Hubbard v. Southwood Realty Company

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
3:24-CV-00481-MEO-DCK
JUSTIN HUBBARD,
Plaintiff,
v.
SOUTHWOOD REALTY COMPANY,
Defendant.
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff Justin Hubbard’s Motion to
Continue Deadline to Complete Discovery in the Court’s March 25, 2026, Order (Doc.
55). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny the motion.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The Court issued an order on March 25, 2026, directing limited discovery on
the similarly-situated inquiry to begin “immediately” and close June 23, 2026. (Doc.
46.) Plaintiff did not serve discovery until May 5, 2026, and noticed one of the five
permitted depositions—the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition—which Plaintiff himself asked
to reschedule to the final day of discovery. During that deposition, Plaintiff’s counsel
asserted that testimony revealed documents previously withheld, including Courtesy
Connect on-call records, inter-departmental communications on meal-break pay, and
complaint-handling procedures. The parties could not agree on an extension, and
Plaintiff filed this Motion the next day seeking ninety additional days.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A scheduling order “may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s
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consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4).
“Good cause” requires “the party seeking relief [to] show
that the deadlines cannot reasonably be met despite the
party's diligence,” and whatever other factors are also
considered, “the good-cause standard will not be satisfied if
the [district] court concludes that the party seeking relief
(or 	that 	party’s 	attorney) 	has 	not 	acted 	diligently 	in
compliance 	with 	the 	schedule.”
	See 	6A 	Charles 	Alan
Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Mary Kay Kane,
Federal
Practice 	and 	Procedure 	Civ.3d 	§ 	1522.2 	(3d 	ed.2010)
(collecting cases);
see also 3 Moore’s Federal Practice §
15.14[1] 	[b], 	at 	16–72 	(Matthew 	Bender 	3d 	ed. 	2010)
(“[A]lthough undoubtedly there are differences of views
among district judges about how compelling a showing
must be to justify extending the deadlines set in scheduling
orders, it seems clear that the factor on which courts are
most likely to focus when making this determination is the
relative diligence of the lawyer or lawyers who seek the
change.”).
Cook v. Howard, 484 F. App’x 805, 815 (4th Cir. 2012).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Plaintiff has not demonstrated the diligence required for an extension of the
discovery period. Plaintiff waited over five weeks to serve any discovery after the
Court ordered it to begin immediately; he exercised only one of five permitted
depositions and chose to schedule it on the last day of discovery, foreclosing any
opportunity to resolve resulting disputes before the deadline; and records he alleges
were not produced were either produced, or addressed in testimony, well before the
close of discovery without follow-up on his part. A party’s own decision to defer
discovery to the eve of a deadline, or to prioritize requests the Court had already
rejected, does not establish the diligence Rule 16(b)(4) requires. And characterizing
long-available documents as newly discovered does not convert delay into good cause.
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The Court ordered a limited, 90-day discovery period on March 25, 2026. That
period ended on June 23, 2026, before Plaintiff filed his Motion to Continue. The
Court does not find good cause to reopen discovery.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Continue Deadline
to Complete Discovery (Doc. No. 55) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: July 7, 2026
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