9:25-cv-00083•Thornton v. Flathead County et al
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conduct as this is neither his first federal court case nor the first time he has falsified authority. To ensure.that the information provided to the Court is authentic and accurate, Thornton is required to conventionally file a hard copy of the complete document for every source of authority cited in any of his filings, including all cases and statutes. If this remedy is insufficient to prevent further misconduct, a hearing will be set and Thornton will be given the opportunity to respond before sanctions are levied. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that: (1) Defendants' motion to dismiss, (Doc. 32), is GRANTED in PART and DENIED in PART. The motion is DENIED as to Thornton's Fourteenth Amendment fabrication of evidence claim (Count III) and his state law negligence claim (Count VIII) premised on that same conduct insofar as those claims are brought against Individual Defendants Ahner, Frechette, and Noonan. The motion is GRANTED in all other respects. Defendant Rolando, Flathead County and all Thornton's other claims (Counts I, II, IV, V, VI, VII, IX, and part of VIII) are dismissed with prejudice. A trial schedule will be set by separate order. (2) On or before February 6, 2026, Thornton must conventionally file a hard copy of the complete source documents for every legal citation in Docs. 34 and 36- 1. The failure to do so, or an incomplete response, may result in Rule 11 26 Case 9:25-cv-00083-DWM Document 38 Filed 01/23/26 Page 26 of 27
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OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative
AUTHENTIC.
U.S. GOVERN
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
MISSOULA DIVISION
DENNIS THORNTON, CV 25—-83—M-—D WM
Plaintiff,
Vs. OPINION
and ORDER
FLATHEAD COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
Plaintiff Dennis Thornton, proceeding without counsel, has filed a civil
rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Defendant Flathead County and
Individual Defendants Flathead County Attorney Travis Ahner and Deputy County
Attorneys Ashley Frechette, Michael Noonan, and Angela Rolando (together,
“Defendants”) violated his constitutional rights and state law in bringing a criminal
proceeding against him. (Doc. 12.) In 2022, Thornton was prosecuted in Flathead
County Justice Court for “criminal trespass to property.” (Doc. 12 at J 13.)
According to Thornton, he was the lawful owner of that property and had been
since 1993. (Id. § 14.) However, Whitefish Credit Union also claimed ownership
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of the property and demanded Thornton be prosecuted. (/d. § 18.) Thornton
maintains that the Flathead County Sheriff investigated the matter and confirmed
there was no probable cause for criminal charges, (id. {§ 15-17), but he was
prosecuted anyway, (id. J] 18-20). The matter was dismissed in Thornton’s favor
on June 15, 2024. Ud. § 22.) Thornton alleges that Defendants prosecuted him
“despite actual notice of [his] ownership and the Sheriff's findings.” (Ud. ¥ 20.)
Thornton has brought nine causes of action: malicious prosecution (direct
liability), malicious prosecution (supervisory liability), fabrication of evidence,
unreasonable seizure of property, civil conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), false
official certifications, Moneil' liability, negligence, and abuse of process. (See
generally id.) He seeks $50 million in compensatory damages and additional
punitive damages. (/d. ] 63.) Defendants seek to dismiss Thornton’s Second
Amended Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(Doc. 32.) Thornton opposes. (Doc. 34.) For the reasons stated below,
Defendants’ motion is granted as to all but two of Thornton’s claims: his
Fourteenth Amendment fabrication of evidence claim and his state law negligence
claim premised on the same conduct. Ironically, Thornton’s filings show that he
has used artificial intelligence (AJ) to generate false and misleading case citations;
the remedy for that misconduct is outlined below.
' Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
2
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LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Jd. Dismissal is appropriate “where there is no cognizable
legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal
theory.” L.A. Lakers, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 869 F.3d 795, 800 (9th Cir. 2017)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Pro se complaints are construed liberally,
Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010), and a court should generally
permit pro se litigants an opportunity to amend their complaint, see United States
v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[D]ismissal without
leave to amend is improper unless it is clear, upon de novo review, that the
complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). “Courts are not required to grant leave to amend if a complaint lacks
merit entirely,” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 , 1129 (9th Cir. 2000), or if there
has been a “repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendment,”
Abagninin v. AMVAC Chem. Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 742 (9th Cir. 2008).
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ANALYSIS
Defendants argue that Thornton fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted because the Individual Defendants are entitled to prosecutorial
immunity and Thornton has failed to plausibly allege a Monell claim against
Flathead County. (See Doc. 33.) Defendants further argue that Thornton’s claims
are also flawed on the merits. (See Docs. 33, 35.) These arguments are fatal to all
but two of Thornton’s claims.” Thornton’s Fourteenth Amendment fabrication of
evidence claim and his state law negligence claim based on the same conduct are
permitted to proceed. Thornton’s other claims are dismissed with prejudice.
I. Prosecutorial Immunity
“[A] prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from [§] 1983 suits for damages
when he acts within the scope of his prosecutorial duties.” Jmbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409, 420 (1976); see also id. at 430-31. This is so even if the prosecutor
has violated a plaintiffs constitutional rights or acts with malicious intent. Broam
v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2003); Genzler v. Longanbach, 410
F.3d 630, 637 (9th Cir. 2005). Courts use a “functional approach” to “decide
2 Defendants’ initial motion was premised primarily on prosecutorial immunity and
the absence of a viable Monell claim. (See Doc. 33.) And while that motion
addressed a few potential merits issues related to Thornton’s individual claims,
(see id. at 15—20), Defendants expanded the grounds for those arguments in their
reply, (see Doc. 35). Although Thornton’s request to file a sur-reply was denied,
(Docs. 36, 37), his putative filing was considered in resolving the present motion.
4
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whether absolute immunity attaches to a particular kind of prosecutorial activity.”
Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 342 (2009); see Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S.
478, 486 (1991). The focus is therefore on “the nature of the function performed,
not the identity of the actor who performed it.” Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219,
229 (1988). “To qualify as advocacy, an act must be ‘intimately associated with
the judicial phase of the criminal process.’” Genzler, 410 F.3d at 637 (quoting
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430). Consistently, such immunity has been found “when a
prosecutor prepares to initiate a judicial proceeding or appears in court to present
evidence in support of a search warrant application.” Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at
343 (internal citations omitted). However, “[p]rosecutors are entitled to qualified
immunity, rather than absolute immunity, when they perform administrative
functions, or ‘investigative functions normally performed by a detective or police
officer.’” Genzler, 410 F.3d at 636 (quoting Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 126
(1997)). “[T]he official seeking absolute immunity bears the burden of showing
that such immunity is justified for the function in question.” Burns, 500 U.S. at
486. “[T]he Supreme Court has ‘been quite sparing in its recognition of absolute
immunity, and has refused to extend it any further than its justification would
warrant.” Genzler, 410 F.3d at 636-37 (quoting Burns, 500 U.S. at 487).
Here, Thornton has alleged that the Individual Defendants pursued criminal
charges against him without probable cause and executed and relied on false
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documentation in doing so. At this stage of the proceeding, Individual Defendants
have succeeded in showing that most of this conduct is protected by absolute
immunity. “The analysis of whether prosecutorial acts constitute advocacy or
police-type investigation work is complicated by the fact that the Supreme Court
has resisted any attempt to draw a bright-line between the two.” Genzler, 410 F.3d
at 637. “The question is whether a prosecutor’s investigation is of the type
normally done by police, in which case prosecutors enjoy only qualified immunity,
or whether an-investigation is bound up with the judicial process, thus affording
prosecutors the heightened protection of absolute immunity.” Jd. The specific
allegations against the Individual Defendants are assessed under this framework.
