Aldridge v. Dismukes

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
CASE NO. 3:25-cv-00975-MR
JOHN S. ALDRIDGE, )
)
Petitioner, )
) MEMORANDUM OF
vs. ) DECISION AND ORDER
)
LESLIE COOLEY DISMUKES, )
Secretary, North Carolina )
Department of Adult Correction, )
)
Respondent. )
________________________________ )
THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of the pro se
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, by
John S. Aldridge, (herein “Petitioner”) on December 8, 2025. [Doc. 1].
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a prisoner of the State of North Carolina.1 The Petitioner
pleaded guilty and was convicted April 18, 2017, in Mecklenburg County
Superior Court on one count of Breaking and Entering, and one count of
Larceny After Breaking and Entering. [Doc. 1 at 1]. Petitioner received an
1 See https://webapps.doc.state.nc.us/opi/viewoffender.do?method=view&offenderID=
0460610&searchOffenderId=0460610&searchDOBRange=0&listurl=pagelistoffendersea
rchresults&listpage=1(herein “NCDAC Database”); Fed. R. Evid. 201.
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active term of imprisonment of 16 to 29 months for his Breaking and Entering
conviction, and a like consecutive term of 16 to 29 months for his Larceny
conviction. [Id.; NCDAC Database]. Petitioner’s projected release date from
imprisonment is October 24, 2029. [NCDAC Database].
After sustaining his state court convictions, the Petitioner filed no direct
appeal. [Doc. 1 at 2]. As for any post-conviction proceedings, Petitioner filed
a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the North Carolina Supreme Court on
August 18, 2025, which was denied by that court the following day. [Id. at 2-
3]; Aldridge v. Dismukes, No. 207P25-1 (N.C. Aug. 19, 2025). In his Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed in this Court, Petitioner raises four
constitutional claims, three sounding in ineffective assistance of counsel
(Grounds One, Two, and Three) and one alleging prosecutorial misconduct
(Ground Four). [Doc. 1 at pp. 5; 7-10].
The Petitioner previously filed a § 2254 petition in this Court
challenging his same 2017 Mecklenburg County judgment in Case Number
3:25-cv-00719-MR. Upon initial review of that § 2254 petition, the Court
found that Petitioner’s filing was both time-barred and factually deficient and
entered a Show Cause Order November 18, 2025. [Case No. 3:25-cv-
00719-MR; Doc. 4 at pp. 2-5]. The Court’s Show Cause Order permitted
Petitioner thirty days to file an amended petition explaining why that action
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should not be dismissed based upon either of the two identified deficiencies.
[Case No. 3:25-cv-00719-MR; Id. at 5]. Rather than filing an amended
petition as directed, the Petitioner instead filed his present-case pro se
petition on December 8, 2025. [Doc. 1]. Petitioner never responded to the
Court’s Show Cause Order in Case Number 3:25-cv-00719-MR and the
Court thereafter dismissed that action without prejudice due to Petitioner’s
failure to prosecute the same. [Case No. 3:25-cv-00719-MR; Doc. 5 at 2].
II. DISCUSSION
In reviewing a § 2254 petition, the Court is guided by Rule 4 of the
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, which directs the district court to
dismiss a petition when it plainly appears from the petition and any exhibits
that the petitioner is entitled to no relief. Rule 4, 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254.
Like the petition filed in Case Number 3:25-cv-00719-MR, the petition filed
herein is time-barred and factually deficient. Unlike the petition filed in Case
Number 3:25-cv-00719-MR, the petition filed herein contains assertions by
Petitioner to excuse its untimeliness. [Doc. 1 at pp. 13-14].
1. Timeliness
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)
provides a statute of limitations for § 2254 petitions by a person in custody
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pursuant to a state court judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The petition
must be filed within one year of the latest of:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by
the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the
time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an
application created by State action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed,
if the applicant was prevented from filing by such
State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted
was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the
right has been newly recognized by the Supreme
Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on
collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the
claim or claims presented could have been
discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
Id.
