Movement Mortgage, LLC v. Scrima

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MOVEMENT MORTGAGE, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
TODD SCRIMA,
Defendant.
No. 2:23-cv-02904-DJC-CSK
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Todd Scrima’s Motion to Dismiss on the basis
that Plaintiff’s claims are preempted by the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act and
that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege claims against Defendant in his personal
capacity. While the Court agrees that Counts Three Through Six are preempted by
the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has
sufficiently alleged claims against the Defendant in his individual capacity.
Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED IN PART on preemption grounds and
DENIED IN PART.
I. Background
Plaintiff Movement Mortgage, LLC (“Movement”), a real estate financing
company, brings the present suit against Defendant Todd Scrima, the owner and
President of Movement’s competitor Summit Funding, Inc. (“Summit”), alleging that
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Defendant personally directed a scheme to steal and misappropriate Movement’s
trade secrets, including Movement’s business model, customer data, and employee
data, which led to the solicitation of numerous Movement employees and loss of
business. (Compl. (ECF No. 1) ¶¶ 5, 7, 12–13, 31–32, 51, 74.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant engaged high-level Movement employees and
employees with broad access to Movement’s information, including a Vice President,
divisional, market, and sales leaders, and an assistant to a divisional leader, to carry
out his scheme. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 17, 21, 24.) He then directed those employees to obtain
documents from Movement’s database and provide them to Summit. (Id. ¶¶ 27–29,
46.) One employee, Linda Plymale, downloaded and exported extensive information
about Movement’s loans and loan officers, training and recruiting, various positions at
Movement, and other business methods information. (Id. ¶¶ 29–34.) Within months
of downloading this information, Plymale resigned from Movement and began
working for Summit days later. (Id. ¶¶ 29, 33, 36.) Another employee, Deran
Pennignton, the Executive Vice President of Recruiting, allegedly obtained
Movement’s profit and loss statements (“P&Ls”) and provided them to Summit at
Defendant’s behest. (Id. ¶¶ 39–46.) Pennington allegedly signed a confidentiality
agreement with Summit in March 2023, but continued working at Movement for
months in order to obtain the information. (Id. ¶¶ 23–25.)
According to Plaintiff, Defendant then used that information to target other
employees at Movement, including loan officers, and direct them to divert loans and
customers to Summit. These loan officers would obtain information about the
customers and prepare their loans, but instead of finalizing the loans, would divert the
customers to a loan officer at Summit, after which they would resign from Movement
and start employment with Summit. (Id. ¶¶ 51–60.) Summit would then ultimately
finalize the loans with the diverted customers. (Id.) In total, Summit solicited more
than 50 Movement employees. (Id. ¶ 74.)
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Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s conduct violates the federal Defend Trade
Secrets Act (“DTSA”) 18 U.S.C. § 1836, the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act
(“CUTSA”) Cal. Gen. Stat. § 3426, the California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) Cal.
Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq., the California Comprehensive Computer Data
Access and Fraud Act (“Computer Fraud Act”), Cal. Penal Code § 502,1 and constitutes
tortious interference with contractual relations and civil conspiracy. (See Id. ¶¶ 63–
133.)
Defendant brings the present Motion to Dismiss arguing that Plaintiff’s tort
claims and claims under the UCL and section 502 are preempted by the California
Uniform Trade Secrets Act and argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against
Defendant in his personal capacity. (Mot. to Dismiss (“MTD”) (ECF No. 6).) Plaintiff has
opposed the Motion and Defendant has filed a Reply. (See Opp’n (ECF No. 11); Reply
(ECF No. 13).) Upon the joint Motion of the Parties, this case was submitted without
oral argument pursuant to local rule 230(g). (ECF Nos. 18 and 19.)
II. Legal Standard for Motion to Dismiss
A party may move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion may be granted if the complaint
lacks a “cognizable legal theory” or if its factual allegations do not support a
cognizable legal theory. Godecke v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 937 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th
Cir. 2019) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)).
The Court assumes all factual allegations are true and construes “them in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Steinle v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco,
919 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51
F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995)). If the complaint’s allegations do not “plausibly give
rise to an entitlement to relief,” the motion must be granted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
1 Section 502 of the California Penal Code allows individuals to bring a civil suit against a violator of the
California Data Access and Fraud Act. Cal. Penal Code § 502(e)(1).
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A complaint need contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), not “detailed
factual allegations,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). But this rule
demands more than unadorned accusations; “sufficient factual matter” must make the
claim at least plausible. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In the same vein, conclusory or
formulaic recitations of elements do not alone suffice. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555). This evaluation of plausibility is a context-specific task drawing on “judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.
