USA v. Adams et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
CASE NO. 3:24-CR-061-FDW-DCK
THIS MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT on “Defendant’s Motion To Suppress
Evidence Seized On February 5, 2024” (Document No. 33), “Defendant’s Motion To Suppress
Statements Made And Evidence Seized On March 25, 2024” (Document No. 34), and
“Defendant’s Motion To Suppress Statements Made And Evidence Seized And Acquired On June
23, 2023” (Document No. 35) filed July 23, 2024. An evidentiary hearing was held before the
undersigned on September 18, 2023, with Defendant personally present with counsel.
These motions have been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(b), and immediate review is appropriate. Having carefully considered the briefs,
exhibits, testimony, and oral arguments, the undersigned will respectfully recommend that the
“…Motion To Suppress Evidence Seized on February 5, 2024” (Document No. 33) be granted,
the “…Motion To Suppress Statements Made and Evidence Seized on March 25, 2024”
(Document No. 34) be denied as moot, and the “…Motion to Suppress Statements Made and
Evidence Acquired on June 23, 2023” (Document No. 35) be denied.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
MEMORANDUM AND
RECOMMENDATION
v. )
)
DAVID ANTON STALLWORTH, )
)
Defendant. )
)
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I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 20, 2024, Defendant David Anton Stallworth (“Defendant” or “Stallworth”) was
indicted for conspiracy to possess and distribute fentanyl and methamphetamine in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 846, and for possession with intent to distribute fentanyl and methamphetamine in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. (Document No. 3). Defendant, through
counsel, filed “Defendant’s Motion To Suppress Evidence Seized On February 5, 2024”
(Document No. 33), “Defendant’s Motion To Suppress Statements Made And Evidence Seized
On March 25, 2024” (Document No. 34), and “Defendant’s Motion To Suppress Statements Made
And Evidence Seized And Acquired On June 23, 2023” (Document No. 35) on July 23, 2024,
seeking to suppress certain Government evidence in the case. The “Government’s Response To
Defendant’s Motion To Suppress Statements Made And Evidence Acquired On June 23, 2023”
(Document No. 43) and “Government’s Response To Defendant’s Motion To Suppress Evidence
Seized On February 5, 2024” (Document No. 44) were filed on August 27, 2024. Defendant filed
“Defendant’s Consolidated Reply To Government’s Responses To Motions To Suppress”
(Document No. 46) and “Defendant’s Amended Consolidated Reply To Government’s Responses
To Motions To Suppress” (Document No. 47) on September 1, 2024. The Government filed the
“Government’s Response To Defendant’s Motion To Suppress Statements Made And Evidence
Seized On March 25, 2024” (Document No. 48) on September 3, 2024. The Court noticed a
hearing on the matter.
The motions came on for a hearing on September 18, 2024, at which time several exhibits
and witnesses were presented by the prosecution and cross-examined by the defense. The principal
questions presented by Defendant’s motions are (1) whether law enforcement was required to read
Defendant his Miranda rights prior to questioning him on June 23, 2023, and (2) whether the
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February 5, 2024, seizure and subsequent forensic search of Defendant’s cell phones were
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
II. FACTUAL SUMMARY
As noted, the Court conducted a hearing in this matter on September 18, 2024, at which
the Government presented witness testimony and both the Government and Defendant presented
argument. The Government presented the testimony of three law enforcement officers – Officers
Jonathan Cerdan (“Cerdan”) and Stephen Brown (“Brown”) of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police
Department (“CMPD”), and Special Agent Courtney Roanhorse (“Roanhorse”) of Homeland
Security Investigations (“HSI”). Evidence also included cross-examination of the witnesses and
presentation of body-worn camera footage from two of the officers.
First, the Government introduced the body-worn camera footage of Officers Jonathan
Cerdan and Stephen Brown from their encounter with Defendant on June 23, 2023. The
Government next presented the testimony of Officer Cerdan. Officer Cerdan has been employed
with CMPD since 2018 as a K-9 detective and is also tasked with assisting HSI as a task force
officer (“TFO”). Officer Cerdan is assigned to screen luggage, cargo, and parcels coming to and
from the Charlotte Douglas International Airport with the assistance of his certified K-9, named
Cali. The Government asked Officer Cerdan about the encounter with Defendant that occurred on
the morning of June 23, 2023. Officer Cerdan recalled that he was working in the area where
baggage is loaded onto the plane (“plane side”) for Defendant’s flight bound from Charlotte to Los
Angeles. Officer Cerdan was working plane side for this flight pulling luggage coming from
source narcotic locations when K-9 Cali alerted on two suitcases belonging to Defendant. Officer
Cerdan called Detective Brown and TFO Osuch to assist him before making contact with
Defendant, who had already boarded the plane.
