USA v. Thompson

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 3:25-CR-00050-KDB-DCK
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
TREYMAYNE LEWIS
THOMPSON,
Defendant.
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Suppress (Doc. No. 30)
and Amended Motion to Suppress (Doc. No. 47). The Court has carefully considered this motion,
the parties’ briefs, testimony, exhibits and oral argument on the motion from the parties’ counsel
on August 24, 2026. For the reasons discussed at the hearing and further explained below, the
Court will DENY the motions.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
The Fourth Amendment ensures “[t]he right of the people to be secure . . . against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The ultimate
touchstone of the Court’s analysis is whether a search is “reasonable under the circumstances.”
United States v. Palmer, 820 F.3d 640, 648 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 653–54 (1979)).
In other words, “[t]he Fourth Amendment permits law enforcement officers to seize the
person or property of another without a warrant or probable cause when the officers have a
“reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal
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activity.” United States v. Cobham, No. 05-4175, 2006 WL 250721, at *2 (4th Cir. Feb. 2, 2006)
(quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702 (1983)) (additional citation omitted).
The government bears the burden to justify any warrantless search or seizure. United States
v. Curry, 965 F.3d 313, 319 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc). “When police violate the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures, the government may be
forbidden from using the improperly obtained evidence at trial.” United States v. Villa, 70 F.4th
704, 716 (4th Cir. 2023). However, when moving to suppress evidence, a defendant “must show
‘not only that the search of [the property] was illegal but also that he had a legitimate expectation
of privacy’ in that property.” United States v. Tillman, No. 5:25-CR-97-D, 2026 WL 84878, at *4
(E.D.N.C. Jan. 12, 2026) (first quoting Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980); and then
citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978)).
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 18, 2024, Officer Matthew Lerlo was monitoring the Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Police Department’s (“CMPD”) real-time crime center cameras (also called “pole cams”) as part
of his duties with the Juvenile Accountability and Diversion Empowerment Unit. Hr’g Tr. (“Tr.”)
1. Through the pole cam, he observed at least three young males inside a parked Jeep in the Grier
Grove apartments parking lot in Charlotte, North Carolina.1 Doc. No. 33-4 at 1; Tr. 1. Outside the
vehicle, a juvenile-appearing male (the “juvenile”), wore a heavy winter coat despite the summer
weather and had what appeared to be a firearm tucked into his waistband.2 Id. He approached and
1 Both Officer Lerlo and Sergeant Caleb Skipper testified that, in 2024, shooting incidents
at the Grier Grove Apartments (legally known as Village Townhomes) occurred approximately
once a week. Tr. 4, 39. Sergeant Skipper further testified that the complex experienced significant
drug activity, reports of stolen vehicles, and ongoing gang activity. Tr. 3–4, 18, 38–40.
2 Officer Lerlo testified that, in his experience, individuals wearing thick jackets or
sweatshirts in the summer heat often do so to conceal items such as firearms in their waistbands.
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eventually entered the Jeep. Tr. 12. Based on these observations, and because it is illegal under
North Carolina law for juveniles to carry concealed firearms, Officer Lerlo directed officers to
respond to the complex. Tr. 5, 7.
Several minutes before they arrived, a Nissan carrying approximately three young males
pulled into the complex’s lot and parked beside the Jeep. Tr. 5. Some of the occupants of the
vehicles briefly interacted. Tr. 14–16. As officers arrived3 and blocked the Jeep’s exit, the
occupants of both vehicles “quickly” and collectively exited and moved away from the officers.4
Tr. 8. The firearm and jacket were left in the Jeep and later recovered. Tr. 10, 21. At that point,
however, the officers present were uncertain who had exited which vehicle. Doc. No. 33-1 at 2;
Tr. 8–9, 51. That uncertainty, combined with their knowledge of gang and firearm activity in the
area, and that at least one of the young men had been armed, led the officers to detain four males
suspected of having been in the Jeep, while they confirmed which vehicle each had exited. Doc.
No. 33-4 at 1, Tr. 41–42. Sergeant Skipper testified that he assisted in detaining the four men and
then contacted Officer Lerlo to confirm through the pole camera footage which individuals had
exited the Jeep. Tr. 42. He explained that “there was talk about some of those—that we had
Tr. 6. As a result, the juvenile’s heavy coat drew his attention, and he observed the firearm when
the juvenile lifted the jacket and exposed his waistband. Id.
3 Sergeant Skipper testified that the substantial police response was driven in part because
of the known gang activity and frequent shootings in the complex, and in part by the tendency for
police presence in the area to draw a large crowd of onlookers. Tr. 39. Consistent with that
testimony, the pole cam footage and body worn camera (“BWC”) recordings played during the
hearing depict a sizeable crowd gathering around the officers, observing their actions, and moving
about the vehicles and detained individuals.