III. Discussion
A. CUTSA Preemption
Section 3426.7 of the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act “implicitly preempts
alternative civil remedies based on trade secret misappropriation.” K.C. Multimedia,
Inc. v. Bank of Am. Tech. & Operations, Inc., 171 Cal. App. 4th 939, 954 (2009). “The
statute's preemptive sweep is broad — it supersedes all claims premised on the
wrongful taking and use of confidential and proprietary information, even if that
information does not meet the statutory definition of a trade secret.” VBS Distribution,
Inc. v. Nutrivita Lab'ys, Inc., No. SA-CV-16-01553-CJC-DFM, 2020 WL 6259999, at *4
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2020) (citing Silvaco Data Sys. v. Intel Corp., 184 Cal. App. 4th 210,
239 n.22 (2010)). The act does not affect contractual or criminal remedies, whether or
not based on appropriation of trade secret, nor does it affect other civil remedies
“that are not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret.” Cal. Civ. Code
§ 3426.7(b). However, any civil claims that are ‘”based on the same nucleus of facts as
the misappropriation of trade secrets claim” are preempted. K.C. Multimedia, 171
Cal. App. 4th at 958 (quoting Digital Envoy, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 370 F. Supp. 2d 1025,
1035 (N.D. Cal. 2005)).
“The preemption inquiry for those causes of action not specifically exempted by
[section] 3426.7(b) focuses on whether other claims are no more than a restatement of
the same operative facts supporting trade secret misappropriation.” Farmers Ins.
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Exch. v. Steele Ins. Agency, Inc., No. 2:13-CV-00784-MCE, 2014 WL 466274, at *3 (E.D.
Cal. Feb. 5, 2014). “Preemption is not triggered where the facts in an independent
claim are similar to, but distinct from, those underlying the misappropriation claim.”
Id. (quoting Gabriel Techs. Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 08-CV-1992-MM-POR, 2009
WL 3326631, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2009)). The claims cannot “simply depend on a
‘different theory of liability’ to survive CUTSA's preemptive effect.” Philips N. Am. LLC
v. Advanced Imaging Servs., Inc., No. 2:21-CV-00876-JAM-AC, 2021 WL 5054395, at
*3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2021). Rather, claims must allege “materially distinguishable”
facts to avoid preemption. C&H Travel & Tours, Inc. v. Chow, No. 2:18-CV-06690-RGK-
MRW, 2018 WL 6427369, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2018). “If the claim is based ‘in
essence [on] the same wrongdoing’ as the alleged CUTSA claim, it is preempted.” Id.
at *3. For example, where the defendant used fake credentials to gain access to trade
secrets, a fraud claim based on the fake credentials was preempted by CUTSA
because both claims “ar[o]se from Defendants’ unauthorized access to Plaintiff's
system.” Philips, 2021 WL 5054395 at *3. In contrast, a claim that the defendant
“disparaged Plaintiff to employees or convinced employees to join a competitor”
without using trade secret information was not based on the same facts as the trade
secret misappropriation claim. C&H Travel & Tours, 2018 WL 6427369 at *3.
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s tortious interference with contractual relations,
civil conspiracy, UCL, and California penal code section 502 claims are preempted by
CUTSA. The Court will address each in turn below.
i. Intentional Interference with Economic Relations
The tortious interference claim alleges that Defendant interfered with the
contractual agreements entered into by Plaintiff and its former employees by inducing
them to violate restrictive covenants, non-solicitation agreements, and confidentiality
agreements. (Compl. ¶¶ 15–18, 97.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
targeted Movement employees and “ordered the misappropriation of Movement’s
confidential information and trade secrets through these employees, inducing and
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causing them to violate their contractual obligations with Movement.” (Id. ¶ 98.) This
claim is based on the same facts as the misappropriation of trade secrets because the
contracts were breached by misappropriating the trade secrets. Like in Phillips, the
tortious interference claim excises a portion of facts underlying the CUTSA claim and
attempts to fashion a second claim out of those same facts in contravention of CUTSA.
In K.C. Multimedia, Inc. v. Bank of America Technology & Operations, Inc., the
court found an interference with contract claim alleging similar facts to be preempted
both legally and factually by CUTSA. 171 Cal. App. 4th at 960–61. There, the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant had encouraged the employee to misappropriate the
trade secrets, and that the employee breached the contract by misappropriating the
trade secrets. See id. The claim was legally preempted because CUTSA covers
“improper means” of acquiring a trade secret including the “breach or inducement of
a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy.” Id. Factually, the two claims were based on
the same conduct of encouraging the employee to acquire and share confidential
information. Id.