A. Defendant Ahner
Thornton alleges that Defendant Ahner, the County Attorney for Flathead
County, (Doc. 12 at § 8), “[p]ersonally initiated charges” against him “without
probable cause,” (id. J 24), “[a]uthorized use of false ownership claims in charging
documents,” (id. § 35), and “directed prosecution knowing no probable cause
existed,” (id. ] 46). These allegations are part of Thornton’s claims for malicious
prosecution, fabrication of evidence, and civil conspiracy. The Supreme Court has
long recognized that the prosecutor’s initiation of a criminal case is “intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process” and is therefore a
“function[] to which the reasons for absolute immunity apply with full force.”
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Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430. That is the case even if the prosecutor brings those
charges in the absence of probable cause. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S.
259, 274 n.5 (1993) (“[A] prosecutor would be entitled to absolute immunity for
the malicious prosecution of someone whom he lacked probable cause to indict.”).
This immunity then flows to Thornton’s claims attendant to the charging decision,
such as his unlawful seizure claim, as he alleges no independent prosecutorial
misconduct associated with those claims.
However, Thornton’s claims regarding the disregard for the Sheriff's
findings and the fabrication of evidence pose a closer question. In the immunity
context, there is an important distinction between “[f]ormulating factual criteria
sufficient to satisfy probable cause from the investigative materials” at issue and
“personally investigating” the case or attesting to or “exercising judgment going to
the truth or falsity of the evidence.” Terwillinger v. Reyna, 4 F.4th 270, 280 (Sth
Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). Immunity attaches only in the first
instance. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33 (recognizing “that the duties of the
prosecutor in his role as advocate for the State involve actions preliminary to the
initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from the courtroom”); Broam, 320
F.3d at 1029 (“In the course of preparing for the initiation of the criminal process
and for trial, a prosecutor may be required to obtain, review, and evaluate
evidence.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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The Second Amended Complaint does not make clear whether Defendant
Ahner allegedly fabricated documentation or merely relied on such documentation
in charging Thornton. Thornton alleges that Defendant Ahner initiated the charges
against him by “relying on false statements from Sean Frampton and Commander
Buls,” (id. ] 24), and merely “[a]uthorized use of false ownership claims in
charging documents,” (/d. J 35). In that instance, Defendant Ahner’s
characterization of those factual statements and his decision to include certain facts
in a charging document falls within the category of a “traditional function[] of an
advocate.” See Kalina, 522 U.S. at 130-31 (describing “drafting . . . [a]
certification,” “determin[ing] that the evidence was sufficiently strong to justify a
probable-cause finding,” and “present[ing] . . . the information and the motion to
the court” as “the work of an advocate . . . integral to the initiation of the
prosecution”). Indeed, “acts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the
initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his
role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute
immunity. Those acts must include the professional evaluation of the evidence
assembled by the police and appropriate preparation for its presentation at
trial... .” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273. Thus, to the extent Thornton claims that
Defendant Ahner merely relied on false information or documentation in charging
him, that claim is foreclosed by absolute immunity.
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But Thornton also alleges that the Individual Defendants “created or
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approved false documents” “under [Defendant] Ahner’s direct supervision and
instruction,” (Doc. 12 at { 21), and that Defendants Ahner, Frechette, and Noonan
“knowingly executed and used false property ownership certifications to support
the prosecution,” (id. J 49). Considered together, these allegations raise a specter
of “investigative” conduct prior to and independent of the charging decision and
subsequent prosecution. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273-74. Read as a whole, the
Second Amended Complaint could be liberally construed to allege that Defendant
Ahner ignored the Sheriffs findings and then brought charges based on an
independent investigation and falsified evidence. Such conduct is not protected by
absolute immunity. See Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001)
(explaining that because it is more akin to police work than advocacy, fabricating
evidence by knowingly obtaining false statements prior to charging a defendant is
not protected by absolute immunity); Genzler, 410 F.3d at 641 (explaining that
“the process of acquiring or manufacturing evidence during [the] performance of
policy-type investigative work” is not protected by absolute immunity).
