Mina entered
through a port of entry and was released into the country on an order of supervision. Mina’s
petition (Filing No. 1) is consistent with this version, stating that she “was released on her
own recognizance, not paroled” into the United States. However, counsel for the federal
respondents stated at the hearing that Mina was not inspected by an immigration officer
upon entering the United States and was not admitted or paroled into the country. 	Her
immigration paperwork is somewhat ambiguous on this point. 	Both Notices to Appear
from DHS state “[y]ou are an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted
or paroled” and that Mina entered the United States “at an unknown location,” (Filing
Nos. 1-4, 1-7), before being granted “Interim Parole” (Filing No. 22-1).
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and Mina appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) (Filing Nos. 20, 23).
That appeal is still pending.
That same day, DHS took Mina into custody as an “applicant for admission” under
INA § 235(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). 	She remains in custody to this day. 	This is
relevant because aliens detained under § 1225(b)(2) must remain in custody throughout
their removal proceedings 	and are not entitled to a bond hearing. 	See Jennings 	v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 297 (2018) (noting that § 1225(b)(1) and (2) “mandate detention
of applicants for admission until certain proceedings have concluded”).
With Mina’s appeal still pending, DHS initiated the expedited removal process by
first referring Mina to an USCIS asylum officer for another credible-fear determination in
accordance with § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) 	(Filing No. 22). 	USCIS again found Mina had a
credible fear of persecution and DHS issued a second NTA on June 28, 2025, with charges
identical to the first NTA (Filing No. 22-3, Ex. C).
The parties appeared at a master-calendar hearing on August 20, 2025, before the
IJ. At that hearing, the IJ (1) found that the second NTA should have been rejected “due
to the previous NTA being on appeal” and (2) granted DHS’s motion to dismiss the second
NTA (Filing Nos. 1-2). 	As a result, Mina asserts she has no active case before the IJ and
no hearings scheduled until the BIA resolves her appeal of the NTA dismissal. 	Thus,
Mina’s ability to present her defensive asylum claim is paused as well. 	The federal
respondents do not dispute this, and a quick search of Mina’s “Alien Registration Number”
in EOIR’s database confirms that she does not have a pending case or any upcoming
hearings.
At that same 	hearing, 	Mina 	requested 	a bond-redetermination 	hearing 	under
§ 236(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), despite being held under § 1225(b)(2). 	Section
1226(a) applies to aliens who are “arrested and detained” on “a warrant issued by the
Attorney General” for removal. 	Unlike with § 1225(b), an alien held under § 1226(a) can
seek release on bond. See id. § 1226(a)(2)(A) (providing that an alien arrested and detained
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on a warrant by the Attorney General may be released on “bond of at least $1,500” and
“conditions prescribed by” the Attorney General).
After considering the parties’ arguments and reviewing the record, the IJ found “no
factors that [releasing Mina] could lead to a danger to the community” and noted Mina
“has no criminal history” (Filing 	No. 1-2). 	The IJ further found that although Mina
presented a moderate flight risk since she has only been in the country since 2022, she “has
some family” in the United States, “has appeared in Court,” and “has elicited fear of return
to Colombia.” 	The IJ granted Mina a $6,000 bond to compensate for the flight-risk
concerns.
This determination was made over DHS’s objection that § 1225(b)(2) applied to
Mina and deprived the IJ of jurisdiction to consider a bond. 	DHS immediately appealed
the IJ’s decision to the BIA, which, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2), 	triggered an
automatic stay of the IJ’s bond order. DHS filed its formal notice of appeal with the BIA
on August 28, 2025. 	See id. (providing that in bond determinations pursuant to § 1226,
where the IJ “authoriz[es] release (on bond or otherwise)” but “DHS has determined that
[the] alien should not be released,” the IJ’s order “shall be stayed upon DHS’s filing of a
notice of intent to appeal”).
Mina remains detained under the automatic stay of the IJ’s bond order, which should
expire after 90 days. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(c)(4). 	It is undisputed, however, that there are
numerous ways Mina’s detention can be extended through various regulations providing
for discretionary stays. 	And given the BIA’s precedential decision in Matter of Yajure
Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025) (holding that IJs lack authority to hear bond
requests or to grant bond to aliens like Mina who are present in the United States without
admission), DHS will very likely prevail on its appeal of the bond order, meaning Mina
will then be detained under § 1225(b).