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Officer Cerdan boarded Defendant’s plane, determined where Defendant was seated, and
went to Defendant’s seat. He confirmed the seat number and observed Defendant seated with a
hoodie over his head; he confirmed that the person seated was Defendant. Officer Cerdan advised
Defendant to gather his personal items, including any carry-on luggage, because he needed to talk
to Defendant about his bags. At the time of the interaction, Officer Cerdan was wearing a blue
polo, blue “BDU” cargo pants, his gun belt and his body camera.
Defendant exited the plane onto the jet bridge ahead of Officer Cerdan. Officer Cerdan
remained behind on the plane temporarily to retrieve Defendant’s electronics charger left behind
in the seat. Officer Cerdan then joined Defendant on the jet bridge. While on the jet bridge,
Defendant was talking on his phone to someone later identified as Dericc Adams (“Adams”).
Officer Cerdan was on his phone notifying TFO Osuch and Detective Brown that he had made
contact with Defendant and they were heading up towards the boarding gate. Officer Cerdan never
told Defendant to get off the phone and testified that to his knowledge Defendant was on the phone
for the duration of this encounter with law enforcement on June 23, 2023.
After exiting the jet bridge, Officer Cerdan and Defendant entered the boarding area and
were joined by Detective Brown and TFO Osuch. Law enforcement did not attempt to relocate
Defendant and/or his luggage to a private area for screening or questioning. The entire interaction
took place in the boarding area accessible to all ticketed passengers. Other passengers and airline
employees remained present in the area for the duration of the encounter. No barriers separated
Defendant from other passengers.
The encounter took place ten to fifteen feet away from the main walkway of the concourse.
Officer Cerdan testified that Defendant could have left the interaction via this walkway or by
reboarding the plane. Officer Cerdan believed that Defendant would be able to reboard his flight
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following resolution of the K-9 alert and he communicated this belief to Defendant. Following
the search of Defendant’s luggage, the gate agent informed Defendant the flight had been closed.
Officer Cerdan testified that this surprised him because he expected the gate agent to alert them
before closing the flight. Officer Cerdan testified he believed he had lawful authority to detain
Defendant’s baggage, but he did not say as much to Defendant in the interest of keeping the
encounter consensual.
Officer Cerdan requested Defendant’s consent to search the luggage, which Defendant
gave. During the search of Defendant’s luggage, law enforcement uncovered a wad of cash, which
they handed to Defendant and allowed him to retain. No narcotics or other contraband were
recovered during the search. The interaction from the time Officer Cerdan boarded Defendant’s
plane to the time law enforcement concluded the search lasted fewer than ten minutes.
On cross-examination of Officer Cerdan, Defendant’s counsel inquired about Officer
Cerdan’s custom of obtaining either consent or a search warrant before searching luggage
following a K-9 alert for narcotics. Officer Cerdan testified that, in the absence of consent to a
luggage search following a K-9 alert, he would typically detain the suitcases and obtain a search
warrant. Officer Cerdan confirmed that while the suitcases were being searched, Defendant was
told he was not under arrest and was free to leave at any time. Officer Cerdan further confirmed
that he was in uniform and wearing his firearm throughout the encounter with Defendant.
The Government next presented the testimony of Officer Stephen Brown. Officer Brown
is a police officer with CMPD at the airport division. Officer Brown further described the June
23, 2023, encounter with Defendant at the Charlotte Douglas International Airport. Officer Brown
reiterated the public nature of the location in the boarding area and reiterated that no steps were
taken to shield the interaction from the public. While in the open boarding area, Officer Brown
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spoke with Defendant as Officer Osuch searched Defendant’s luggage. Throughout the
interaction, Defendant was holding his cellphone and was on an active FaceTime call. Officer
Brown testified that he never asked Defendant to terminate the call. Officer Brown told Defendant
he could leave the interaction if he wanted to. At no point did Officer Brown physically touch
Defendant.
While Defendant’s luggage was being searched, Officer Brown asked Defendant various
questions, including about the purpose of his trip to Charlotte. Defendant responded that he had
been visiting his uncle. Officer Brown asked Defendant for his uncle’s address; Defendant
responded that he did not know. Officer Brown asked Defendant if he was on the phone, and who
he was on the phone with. Defendant responded that he was on the phone with a traveling
companion named Dericc Adams. Officer Brown testified that at no point did he prevent the
person on the phone from seeing and hearing the entire interaction.
On cross-examination, Officer Brown confirmed that he told Defendant he could leave the
interaction at any time. Officer Brown also confirmed that if Defendant had left the interaction,
he would have been leaving his luggage with the law enforcement officers searching it. Officer
Brown also confirmed that law enforcement told Defendant his luggage was being detained due to
a positive K-9 alert. Officer Brown testified that the luggage was not searched as soon as the K-9
alerted to it because he believed consent or a search warrant was needed first.