4 All of the vehicles in that portion of the parking lot, including the Nissan parked next to
the Jeep, were blocked in by the multiple police vehicles that responded to the scene. Tr. 36.
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detained could potentially have been in that Nissan. So then my goal was to make sure we had the
correct ones detained and then release those that did not need to be detained.”5 Id.
Defendant was detained as part of that group. It took Sergeant Skipper and Officer Lerlo
approximately seven minutes to determine that Defendant had not exited the Jeep.6 Tr. 47.
However, while the identification process was underway, Officer Adam Earl, who was positioned
in the parking lot between the Nissan and the Jeep, testified that he observed through the Nissan’s
window what appeared to be a “marijuana nugget” in plain view on the front passenger dashboard.
Tr. 22, 27–28. He notified Sergeant Skipper of the marijuana just as Defendant was identified. Tr.
47. Continuing to look through the Nissan’s windows, Officer Earl also identified a firearm near
the driver’s seat and reported that observation. Tr. 22–23.
Rather than releasing Defendant, officers further detained him while they conducted a
probable cause search of the vehicle. That search recovered two firearms, a digital scale with white
powder residue, approximately 60 grams of crack and powder cocaine (located in the front driver’s
side door), 104 grams of marijuana, and $2,713 in currency. Doc. No. 33-4 at 2. Defendant’s
driver’s license was also found in the vehicle. Tr. 35–36. Defendant was then arrested and
transported to Mecklenburg County Jail for processing. Id.
On March 18, 2025, Defendant was indicted for possession of a firearm by a felon,
possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, and possession of a firearm in
furtherance of drug trafficking. Doc. No. 1. After Defendant filed an untimely motion to suppress
(Doc. No. 30), and was assigned new counsel, the Court allowed him to file an Amended Motion
5 According to Sergeant Skipper, those who had not come “from the Jeep,” including
Defendant, were going to be released, but Defendant was further detained because of the marijuana
and firearm observed inside the Nissan. Tr. 45.
6 Sergeant Skipper testified that Officer Lerlo relied both on his memory and replaying of
the pole cam footage to determine, detainee by detainee, the Jeep’s occupants. Tr. 42.
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to Suppress (Doc. No. 47). The Court held a hearing on the Amended Motion, and after the parties
presented evidence and argument, denied it, noting that this written Order would follow.
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant alleges that CMPD officers violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth,
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments when they detained him without reasonable suspicion and
when they seized and searched the Nissan without probable cause. Doc. No. 47 at 1, 4.
A. Seizure of Defendant
Defendant first contends that he was improperly detained because he was the driver of the
Nissan rather than an occupant of the Jeep that the juvenile with the firearm was seen entering. See
Doc. No. 47. He further alleges that although there was some interaction between the occupants of
the Jeep and Nissan, the juvenile did not interact with anyone in the Nissan. Id. at 7.
A “brief investigatory stop[] of the sort identified in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct.
1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)” is a type of personal seizure. United States v. Johnson, 599 F.3d
339, 344–45 (4th Cir. 2010). Officers “do not need a warrant or probable cause to briefly detain a
civilian; instead, [they] may briefly detain a civilian when [they have] reasonable, articulable,
personalized suspicion that the person is or has been engaged in illicit activity.” United States v.
Avagyan, 164 F. Supp. 3d 864, 881–82 (E.D. Va. 2016), aff’d sub nom. United States v.
Ghazaryan, 685 F. App’x 222 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Smith, 994 F. Supp. 2d 758,
761–62 (E.D.Va.2013) aff’d, 583 F. App’x 196 (4th Cir. 2014)) (citation omitted). See also Terry,
392 U.S. at 21. This “so-called Terry stop allows [officers] whose observations lead [them] to
suspect that a particular person has committed or is about to commit a crime to detain the person
briefly in order to ‘investigate the circumstances’ provoking that suspicion.” Johnson, 599 F.3d at
345 (quoting United States v. Brignoni–Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975)) (citation omitted).
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Reasonable suspicion is “a less demanding standard than probable cause,” and requires
officers to have “at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.” United
States v. Critchfield, 81 F.4th 390, 393 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,
123 (2000)). In short, it must be “something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion
or hunch.” United States v. Burton, 228 F.3d 524, 527 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at
27) (internal quotations omitted). Courts assess reasonable suspicion under “the totality of the
circumstances.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002).
Here, the Grier Grove apartment complex was well known to CMPD for its frequent gang
and drug activity, and shootings occurred there approximately weekly (including an accidental
firearm discharge on the day Defendant was arrested). Officer Lerlo observed a juvenile with a
firearm entering the Jeep. As officers responded, Defendant, along with up to seven other young
men, including the juvenile, was seen quickly exiting one of the two vehicles and moving away
from the officers.7 In addition, the heavy winter jacket and firearm had been discarded in the Jeep,
making it more difficult for the officers to distinguish the juvenile in question from the rest of the
young men. Indeed, Sergeant Skipper testified that he was not certain which individuals had exited
the Jeep. And, the scene was chaotic, with onlookers milling throughout the area, including around
officers, the detained men, and the vehicles.