On September 24, 2025, Mina filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. 	§ 2241 	with this 	Court, arguing 	that her 	detention became 	unlawful on
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August 20, 2025, when the automatic-stay regulation halted the IJ’s bond order. 	She
specifically argues that her continued detention is unlawful because (1) DHS’s invocation
of the automatic-stay regulation violates her due-process rights under the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution; (2) she should not be subject to mandatory detention
under § 1225(b)(2); and (3) the automatic-stay regulation exceeds the authority given to
the Attorney General by Congress and eliminates IJs’ discretionary authority to make
custody determinations.
II. 	DISCUSSION
Absent suspension, “the writ of habeas corpus remains available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing
U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, cl. 2). Under § 2241, the writ is extended to persons “in custody in
violation 	of 	the Constitution 	or 	laws 	or treaties 	of the 	United States.” 	8 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3). 	The Court’s habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration-related
detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,
473, 483 (2004).
Here, Mina alleges she is detained in violation of the statutory scheme set forth in
§§ 1225 and 1226, as well as in violation 	of her 	due-process-rights 	under the Fifth
Amendment. 	Mina is physically 	detained within the geographical boundaries of this
district and the federal respondents do not dispute that this Court possesses 	habeas
jurisdiction.
A. 	Classification under §§ 1225 and 1226
Judges in this district, like many others around the country, have already wrestled
with the underlying statutory framework of this case and reached different conclusions.
Compare Carlon v. Kramer, No. 4:25CV3178, 2025 WL 2624386, at *1-2 (D. Neb.
Sept. 11, 2025); Arce v. Trump, No. 8:25CV520, 2025 WL 2675934, at *1 (D. Neb.
Sept. 18, 2025); and Giron Reyes v. Lyons, No. C25-4048-LTS-MAR, 2025 WL 2712427,
at *1-2 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 23, 2025); with Vargas Lopez v. Trump, No. 8:25CV526, 2025
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WL 2780351, at *5-6 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 2025); and Barrios Sandoval v. Acuna, No. 6:25-
cv-01467, 2025 WL 3048926, at *2-4 (W.D. La. Oct. 31, 2025). Section 1225(b) governs
the “inspection of applications for admission.” 	Congress has defined an applicant for
admission as “[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who
arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including an
alien who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in international or
United States waters).” 	8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). 	Despite the lack of clarity around Mina’s
arrival to the United States and the basis for her interim parole, the parties agree that Mina
was not admitted to the United States. She therefore fits squarely within the definition of
an “applicant for admission.” 	See id.
Under § 1225(b)(2), an “applicant for admission” who is “seeking admission” must
be detained pending a removal proceeding without bond. See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287-88.
By contrast, aliens detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) may be given an individualized bond
assessment. 	Id. at 288.
As noted above, if the IJ decides to authorize bond, that decision may be temporarily
stayed if DHS appeals the bond order. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2). 	That regulation provides
as follows:
In any case in which DHS has determined that an alien should not be released
or has set a bond of $10,000 or more, any order of the immigration judge
authorizing release (on bond or otherwise) shall be stayed upon DHS’s filing
of a notice of intent to appeal the custody redetermination (Form EOIR-43)
with the immigration court within one business day of the order, and, except
as otherwise provided in 8 CFR 1003.6(c), shall remain in abeyance pending
decision of the appeal by the [BIA]. The decision whether or not to file Form
EOIR-43 is subject to the discretion of the Secretary [of DHS].
Id. The automatic stay will cease upon a decision of the BIA or 90 days, whichever comes
sooner. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(c)(4) (“If the [BIA] has not acted on the custody appeal, the
automatic stay shall lapse 90 days after the filing of the notice of appeal”).
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Although the automatic-stay regulation is the operative mechanism of her detention
pending DHS’s appeal of the bond order, the federal respondents argue that Mina’s
confinement is also statutorily authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) as an applicant for
admission. 	That 	provision 	requires 	detention 	throughout 	Mina’s 	entire 	removal
proceedings (Filing No. 20).
Mina responds that only § 1226(a) applies to her, not § 1225 (Filing No. 23). While
some courts have held that § 1225(b)(2) only “applies to aliens encountered as they are
attempting to enter the United States or shortly after they gained entry without inspection,”
Arce, No. 8:25CV520, 2025 WL 2675934, *3 n.3 (citing cases),4 others have concluded
that § 1225 can apply to aliens detained within the country if they were never admitted,
see, e.g., Barrios Sandoval, 2025 WL 3048926, at *2-4; Vargas Lopez, No. 8:25CV526,
2025 WL 2780351, at *5-6. 	And still others have found it is unnecessary to rule on the
proper interpretation of §§ 1225 and 1226 to consider an as-applied 	challenge 	to the
4 Some courts that have held that § 1225 cannot apply to aliens present in the country
have emphasized the term “arriving aliens” in the title of § 1225 and “seeking admission”
in § 1225(b)(2)(A). 	See, e.g., Orellana 	v. Noem, No. 4:25-CV-112-RGJ, 	2025 WL
3006763, at *3-4 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 27, 2025). 	They argue that it is “difficult to find that an
individual is ‘seeking admission’ when that noncitizen never attempted to do so.” Id. That
may be, but it ignores 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5), which provides that an alien present in the
country who was paroled after arrival is “returned to the custody from which [the alien]
was paroled” if the Secretary of DHS ends the parole. 	INA § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(5). Thereafter, the formerly paroled alien’s “case shall continue to be dealt with
in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission[.]” 	Id.; see also 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B) 	(describing 	“aliens 	paroled 	after 	arrival 	pursuant 	to 	section
212(d)(5)” of the INA as “arriving aliens”). 	The federal regulations also define “arriving
alien” as an applicant for admission “coming or attempting to come into the United States”
whether or not at a port of entry. 	8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(q). 	That definition further provides
that an alien “remains an arriving alien even if paroled pursuant to section 212(d)(5) of the
[INA], and even after any such parole is terminated or revoked.” 	Id. (emphasis added).
So, it is hard to say that applying the term “arriving alien” to an applicant for admission
paroled into the country is a novel interpretation of § 1225. See also Matter of Oseiwusu,
22 I&N Dec. 19, 20 (BIA 1998) (concluding that an alien paroled into the country is still
an “arriving alien” and that an IJ has “no authority over the apprehension, custody, and
detention of arriving aliens”). 	All that to say, the parties did not raise these specific
arguments, so the Court need not resolve them.
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automatic-stay regulation. 	See, e.g., Herrera v. Knight, 2025 WL 2581792, at *7 (D. Nev.
Sept. 5, 2025); Silva v. Larose, No. 25-cv-2329, 2025 WL 2770639, at *3 (S.D. Cal.
Sept. 29, 2025).
The federal respondents contend that Mina’s detention would be lawful under either
§§ 1226 or 1225. 	As they see it, under § 1225(b), the IJ does not have jurisdiction to
consider bond and Mina’s detention is mandatory. Under § 1226(a), DHS’s appeal of the
IJ’s bond determination stayed the bond order and Mina is detained pending the resolution
of that appeal.
Mina acknowledges that aliens detained under § 1225 are subject to mandatory
detention, so she focuses on § 1226. Thus, assuming, without deciding, that § 1226 applies
to Mina’s case, the Court will evaluate whether the automatic stay of the IJ’s bond order
under § 1226 violates Mina’s due-process rights under the Fifth Amendment. 	However,
even under her preferred section, Mina has not shown that her detention is unlawful at this
point.
B. 	Mina’s Procedural-Due-Process Claim
“[T]he 	Due Process 	Clause 	applies 	to all ‘persons’ 	within the United States,
including 	aliens, 	whether 	their 	presence 	here 	is 	lawful, 	unlawful, 	temporary, 	or
permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693; accord A.A.R.P. v. Trump, 605 U.S. 91, 94 (2025)
(“[T]he Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in the context of removal
proceedings.”) (quoting Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025) (per curiam)). 	While
certain constitutional protections do not extend outside the “geographic borders” of the
United States, “legal circumstances 	change” as soon as an alien “enters the country.”
Zadvydas, 553 U.S. at 693.
As a threshold issue, there is some ambiguity about the precise nature of Mina’s
due-process claim. 	Mina does not expressly state whether she is challenging the automatic
stay on substantive or procedural grounds—or both. 	She does argue, however, that
Mathews v. Eldrige, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), is the “appropriate test” to analyze her
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claim. 	Courts generally apply the three-part test in Mathews v. Eldridge to determine
whether a civil detention violates an individual’s procedural-due-process 	rights. 	Under
that test, the Court must consider (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the
government’s interest in maintaining the current process, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
Mina’s liberty interest in avoiding a prolonged detention is somewhat limited here
by her status as noncitizen. 	See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003) (noting
that Congress has broad powers in the immigration context and “regularly makes rules that
would be unacceptable if applied to citizens”); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305-306
(1993) (same); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) (same). 	Thus, although the
“Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings,”
Flores, 507 U.S. at 306, the Supreme Court has consistently “recognized detention during
deportation proceedings as a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process,”
Demore, 538 U.S. at 523.
