Jefferson v. Boykins et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
1:24-cv-00219-MR
ANTONIO DUPREE )
JEFFERSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) ORDER
)
)
T.J. BOYKINS, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
___________________________ )
THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff’s
Complaint, [Doc. 1], filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)
and 1915A. Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. [Docs. 2, 4].
I. BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiff Antonio Dupree Jefferson (“Plaintiff”) is a prisoner of
the State of North Carolina currently incarcerated at the Tabor Correctional
Institution in Tabor City, North Carolina. He filed this action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 on August 19, 2024, against the following Defendants: (1) T.J.
Boykins, identified as a Sergeant Correctional Officer at the Rutherford
County Detention Center (the “Jail”); (2) Joey E. Brandle, identified as a
Rutherford County Sheriff’s Department Deputy (“Sheriff’s Deputy”); (3) D.S.
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Chapman, identified as a Sheriff’s Deputy; (4) FNU Steele, identified as a
Jail Corporal; (5) FNU Smith, identified as a Jail Corporal; (6) John Doe 1,
identified as a Sheriff’s Deputy; and (7) John Doe 2, identified as a Sheriff’s
Deputy. [Id. at 3-5]. Plaintiff sues Defendants in their individual and official
capacities. [Id.].
Plaintiff alleges as follows. On August 22, 2021, Plaintiff was detained
at the Jail when Defendant Steele, along with multiple Sheriff’s Department
and Jail employees, entered Plaintiff’s cell and “viciously attacked” the
Plaintiff, pushing him into his bed and Steele “wrapping his hands around
[Plaintiff’s] throat, leaving [Plaintiff] unable to breathe for several seconds
until being forcefully removed by” Defendant Doe 1. Plaintiff complained to
Defendants Smith and Brandle and another Sheriff’s Deputy about the use
of excessive force. Defendant Boykins then escorted Plaintiff from his cell
and down some stairs. Plaintiff upset Defendant Boykins to the point that
Boykins “aggressively wrapped his arm around [Plaintiff’s] neck and
slammed [him] face first into the concrete,” breaking Plaintiff’s tooth and
injuring his lip. [Id. at 6]. The other officers “dog piled and handcuffed”
Plaintiff. [Id. at 6-7]. Defendants Boykins, Brandle, Chapman, and others
“slightly drug” Plaintiff towards the landing. While Plaintiff was handcuffed
behind his back and unable to defend himself, Defendants Boykins, Brandle,
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Chapman, Smith, Doe 1, and Doe 2, believing Plaintiff had spat on
Defendant Boykins, “all maliciously, sadistically and brutally beat [Plaintiff]
with closed fist.” [Id. at 7]. Plaintiff was eventually strapped into a full
restraint chair and a “spit cover” was placed over his head. “[T]he mentioned
parties escorted [Plaintiff] to a solitary cell where [he] remained for hours
unable to recieve [sic] any type of medical treatment” for his injuries. [Id.].
Plaintiff claims Defendants violated his rights under the First, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendments.1 [Id. at 6]. For injuries, Plaintiff claims that he
suffered a broken tooth, brain trauma, a “busted lip,” and “multiple knots on
[his] head and facial area.” [Id. at 8]. For relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary
relief, including punitive damages. [Id. at 9].
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must
review the Complaint to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the
grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore, under § 1915A
the Court must conduct an initial review and identify and dismiss the
complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief
1 The Court will address those claims fairly raised by Plaintiff’s Complaint.
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from a defendant who is immune to such relief.
In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the Complaint
raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly
baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se
complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a
district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his Complaint which
set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
III. DISCUSSION
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was
deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
and that the alleged deprivation was committed by a “person” acting under
color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan,
526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999); Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty. v. Talevski,
599 U.S. 166, 143 S.Ct. 1444 (2023).
A. Official Capacity Claims
Suits against an officer in his official capacity “generally represent only
another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an
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agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099 (1985)
(1985) (quoting Monell v Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436
U.S. 658, 690 n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035 (1978)). The Office of Sheriff is
not liable under § 1983 for an employee’s acts “unless action pursuant to
official municipal policy of some nature caused [the] constitutional tort.”
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120-21, 112 S.Ct. 1061,
1066 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2036). That is, “[f]or a
governmental entity to be liable under section 1983, the official policy must
be the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Moore v. City of
Creedmoor, 345 N.C. 356, 366, 481 S.E.2d 14, 21 (1997) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). “Thus, the entity’s ‘policy or custom’ must have
played a part in the violation of federal law.” Id. (quoting Monell, 436 U.S.
658, 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2037-38).
Plaintiff purports to sue the individual Defendants, who he alleges are
employees of either the Jail or the Sheriff’s Department, in their official and
individual capacities. Plaintiff, however, fails to allege that any official policy
was the moving force behind or otherwise played a part in any constitutional
violation. The Court, therefore, will dismiss Plaintiff’s official capacity claims.
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B. Fourteenth Amendment
The Fourteenth Amendment “protects a pretrial detainee from the use
of excessive force that amounts to punishment.” Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989). To state an excessive force claim, a pretrial
detainee must show only that the force “purposely or knowingly used against
him was objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389
(2015). The standard for assessing a pretrial detainee’s excessive force
claim is “solely an objective one.” Id. In determining whether the force was
objectively unreasonable, a court considers the evidence “from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer
knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. (citing Graham,
490 U.S. at 396).
Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true and drawing all reasonable
inferences in his favor, Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment excessive force
claim against all Defendants survives initial review as not clearly frivolous.
A pretrial detainee’s claim based on deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need is also properly brought pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment. Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593, 611 (4th Cir. 2023). To state
such a claim, a plaintiff must allege that:
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(1) they had a medical condition or injury that posed a substantial
risk of serious harm; (2) the defendant intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly acted or failed to act to appropriately address the risk
that the condition posed; (3) the defendant knew or should have
known (a) that the detainee had the condition and (b) that the
defendant's action or inaction posed an unjustifiably high risk of
harm; and (4) as a result, the detainee was harmed.
Id. at 611. Under this standard, “the plaintiff [need not] show that the
defendant had actual knowledge of the detainee’s serious medical condition
and consciously disregarded the risk that their action or failure to act would
result in harm.” Id. “[I]t is enough that the plaintiff show that the defendant
acted or failed to act ‘in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is
either known or so obvious that it should be known.’” Id. (quoting Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994)). It remains, however,
insufficient “for the plaintiff to allege that the defendant negligently or
accidentally failed to do right by the detainee.” Id. at 611-12.
Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true and giving him the benefit of every
reasonable inference, Plaintiff has nonetheless failed to state a claim based
on the alleged denial of medical care. Plaintiff alleges only that Defendants
Boykins, Brandle, Chapman, Smith, Doe 1, and Doe 2 escorted Plaintiff to a
solitary cell “where [he] remained for hours unable to receive any type of
medical treatment [for his] trauma to the brain, a broken, tooth, busted lip as
well as multiple light headed spells[.]” [Doc.1 at 7]. Even if the Court
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assumes Plaintiff’s injuries posed a substantial risk of serious harm, Plaintiff
has failed to allege facts showing that these Defendants “intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly” failed to act to address the risk these conditions
posed or that Defendants knew or should have known that Plaintiff had these
conditions and that their inaction posed an unjustifiably high risk of harm.
See Short, 87 F.4th at 611. The Court, therefore, will dismiss this claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s
Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim survives initial review against
all Defendants. Plaintiff’s remaining claims, including his official capacity
claims, fail initial review and will be dismissed.
Before the Court can facilitate service on the Defendants John Doe 1
and John Doe 2, Plaintiff must identify and provide completed summonses
for these Defendants. In this regard, Plaintiff may conduct pre-service
discovery to identify these Defendants. Should Plaintiff be unable to identify
the Defendants by name, he must submit on the summonses any and all
information he knows that may assist in their identification and subsequent
service on them.
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ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Fourteenth
Amendment excessive force claim survives initial review against all
Defendants in accordance with this Order. Plaintiff’s remaining claims,
including his official capacity claims, are DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall identify Defendants
John Doe 1 and John Doe 2 in accordance with the terms of this Order.
The Clerk is instructed to mail seven (7) blank summonses to Plaintiff
to fill out and identify Defendants, and then return the summonses to the
Court. Plaintiff is required to provide the necessary information for the U.S.
Marshal to effectuate service on Defendants. When the Court receives these
summonses from Plaintiff, the Clerk shall direct the U.S. Marshal to
effectuate service upon Defendants.
The Clerk is also instructed to separately list Defendant “John Does”
as “John Doe 1” and “John Doe 2” in the docket in this matter.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed: September 2, 2024
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