Liberally construing the facts alleged in the Second Amended Complaint as
true, Defendant Ahner may have been engaged in police-type investigative work,
not advocacy, when he marshaled evidence against Thornton. At this stage of the
proceedings, it is not clear that Defendant Ahner is immune for that conduct.
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B. Defendant Frechette
Thornton alleges that “Defendant Frechette [d]rafted and/or signed the
probable cause affidavit omitting proof of [Thornton]’s ownership and the
Sheriffs findings,” (id. | 25), “[o]mitted exculpatory facts from affidavits and
court filings,” (id. { 36), and “[fliled an affidavit omitting exculpatory evidence,”
(id. { 46). As discussed above, a prosecutor is immune for actions taken in
“preparation” of “the initiation of the criminal process.” Jmbler, 424 US. at 431
n.33. Additionally, “[a] prosecutor is absolutely immune from liability for failure
to investigate the accusations against a defendant before filing charges,” Broam,
320 F.3d at 1029, and for the “decision not to preserve or turn over exculpatory
material before trial, during trial, or after conviction,” id. at 1030 (collecting
cases). Thus, Defendant Frechette is immune from liability for the specific
conduct alleged above. Nevertheless, Thornton’s general allegations that the
Individual Defendants, including Defendant Frechette, “created or approved false
documents,” (Doc. 12 at § 21), and “knowingly executed and used false property
ownership certifications to support the prosecution,” (id. J 49), prevents a finding
of immunity as to conduct that occurred prior to the filing of charges. Once again,
factually it is unclear at this pleadings stage whether Defendant Frechette engaged
in police-type investigative activity prior to the leveling of charges.
C. Defendant Noonan
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Thornton alleges that Defendant Noonan “[r]eviewed exculpatory records
and the Sheriff's report [dJespite not having a signed complaint but took no action
to halt prosecution,” (id. J 26), “[a]pproved filings despite knowledge they
contained fabricated information,” (id. J] 37), and “participated in malicious
prosecution despite contrary evidence,” (id. | 46). As discussed above,
prosecutorial immunity extends the “professional evaluation of the evidence
assembled by the police and appropriate preparation for its presentation at trial,”
Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273, as well as to the discretion to not disclose exculpatory
records and to maintain a prosecution despite exculpatory evidence, see Broam,
320 F.3d at 1029-30. Thus, Defendant Noonan is immune from liability for the
conduct outlined above. But, akin to Defendants Ahner and Frechette, Thornton’s
bare general allegations that the Individual Defendants, including Defendant
Noonan, “created or approved false documents,” (Doc. 12 at J 21), and “knowingly
executed and used false property ownership certifications to support the
prosecution,” (id. J 49), prevents a preliminary finding of immunity as to potential
investigative activities.
D. Defendant Rolando
Thornton alleges that Defendant Rolando dismissed the charges against
Thornton following a two-day investigation, (id. J 27), and “[d]id not fabricate
evidence or permit false certifications,” (id. J 38), but “participated in malicious
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prosecution despite contrary evidence,” (id. § 46). The third allegation falls
squarely within protected advocacy activity for which Defendant Rolando is
immune, and the second allegation explicitly states that Defendant Rolando did not
actually engage in the misconduct alleged. And while the allegation of
investigative action likely falls outside the scope of absolute prosecutorial
immunity, see Genzler, 410 F.3d at 639, there is no harm associated with it. To the
contrary, Thornton alleges that Defendant Rolando’s investigation led to the
dismissal of the charges against him, (Doc. 12 at § 27), and does not allege that
Defendant Rolando “created or approved false documents,” (id. | 21).
Accordingly, Defendant Rolando is dismissed from this action entirely.
E. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Defendants have shown that most of the alleged
misconduct falls within the protections of absolute immunity. More specifically,
the Individual Defendants’ filing of criminal charges, failure to disclose
exculpatory evidence related to those charges, and maintenance of the prosecution
in the absence of probable cause qualifies as advocacy and is therefore protected
by absolute immunity. However, the Second Amended Complaint leaves open the
possibility that Defendants Ahner, Frechette, and Noonan engaged in police-like
investigative activity or the fabrication of evidence. Absolute immunity does not
extend to such conduct; but it may be insulated from liability by qualified
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immunity or a more complete record.
Ultimately, of Thornton’s federal claims against the Individual Defendants,
only his alleged Fourteenth Amendment fabrication of evidence claim (Count III)
and his alleged false official certifications claim (Count VJ) survive the
prosecutorial immunity analysis. And because immunity makes amendment of the
dismissed claims futile, that dismissal is with prejudice.
II. Federal Claims
Thornton has brought nine causes of action against Defendants, including
seven federal claims and two state law claims. Most of his federal claims are
barred by prosecutorial immunity as discussed above. Those claims include
malicious prosecution (Counts I and ID), Fourth Amendment seizure (Count IV),
and civil conspiracy (Count V).° His claim for false official certifications under 18
U.S.C. § 1018 (Count VJ) and his Monell claim against the County (Count VII) fail
on the merits. As a result, of Thornton’s federal claims, only his Fourteenth
Amendment fabrication of evidence claim (Count IIT) survives the present motion.
3 These claims would also be subject to dismissal on the merits. Thornton has not
alleged that he was seized, foreclosing his Fourth Amendment malicious
prosecution claim under § 1983. See Chiaverini v. City of Napolean, Ohio, 602
U.S. 556, 558 (2024). Nor has he shown the government meaningfully interfered
with his possessory interest in the real property at issue. See--Soldal v. Cook
Cnty., Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992). Finally, Thornton has alleged no racial or
otherwise class-based invidious discriminatory animus behind Defendants’
conduct. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
13
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A. Fabrication Claim
“The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the deliberate fabrication of evidence
by a state official.” Spencer v. Peters, 857 F.3d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 2017). “To
prevail on a § 1983 claim of deliberate fabrication, a plaintiff must prove that
(1) the defendant official deliberately fabricated evidence and (2) the deliberate
fabrication caused the plaintiff's deprivation of liberty.” Jd. at 798. “To establish
the second element of causation, the plaintiff must show that (a) the act was the
cause in fact of the deprivation of liberty, meaning that the injury would not have
occurred in the absence of the conduct; and (b) the act was the proximate cause or
legal cause of the injury, meaning that the injury is of a type that a reasonable
person would likely see as a result of the conduct in question.” /d. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Defendants argue that Thornton has failed to state a
viable fabrication claim because “damage to reputation, standing alone, cannot
state a claim for relief under § 1983.” (Doc. 35 at 7.) Defendants miss the point.
Damage to reputation aside, under § 1983, a “plaintiff need not be convicted on the
basis of the fabricated evidence to have suffered a deprivation of liberty—being
criminally charged is enough.” Caldwell v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 889
F.3d 1105, 1115 (9th Cir. 2018). “[T]here is a clearly established constitutional
due process right not to be subjected to criminal charges on the basis of false
14
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evidence that was deliberately fabricated by the government.” Devereaux v.
Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2001).
Defendants further argue that Thornton fails to allege facts showing that two
of the Individual Defendants, Noonan and Rolando, fabricated any evidence. As
discussed above, Defendants are correct regarding Defendant Rolando. As it
relates to Defendant Noonan, however, Thornton specifically alleges that
“Noonan ..., under Ahner’s direct supervision and instruction, created or
approved false documents.” (Doc. 12 at J 21.)
Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied as to
Thornton’s fabrication of evidence claim against Individual Defendants Ahner,
Frechette, and Noonan.
