9:25-cv-00175•Grigg v. Flathead District Attorney
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1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA MISSOULA DIVISION PETER GRIGG, Plaintiff, v. FLATHEAD DISTRICT ATTORNEY, Defendant. CV-25-175-M-KLD ORDER and FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION On October 28, 2025, pro se Plaintiff Peter Grigg filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 1) and lodged a complaint against the Flathead District Attorney.1 (Doc. 2). On December 4, 2025, Grigg filed an “Addendum to Complaint of Violation of Civil Rights.” (Doc. 4). I. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a civil proceeding may be commenced without prepayment of fees upon filing an affidavit showing inability to pay. On October 28, 2025, Grigg completed an “Application to Proceed in District Court without 1 Montana uses the terminology “County Attorney” when referring to prosecutors for the State. The Court assumes Grigg is referring to Flathead County Attorney Travis Ahner. Case 9:25-cv-00175-DWM Document 5 Filed 01/28/26 Page 1 of 9
2 Prepaying Fees or Costs.” (Doc. 1). The information provided in the application is sufficient to make the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and the Court grants his request to proceed in forma pauperis. II. Screening Requirement Because Grigg is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review his Complaint to determine if the allegations are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. If so, the Complaint must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate when the complaint “either (1) lacks a cognizable legal theory or (2) fails to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Zixiang Li v. Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008)). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677– 78 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)), and “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Case 9:25-cv-00175-DWM Document 5 Filed 01/28/26 Page 2 of 9
3 Where, as here, the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court has an obligation “to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the [plaintiff] the benefit of any doubt.” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012). But even where the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the complaint should be dismissed if it appears “beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim.” See Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1997). A pro se plaintiff must be given leave to amend unless it is “absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by amendment.” Weilburg v. Shapiro, 488 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007). If it is clear that the complaint’s deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment, dismissal without leave to amend is appropriate. See e.g. Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int’l., 300 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 200); Klamath-Lake Pharma. Ass’n v. Klamath Medical Servs. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1293 (9th Cir. 1983). III. Analysis Grigg brings this action against the Flathead District Attorney in his official capacity. (Doc. 2 at 2). He alleges unspecified violations of the Montana and United States Constitutions, and cites to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the “US Courts Judicial Canons”, and the United States Declaration of Independence as the basis of his claims. (Doc. 2 at 3). Liberally construed, the Complaint and the Addendum to Complaint allege that the Flathead District Attorney violated Grigg’s constitutional and civil rights for failing to prosecute Wilma Jean Brown and Case 9:25-cv-00175-DWM Document 5 Filed 01/28/26 Page 3 of 9
4 Byron Kirkland. (Doc. 2 at 4; Doc. 4 at 1). Grigg also appears to allege the Flathead District Attorney failed to provide him with “necessary legal documents and evidence” in a separate matter. (Doc. 2 at 4; Doc 4. at 2). State prosecutors are absolutely immune from a suit brought for damages arising under 42 U.S. § 1983 for conduct within the scope of their duties, “insofar as that conduct is intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). Acts within the scope of a prosecutor’s duties include “preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993). This prosecutorial immunity applies even if the prosecutor has violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights or acts with malicious intent. Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028−29 (9th Cir. 2003); Genzler v. Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, 637 (9th Cir. 2005). Grigg appears to allege the Flathead District Attorney did not prosecute Wilma Jean Brown and Byron Kirkland for alleged criminal conduct under several Montana Code Annotated statutes, including “assault, intimidation, threats and harassment” with respect to Wilma Jean Brown and “assault with a weapon” with respect to Byron Kirkland. (Doc. 2 at 4; Doc. 4 at 2). Grigg further alleges such conduct resulted in “bias, discrimination, extreme prejudice, excessive punishment, Case 9:25-cv-00175-DWM Document 5 Filed 01/28/26 Page 4 of 9