Mina’s interest is also different than an alien who has been lawfully admitted to the
United States. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. “The distinction between an alien who has
effected an entry into the United States and one who has never entered runs throughout
immigration law.” Id. (citing Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 188-90 (1958) (noting
that an alien “paroled” into the United States pending admissibility had not effected an
“entry”)).
Mina has not provided, and the Court has not found, any case in which the Supreme
Court has applied 	Mathews v. Eldridge 	when addressing constitutional challenges 	to
immigration detention. See, e.g., Demore, 538 U.S. at 523, 526-29; see also Dusenbery v.
United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168 (2002) (“[W]e have never viewed Mathews as announcing
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an all-embracing test for deciding due process claims.”). 	And while the Eighth Circuit has
not weighed in on a due-process claim under § 1226(a), it has declined to apply Mathews
v. Eldridge balancing in mandatory detention cases, noting “Zadvydas and Demore have
already done whatever balancing is necessary.” 	Banyee v. Garland, 115 F.4th 928, 933
(8th Cir. 2024).
Despite the dearth of authority on this specific issue, most district courts that have
considered similar detention cases have done so under Mathews balancing, and Mina also
frames her case in those terms. Therefore, the Court will evaluate Mina’s procedural-due-
process claim under Mathews v. Eldridge with the immigration context in mind.
1. 	Private Interest
Mina argues that her private interest here is “fundamental: freedom from detention.”
She argues that she could “theoretically 	remain in custody indefinitely.” 	The federal
respondents emphasize the temporariness of Mina’s detention. 	They argue she is only
detained “as her process unfolds,” not indefinitely. 	Her removal case, they note, “will
resume upon resolution of the first BIA appeal[.]” 	In the government’s view, resolution is
“undoubtedly forthcoming.”
The Court does not doubt that Mina has a strong private interest in being free from
detention. However, at the time of this Memorandum and Order, Mina has been detained
under the automatic-stay provision for fewer than 90 days. The automatic-stay provision
has yet to lapse. While her argument may gain strength if her detention becomes indefinite
or unduly prolonged at some point down the line, she is not there yet.
2. 	Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
The second Mathews factor is “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [Mina’s]
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards.” 	Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Mina argues the automatic
stay carries a high risk of erroneously depriving her of her freedom because she “prevailed
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at her bond hearing” and the stay “is not based on any new evidence, a finding of legal
error, or a finding of likelihood of success on appeal.” 	In the federal respondents’ view,
DHS’s invocation of the stay is based on its belief that the IJ committed a legal error and
that DHS would likely succeed on appeal. See Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. at 216.
The 	Court 	cannot 	say 	at 	this 	point, 	that the 	automatic-stay 	regulation 	has
erroneously deprived Mina of her liberty and that “substitute procedural safeguards” are
needed. 	When Mina was detained, an ICE officer made an individualized 	custody
determination. 	Mina was given an NTA explaining the reasons for her detention. 	She
underwent 	a 	credible-fear 	interview. 	She 	was 	then 	able 	to 	request 	a 	custody
redetermination before an IJ at her August 20, 2025, master-calendar 	hearing. 	Mina
received that bond hearing, at which she was represented by counsel and could present
evidence that might bear on the IJ’s determination. 	Although the IJ’s discretionary bond
determination was stayed by DHS’s appeal, that appeal is pending before the BIA. Thus,
the probable value of additional procedurals safeguards is limited at this stage.
3. 	Government’s Interest
Mina argues that the government’s interest in detaining her under the automatic-
stay provision is “comparatively 	very low.” 	In her view, the government’s interest in
detaining her is because DHS maintains she is subject to mandatory detention under
§ 1225, which “carries little weight.”
Unsurprisingly, 	the 	federal 	respondents 	disagree 	with 	this 	uncharitable
minimization 	of the governmental interest. 	They 	argue that “Congress 	has made a
legislative judgment to detain undocumented aliens during removal proceedings” and that
the 	Supreme 	Court 	has 	recognized 	this 	interest 	to 	detain aliens 	pending 	removal
proceedings. 	See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952) (“Detention is necessarily
a part of this deportation procedure.”); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235
(1896) (“Proceedings to exclude or expel would be vain if those accused could not be held
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in custody pending the inquiry into their true character, and while arrangements were being
made for their deportation.”).