B. False Certification — 18 U.S.C. § 1018
Thornton alleges that “Defendants knowingly executed and used false
property ownership certifications to support the prosecution” in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1018, which criminalizes false official certificates or writings. (Doc. 12
at ] 49.) Criminal statutes rarely create private causes of action. See Cent. Bank of
Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 190 (1994)
(“We have been quite reluctant to infer a private right of action from a criminal
prohibition alone.”). There is no statutory basis for inferring that a civil cause of
action exists for Defendants’ alleged violation of § 1018. See Gonzaga Univ. v.
15
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Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285 (2002) (reaffirming that § 1983 provides a mechanism for
enforcing individual rights secured by the constitution or laws of the United
States). This claim is dismissed without leave to amend.
C. Monell Claim
“A government entity may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unless
a policy, practice, or custom of the entity can be shown to be a moving force
behind a violation of constitutional rights.” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d
892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New
York, 436 U.S. 659, 694 (1978)). The Ninth Circuit recognizes four situations
when local government conduct may be considered a policy: “(1) an official
policy; (2) a pervasive custom or practice; (3) a failure to train, supervise, or
discipline; or (4) a decision or act by a final policymaker.” Horton by Horton v.
City of Santa Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 602-03 (9th Cir. 2019). A local government
“may not, however, be sued under a respondeat superior theory.” Jd. And the
“official policy must be the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Polk
Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Thornton alleges that “Flathead County had policies/customs that
allowed prosecutions without probable cause and with disregard for exculpatory
law enforcement findings,” (Doc. 12 at § 52), and that “[s]uch policies/customs
were the moving force behind the violations,” (id. § 53). Defendants persuasively
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argue that this claim is woefully inadequate. At the pleadings stage, a plaintiff's
Monell claim “may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must
contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts” to provide the opposing party
with fair notice to defend itself. AF ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d
631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thornton’s
conclusory allegations fall far short of that requirement. As a result, dismissal is
appropriate. The remaining discussion therefore speaks to why Thornton will not
be given leave to amend.
The Second Amended Complaint does not identify by which means
Thornton believes his prosecution amounts to a policy, custom, or practice.
However, in his briefing, Thornton appears to argue that the misconduct was by a
final policy-making official and that his mere filing of such charges made it policy
within Flathead County. Neither argument states a plausible claim for Monell
liability. First, Thornton argues that Defendant Ahner, as County Attorney, was a
final policy maker that “personally authorized, directed, and ratified the challenged
conduct.” (Doc. 34 at 10.) “To hold a local government liable for an official’s
conduct [under § 1983], a plaintiff must first establish that the official (1) had final
policymaking authority concerning the action alleged to have caused the particular
constitutional or statutory violation at issue and (2) was the policymaker for the
local governing body for the purposes of the particular act.” Weiner v. San Diego
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Cnty., 210 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“(Whether a particular official has final policy-making authority is a question of
state law.” Jett v. Dallas Independ. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989) (internal
quotation marks and emphasis omitted).
Although the Montana Attorney General has the obligation “to exercise
supervisory powers over county attorneys in all matters pertaining to the duties of
their offices,” Mont. Code Ann. § 2—15-501(5), Montana law vests county
attorneys with broad discretion to determine whether to prosecute an offender
and/or determine what offense to charge, see Mont. Code Ann. § 7-4—2716(1);
State v. Meeks, 176 P.3d 1073, 1075 (Mont. 2008). Defendants do not present any
legal authority for the proposition that Defendant Ahner, as County Attorney, did
not have final policymaking authority for his conduct as the prosecuting attorney in
this case. Cf Mont. Code Ann. § 7—-4—2716(2) (explaining that when ordered by
the attorney general, county attorneys must “promptly institute and diligently
prosecute... in the name of the state of Montana any criminal . . . proceeding.”).
A more nuanced question, however, is whether Defendant Ahner was acting
as a policymaker for the state or the county in this context. This inquiry is
dispositive because “if the relevant officials were working on behalf of the State,
then any practice or custom was a State practice or custom, not a municipal
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practice or custom.” