Grigg v. Flathead District Attorney

9:25-cv-00175MtdJan 28, 2026

Full text

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
MISSOULA DIVISION
PETER GRIGG,
Plaintiff,
v.
FLATHEAD DISTRICT
ATTORNEY,
Defendant.
CV-25-175-M-KLD
ORDER and FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATION
On October 28, 2025, pro se Plaintiff Peter Grigg filed a motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 1) and lodged a complaint against the Flathead
District Attorney.1 (Doc. 2). On December 4, 2025, Grigg filed an “Addendum to
Complaint of Violation of Civil Rights.” (Doc. 4).
I. 	Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a civil proceeding may be commenced without
prepayment of fees upon filing an affidavit showing inability to pay. On October
28, 2025, Grigg completed an “Application to Proceed in District Court without
1 Montana uses the terminology “County Attorney” when referring to prosecutors
for the State. The Court assumes Grigg is referring to Flathead County Attorney
Travis Ahner.
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Prepaying Fees or Costs.” (Doc. 1). The information provided in the application is
sufficient to make the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and the Court
grants his request to proceed in forma pauperis.
II. 	Screening Requirement
Because Grigg is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review his
Complaint to determine if the allegations are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. If so, the Complaint must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate when the
complaint “either (1) lacks a cognizable legal theory or (2) fails to allege sufficient
facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Zixiang Li v. Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 999
(9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097,
1104 (9th Cir. 2008)). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 677– 78 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)), and “sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
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Where, as here, the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court has an obligation
“to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the [plaintiff] the benefit of any
doubt.” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012). But even where the
plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the complaint should be dismissed if it appears
“beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim.”
See Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1997). A pro se plaintiff must be
given leave to amend unless it is “absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the
complaint cannot be cured by amendment.” Weilburg v. Shapiro, 488 F.3d 1202,
1205 (9th Cir. 2007). If it is clear that the complaint’s deficiencies cannot be cured
by amendment, dismissal without leave to amend is appropriate. See e.g. Chaset v.
Fleer/Skybox Int’l., 300 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 200); Klamath-Lake Pharma.
Ass’n v. Klamath Medical Servs. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1293 (9th Cir. 1983).
III. 	Analysis
Grigg brings this action against the Flathead District Attorney in his official
capacity. (Doc. 2 at 2). He alleges unspecified violations of the Montana and
United States Constitutions, and cites to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the “US
Courts Judicial Canons”, and the United States Declaration of Independence as the
basis of his claims. (Doc. 2 at 3). Liberally construed, the Complaint and the
Addendum to Complaint allege that the Flathead District Attorney violated Grigg’s
constitutional and civil rights for failing to prosecute Wilma Jean Brown and
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Byron Kirkland. (Doc. 2 at 4; Doc. 4 at 1). Grigg also appears to allege the
Flathead District Attorney failed to provide him with “necessary legal documents
and evidence” in a separate matter. (Doc. 2 at 4; Doc 4. at 2).
State prosecutors are absolutely immune from a suit brought for damages
arising under 42 U.S. § 1983 for conduct within the scope of their duties, “insofar
as that conduct is intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
process.” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). Acts within the scope of a prosecutor’s duties include
“preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in
the course of his role as an advocate for the State.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509
U.S. 259, 273 (1993). This prosecutorial immunity applies even if the prosecutor
has violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights or acts with malicious intent.
Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028−29 (9th Cir. 2003); Genzler v. Longanbach,
410 F.3d 630, 637 (9th Cir. 2005).
Grigg appears to allege the Flathead District Attorney did not prosecute
Wilma Jean Brown and Byron Kirkland for alleged criminal conduct under several
Montana Code Annotated statutes, including “assault, intimidation, threats and
harassment” with respect to Wilma Jean Brown and “assault with a weapon” with
respect to Byron Kirkland. (Doc. 2 at 4; Doc. 4 at 2). Grigg further alleges such
conduct resulted in “bias, discrimination, extreme prejudice, excessive punishment,
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double jeopardy, retaliation, retribution, and persecution of plaintiff.” (Doc. 2 at 4).
Additionally, Grigg asserts the Flathead District Attorney “refuses” to provide him
with an “Amended Settlement Agreement” which was “filed on the morning of
Plaintiff[‘s] Change of Plea Hearing” causing “double jeopardy” and “excessive
punishment.” (Doc. 2 at 4; Doc. 4 at 2). The alleged failure to produce legal
documents also appears to have resulted in a restraining order against Grigg for
Wilma Jean Brown causing “theft, damage, loss of all personal good, chattels,