5 double jeopardy, retaliation, retribution, and persecution of plaintiff.” (Doc. 2 at 4). Additionally, Grigg asserts the Flathead District Attorney “refuses” to provide him with an “Amended Settlement Agreement” which was “filed on the morning of Plaintiff[‘s] Change of Plea Hearing” causing “double jeopardy” and “excessive punishment.” (Doc. 2 at 4; Doc. 4 at 2). The alleged failure to produce legal documents also appears to have resulted in a restraining order against Grigg for Wilma Jean Brown causing “theft, damage, loss of all personal good, chattels, possessions, [and] finances” upon Grigg. (Doc. 2 at 5; Doc. 4 at 2). Taking these allegations as true, all of the Flathead District Attorney’s actions were intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. As alleged in the Complaint and Addendum to the Complaint, the Flathead District Attorney was at all times preparing for the initiation of a judicial proceeding and acting within his scope as an advocate of the state. To the extent Grigg requests remuneration for a “miscarriage of justice” or “punishment for a crime not committed” (Doc. 2 at 5) in the amount of $20,000,000 (Doc. 4 at 2), the Flathead District Attorney is entitled to absolute immunity. Regarding Grigg’s additional claims for relief, “[p]rosecutorial immunity only protects the defendants from § 1983 damage claims; it does not protect them from suits for injunctive relief.” Gobel v. Maricopa Cnty., 867 F.2d 1201, 1203 n.6 (9th Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 Case 9:25-cv-00175-DWM Document 5 Filed 01/28/26 Page 5 of 9
6 U.S. 378 (1989). However, federal courts do not have the authority to grant injunctive relief that would interfere with pending state judicial proceedings. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–45 (1971). Likewise, federal courts do not have the authority to invalidate a state court judgment. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415−16 (1923). To the extent Grigg seeks to overturn and vacate the “ruling in case DC-24- 298 and order a new trial” as injunctive relief, the Court does not have the authority to do so as it would require review of a state court judgment. To the extent Grigg seeks an order directing the Flathead District Attorney to prosecute Wilma Jean Brown and Byron Kirkland, the Court does not have the authority to do so as it would interfere with state judicial proceedings. In the Addendum to Complaint, Grigg appears to also implicate, but not name as a party, District Court Judge Amy Eddy, and alleges the unspecified violations of civil rights “led to biased, extreme, excessive judgment” by Judge Eddy. (Doc. 4 at 2). To the extent Grigg asserts any allegations against Judge Amy Eddy, Grigg has failed to properly name her as a party. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 10(a). Even so, it is well established that a judge is absolutely immune from suit for judicial actions undertaken in the course of her official capacity or in the complete absence of jurisdiction. Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11−12 (1991). Judicial immunity is not overcome “even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously Case 9:25-cv-00175-DWM Document 5 Filed 01/28/26 Page 6 of 9
7 and corruptly.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (explaining that the doctrine of judicial immunity exists to benefit the public because “[a judge’s] errors may be corrected on appeal, but he should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption”). As alleged in the Addendum to Complaint, Judge Eddy’s actions in Grigg’s state court proceedings are unquestionably judicial acts and she is accordingly entitled to absolute immunity. Further in the Addendum to Complaint, Grigg appears to implicate, but not name as a party, the Kalispell Office of Public Defenders for failure to “provide documents and misinform their Client,” Grigg. (Doc. 4 at 2). To the extent Grigg asserts any allegations against the Kalispell Public Defender’s Office, Grigg has failed to properly name said office as a party. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 10(a). Moreover, public defenders are not considered state actors for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability. See Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 919−20 (1984) (stating “appointed counsel in a state criminal prosecution, though paid and ultimately supervised by the State, does not act ‘under color of’ state law in the normal course of conducting the defense”) (citing Polka County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981)). Therefore, Grigg has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court concludes that the deficiencies set forth above cannot be cured by the allegation of additional facts and amendment would be futile. Therefore, the Case 9:25-cv-00175-DWM Document 5 Filed 01/28/26 Page 7 of 9
8 Court recommends Grigg’s Complaint be dismissed with prejudice. For the reasons discussed above, the Court enters the following: ORDER IT IS ORDERED that Grigg’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 1) is GRANTED and his filing fee is waived. The Complaint is deemed filed on October 28, 2025. RECOMMENDATION IT IS RECOMMENDED that: 1. Grigg’s Complaint (Doc. 2) and Addendum to Complaint (Doc. 4) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 2. The Court should CERTIFY, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(4)(B), that any appeal from this disposition would not be taken in good faith. The Court should direct the Clerk to enter, by separate document, a judgment of dismissal. NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT TO FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION AND CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO OBJECT Grigg may object to this Findings and Recommendation within 14 days. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Failure to timely file written objections may bar a de novo determination by the district judge and/or waive the right to appeal. Case 9:25-cv-00175-DWM Document 5 Filed 01/28/26 Page 8 of 9
9 Grigg must immediately advise the Court of any change in his mailing address. Failure to do so may result in dismissal of this action without notice to him. DATED this 28th day of January, 2026. ______________________________ Kathleen L. DeSoto United States Magistrate Judge Case 9:25-cv-00175-DWM Document 5 Filed 01/28/26 Page 9 of 9
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