The Government next recalled Officer Cerdan to testify as to the events of February 5,
2024. Officer Cerdan testified that, in his work with K-9 Cali, he first identifies flights going to
and from known source narcotic locations. He then works plane side on these flights with K-9
Cali to identify and investigate narcotics trafficking, often obtaining seizures of drugs including
marijuana, cocaine, fentanyl, and methamphetamine. Officer Cerdan targets Los Angeles, San
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Francisco, Phoenix, Las Vegas, and Oklahoma City flights. These plane side searches have
resulted in seizures of drugs as well as illicit currency. Officer Cerdan testified that he often
observes drugs coming into Charlotte and money going out of Charlotte to the source narcotic
locations to make narcotics purchases and further the trafficking enterprise. Officer Cerdan
confirmed that cash was recovered, but not seized, from Defendant’s suitcase during the June 23,
2023, search of his luggage while leaving Charlotte on a flight for Los Angeles.
Defendant’s counsel did not present further cross-examination of Officer Cerdan.
The Government next presented the testimony of Special Agent (“SA”) Courtney
Roanhorse. SA Roanhorse has been employed as a Special Agent with Homeland Security
Investigations (“HSI”) since 2019. Previously, SA Roanhorse worked for United States Customs
and Border Protection (“CBP”) from 2015 to 2019. SA Roanhorse’s duties primarily involve
investigating drug trafficking and cash smuggling cases.
SA Roanhorse testified that her first encounter with Defendant was in August 2023, but
that HSI was previously aware of Defendant from the events of June 23, 2023. On August 1, 2023,
SA Roanhorse was involved in a K-9 interdiction operation at the Charlotte Douglas airport. The
purpose of an interdiction is to discover and prohibit contraband, such as narcotics or the illicit
currency gathered from sales of narcotics, from being placed onto aircraft. The August 1, 2023,
interdiction targeted American Airlines flight 1499 arriving to Charlotte from Los Angeles. HSI
routinely runs K-9 interdictions on flights arriving from Los Angeles because it is known as a
source state for narcotics, in large part due to its border with Mexico. SA Roanhorse testified that
border states are typically source states for narcotics. During this interdiction, the K-9 alerted to
suitcases belonging to Dericc Adams and Anthony Boyd (“Boyd”). Law enforcement withheld
these suitcases from being dropped onto the baggage carousel and instead brought them out
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separately into the baggage claim area. SA Roanhorse waited in plainclothes in the baggage claim
area to observe the individuals who would claim the suitcases.
SA Roanhorse observed Defendant in the baggage claim area at this time, along with two
other black males later identified as Adams and Boyd. Defendant was on the phone and had a
carry-on suitcase. He exited the airport and then came back in a few minutes later without the
carry-on suitcase. Uniformed officers then brought the detained suitcases out and approached
Adams and Boyd. Defendant observed this occurring, turned around and began to exit the airport
again. SA Roanhorse and another agent followed Defendant outside. Defendant crossed a
crosswalk to the pickup area at the airport and entered a vehicle registered to an individual later
identified as the grandmother of Dericc Adams.
Officers recovered approximately one kilogram of fentanyl and a little over two kilograms
of methamphetamine from Adams’s suitcase, and a little over three kilograms of
methamphetamine from Boyd’s suitcase. Law enforcement also seized two cellular devices during
this interdiction, one each from Adams and Boyd. State search warrants were executed for both,
which uncovered messages to Defendant. Following this interdiction, SA Roanhorse began to
investigate Defendant. During this investigation, SA Roanhorse determined that Defendant was
on the radar of other agency investigations into bulk cash smuggling.
SA Roanhorse next testified about the events of February 5, 2024. SA Roanhorse received
notification that Defendant would be traveling through the Charlotte airport coming from the
Dominican Republic, which is also known as a source country for controlled substances. SA
Roanhorse partnered with CBP at the Charlotte airport to conduct an inspection of Defendant’s
items and those of his co-traveler, girlfriend Paulette Young (“Young”). The purpose of this
investigation was to check for any type of contraband, which SA Roanhorse stated included the
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travelers’ cellular devices. SA Roanhorse testified that this type of investigation is standard
procedure for someone being investigated for possible transnational crimes. SA Roanhorse
testified that CBP had reasonable suspicion at this time that Defendant was involved in drug
trafficking. SA Roanhorse had communicated to CBP that Defendant was the target of an
investigation, based in part on the state search warrants executed on Adams’s and Boyd’s phones.
These warrants recovered a message sent from Adams to Defendant containing a short video of a
package that appeared to be methamphetamine inside plastic baggies sitting on a bathroom sink
with Welch’s fruit snack boxes behind those baggies, which is how the methamphetamine was
packaged that was seized on August 1, 2023. The suspicion was also based on communication
between Boyd, Adams, and Defendant coordinating their travel on the day of the August 1, 2023,
seizure, and historical messages of the three coordinating flights to different states, which SA
Roanhorse listed to include Arkansas and North Carolina.
During the February 5, 2024, inspection, CBP requested consent to enter Defendant’s and
Young’s cell phones; Defendant and Young declined to give the requested consent. SA Roanhorse
testified that standard procedure following a denial of consent when CBP has reasonable suspicion
is to detain the phones to complete the inspection.
On cross-examination, SA Roanhorse confirmed her suspicion of Defendant derived
primarily from his connections with Adams and Boyd. SA Roanhorse stated she knew Defendant
would be traveling with Young on February 5, 2024, and that Defendant and Young were in the
Charlotte airport for purposes of connecting to Los Angeles. SA Roanhorse testified that, based
on her investigation, she had made the decision to inspect Defendant when he returned from the
Dominican Republic. SA Roanhorse confirmed that, on February 5, 2024, CBP searched
Defendant’s and Young’s luggage and found nothing illegal, at which point they seized
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Defendant’s and Young’s phones. SA Roanhorse stated CBP detained Defendant’s phones and
handed them over to HSI. SA Roanhorse testified that one phone was forensically examined
without a warrant and evidence was recovered; the second phone had not yet been searched but
was still detained at the time of the hearing. SA Roanhorse confirmed that neither of Defendant’s
phones had been returned to him. SA Roanhorse confirmed that it was obvious to her that
Defendant was not hiding drugs in his cell phones. Defense counsel asked SA Roanhorse whether
the purpose of seizing the phones was to advance her criminal investigation, to which she
responded, “Yes.” SA Roanhorse also confirmed that her team obtained search warrants to search
Boyd’s and Adams’s luggage and phones following the August 1, 2023, encounter. However,
although no drugs were found in Defendant’s or Young’s luggage on February 5, 2024, no search
warrants were obtained for the search of Defendant’s phones.
On re-direct, SA Roanhorse confirmed that Defendant’s February 5, 2024, flight was an
international one arriving from the Dominican Republic. This flight was therefore subject to
CBP’s jurisdiction, whereas the August 1, 2023, flight was a domestic one subject to the
jurisdiction of HSI and task force officers from CMPD. SA Roanhorse testified that the search
authority and reasonableness requirements for the two flights differed accordingly. SA Roanhorse
stated Young was not a target of any investigations, so there was no reason to detain her phone.
SA Roanhorse again stated the primary purpose of seizing the phones was to further her
investigation; there was no other purpose. She reiterated that her first awareness of the connection
between Defendant, Boyd, and Adams was the August 1, 2023, encounter.
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The Fourth Amendment safeguards “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV;
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United States v. Nkongho, 107 F.4th 373, 380 (4th Cir. 2024). As such, “an officer must generally
obtain a warrant, supported by probable cause, to search or seize someone’s person or property.”
Id. (citing Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014)). Border searches represent one exception
to this general warrant requirement. Id. at 380–81. The Supreme Court “has long held that border
agents need no warrant, nor any individualized suspicion, to conduct ‘routine searches of the
persons and effects of entrants.’” Id. at 381 (citing United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473
U.S. 531, 538 (1985)). However, even when the border search exception applies, “certain ‘highly
intrusive searches’ may qualify as ‘nonroutine’ and so require some level of individualized
suspicion.” United States v. Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d 713, 720 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States
v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004)). The Fourth Circuit has stated that “a forensic
border search of a phone must be treated as nonroutine, permissible only on a showing of
individualized suspicion.” United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 144 (2018); see also Aigbekaen,
943 F.3d at 720. Specifically, to conduct an intrusive and nonroutine search under the border
search exception to the warrant requirement, “the Government must have individualized suspicion
of an offense that bears some nexus to the border search exception’s purposes of protecting
national security, collecting duties, blocking the entry of unwanted persons, or disrupting efforts
to export or import contraband.” Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d at 721.
Miranda warnings are required when a subject is interrogated while in custody. Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); accord Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000)
(reaffirming Miranda as “a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively,”
reversing unique Fourth Circuit holding to the contrary). The test for determining whether an
individual is “in custody” for Miranda purposes is whether, under the totality of the circumstances,
the “suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest.” Berkemer
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v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (internal quotations omitted). Statements volunteered by a
defendant while he is in custody are not implicated by Miranda. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S.
291, 300 (1980). However, statements made in response to “the functional equivalent” of custodial
interrogation do require Miranda warnings. Id. To be the functional equivalent of custodial
interrogation, the law enforcement officer should know [the statements or questions] are likely to
elicit an incriminating response. Id. at 299–304.
