USA v. Brown et al

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 1:00-cr-00069-MR-5
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) O R D E R
)
AMOS JUNIOR SCOTT, )
)
Defendant. )
_______________________________ )
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Defendant’s Motion for
Compassionate Release [Doc. 207]; the Government’s Response to
Defendant’s Motion for Compassionate Release [Doc. 213]; and the
Government’s Motion for Leave to File Response under Seal [Doc. 214].
I. BACKGROUND
In January 2001, the Defendant Amos Junior Scott was found guilty by
a jury of one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute at least
five kilograms of powder cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846.
[Doc. 80: Jury Verdict]. In light of the Defendant’s prior convictions for
controlled substance offenses, the Government filed a Notice pursuant to 21
U.S.C. § 851. [Doc. 7: Information]. The Defendant thus faced a minimum
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of twenty years’ imprisonment and a maximum of life. See 21 U.S.C. §§
841(b)(1)(A) and 851.
At sentencing, the Court found the Defendant to be responsible for at
least five kilograms but less than 15 kilograms of powder cocaine. [Doc. 111:
Judgment at 7, 9]. The Defendant was found to be a career offender, with a
Guidelines range of 360 months to life. [Doc. 189: PSR at ¶ 52]. The Court
sentenced him to a term of life imprisonment. [Doc. 111: Judgment at 2].
The Defendant is currently housed at FCI Butner Medium II with no projected
release date due to his life sentence.1
The Defendant now moves the Court for a compassionate release.
[Doc. 207]. The Court directed the Government to respond to the
Defendant’s motion. [Text-Only Order dated Feb. 22, 2021]. The
Government filed its Response on March 22, 2021. [Doc. 213]. The
Defendant thereafter filed a Reply. [Doc. 217].
II. DISCUSSION
A. Motion for Compassionate Release
Section 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by The First Step Act of 2018, Pub.
L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (Dec. 21, 2018), permits a defendant
1 See https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited July 22, 2021).
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to seek a modification of his sentence for “extraordinary and compelling
reasons,” if the defendant has “fully exhausted all administrative rights to
appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s
behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the
warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier.” 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(1)(A). Here, the Government concedes that the Defendant has
sufficiently exhausted his administrative remedies with BOP by requesting
compassionate release from the Warden. [Doc. 213 at 3]. Accordingly, the
Court will proceed to address the merits of the Defendant’s compassionate
release request.
As is relevant here, the Court may reduce a defendant’s sentence
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) for “extraordinary and compelling reasons
if “such reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by
the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The Court must
also consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the extent that
such factors are applicable. Id.
Section 1B1.13 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines sets forth
the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement applicable to compassionate
release reductions. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. As is relevant here, the
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application note to § 1B1.13 specifies the types of medical conditions that
qualify as “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” First, that standard is met
if the defendant is “suffering from a terminal illness,” such as “metastatic
solid-tumor cancer, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), end-stage organ
disease, [or] advanced dementia.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1(A)(i).
Second, the standard is met if the defendant is:
(I) suffering from a serious physical or medical
condition,
(II) suffering from a serious functional or cognitive
impairment, or
(III) experiencing deteriorating physical or mental
health because of the aging process,
that substantially diminishes the ability of the
defendant to provide self-care within the environment
of a correctional facility and from which he or she is
not expected to recover.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1(A)(ii). This policy statement, however, was
adopted before the First Step Act, and the Sentencing Commission has not
updated the policy statement to account for the fact that defendants are now
permitted to file their own motions for compassionate release. In light of
these circumstances, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that §
1B1.13 is no longer an “applicable” policy statement that constrains the
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discretion of the district courts in finding that “extraordinary and compelling
reasons” exists to warrant a reduction in sentence. See United States v.
McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 282 (4th Cir. 2020) (“By its plain terms, . . . § 1B1.13
does not apply to defendant-filed motions under § 3582(c)(1)(A)”). Thus, this
Court is “empowered . . . to consider any extraordinary and compelling
reason for release that a defendant might raise.” Id. at 284 (quoting United
States v. Zullo, 976 F.3d 228, 230 (2d Cir. 2020)). Nevertheless, the Court
recognized, that the policy statement “remains helpful guidance even when
motions are filed by defendants.” Id. at 282 n.7.
Here, the Defendant argues that extraordinary and compelling reasons
exist for a compassionate release on three grounds: (1) that he was
erroneously classified as a career offender, and that if he were sentenced
today, he would not have been sentenced as severely; (2) that he suffers
from a number of chronic health conditions which increase his risk of serious
illness or death from COVID-19; and (3) that he “has compiled a remarkable
record of rehabilitation” in prison, thereby demonstrating that he would not
be a danger to the public if released. [Doc. 207 at 1-2]. The Court will
address each of these grounds in turn.