possessions, [and] finances” upon Grigg. (Doc. 2 at 5; Doc. 4 at 2).
Taking these allegations as true, all of the Flathead District Attorney’s
actions were intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.
As alleged in the Complaint and Addendum to the Complaint, the Flathead District
Attorney was at all times preparing for the initiation of a judicial proceeding and
acting within his scope as an advocate of the state. To the extent Grigg requests
remuneration for a “miscarriage of justice” or “punishment for a crime not
committed” (Doc. 2 at 5) in the amount of $20,000,000 (Doc. 4 at 2), the Flathead
District Attorney is entitled to absolute immunity.
Regarding Grigg’s additional claims for relief, “[p]rosecutorial immunity
only protects the defendants from § 1983 damage claims; it does not protect them
from suits for injunctive relief.” Gobel v. Maricopa Cnty., 867 F.2d 1201, 1203 n.6
(9th Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489
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U.S. 378 (1989). However, federal courts do not have the authority to grant
injunctive relief that would interfere with pending state judicial proceedings. See
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–45 (1971). Likewise, federal courts do not
have the authority to invalidate a state court judgment. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust
Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415−16 (1923).
To the extent Grigg seeks to overturn and vacate the “ruling in case DC-24-
298 and order a new trial” as injunctive relief, the Court does not have the
authority to do so as it would require review of a state court judgment. To the
extent Grigg seeks an order directing the Flathead District Attorney to prosecute
Wilma Jean Brown and Byron Kirkland, the Court does not have the authority to
do so as it would interfere with state judicial proceedings.
In the Addendum to Complaint, Grigg appears to also implicate, but not
name as a party, District Court Judge Amy Eddy, and alleges the unspecified
violations of civil rights “led to biased, extreme, excessive judgment” by Judge
Eddy. (Doc. 4 at 2). To the extent Grigg asserts any allegations against Judge Amy
Eddy, Grigg has failed to properly name her as a party. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 10(a).
Even so, it is well established that a judge is absolutely immune from suit for
judicial actions undertaken in the course of her official capacity or in the complete
absence of jurisdiction. Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11−12 (1991). Judicial
immunity is not overcome “even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously
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and corruptly.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (explaining that the
doctrine of judicial immunity exists to benefit the public because “[a judge’s]
errors may be corrected on appeal, but he should not have to fear that unsatisfied
litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption”). As alleged
in the Addendum to Complaint, Judge Eddy’s actions in Grigg’s state court
proceedings are unquestionably judicial acts and she is accordingly entitled to
absolute immunity.
Further in the Addendum to Complaint, Grigg appears to implicate, but not
name as a party, the Kalispell Office of Public Defenders for failure to “provide
documents and misinform their Client,” Grigg. (Doc. 4 at 2). To the extent Grigg
asserts any allegations against the Kalispell Public Defender’s Office, Grigg has
failed to properly name said office as a party. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 10(a). Moreover,
public defenders are not considered state actors for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
liability. See Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 919−20 (1984) (stating “appointed
counsel in a state criminal prosecution, though paid and ultimately supervised by
the State, does not act ‘under color of’ state law in the normal course of conducting
the defense”) (citing Polka County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981)).
Therefore, Grigg has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The Court concludes that the deficiencies set forth above cannot be cured by
the allegation of additional facts and amendment would be futile. Therefore, the
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Court recommends Grigg’s Complaint be dismissed with prejudice. For the reasons
discussed above, the Court enters the following:
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that Grigg’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 1)
is GRANTED and his filing fee is waived. The Complaint is deemed filed on
October 28, 2025.
RECOMMENDATION
IT IS RECOMMENDED that:
1. 	Grigg’s Complaint (Doc. 2) and Addendum to Complaint (Doc. 4) be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim on which relief may
be granted.
2. 	The Court should CERTIFY, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 24(a)(4)(B), that any appeal from this disposition would not be taken in
good faith. The Court should direct the Clerk to enter, by separate document, a
judgment of dismissal.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT TO FINDINGS &
RECOMMENDATION AND CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO
OBJECT
Grigg may object to this Findings and Recommendation within 14 days. See
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Failure to timely file written objections may bar a de novo
determination by the district judge and/or waive the right to appeal.
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Grigg must immediately advise the Court of any change in his mailing
address. Failure to do so may result in dismissal of this action without notice to
him.
DATED this 28th day of January, 2026.
______________________________
Kathleen L. DeSoto
United States Magistrate Judge
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