IV. DISCUSSION
The undersigned will address each of Defendant’s arguments in turn, in order of the
motions as filed.
A. Cell Phone Evidence Seized on February 5, 2024
Defendant contends the February 5, 2024, “seizure of his two cell phones, subsequent
search of one of them, and prolonged detention of the other one was unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.” (Document No. 33, p. 1). Defendant asserts “[e]vidence gathered from the phone
search must be suppressed and the detained phone should be returned immediately.”1 Id.
Defendant argues the accepted justifications for a warrantless border search “have no application
here" and that “[t]he search and continued detention of [Defendant’s] two phones was in
furtherance of HSI's criminal investigation and had nothing to do with the reasons the Supreme
Court carved out the border search exception to the warrant requirement in the first place.” Id. at
p. 4. Defendant argues the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply in this
instance because “established Circuit precedent informed (and continues to inform with regard to
1 The undersigned is making a recommendation to the presiding District Judge regarding the legal propriety
of the search of Defendant’s phones. Defendant seeks suppression of the evidence on the phone that was
searched, and the return of both phones. (Document No. 33, p. 7). Argument specifically addressed to
whether the phones should be returned is not especially robust. The undersigned makes no recommendation
at this time on the issue of the return of the phones pending the District Judge’s action on this
recommendation. The Court may seek further argument on that issue at a later date.
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the phone seized from [Defendant] that has not been searched yet continues to be detained) that a
search warrant is required.” Id. at p. 5. Defendant contends the seizure of his second phone
“should be suppressed and the Court should order its immediate return,” because “[a] ‘seizure
reasonable at its inception must remain reasonable in scope and duration to satisfy the Fourth
Amendment.’” Id. at pp. 5–6 (quoting Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 141). At the evidentiary hearing,
Defendant contended there is no question the disputed search was nonroutine.
Also at the hearing, the Government argued the detention and subsequent search of
Defendant’s phones were routine border searches. The Government also argued that even if the
search and seizures were nonroutine, law enforcement had the requisite level of individualized
suspicion to detain and search the phones without warrants under border search authority. In its
Response, the Government contends that “agents had reasonable and individualized suspicion that
[Defendant] was involved in narcotics smuggling,” and that “[n]arcotics smuggling and the
smuggling of contraband is a transnational offense that goes to the heart of the border search
exception, which rests in part on ‘the sovereign interest of protecting and monitoring exports from
the country.’” (Document No. 44, p. 4) (quoting United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290, 1297 (4th
Cir. 1995)). Ultimately, the Government argues that “the search and seizure of the devices was
lawful because the agents reasonably suspected that the devices would contain evidence of drug
trafficking.” Id. at p. 5.
In reply, Defendant asserts “the Government concedes that the purpose of the seizure of
[Defendant’s] cell phones had nothing to do with traditional justifications for warrantless border
searches…but rather was conducted for the purpose of crime detection.” (Document No. 47, p. 4)
(citing Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d at 713). Defendant further “disagrees with the Government’s
contention that there was reasonable suspicion to suspect he was involved in narcotics smuggling,
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based on the evidence within law enforcement’s purview on February 5, 2024.” Id. at p. 5.
Defendant notes that “[s]ignificantly, the Government’s response fails to address the issue relating
to the length of time [his] cell phones have been detained, at this writing approximately seven
months.” Id. at p. 6.
The undersigned will consider first whether the border search exception to the warrant
requirement applies on these facts, and then whether the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule bars suppression of the evidence nonetheless.
1. Insufficient International Nexus For Border Search Applicability
Here, the undersigned is persuaded that the prolonged seizure and forensic search of
Defendant’s phones were nonroutine, necessitating some level of individualized suspicion and a
transnational nexus to satisfy the border search exception to the warrant requirement. As the
Fourth Circuit has explained, “extending the individualized suspicion and transnational nexus
requirements to the nonroutine seizure of a phone for the purpose of a forensic search protects the
traveler’s interests and keeps the seizure tethered to the rationale behind the border exception.”
Nkongho, 107 F.4th at 382. In Nkongho, CBP warrantlessly seized a traveler’s devices for
purposes of conducting a forensic search. Id. at 368. The Fourth Circuit required individualized
suspicion for the warrantless seizures. Id. at 382. See also Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 144 (“[P]articularly
in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Riley, a forensic border search of a phone must be
treated as nonroutine, permissible only on a showing of individualized suspicion.”); Aigbekaen,
943 F.3d at 720.
In Aigbekaen, the Fourth Circuit also “reject[ed] the district court’s conclusion that a
nonroutine, intrusive search’s physical and temporal proximity to an international border ‘trumps
everything’ under the Fourth Amendment.” Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d at 722. Rather, the Fourth
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Circuit reiterated its clarification from Kolsuz “that a nonroutine search’s location is not
dispositive of whether the border search exception applies; rather, it is the search’s relation to the
Government’s sovereign interests that is paramount.” Id. (citing Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 142–43).
In Aigbekaen, the defendant was suspected of the domestic interstate sex trafficking of a
minor. Id. at 717–18. HSI agents “learned that Aigbekaen had left the country and was set to
return through John F. Kennedy International Airport. The agents asked U.S. Customs and Border
Protection officers to seize any electronic media devices in Aigbekaen’s possession at the airport
upon his return.” Id. at 718. The Fourth Circuit found “the Government lacked sufficient
individualized suspicion of criminal activity with any nexus to the sovereign interests underlying
the border search exception” and thus “its warrantless forensic searches of Aigbekaen’s devices
violated the Fourth Amendment.” Id. In Nkongho, by contrast, the Fourth Circuit emphasized:
At the time of the seizure, agents had probable cause to believe that Nkongho was
part of an international munitions export scheme. Indeed, nine days after agents
seized Nkongho’s devices, a magistrate judge found probable cause that she was
part of a conspiracy to violate the Arms Export Control Act…and issued a warrant
to conduct to the forensic search.
Nkongho, 107 F.4th at 382–83 (rejecting the defendant’s contention that agents had probable cause
only for domestic offenses which were not sufficiently tethered to the exception’s justifications of
stopping transnational crime).
The undersigned is not satisfied that a sufficient transnational nexus exists in this case to
justify the absence of a warrant for the prolonged seizure and forensic search of Defendant’s
phones. The Government’s argument that individualized suspicion of transnational crimes existed
in this case appears to rest on the following facts: (1) Defendant is connected to the recovery of
narcotics from an interdiction on a domestic flight, operating from Los Angeles to Charlotte; and
(2) Defendant’s phones were seized upon his return from vacation to the Dominican Republic,
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identified as a source country for narcotics trafficking. As support for the weight of the first fact,
the Government notes that California is identified as a source narcotics state due to its location on
the Mexico border.
On these facts, the undersigned considers the international nexus “so attenuated from the
rationale for the border search exception that it no longer would fall under that exception.” Kolsuz,
890 F.3d at 143. As the Fourth Circuit has stated, “[i]f the border search exception is to retain any
distinction from the Government’s ‘generalized interest in law enforcement and combatting crime,
…it cannot be invoked to sanction invasive and nonroutine warrantless searches of all suspected
domestic ‘criminals,’ nor the suspected ‘instrumentalities’ of their domestic crimes.” Aigbekaen,
943 F.3d at 724 (quoting Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 143).
The undersigned finds the facts of the current case most analogous to those of Aigbekaen.
Nothing illegal was found in Defendant’s or Young’s luggage following their return from vacation
to the Dominican Republic. Defendant had been previously tied to narcotics transported aboard
domestic—not international—flights, and to evidence of domestic—not international—interstate
drug trafficking. While the Government may have introduced individualized suspicion that
Defendant is connected to domestic drug trafficking, the undersigned is not persuaded that the
Government possessed a “particularized and objective basis” to suspect Defendant possessed the
fruits, instrumentalities, or other evidence of transnational crimes on the seized phones.
Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d at 723 (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541
(1985)).
The undersigned is thus unpersuaded that the Government possessed individualized
suspicion of crimes with the requisite international nexus to conduct prolonged seizures and
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forensic searches of Defendant’s phones without a warrant under the border search exception.2
The undersigned will now turn to whether the good faith exception renders the fruits of these
searches admissible nonetheless.
2. Good Faith Exception
“The evidentiary fruits of Fourth Amendment violations are generally inadmissible at
trial…But the fruits of ‘a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding precedent [are] not
subject to the exclusionary rule,’ as that rule is designed to deter future Fourth Amendment
violations.” Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d 713. In Aigbekaen, “the HSI agents who searched Aigbekaen’s
devices in May of 2015 reasonably relied on an ‘established and uniform body of precedent
allowing warrantless border searches of digital devices.’” Id. at 725 (quoting Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at
148). While the Fourth Circuit applied the good faith exception in Aigbekaen’s case, it did so
recognizing that “when a Fourth Amendment case presents a novel question of law whose
resolution is necessary to guide future action by law enforcement officers and magistrates, there is
sufficient reason for [a court] to decide the violation issue before turning to the good-faith
question.” Id. at 719 (quoting United States v. Bosyk, 933 F.3d 319, 332 n.10 (4th Cir. 2019)).
