Crowder et al v. Burress et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
1:24-cv-00059-KDB
DANIEL L. CROWDER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. )
) ORDER
)
BETHANY HERMAN, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
____________________________________)
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 14],
Defendants’ motions to seal [Docs. 23, 29], Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Doc. 9],
and Plaintiff’s “Motion For Judges Consideration While deciding Preliminary Injunction,” [Doc.
12], which the Court construes as a motion to supplement Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction.
I. BACKGROUND
On February 20, 2024, pro se Plaintiff Daniel L. Crowder filed this action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of himself and his wife Diane L. Crowder1 against Defendants (1)
Kimberly Burress, Probation/Parole Officer; (2) Bethany Herman, Chief Probation Officer; (3)
Gregory Moss, Jr., Member of the North Carolina Post-Release Supervision & Parole Commission
(the “Commission” or “Parole Commission”)2; (4) Graham Atkinson, Commission Member; (5)
1 The Court dismissed Diane Crowder as a Plaintiff in this matter on initial review because she did not sign
the Complaint. [Doc. 6 at n.1].
2 The Commission, which is part of the North Carolina Department of Adult Corrections (NCDAC), “has
been delegated the authority by the General Assembly to decide which conditions authorized by N.C.G.S.
§ 15A-1368.4 to impose for every prisoner subject to [post-release supervision].” State v. McCants, 854
S.E.2d 415, 419 (N.C. App. 2020).
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Haley Phillips, Commission Member; and (6) Darren Jackson, Commission Chair, in their
individual and official capacities. [Doc. 1 at 13-14]. In his unverified Complaint, Plaintiff alleged
that he and his wife were arrested in June 2016 and eventually pleaded guilty in 2022 to
unidentified charges and were sentenced to terms of incarceration of 25 to 42 months. Plaintiff
further alleged that, on release, he and his wife will be subject to twelve-month terms of post-
release supervision a condition of which would prohibit them from having any contact with each
other. Plaintiff claimed that the post-release supervision term prohibiting him from contacting and
living with his wife “would be an ongoing violation of Federal Law” and violate his due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff sought monetary damages and injunctive relief
ordering that Plaintiff and his wife not be found in violation of their post-release supervision terms
“if they live together as husband and wife” and that they not be “retaliated against” during their
supervised release. [Docs. 1, 4].
On March 5, 2024, Plaintiff’s Complaint failed initial review. [Doc. 6]. The Court
concluded that it appeared to lack subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff had not yet suffered
injury and the matter in controversy was not yet final and “remained dependent on future
uncertainties.” [Id. at 4 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)]. The Court also noted
that it was unclear whether the terms of Plaintiff’s post-release supervision had been entered as
part of a state court judgment, and, if so, whether relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was barred by
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and whether 28 U.S.C. § 2254 was the proper avenue
for relief. [Id. at 5-6]. The Court allowed Plaintiff to amend his Complaint to state a claim for
relief. [Id. at 7].
Plaintiff timely filed an unverified Amended Complaint. [Doc. 7]. Plaintiff named the
same Defendants, again in their individual and official capacities. [Id. at 12-13]. He alleged as
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follows. On or about December 19, 2023, while Plaintiff was incarcerated at Randolph
Correctional Center in Asheboro, North Carolina, Plaintiff’s mother learned from Defendant
Herman, Chief Probation Officer, that Plaintiff and his wife would not be allowed to live together
nor contact each other while on post-release supervision. [Id. at 15]. On January 2, 2024,
Plaintiff’s case manager told him as much and that he needed to make alternative living
arrangements because his wife would be released before him. [Id.]. Plaintiff attempted to appeal
this post-release condition with the Commission. [Id. at 15-16]. On February 27, 2024, after
apparently having been transferred to Craggy Correctional Center in Asheville, North Carolina,
Plaintiff learned that the “parole condition” would not be changed. [Id. at 17-18]. Plaintiff was
released from state prison on May 7, 2024, and is now serving 75 days in County Jail. He will be
released from the Jail on or about July 20, 2023. [See id. at 19]. Similarly, his wife was released
from prison on April 7, 2024, and is now serving 75 days in Jail. She will be released on June 20,
2024. [See id.]. On their respective releases from Jail, Plaintiff and his wife will each have nine
and a half months remaining on their terms of supervised release.3 [Id. at 19]. Plaintiff is not
challenging the term of post-release supervision, but only the post release “‘condition’” imposed
by the Commission preventing him from living with his wife on release. [Id. at 19]. The
challenged condition “was not ordered by the [state] court in or during any criminal proceeding,”
and is not among those authorized by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1368.4. Rather it is a discretionary condition
imposed by the Commission under § 15A-1368.4(c). 4 [Id. at 19-20].
