Patterson v. City of Charlotte

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
3:18-cv-00612-RJC-DSC
Will Summers Jr, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
City of Charlotte,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Order
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (the
“Motion”) (Doc. No. 183). For the reasons stated herein, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART
and DENIED IN PART.
I. BACKGROUND
After seven successful motions to compel and one successful motion for sanctions,
Plaintiffs filed a second motion for sanctions seeking default judgment and attorneys’ fees. (Doc.
No. 117). The Magistrate Judge recommended granting the second motion for sanctions in part,
and sanctioning Defendant by striking its motions for summary judgment, giving an adverse jury
instruction addressing the loss or destruction of responsive documents, and awarding reasonable
attorneys’ fees (the “M&R”). (Doc. No. 143). Over objection, the Court adopted the M&R and
requested that Plaintiffs submit an accounting of their reasonable attorneys’ fees. (Doc. No. 177).
Thereafter, Plaintiffs submitted their Motion for Attorneys’ Fees seeking $37,824.84 for costs and
attorneys’ fees associated with filing their second motion for sanctions. (Doc. Nos. 183, 184).
Case 3:18-cv-00612-TMR-SCR Document 205 Filed 06/06/22 Page 1 of 5

Specifically, Plaintiffs request $445.34 in costs for Westlaw research and attorneys’ fees based on
the following:1
(Id.). Plaintiffs also ask the Court to order Defendant’s counsel jointly and severally liable for the
award. (Id.).
II. DISCUSSION
An award of attorney’s fees and the amount awarded is within the district court’s discretion.
McAfee v. Boczar, 738 F.3d 81, 88 (4th Cir. 2013). The starting point is to determine the lodestar
figure by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. Id.;
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). “To ascertain what is reasonable in terms of
hours expended and the rate charged, the court is bound to apply the factors set forth in Johnson
v. Georgia Highway Express Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974).” Id.; Randolph v.
Powercomm Construction, Inc., 715 Fed. App’x 227, 230 (4th Cir. 2017) (unpublished). The
Johnson factors are:
(1) the time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions
raised; (3) the skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered; (4) the
attorney’s opportunity costs in pressing the instant litigation; (5) the customary fee
for like work; (6) the attorney’s expectations at the outset of the litigation; (7) the
time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount in
1 Although this table, an image from Plaintiffs’ counsel’s affidavit in support of the Motion, lists
paralegal Melissa Hall’s hourly rate as $250, other documents in support of the Motion list Ms.
Hall’s hourly rate as $150, which is consistent with the total fees calculation requested (33.5 hours
X $150/hour = $5,025). (Doc. No. 184-1). Additionally, while this table represents that attorney
Mitchell Davis billed 49.3 hours, the time records submitted in support of the Motion indicate Mr.
Davis billed 46.3 hours on the second motion for sanctions. (Doc. No. 184-1).
Case 3:18-cv-00612-TMR-SCR Document 205 Filed 06/06/22 Page 2 of 5

controversy and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of
the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case within the legal community in which
the suit arose; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship between
attorney and client; and (12) attorneys’ fees awards in similar cases.
Id. n.2.
“Billing judgment is an important component in fee setting” and “[c]ounsel for the
prevailing party should make a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are
excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. “Hours that are
‘excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary,’ are to be excluded, and in dealing with such
surplusage, the court has discretion simply to deduct a reasonable percentage of the number of
hours claimed ‘as a practical means of trimming fat from a fee application.’” Kirsch v. Fleet St.,
Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 173 (2d Cir. 1983). “The burden is on the party seeking attorney’s fees to
submit sufficient evidence to support the hours worked and the rates claimed.” Hugee v. Kimso
Apts., LLC, 852 F. Supp. 2d 281, 298 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433).
Defendant largely argues the number of hours expended on Plaintiffs’ second motion for
sanctions is excessive. According to the Motion, Plaintiffs’ counsel spent roughly 170 hours on
the second motion for sanctions, exhibits, and reply brief. While Plaintiffs’ second motion for
sanctions was helpful and detailed, after reviewing the time records, the Court finds the number of
hours spent on the second motion for sanctions excessive. First, the time records include some
redundant, duplicative, and excessive time entries related to research, drafting, revising, and
preparing the second motion for sanctions. Further, the time records provide a number of hours
spent reviewing Defendant’s discovery responses to assist with preparing exhibits and the Motion.
However, to some extent, reviewing and organizing discovery responses are necessary tasks for
litigating and preparing a case for trial regardless of whether discovery disputes and sanctions
motions arise. Further, the discovery rules, discovery disputes, and related sanctions are not novel
Case 3:18-cv-00612-TMR-SCR Document 205 Filed 06/06/22 Page 3 of 5

or difficult, and do not require any extraordinary skill. Rather, all lawyers litigating civil cases in
federal court should be familiar with and knowledgeable about the discovery rules and related
disputes while representing their clients. Last, the Court notes that the Magistrate Judge
determined that the reasonable attorneys’ fees for Plaintiffs’ first motion for sanctions was $5,000,
reduced from the request for $22,520 for 95.8 hours.
On the other hand, the Court is aware that Defendant caused discovery and related disputes
to be significantly more difficult than necessary and repeatedly failed to participate in the discovery
process. Indeed, even in the face of numerous Court Orders compelling Defendant to comply with
discovery requirements and sanctions Defendant continued to fail to comply. The need to file the
second motion for sanctions was caused only by Defendant’s continued actions, and inactions,
evidencing an intent to deprive Plaintiffs of information.
For these reasons, the Court finds it necessary to reduce Plaintiffs’ hours by fifty percent
(50%). In making this reduction, the Court does not opine on the decision of the lawyers or their
client to spend hours above the amount the Court ultimately determines is reasonable. There may
be internal standards of excellence adhered to, or client expectations, that push lawyers to do more
rather than less in pursuing a successful outcome. Additionally, the Court finds Plaintiffs’
counsel’s hourly rates to be reasonable. Accordingly, as Plaintiffs’ counsel billed 168.25 hours2
at an average rate of $242.50 per hour, Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys’
2 Plaintiffs’ Motion and related records provide inconsistent evidence of the number of hours
expended on the second motion for sanctions. For example, the time records provides a total of
170.1 hours, but the breakdown of time by individual on the same document only provides a total
of 168.25 hours. (Doc. No. 184-1 at 16). And the table of hours in Plaintiffs’ counsel’s affidavit
provides a total of 171.25 hours. (Id. at 7). Due to this inconsistency, and that it is Plaintiffs’
burden to demonstrate reasonable attorneys’ fees, the Court will start with 168.25 hours. (Id. at
16).
Case 3:18-cv-00612-TMR-SCR Document 205 Filed 06/06/22 Page 4 of 5

fees in the amount of $20,401.53 (84.13 hours X $242.50/hour = $20,401.53). Plaintiffs are also
entitled to reasonable costs for Westlaw research in the amount of $445.34. Finally, the Court will
deny Plaintiffs’ request to order Defendant’s counsel jointly and severally liable for the fees and
costs awarded for the second motion for sanctions.
III. CONCLUSION
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (Doc. No. 183) is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART;
2. Plaintiffs are AWARDED $20,401.53 in reasonable attorneys’ fees and $445.34 in
costs which shall be paid directly to Plaintiffs’ counsel within forty-five (45) days of
this Order; and
3. Plaintiffs’ request for Defendant’s counsel to be jointly and severally liable is
DENIED.
Signed: June 6, 2022
Case 3:18-cv-00612-TMR-SCR Document 205 Filed 06/06/22 Page 5 of 5