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The Defendant first argues that he was erroneously classified as a
career offender. [Doc. 207 at 1]. He further contends that the penalty range
for his offense of conviction was recently reduced by the First Step Act. [Id.
at 1]. Ultimately, he argues that if he were sentenced today, his advisory
guideline range would be 292-365 months, rather than 360-life. [See id. at
5].
The Fourth Circuit recognized in McCoy that a district court may find
extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction where the
original sentence was based on laws that have been substantially revised in
the intervening years, such that the prisoner is stuck serving far more time
than he could possibly receive if he were to be resentenced today. See
McCoy, 981 F.3d at 285 (affirming district court’s grant of compassionate
release where, due to the now-outdated “stacking” rule, prisoners convicted
of multiple Section 924(c) offenses at the same time were serving sentences
30 years longer than they could possibly receive under current law).
However, the Defendant does not present such a case here.
The Defendant was determined at the time of sentencing to be a career
offender. As the Court recently explained in denying the Defendant’s motion
to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, that conclusion was correct then and
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remains correct today. [See Civil Case No. 1:19-cv-00305-MR, Doc. 8 at 6-
13]. Further, the Defendant was convicted of participating in a conspiracy to
possess with the intent to distribute more than five kilograms of powder
cocaine. That offense still carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment.
See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii). A career offender convicted of an offense
with a statutory maximum of life imprisonment is classified at offense level
372 under the guidelines, with a criminal history category of VI. See U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.1(b)(1).
The Defendant also argues that § 401 of the First Step Act provides
him relief. While that section may have changed his mandatory minimum
sentence, that minimum was not implicated in his sentencing. As such, this
matter is entirely unlike McCoy where the defendant was sentenced to the
“stacked” mandatory minimum, which minimum was then reduced by two
thirds. That change was held to be “extraordinary and compelling”. The
Defendant herein, however, was sentenced based on his criminal history
2 Admittedly, the drug quantity table in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) has changed, such that the
5-15 kilograms of cocaine for which the Defendant was found to be personally responsible
would now produce a base offense level of 30, rather than the 36 cited in the Presentence
Investigation Report. [See Doc. 189: PSR at ¶ 15]. The Defendant’s adjusted offense
level, without reference to the career offender provisions, would be 32, not 38. But
because the Defendant is a career offender, the higher offense level of 37 applies. See
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b).
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(career offender predicates) and the prodigious quantity of powder cocaine
for which he was found responsible. The mandatory minimum sentence had
nothing to do with it.
In short, while there have been changes in the law since the time that
the Defendant was sentenced, they have no effect on his case. There is
nothing “extraordinary and compelling” about a career offender whose
offense of conviction produces a guideline range of 360-life having been
incarcerated for approximately 19 years. Accordingly, the Court finds the
Defendant’s first argument to be without merit.
Next, the Defendant argues that he has a number of medical
conditions—including, obesity, hypertension, cardiovascular disease, and
high cholesterol—that place him at an increased risk of serious illness or
death from COVID-19. [Doc. 207 at 13]. He further contends that the BOP
is failing to control the spread of the virus or to protect the health and safety
of its inmates within Butner. [Id. at 12-16].
While the Defendant expresses concern that he is particularly
susceptible to severe illness or death if he were to contract COVID-19, the
medical records submitted by the Government indicate that the Defendant
actually contracted the coronavirus in February 2021, was asymptomatic,
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and apparently recovered without any noted long-term effects. [Doc. 213-2
4; Doc. 213-3 at 2-6].
Further, despite the Defendant’s argument to the contrary, the Court
finds that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has taken significant
measures to protect the health of its inmates. See United States v. Johnson,
No. 1:19-cr-00020-MR-WCM, 2020 WL 7646809, at *2-3 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 23,
2020) (Reidinger, C.J.). In addition to these measures, BOP has begun the
process of vaccinating inmates, which will offer inmates further protection
from the virus. Taken together, these measures are designed to mitigate
sharply the risks of COVID-19 transmission in BOP institutions while allowing
BOP to continue to fulfill its mandate of incarcerating those persons
sentenced or detained based on judicial orders.3 Given BOP’s efforts, the
fact that the Defendant faces a potential risk of contracting the virus while
incarcerated, without more, is not sufficient to justify the relief he requests.
United States v. Raia, 954 F.3d 594, 597 (3d Cir. 2020) (“[T]he mere
existence of COVID-19 in society and the possibility that it may spread to a
3 The effects of these mitigation efforts in evident in the fact that FCI Butner Medium II
has had a total of 399 coronavirus cases among its inmate population and three deaths,
but currently has only one positive case among its inmate population. See
https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/ (last visited July 22, 2021).
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particular prison alone cannot independently justify compassionate release,
especially considering BOP's statutory role, and its extensive and
professional efforts to curtail the virus's spread.”).
The third reason cited by the Defendant for his compassionate release
request is his rehabilitation while in prison. It is clear that the Defendant has
made significant efforts to rehabilitate himself while incarcerated, including
earning several degrees and working as a paralegal. While his efforts are
certainly commendable, the law is clear that “[r]ehabilitation of the defendant
alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason” to
justify compassionate release. 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). Thus, the Defendant’s
rehabilitation, without more, is insufficient to warrant the extraordinary relief
sought.
Even if the Defendant could establish an extraordinary and compelling
reason for his release, this Court still must consider the § 3553(a) factors, as
“applicable,” as part of its analysis of determining whether a sentence
reduction is warranted. See § 3582(c)(1)(A); United States v. Chambliss,
948 F.3d 691, 694 (5th Cir. 2020).
Here, the Defendant’s crime was extremely serious. The Defendant
pled guilty to participating in a conspiracy to distribute a significant amount
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of cocaine. The Court found that the Defendant sold, purchased, and/or
possessed between five and fifteen kilograms of cocaine throughout the
course of the conspiracy. [Doc. 111: Judgment at 9]. During the course of
their investigation, law enforcement officers discovered that the Defendant
was cooking crack cocaine and trafficking MDMA and played a leadership
role within the conspiracy. [Doc. 189: PSR at ¶ 9]. Additionally, the
Defendant had a significant criminal history, including convictions for assault
with a deadly weapon, carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of rock
cocaine, which warranted the Court designating him as a career offender.
[Id. at ¶¶ 29-33]. In light of the seriousness of the offense of conviction, and
the Defendant’s career offender status, analysis of the relevant § 3553(a)
sentencing factors—including the need for the sentence to reflect the true
extent and seriousness of the Defendant’s offense, to promote respect for
the law, to provide just punishment, to afford adequate deterrence, and to
protect the public from the Defendant’s further crimes—leads the Court to
conclude that the pronounced sentence of life imprisonment continues to be
appropriate.
In sum, the Court finds that there are no “extraordinary and compelling
reasons” for the Defendant’s release and that analysis of the relevant §
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3553(a) factors continue to weigh in favor of his continued incarceration.
Accordingly, the Defendant’s Motion for Compassionate Release is denied.
B. Motion to Seal
The Government moves the Court for leave to file under permanent
seal its Response and the accompanying exhibits. [Doc. 214]. For grounds,
the Government states that two of the exhibits submitted are the Defendant’s
health chart and his BOP medical records, and that those records are
referenced in the Government’s Response. [Doc. 215]. The Government
has submitted a redacted version of its filing [Doc. 213], in addition to the
sealed version.
Before sealing a court document, the Court must “(1) provide public
notice of the request to seal and allow interested parties a reasonable
opportunity to object, (2) consider less drastic alternatives to sealing the
documents, and (3) provide specific reasons and factual findings supporting
its decision to seal the documents and for rejecting the alternatives.”
Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 288, 302 (4th Cir. 2000). In the present
case, the public has been provided with adequate notice and an opportunity
to object to the Government’s motion. The Government filed its motion on
March 22, 2021, and such motion has been accessible to the public through
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the Court’s electronic case filing system since that time. Further, the
Government has demonstrated that the subject medical records set forth in
Doc. 215-2 and Doc. 215-3 contain sensitive information concerning the
Defendant and that the public’s right of access to such information is
substantially outweighed by the Defendant’s competing interest in protecting
the details of such information. See United States v. Harris, 890 F.3d 480,
492 (4th Cir. 2018). Finally, having considered less drastic alternatives to
sealing the documents, the Court concludes that sealing of these medical
records is necessary to protect the Defendant’s privacy interests.
Accordingly, the Court will direct that Government’s Exhibits 2 and 3 [Doc.
215-2, 215-3] shall remain under seal until further Order of this Court.
Other than briefly mentioning the medical conditions which the
Defendant constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons for this release,
the Government’s Response does not discuss the Defendant’s medical
records in any great detail. Further, Government’s Exhibit 1 contains public
data regarding the Defendant’s incarceration. Accordingly, the Court
concludes that the Government’s Response [Doc. 215] and Government’s
Exhibit 1 [Doc. 215-1] need not be filed under seal. These documents are
already set forth in the public record as Doc. 213 and Doc. 213-1,
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respectively. As such, the Court will direct the Clerk to remove Doc. 215 and
Doc. 215-1 as duplicative.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Defendant’s Motion for
Compassionate Release [Doc. 207] is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Government’s Motion for Leave
to File Response under Seal [Doc. 214] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED
IN PART as follows. The medical records submitted in support of the
Government’s Response [Docs. 215-2, 215-3] shall remain under seal until
further Order of the Court. The Government’s Response [Doc. 215] and
Exhibit 1 to the Government’s Response [Doc. 215-1] need not be sealed
and are duplicative of the Government’s previous filings [Docs. 213, 213-1];
accordingly, these documents [Docs. 215, 215-1] shall be removed from the
record as duplicative.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: July 26, 2021
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