In contrast, in Rovince Intern. Corp. v. Preston, the court found the interference
claim could be separated from the CUTSA claim because the contract was not
breached by the misappropriation itself. There, the defendant “persuaded one of [the
plaintiff’s] suppliers to breach its contract” with the plaintiff. No. CV-13-3527-CAS-
PJW, 2013 WL 5539430, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2013). The court found that the claim
was not preempted because “none of the elements of Rovince's claim for inducing
breach of contract will turn on [the employee]'s alleged misuse of confidential
information.” Id. at *5. The Rovince court distinguished K.M. Multimedia, where the
plaintiff “could only prevail on their claim for contractual interference if they proved
that trade secrets were in fact misappropriated.” Id. Here, similar to K.C. Multimedia
Plaintiff’s claim with respect to the restrictive covenants and confidentiality
agreements relies on proving misappropriation because Plaintiff alleges that it was the
misappropriation of confidential information by the employees which violated those
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agreements.
The portion of the interference claim alleging violation of the non-solicitation
agreements also cannot be separated from the misappropriation claim. Plaintiff
alleges that it was Defendant’s use of the misappropriated trade secrets which
“result[ed] in the successful solicitation of fifty (50) Movement employees whom
Defendants could not have solicited without the trade secret and data theft described
herein.” (Compl. ¶ 74 (emphasis added).) The solicitation of the employees is
therefore inherently intertwined with the misappropriation of the trade secrets.
JEB Group, Inc. v. San Jose, relied on by Plaintiff, is factually distinguishable.
There, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants improperly solicited the plaintiff’s
clients and thereby interfered with the plaintiff’s prospective economic relations. No.
CV-19-04230-CJC-AGR, 2020 WL 2790012, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2020). However,
it was “unclear from the complaint whether this improper solicitation hinged on
Defendants' misappropriation of [Plaintiff]'s confidential client lists.” Id. at *4.
Accordingly, the court, viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, held that it was “reasonable to infer that Defendants interfered with
[Plaintiff]'s business relationships without relying on trade secrets or other confidential
information.” Id. Here there is no such ambiguity: Plaintiff explicitly alleges that
Defendant did rely on the trade secrets in order to improperly solicit the other
employees. Accordingly, this claim is preempted by CUTSA.
ii. Civil Conspiracy
The civil conspiracy claim is also preempted by CUTSA because it relies on the
same facts as the CUTSA claim. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “conspired to take the
tortious actions described herein against Movement together with certain Movement
employees . . . for the primary purpose of acquiring and misusing Movement’s trade
secrets and confidential and proprietary information as well as to solicit Movement
employees and customers . . . .” (Compl. ¶¶ 113–114.) Despite Plaintiff’s attempt to
split hairs and argue that Defendant had initially only ”developed a scheme to initiate
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a corporate raid of Movement’s employees using the Company’s former high-level
managers,” the Complaint does not allege that Defendant took any steps in
furtherance of this limited conspiracy or engaged the other employees at this point.
(Opp’n at 10; Compl. ¶ 12.) Instead, Plaintiff alleges in the next sentence that
Defendant “recognized that Summit was not able to successfully compete with
Movement, recruit its staff, or be competitive in the marketplace even with those
former members on board if he did not also steal Movement’s trade secrets and
computer file” and that Defendant “personally orchestrated a plan to steal
Movement’s trade secrets to facilitate his plans to raid its employees and copy its
business model.” (Compl. ¶ 12 (emphasis added).) According to Plaintiff’s
allegations, the misappropriation was integral to the goal of soliciting employees and
diverting customers. Plaintiff does not allege any conspiratorial conduct unrelated to
this scheme to misappropriate trade secrets. As such, the claim is preempted under
CUTSA.
Despite Plaintiff’s reliance on Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Steele Ins. Agency, Inc.,
which held that the formation of a conspiracy can be separated from CUTSA by the
addition of facts including the agreement to steal trade secrets and the formation of
the conspiracy, that case is inconsistent with the nucleus of facts test and its premise
has been rejected by multiple courts. See Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. v. Tarantino, No.
20-CV-05505-EMC, 2022 WL 4092673, at *15 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2022) (collecting
cases). Courts have held that merely adding additional facts to a claim or pleading a
different theory of liability based on the same facts is not sufficient to escape CUTSA
preemption where the core facts are common among the claims. See Philips, 2021
WL 5054395 at *3; SunPower Corp. v. SolarCity Corp., No. 12-CV-00694-LHK, 2012
WL 6160472, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2012). “[T]he nucleus of fact test does not
focus on whether a non-CUTSA claim requires the pleading of different elements than
the CUTSA claim, but rather on whether ‘there is [a] material distinction between the
wrongdoing alleged in a [C]UTSA claim and that alleged in [the non-CUTSA] claim . . .