Sergeant Skipper further testified that only four of the young men were detained and
handcuffed (rather than all who had exited the vehicles), as those four were believed to have
specifically exited the Jeep. It took approximately seven minutes for Sergeant Skipper and Officer
Lerlo to go through the pole cam footage and determine Defendant’s vehicle of origin. Under the
7 See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125 (a defendant’s unprovoked flight from officers in area of
heavy narcotics trafficking supported the officers’ reasonable suspicion that defendant was
involved in criminal activity and justified stop).
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totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that officers had reasonable suspicion to detain
Defendant for that short period of time while determining whether he had exited the Jeep.
B. Seizure and Search of the Nissan
Defendant next argues that the seizure of the Nissan was unreasonable and the fruits of the
search should be suppressed because officers lacked probable cause to search the vehicle. He
further contends that under Terrence Byrd v. United States, 584 U.S. 395 (2018), he had an
expectation of privacy in the vehicle and its contents even though he did not own it and was not
on the rental agreement. Doc. No. 47 at 6. Defendant also asserts that because he remained “near”
the vehicle after exiting it, he did not relinquish that expectation of privacy. Doc. No. 47 at 6.
Even assuming Defendant had a privacy right in the Nissan (which the Court need not
decide), “[t]he Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches is not implicated
when the plain view doctrine applies.” United States v. Runner, 43 F.4th 417, 421 (4th Cir. 2022).
The Fourth Circuit has held that “[v]iewing an article that is already in plain view does not involve
an invasion of privacy and, consequently, does not constitute a search implicating the Fourth
Amendment ....” Id. (quoting United States v. Jackson, 131 F.3d 1105, 1108 (4th Cir. 1997)). Still,
“[n]ot everything in plain view ... may be seized—only those items that are perceived to be
contraband, stolen property, or incriminating in character.” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, “for the
plain view exception to apply, the government must show that: ‘(1) the officer [was] lawfully in a
place from which the object [could] be plainly viewed; (2) the officer ha[d] a lawful right of access
to the object itself; and (3) the object’s incriminating character [wa]s immediately apparent.’” Id.
(quoting Jackson, 131 F.3d at 1109).
Marijuana is illegal in North Carolina. United States v. Vernon, No. 2:25-CR-00004-M,
2025 WL 1840734, at *2 (E.D.N.C. July 3, 2025). Its presence in a vehicle has long allowed
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officers to conduct a probable cause search under the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement (which provides a lawful right of access). United States v. Bolling, No. 23-4572, 2025
WL 1682298, at *3 (4th Cir. June 16, 2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 1599, 224 L. Ed. 2d 30 (2026)
(additional citations omitted). See also See United States v. Brown, 129 F.3d 1260 (Table), 1997
WL 720418, at *3 (4th Cir. 1997) (the illegal marijuana in the vehicle gave the officer probable
cause to search it under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement); United States v.
Alston, 941 F.3d 132, 138 (4th Cir. 2019) (“An officer’s detection of marijuana creates ... probable
cause.”). And when “police have probable cause, the automobile exception permits “the search of
every part of the vehicle ... that may conceal the object of the search.”8 Alston, 941 F.3d at 138
(quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982)).
Here Officer Earl was lawfully present at the apartment complex, and as he stood between
the Jeep and Nissan, while Defendant was being identified, he looked through the Nissan’s window
and observed, in plain view, marijuana on the passenger dashboard and a firearm near the driver’s
seat. Because officers identified Defendant contemporaneously with the plain view discovery of
the marijuana, and shortly thereafter of the firearm, they were justified in further detaining him
while conducting a lawful probable cause search of the vehicle under the automobile exception.
Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Suppress will be denied.
IV. ORDER
8 Probable cause exists “when ‘the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant
a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.’”
United States v. Davis, 997 F.3d 191, 201 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Patiutka, 804
F.3d 684, 690 (4th Cir. 2015)). The “principal components” of a court’s review and determination
of whether probable cause existed “will be the events which occurred leading up to the stop or
search” and “whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively
reasonable police officer, amount to … probable cause.” Id. (quoting United States v. Brookins,
345 F.3d 231, 235–36 (4th Cir. 2003)).
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NOW THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. Defendant’s Amended Motion to Suppress (Doc. No. 47) is DENIED; and
2. Defendant’s Motion to Suppress (Doc. No. 30) is DENIED as moot.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: August 31, 2026
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