3 According to the sworn materials filed by Defendants, Plaintiff’s 12-month term of supervised release
does not begin until the expiration of his misdemeanor sentences, which he is currently serving in the
custody of the Swain County Sheriff. [Doc. 22-1 at ¶¶ 3-5].
4 Nowhere in his Complaint or Amended Complaint did Plaintiff allege the nature of the crimes for which
he was and is serving these sentences. [See Docs. 1, 7]. Although not bearing on Defendants’ motion to
dismiss, the Court by way of background and context provides the following from Defendants’ response to
Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction.
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Plaintiff again claimed that the subject condition of his parole “would be an ongoing
violation” of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. [Id. at 7]. For relief, Plaintiff seeks
a permanent injunction allowing him and his wife to live together as husband and wife after their
release from custody and preventing “retaliation” against them for living together as husband and
wife while on post-release supervision.5 [Id. at 24]. Plaintiff also sought monetary relief. [Id.].
On or about August 8, 2016, Plaintiff was indicted for felony child abuse that resulted in serious
bodily injury to a four-year-old child in his care, “namely brain and spinal cord injury requiring
neurosurgical intervention,” in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-318.4(a4). [Doc. 22-8]. On April 4, 2016, the
minor victim was brought to the Swain County Hospital emergency room by Mrs. Crowder who claimed
he was possibly a “drug baby.” The minor victim was not breathing, ashen in color, had a core temperature
of 87 degrees, very dirty, malnourished, and had bruises, scratches, and other injuries all over his body.
[Doc. 22-3 at 4]. The child’s skin was hanging off his body, he had no hair, and was covered in dirt and
animal feces. [Id.]. The child was transferred to the intensive care unit at Mission Hospital because he was
not breathing on his own. [Id. at 5]. The child was placed on life support. He had two “brain bleeds” and
a spinal injury all caused by blunt force trauma. [Doc. 22-4; Doc. 22-5 at 6]. Investigators learned from
one of the Plaintiffs and Mrs. Crowder’s biological children that they kept the refrigerator locked and
alarmed so they would know when the minor victim tried to get food, and, when he did, “they would take
a switch to his legs.” [Doc. 22-3 at 6]. Investigators also learned that, up until March 2016 when Plaintiff
and Mrs. Crowder became the primary caregivers of the child, the minor victim was a “normal 4 year old
boy.” [Doc. 22-4].
On or about May 11, 2022, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to one count of violation of Section 14-
318.4(a4), which carried a maximum term of 88 months, and two misdemeanor counts of violation of
N.C.G.S. § 14-318.2, which each carried a maximum term of 150 days. The trial court sentenced Plaintiff
to a maximum term of 42 months in the custody of the NCDAC for the felony conviction and a consecutive
sentence of a maximum term of 75 days in the custody of the Swain County Sheriff for both misdemeanor
convictions. [Doc. 22-10, 22-11]. Plaintiff’s co-defendant wife, Diane Crowder, who also pleaded guilty,
was identically sentenced the same day for the same crimes. [Docs. 22-12, 22-13]. Pursuant to a negotiated
plea, Plaintiff and Mrs. Crowder also have the same 12-month post-release supervision sentences, which
are for the suspended portion of their felony child abuse sentences. [Doc. 22-1 at ¶¶ 6, 10: Herman Aff.].
In addition to “required” and “controlling” conditions of supervised release mandated by statute,
the Division of Community Supervision (“Community Supervision”), which is part of the NCDAC, is
authorized to impose discretionary conditions that must be approved by the Commission. [Id. at ¶ 14 (citing
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1368.4)]. One discretionary condition imposed by Community Supervision for all
offenders with co-defendants is that such offenders have no contact with any co-defendant(s) during the
term of supervised release. [Id. at ¶ 15].
5 Plaintiff also separately moved to preliminarily enjoin Defendants from enforcing the disputed condition,
[Doc. 9; see Doc. 12] and asks the Court to seal his supplement to his motion for preliminary injunction.
[Doc. 12 at 7]. The Court will deny the request to seal. Plaintiff provides no grounds for this relief and
himself acknowledges that the information he wants sealed, that is, the charges he and his wife were
convicted of, are accessible for public viewing on the NCDAC website.
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On initial review of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, the Court, citing Ex parte Young, 28
S.Ct. 441 (1908), found that Plaintiff’s official capacity Fourteenth Amendment due process
claims against Defendants Herman, Moss, Atkinson, Phillips, and Jackson were “not wholly
frivolous” and allowed them to pass initial review. [Doc. 10 at 5-6]. The Court, however, found
that Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Burress were insufficient and dismissed her as a
Defendant. [Id. at 6]. The Court also dismissed Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims against all
Defendants because parole officers and members of the Commission are immune from liability in
money damages.6 and reserved ruling on Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction pending
Defendants’ response thereto [Id. (citation omitted), 8-9].
On April 26, 2024, Defendants moved to dismiss this action pursuant to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (b)(6) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and Plaintiff’s failure to
state a claim for relief, respectively, and answered Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. [Docs. 14,
16]. On May 3, 2024, Defendants responded to Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction and
moved to seal certain documents filed in support of their response. [Docs. 22, 23; see Doc. 29].
Plaintiff has responded to Defendants’ motion to dismiss [Doc. 28] and replied to Defendants’
response to his motion for preliminary injunction [Doc. 31].
These matters are now ripe for adjudication.
II. MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendants move to dismiss this action pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. [Doc. 15]. Defendants argue that this Court should dismiss this
action because there is no federal constitutional right to relief; Plaintiff’s remaining claim is not
ripe for review; the Eleventh Amendment and common law immunity bar Plaintiff’s claims;
6 The Court reserved ruling on Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction pending Defendants’ response
thereto. [Id. at 8-9].
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matters in the statutory discretion of the Commission are not properly before the Court; and, citing
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1981), this Court lacks authority to
modify conditions of North Carolina supervised release. [Id.]. Because they are determinative,
the Court addresses only Younger abstention and the lack of an applicable federal constitutional
right to relief.
A. Legal Standards
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a party may seek dismissal based on the
court's “lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The United States Courts are
courts of specifically limited jurisdiction and may exercise only that jurisdiction which Congress
has prescribed. Chris v. Tenet, 221 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). Therefore, whether the Court has jurisdiction
over the subject matter of a case must be considered before addressing its merits. Jones v. Am.
Postal Workers Union, 192 F.3d 417, 422 (4th Cir. 1999). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving
that subject matter jurisdiction exists. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United
States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991). When a defendant challenges subject matter jurisdiction
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), “the district court is to regard the pleadings as mere evidence on the
issue, and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one
for summary judgment.” Id. The district court should grant the Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss
“only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail
as a matter of law.” Id.
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for “failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted” tests whether the complaint is legally and factually
sufficient. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In evaluating whether a claim is stated, “[the] court
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accepts all well-pled facts as true and construes these facts in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff,” but does not consider “legal conclusions, elements of a cause of action, ... bare assertions
devoid of further factual enhancement[,] ... unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or
arguments.” Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir.
2009). Construing the facts in this manner, a complaint must only contain “sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (internal
quotations omitted). Thus, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) determines only whether a
claim is stated; “it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the
applicability of defenses.” Republican Party of North Carolina v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th
Cir. 1992).
B. Younger Abstention
Defendants argue inter alia that this Court lacks “authority” to address Plaintiff’s claim,
and that, as a matter of “administrative discretion” committed entirely to the Commission, judicial
review is unavailable. [Doc. 15 at 7]. In this regard, Defendants tacitly invoke Younger, without
meaningful argument in support of abstention. [See id.]. Because the Court may invoke Younger
sua sponte in any event, the Court address it here. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 143 n.10
(1976).
As a general matter, “federal courts lack the authority to abstain from the exercise of
jurisdiction that has been conferred,” New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans,
491 U.S. 350, 358, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 (1989). Nonetheless, there is a “longstanding
public policy against federal court interference with state court proceedings” that is grounded in
“the notion of ‘comity,’ that is, a proper respect for state functions.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
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Federal courts, therefore, have broad discretion to withhold relief that would cause “undue
interference with state proceedings.” Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. at 359.