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.’” SunPower Corp., 2012 WL 6160472, at *12. As stated above, because the civil
conspiracy claim is based on the same core facts as the CUTSA claim, it is preempted.
////
////
iii. Section 502 and UCL
Plaintiff argues that its UCL and section 502 claims cannot be preempted
because they are based on statutory violations. While CUTSA states that it does not
“not supersede any statute relating to misappropriation of a trade secret, or any
statute otherwise regulating trade secrets,” Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.7(a), this language
does not apply to “every statute that might be applied to trade secret theft, but only to
preserve the operation of the many statutes that expressly allude to trade secrets in
particular settings.” Silvaco Data Sys. v. Intel Corp., 184 Cal. App. 4th 210, 241 (2010),
as modified on denial of reh'g (May 27, 2010) (emphasis in original). Courts have
found that both the UCL and section 502 are not the type of trade secret specific
statute exempted by CUTSA because they are not directed at regulating trade secrets
and have applicability beyond trade secrets. Id. (UCL); Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v.
Health IQ, LLC, No. SA-CV-13-00308-CJC-RNB, 2013 WL 12132029, at *5 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 29, 2013) (UCL); Henry Schein, Inc. v. Cook, No. 16-CV-03166-JST, 2017 WL
783617, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2017) (section 502); C&H Travel, 2018 WL 6427369, at
*2 (section 502). As such neither the UCL nor 502 are outside of CUSTA’s preemptive
reach.
Although some courts have determined that California Penal Code 502 is not
preempted by CUTSA because the remedy is derived from a criminal code section
and criminal remedies are exempted, these courts fail to account for the plain
language of CUTSA which states that “civil remedies,” based on misappropriation are
preempted. Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.7(b) (emphasis added); see JEB Grp., 2020 WL
2790012, at *4 (relying solely on language from K.C. Multimedia that states CUTSA
preempts “common law” claims in finding that a statutory violation cannot be
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preempted and not referencing the language in CUTSA); Heieck v. Fed. Signal Corp.,
No. SA-CV-18-02118-AGK-ES, 2019 WL 6873869, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2019)
(finding no preemption because “section 502 is a criminal statute that contains
criminal remedies” without acknowledging that the plaintiff was seeking a civil
remedy, not a criminal remedy). The Court is instead persuaded by the reasoning in
ATS Prod., Inc. v. Champion Fiberglass, Inc., No. 13-CV-02403-SI, 2015 WL 224815, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2015). There the court found that a claim under California Penal
Code section 496, which similarly provides for civil remedies, was not exempted from
CUTSA preemption because the plaintiff sought civil remedies, not criminal remedies.
Id. Here too Plaintiff seeks only civil remedies and thus the claim is not exempted.
Both the UCL and section 502 claims are based on the same facts as the CUTSA
claim and therefore preempted. The section 502 claim alleges that Defendant,
through the former Movement employees, accessed Movement’s computers and took
its confidential and proprietary information. (Compl. ¶¶ 118, 121–124.) This
allegation describes Defendant’s scheme to use the former employees to steal trade
secrets by downloading files from Movement databases and computers, and refers to
the events recounted in the section of the Complaint entitled “Theft of Trade Secrets
and Computer Files.” (Id. ¶¶ 22–46.) And in fact, Plaintiff relies on the same exact
allegations to form the basis of both the CUTSA and section 502. (Compare id.
¶¶ 83–86, with id. ¶¶ 124–127.) Accordingly, there is no meaningful difference
between facts underlying the section 502 and CUTSA claims.
The UCL claim is derivative of the other claims already analyzed by the Court,
and so it too is preempted. The UCL claim is based on “Defendant’s acts, as alleged
herein, including but not limited to his improper solicitation of Movement’s borrowers,
tortious interference with contracts, and aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary
obligations and duties of loyalty, and misappropriation of trade secrets and
confidential and proprietary information . . . .” (Id. ¶ 106.) This claim does not allege
any independent conduct which is not based on the same common factual nucleus as
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the CUTSA claim and is therefore also preempted.
For the reasons described above, Counts Three through Six are preempted
under CUTSA. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED IN PART, and these
claims are DISMISSED.
B. Failure to State a Claim Against Defendant
With respect to the remaining claims alleging violation of DTSA and CUTSA,
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to hold him
personally liable for the conduct at issue.
“A corporate officer or director is, in general, personally liable for all torts which
he authorizes or directs or in which he participates, notwithstanding that he acted as
an agent of the corporation and not on his own behalf.” Coastal Abstract Serv., Inc. v.
First Am. Title Ins. Co., 173 F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac
Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1021 (9th Cir. 1985)). As Defendant has
conceded, an individual may be liable for wrongful conduct committed on behalf of a
company where that individual was the “‘guiding spirit’ behind the wrongful conduct, .
. . . or the ‘central figure’ in the challenged corporate activity.” Davis v. Metro Prods.,
Inc., 885 F.2d 515, 523, n.10 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Escude Cruz v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 619 F.2d 902, 907 (1st Cir. 1980)).
Plaintiff’s Complaint supports an inference that Defendant personally directed
the conduct of the employees who stole confidential information from Movement.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, as the sole owner and President of Summit,
“personally orchestrated a plan to steal Movement’s trade secrets to facilitate his plans
to raid its employees and copy its business model” and provides copious
documentary evidence to support these allegations. (See Compl. ¶¶ 5, 12; Exs. A–J
(ECF Nos. 1-1–1-10).) First, in a text message thread, Defendant sent the contact
information for a then-Movement employee, Plymale, and said that he had a “great
call” “working on the first 90 day plan.” (Compl. ¶ 27; Ex. B (ECF No. 1-2).) Within
weeks of this message, Plymale began accessing and downloading a number of
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Movement reports and documents from Movement’s database in unprecedented
ways. (See Compl. ¶¶ 27 –36.) She also retained her Movement laptop past the
effective date of her resignation and visited Summit headquarters while she still had
the laptop. (See id. ¶¶ 36–38.) Days later, Plymale began her employment with
Summit, and accessed the downloaded Movement documents during the first few
days of her employment. (Id.) All of these actions appear to stem from Defendant’s
“plan.”
In a different thread, Defendant discusses “P&Ls” that he asked another officer
to request from a different then-Movement employee, Pennington. Defendant asks,
“did you receive p&l’s[?]” to which the officer says, “Requested twice from Deran2, not
received.” (Id., Ex. C (ECF No. 1-3).) The Summit officer then asks, “Are you sure you
want movement p&ls’s (their proprietary/confidential docs) on summit servers?” to
which Defendant replies “Not on our servers. Can you maybe set up misc whatsapp
account and have them texted there?” (Compl. ¶ 40.) Again, these messages support
the allegation that Defendant directed others to obtain the trade secret information.
Plaintiff also provides evidence that Defendant directed others to
misappropriate the allegedly stolen trade secrets. Once the P&Ls were received,
Defendant sent an email saying “Team, Please dissect this!” (Id. ¶ 41.) On a recorded
call, a former Summit officer recounted the Summit CFO saying about analyzing
Movement’s stolen data “if Todd [Scrima] wants me to do this, I’m going to do this.”
(Id., Ex. E (ECF No. 1-5) at 14.) These allegations, taken as a whole, sufficiently tie
Defendant to the conduct at issue and support a plausible inference that Defendant
was organizing and directing the alleged scheme to steal and misappropriate
Movement’s trade secrets.
There are also sufficient facts to support the allegation that Defendant directed
the scheme to solicit Movement customers. The allegedly stolen information
2 “Deran” refers to Deran Pennignton, Movement’s then Executive Vice President of Recruiting.
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contained lists of Movement employees and customers. (Id. ¶¶ 42, 67.) Months after
Defendant and Summit received this information, loan officers began resigning from
Movement, and joining Summit. In the interim, these officers diverted Movement
customers over to Summit. (Id. ¶¶ 52, 58–60.) Plaintiff alleges that this scheme too
was orchestrated by Defendant. (Id. ¶ 62.) Although Plaintiff provides less facts tying
Defendant personally to the scheme, the other facts pertaining to his involvement in
obtaining and misappropriating the trade secrets, coupled with the close proximity
between the retention of the trade secrets and the initiation of these scheme, and
Defendant’s role as the owner and President of Summit, make it plausible that
Defendant was also the “guiding spirit” behind soliciting the other employees and
customers.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s remaining causes of action are sufficiently plead, and the
Motion is DENIED as to Counts One and Two.
IV. Conclusion
For the above reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
(ECF No. 6) is GRANTED IN PART as to Counts Three through Six and DENIED IN
PART as to Counts One and Two. Counts Three through Six are DISMISSED with leave
to amend. Any amended complaint must be filed within 30 days of the date of this
Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 10, 2024
Hon. Daniel J. Calabretta
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DJC2 — Movement23cv02904.mtd
Case 3:24-cv-00998-GCM-WCM Document 20 Filed 06/11/24 Page 13 of 13