The Fourth Circuit noted that, prior to its decision in Kolsuz, “[a]lthough it has long been
understood that the scope of a warrant exception should be tailored to the purposes underlying that
exception, no court had yet applied that principle to require a warrant ‘for any border search, no
matter how nonroutine or invasive.’” Id. at 725 (first citing Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 147; then citing
2 Defendant seeks to suppress evidence resulting from the warrantless forensic search and prolonged
detention of his phones. The undersigned is persuaded that the border search exception does not apply to
the warrantless forensic search of the first phone or to the nearly eight-month detention of the other. At
this time, the undersigned does not further address the question of whether the initial seizures of
Defendant’s phones may have been routine or reasonable, or the reasonableness of prolonged seizures
generally. In light of the remedy Defendant seeks, the undersigned need only address whether a warrant
was required for the forensic search and prolonged detention of the phones.
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United States v. Molina-Isidoro, 884 F.3d 287, 294 (5th Cir. 2018) (Costa, J., concurring) (noting
that “no reported federal decision has required a warrant for any border search”)). The Aigbekaen
court acknowledged its 2018 recognition in Kolsuz “that ‘a search initiated at the border could
become so attenuated from the rationale for the border search exception that it no longer would
fall under that exception’ and so require a warrant.” Id. (citing Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 143). The
court then went on to ultimately hold as unconstitutional “such an attenuated, warrantless,
nonroutine forensic search at the border.” Id.
The undersigned is thus unpersuaded that the Government can claim reasonable reliance
on binding precedent such that the good faith exception would apply in this case. The Fourth
Circuit has clearly taken pains “to guide future action by law enforcement officers and magistrates”
in establishing that nonroutine searches, specifically including the forensic searches of electronic
devices, may be so attenuated from the rationale underlying the border search exception as to
require a warrant. Indeed, in Nkongho:
Because the Homeland Security Investigations agents didn’t know whether they
needed a warrant to search the devices, they contacted the local U.S. Attorney’s
Office and their agency’s internal legal department for advice. Despite
disagreement between the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the agency’s legal
department about needing a warrant, [HSI Agent] Merker applied for one…nine
days after the devices were seized. He received the warrant that day.
Nkongho, 107 F. 4th at 378.
The undersigned is thus persuaded by Defendant’s argument that “[a]fter Kolsuz and
Aigbekaen, decided in 2018 and 2019, respectively, good faith for the illegal search no longer
applies.” (Document No. 33, p. 5).
As such, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Defendant’s “Motion To Suppress
Evidence Seized On February 5, 2024” (Document No. 33) be granted.
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B. Statements Made And Evidence Seized On March 25, 2024
Defendant also requests that certain statements made and evidence seized on March 25,
2024, be suppressed. (Document No. 34). In response to this motion, the Government asserts it
does not intend to use the disputed evidence at trial and plans to return the seized phone.
(Document No. 48). As such, Defendant conceded at the evidentiary hearing that this motion is
effectively moot. The undersigned will therefore respectfully recommend that “Defendant’s
Motion To Suppress Statements Made And Evidence Seized On March 25, 2024” (Document No.
34) be denied as moot, without prejudice to re-file if the Government changes its position regarding
the disputed evidence.
C. Statements Made And Evidence Seized On June 23, 2023
Defendant contends “he was seized and in custody on June 23, 2023[,] when he was
required to deplane, searched, and questioned without the benefit of Miranda warnings,” and that
“[e]vidence gathered from the illegal seizure, including but not limited to unwarned statements
and fruits of those statements, must be suppressed.” (Document No. 35, pp. 1–2). Defendant cites
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), to support his argument regarding the coercive nature of
airport encounters. Id. at p. 3. Defendant argues that “[g]iven the circumstances surrounding [his]
interrogation, no reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the encounter and leave.” Id.
at p. 4. Defendant emphasizes the detention of his luggage and the location of the encounter in an
airport, as well as the fact he was surrounded by three law enforcement officers and informed that
a narcotics canine had alerted on his luggage, as factors that restricted his means of egress from
the situation and combined to make the encounter tantamount to a formal arrest. (Document No.
35, pp. 3–4); (Document No. 47, pp. 2–4).
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The Government argues in response that Miranda warnings were not required and, in any
event, Defendant’s statements offered during questioning were voluntary. (Document No. 43, p.
1). The Government emphasizes “[t]he entire interaction occurred in public view,” “[o]fficers
never made physical contact with Stallworth, and Stallworth was never placed in handcuffs.” Id.
at p. 3. Moreover, “[d]uring the search, Stallworth was specifically told that he was not under
arrest and that he could leave at any time. Stallworth chose to remain with his luggage rather than
discontinue his interaction with law enforcement.” Id. At the evidentiary hearing, the Government
further argued that, under the totality of the circumstances, Defendant was free to leave the
interaction with law enforcement. The Government contended the circumstances of the interaction
did not rise to the level of a formal arrest. Ultimately, the Government argued Defendant was not
in custody while being questioned and therefore was not entitled to Miranda protections.
To the extent Defendant’s Motion suggests his consent to the agents’ search of his luggage
during this encounter was tainted by coercion, the undersigned notes that at the evidentiary hearing
held on September 18, 2024, Defendant conceded the validity of this consent and focused solely
on the issue of Miranda warnings.
With respect to the issue of Miranda warnings, the undersigned is ultimately persuaded by
the Government’s argument that, considering the totality of the circumstances, Defendant was not
in custody at the time of questioning.
Several aspects of the Royer case make it distinguishable from the instant matter. In Royer,
detectives stopped the defendant at the Miami International Airport based on profiling. Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 493–94 (1983). The detectives procured Royer’s airline ticket and driver’s
license, then asked him to accompany them to a room “later described…as a ‘large storage closet,’
located in the stewardesses’ lounge and containing a small desk and two chairs.” Id. at 494. The
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detectives searched Royer’s luggage without procuring oral consent for one suitcase and without
returning Royer’s ticket or license to him. Id. at 494–95. On appeal, the State “conceded at oral
argument before the court that ‘the officers would not have permitted Royer to leave the room
even if [Royer] had erroneously thought he could.’” Id. at 496. “Royer was never informed that
he was free to board his plane if he so chose, and he reasonably believed that he was being
detained.” Id. at 503.
In the instant case, any questioning of Defendant occurred in public view, in an open area
of the airport concourse accessible to all ticketed passengers. No barriers separated Defendant
from the rest of the ticketed passengers in the concourse. Defendant was informed he was free to
leave at any time. Law enforcement told Defendant he would not miss his flight, which Defendant
seemed to believe. Defendant had various means of egress available to him, including the option
to reboard his flight. Defendant was permitted to remain on an active FaceTime call with a fellow
traveler for the duration of the interaction. Defendant was permitted to retain the cash discovered
in his luggage. At no time was Defendant physically touched or placed in handcuffs.
The undersigned is ultimately satisfied that, in contrast to Royer, at no time during the June
23, 2023, encounter did Defendant’s circumstances “rise to the level of a formal arrest.” As such,
the undersigned finds Miranda warnings were not required prior to questioning Defendant during
the encounter, and Defendant’s statements made in response to these questions do not require
suppression. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (“Miranda warnings are required
only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him ‘in custody.’”).
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned respectfully recommends that “Defendant’s
Motion To Suppress Statements Made And Evidence Seized And Acquired On June 23, 2023”
(Document No. 35) be denied.
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V. CONCLUSION
The undersigned finds that, with respect to the evidence seized on February 5, 2024, the
border search exception to the warrant requirement did not apply due to an absence of the requisite
transnational nexus. The undersigned also finds the good faith exception inapplicable in this case,
and suppression of this evidence is thus proper.
The undersigned next finds that, with respect to the statements made and evidence seized
on March 25, 2024, Defendant concedes the related “…Motion To Suppress…” (Document No.
34) is moot.
Lastly, the undersigned finds that, with respect to statements made and evidence seized on
June 23, 2023, the totality of the circumstances did not render Defendant “in custody” for purposes
of necessitating Miranda warnings. Thus, suppression of these statements and this evidence is not
required by the lack of Miranda warnings given on June 23, 2023.
VI. RECOMMENDATION
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the
“…Motion To Suppress Evidence Seized on February 5, 2024” (Document No. 33) be granted,
the “…Motion To Suppress Statements Made and Evidence Seized on March 25, 2024”
(Document No. 34) be denied as moot, without prejudice to refile if the Government changes its
position, and the ”…Motion to Suppress Statements Made and Evidence Acquired on June 23,
2023” (Document No. 35) be denied.
VII. TIME FOR OBJECTIONS
The parties are hereby advised that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), and Rule 72 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, written objections to the proposed findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and recommendation contained herein may be filed within fourteen (14) days
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of service of same. Responses to objections may be filed within fourteen (14) days after service
of the objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file objections to this Memorandum and
Recommendation with the District Court constitutes a waiver of the right to de novo review by the
District Court. Diamond v. Colonial Life, 416 F.3d 310, 315-16 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 428 (4th Cir. 2008). Moreover, failure to file timely objections will preclude
the parties from raising such objections on appeal. Id. “In order ‘to preserve for appeal an issue
in a magistrate judge’s report, a party must object to the finding or recommendation on that issue
with sufficient specificity so as reasonably to alert the district court of the true ground for the
objection.’” Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239, 245 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Midgette,
478 F.3d 616, 622 (4th Cir. 2007)).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Signed: October 14, 2024
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