In Younger, the Supreme Court held that a federal court should abstain from deciding cases
in which plaintiffs seek to enjoin pending state-court criminal proceedings. See id. at 44. “So
long as the plaintiff’s constitutional claim can be adjudicated in the state forum, and ‘so long as
there is no showing of bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary circumstances that would
make abstention inappropriate, the federal courts should abstain.’” White v. Covington, 2010 WL
538849, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2010) (quoting Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State
Bar Ass’n., 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Under the abstention doctrine, abstention is proper in federal court when (1) there is an
ongoing state court proceeding; (2) the proceeding implicates important state interests; and (3) the
petitioner has an adequate opportunity to present the federal claims in the state proceeding. Emp’rs
Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Shannon, 65 F.3d 1126, 1134 (4th Cir. 1995).
North Carolina’s Justice Reinvestment Act (“JRA”), effective December 1, 2011,
“mandates terms of post-release supervision for all convicted felons except those serving sentences
of life without parole.” United States v. Barlow, 811 F.3d 133, 137 (4th Cir. 2015) (citation
omitted). In North Carolina, post-release supervision is defined as “[t]he time for which a
sentenced prisoner is released from prison before the termination of his maximum prison term.”
Id. at 138 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1368(a)(1)). Under this scheme, the “‘sentence or
sentences’” imposed do not terminate until ‘a supervisee completes the period of post-release
supervision.’” Id. (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1368.2(f)). “State law accordingly places time
spent on post-release supervision within, not outside of or in addition to, the maximum term of
imprisonment.” Id. In this regard, the Fourth Circuit has held that a term of post-release
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supervision in North Carolina is unambiguously part of a convicted felon’s sentence. Id. at 138-
40. Here, Plaintiff remains incarcerated on two misdemeanors related to his felony child abuse
conviction and, beginning on or around July 20, 2024, he will begin a mandatory 12-month term
of post-release supervision that is necessarily part of his state felony criminal sentence and under
which he will remain a prisoner of the State of North Carolina.
The Fourth Circuit has not addressed whether mandatory North Carolina post-release
supervision constitutes an “ongoing state proceeding” warranting Younger abstention. In
considering the treatment of comparable circumstances by other courts, however, the Court
concludes that the state proceedings at issue here are ongoing for Younger purposes. See Tobey
v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 651 (7th Cir. 2018) (holding that Younger prohibits federal courts from
“taking jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims that involve or call into question ongoing
state proceedings,” including ongoing supervision of a probation); Huggins v. ABK Tracking, Inc.,
676 F.Supp.3d 662, 683 (S.D. Ind. Jun. 9, 2023) (concluding abstention appropriate in state
criminal defendants’ suit against supervision monitoring company for return of fees because its
acts were in furtherance of conditions of said defendant’s state criminal sentence); Mabe v. LNU,
2022 WL 4870885, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 3, 2022) (abstaining under Younger on initial review of
§ 1983 claim by North Carolina state prisoner in custody on post-release supervision violation);
Azizi v. Zierhut, 2022 WL 3700884, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 26, 2022) (concluding on initial review
of pro se plaintiff’s § 1983 complaint that “this court cannot interfere [under Younger if] the
plaintiff’s probation term is lawful and still ongoing”). See also Moore v. City of Asheville, N.C.,
396 F.3d 385, 395 (4th Cir. 2005) (upholding district court’s abstention under Younger in § 1983
action by street preacher who was cited for violating city noise ordinance and thereby subject to
“state coercive proceedings even when the state proceedings have ended, as long as the federal
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proceeding casts aspersions on the state proceedings or annuls their results” where he failed to
appeal the citations and exhaust administration remedies and defaulted on his state appellate
rights). Furthermore, the importance of the state interest at stake is self-evident and Plaintiff has
an adequate opportunity to challenge the disputed condition in state proceedings should he be
deemed in violation thereof. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-1368.6, 143B-1490.
Finally, as a practical matter, this Court’s review of Plaintiff’s disputed post-release
condition would invite endless North Carolina supervisees unhappy with their conditions of post-
release supervision to similarly seek such review, thereby rendering this Court the de facto North
Carolina Parole Commission appeals court. The Court will not sanction that result under the
circumstances here.
As such, for these reasons, the Court will exercise its discretion under Younger to abstain
from federal judicial review of the challenged condition and grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Moreover, even if the Court were not to abstain, the Court would nonetheless grant Defendants’
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
C. No Federal Constitutional Right
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was deprived of a right secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed
by a “person” acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999); Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty. v. Talevski, 599 U.S.
166, 143 S.Ct. 1444 (2023). While Plaintiff’s Complaint survived the very low frivolity bar on
initial review of his Amended Complaint, further inquiry shows that there is no federal
constitutional right for a defendant to cohabitate with his co-defendant, co-supervisee spouse
during a mandatory term of post-release supervision that is necessarily part of such defendant’s
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North Carolina criminal sentence.
To be sure, “[p]risoners … may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974)
(citations omitted). However, “the fact that prisoners retain rights under the Due Process Clause
in no way implies that these rights are not subject to restrictions imposed by the nature of the
regime to which they have been lawfully committed.” Id. “While a prisoner retains basic
constitutional rights, the Supreme Court has found that an inmate’s liberty interests derived from
the Fourteenth Amendment are limited, given the nature of incarceration.” Jones v. Keller, 698
S.E.2d 49, 55 (N.C. 2010) (citing Helms, 459 U.S. at 467, 103 S.Ct. 864)) (internal citation
omitted).
As explained supra, Plaintiff will remain a prisoner of the State of North Carolina during
his term of supervised release. There is of course no question that an incarcerated criminal
defendant necessarily has no liberty interest in residing with his spouse during such incarceration.
See, e.g., Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (observing that
an inmate “has no constitutional right to physical contact with his family”). Special conditions of
supervised release barring co-defendants from associating with one another have also been upheld.
See United States v. Hendricks, 69 Fed. App’x 592, 597 (4th Cir. 2003) (unpublished decision).
In the instant case, Plaintiff and his wife, Diane Crowder, necessarily served the physically
incarcerated portion of their felony child abuse sentences at different State correctional facilities.
[See Doc. 22-10 at 1, Doc. 22-12 at 1]. As such, the condition Plaintiff challenges here is hardly
different from the circumstances of Plaintiff’s incarceration. See also Din, 576 U.S. at 95, 135
S.Ct. 2128 (eschewing “a free-floating and categorical liberty interest in marriage … sufficient to
trigger constitutional protection whenever a regulation in any way touches upon an aspect of the
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marital relationship”). The Court, therefore, would also dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
on this ground.
IV. MOTIONS TO SEAL
Also pending are Defendants’ motion to seal and amended motion to seal certain exhibits
submitted in response to Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction. [Docs. 23, 29; see Docs.
22-3, 22-5, 22-7, 24, 25, and 26]. As grounds, Defendants argue that sealing these exhibits is
necessary to protect the privacy and identity of the minor victim in Plaintiff’s criminal proceedings,
the confidentiality afforded to juvenile proceedings, Diane Crowder’s personal privacy and
security in post-release supervision records, and the privacy and security of the Parole Commission
and the NCDAC. [Docs. 23, 23-1, 29, 29-1]. In sum, Defendants argue that the “information
contained in said documents is either confidential under North Carolina law or is otherwise
sensitive information that invades the privacy of another.” [Doc. 23-1 at 1; Doc. 29-1 at 1].
Before sealing a court document, the Court must “(1) provide public notice of the request
to seal and allow interested parties a reasonable opportunity to object, (2) consider less drastic
alternatives to sealing the documents, and (3) provide specific reasons and factual findings
supporting its decision to seal the documents and for rejecting the alternatives.” Ashcraft v.
Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 288, 302 (4th Cir. 2000).
In the present case, the public has been provided with adequate notice and an opportunity
to object to Defendants’ motion. Defendants filed their motions on May 3, 2024, and May 9, 2024,
respectively, and they have been accessible through the Court’s electronic case filing system since
that time. Defendants have demonstrated that the subject records contain sensitive information
concerning the minor victim, juvenile proceedings involving Plaintiff’s own minor children, Diane
Crowder’s post-release supervision records, and NCDAC records protected by law. Defendants
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have also shown that the public’s right of access to such information is substantially outweighed
by the Defendants’ competing interest in protecting the details of such information. Having
considered less drastic alternatives to sealing these particular documents, the Court concludes that
sealing these records is necessary to protect the stated privacy interests. As such, the Court will
order that the subject records shall remain unsealed.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss, deny
Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction and other pending motion as moot, and grant
Defendants’ motions to seal.
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 14] is
GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Doc. 9]
and Plaintiff’s “Motion For Judges Consideration While deciding Preliminary Injunction” [Doc.
12] are DENIED as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Seal [Doc. 23] and Amended
Motion to Seal [Doc. 29] are GRANTED and Docket Nos. 22-3, 22-5, 22-7, 24, 25, and 26 shall
remained SEALED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: July 1, 2024
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