Petitioner pleaded guilty to the B&E and Larceny offenses over eight
(8) years ago. Since Petitioner filed no direct appeal, and since Petitioner
has not asserted any grounds listed in § 2244(d)(1)(B) through §
2244(d)(1)(D), Petitioner’s convictions became final at the expiration of the
time for seeking direct review of his convictions. Thus, Petitioner’s 365-day
limitations period began to run on May 2, 2017, fourteen days after the entry
of his state judgment on April 18, 2017. N.C. R. APP. 4(a). Nothing else
appearing, the limitations period for Petitioner to commence this action
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expired May 2, 2018. Petitioner explains, in response to Question 18 of his
petition regarding how he has complied with the applicable AEDAP
limitations period, that enforcing “the one-year statute of limitations would
cause an injustice.” As such, the Petitioner asserts equitable tolling should
apply in this matter.
Equitable tolling of the statute of limitations for an untimely § 2254
petition may apply where the petitioner demonstrates “(1) that he has been
pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance
stood in his way” to prevent timely filing. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631,
649 (2010); Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). It is appropriate
in those “rare instances where – due to circumstances external to the party's
own conduct – it would be unconscionable to enforce the limitation period
against the party and gross injustice would result.” Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d
238, 246 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 330
(4th Cir. 2000)). The Petitioner cannot satisfy either requirement.
First, the statute of limitations expired seven years before Petitioner
commenced this action, or his prior action. Nowhere does Petitioner explain,
during that seven-year period, how he was diligently pursuing his rights to
bring about this federal habeas action. On that basis alone the Petitioner is
not entitled to equitable tolling. Second, Petitioner has described no
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circumstance that stood in his way to prevent timely filing. All Petitioner can
muster is an unsupported allegation that the “state court ruling was not just
wrong, but unreasonably wrong.” [Doc. 1 at 14]. Petitioner’s barebone
assertion, however, provides no factual or legal basis to excuse his untimely
filing. See, e.g., United States v. Sosa, 354 F.3d 507, 512 (4th Cir. 2004)
(ignorance of the law does not provide a basis for equitable tolling of statute
of limitations under ADEA). The Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling.
2. Factual Deficiency
Aside from the petition’s untimeliness, the Petitioner attempts to raise
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct in
relation to his underlying state criminal proceeding. [Doc. 1 at 1-12]. The
present § 2254 petition, like Petitioner’s prior petition, is deficient as it fails to
comply with Rule 2 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases requiring
habeas petitions to follow a specific format. The Petitioner has failed to
specify, in any of the grounds for relief, detailed facts supporting each claim
alleging instead only conclusions. For example, Petitioner alleges in Ground
One: “Ineffective assistance of counsel, failure to investigate, failure to plea
the best plea agreement. Counsel did not investigate proper sentencing
points range, petitioner was sentenced on wrong level. Did not look into
lesser offense or charges. Failed to get the best plea agreement available.”
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Grounds Two, Three, and Four are similarly devoid of any detail. As such,
Petitioner has failed to discuss any facts that show how or why his claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct establish that
viable constitutional violations occurred in the state proceeding. See Rule
2(c)(2), 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254 (the petition must state the facts supporting
each ground). The petition is thus subject to dismissal for its failure to allege
any facts sufficient to state a claim.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the § 2254 petition [Doc. 1] shall be
dismissed with prejudice as untimely because the Petitioner fails to establish
that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Further, the
§ 2254 petition [Doc. 1] shall be dismissed with prejudice for its failure to
state any claims.
Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases,
the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338 (2003) (in order to satisfy
§ 2253(c), a petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find
the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or
wrong); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (when relief is denied
on procedural grounds, a petitioner must establish both that the dispositive
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procedural ruling is debatable and that the petition states a debatable claim
of the denial of a constitutional right).
O R D E R
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Doc. 1] is DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
2. Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases, the Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.
3. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: March 2, 2026
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