The Court acknowledges the government has a substantial interest in enforcing the
immigration laws as it interprets them. See Dep’t of State v. Munoz, 602 U.S. 899, 911-12
(2024) (“[T]he 	through line of history is recognition of the Government’s 	sovereign
authority to set the terms governing the admission and exclusion of noncitizens.”). 	That
interest may very well wane and become overshadowed by Mina’s interest if detention
becomes unduly prolonged and unreviewed. See Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842,
855 (2d Cir. 2020) (noting that the longer an alien’s detention continues, “the greater the
need for the Government to justify its continuation”). 	At this juncture in Mina’s removal
proceedings, however, and before the automatic stay has even lapsed, Mina has not
convinced the Court that her interest clearly outweighs the government’s.
C. 	The Alleged Ultra Vires Nature of 8 C.F.R. 1003.19(i)(2)
Finally, Mina argues that the automatic-stay regulation is ultra vires because it
“unlawfully eliminates IJs’ discretionary authority to make custody determinations.” Ultra
vires claims “are confined to ‘extreme’ agency error where the agency has ‘stepped so
plainly beyond the bounds of [its statutory authority], or acted so clearly in defiance of it,
as to warrant the immediate intervention of an equity court[.]’” 	Fed. Express v. United
States Dep’t of Com., 39 F.4th 756, 764 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (quoting Griffith v. Fed. Lab.
Rels. Auth., 842 F.2d 487, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1988)) (alteration in original); accord Oestereich
v. Selective Serv. Sys. Loc. Board No. 11, 393 U.S. 233, 238 (1968) (noting that ultra vires
cases must go beyond mere error and amount to a “clear departure by the [agency] from its
statutory mandate” or be “blatantly lawless” agency action). “An ultra vires challenge, in
other words, is ‘essentially a Hail Mary pass[.]’” 	Fed. Express, 39 F.4th at 765 (quoting
Nyunt v. Chairman, Broadcasting Board of Governors, 589 F.3d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir.
2009)). 	Mina’s Hail Mary pass falls incomplete.
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The automatic-stay regulation provides for a temporary stay of an IJ’s bond order
pending the BIA’s review when DHS objects to the bond order. 	That regulation is based
on the Attorney General’s discretionary authority to grant bond under § 1226(a). 	See 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1) (“[T]he Attorney General may continue to detain the arrested alien;
and may release the alien on bond . . .”) (emphasis added). “The Attorney General at any
time may revoke a bond or parole authorized under subsection (a), rearrest the alien under
the original warrant, and detain the alien.” 	Id. at § 1226(b). 	Thus, the regulation does not
give DHS the final word on bond, it merely preserves the status quo while the BIA (also
under the Attorney General) reviews the bond order of an IJ exercising the Attorney
General’s authority by delegation.
The Court is not persuaded that a regulation that temporarily stays the effect of the
Attorney General’s delegated, discretionary authority to allow review by a higher authority
(within the same agency) is “extreme” agency error “plainly beyond the bounds” of its
statutory authority. 	See Fed. Express, 39 F.4th at 764. Section 1226 does not require the
Attorney General to conduct bond hearings at all. 	Therefore, Mina has not convinced the
Court that the automatic-stay regulation is “a clear departure” from the Attorney General’s
“statutory mandate” or “blatantly lawless.” 	See Oestereich, 393 U.S. at 238.
III. 	CONCLUSION
This case presents some challenging questions. The Court does not definitively rule
out the possibility 	that Mina may qualify for habeas relief in the future. 	At present,
however, the Court concludes that Mina’s detention under the automatic-stay provision
does not violate her procedural-due-process 	rights under the Fifth Amendment. 	And
because the Court concludes that Mina’s detention under § 1226 does not warrant habeas
relief, it need not decide whether Mina is properly detained under both §§ 1225 and 1226.
Accordingly,
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IT IS ORDERED:
1. 	Petitioner Camila Fory Mina’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Filing
No. 1) is denied.
2. 	A separate judgment will issue.
Dated this 10th day of November 2025.
BY THE COURT:
Robert F. Rossiter, Jr.
Chief United States District Judge
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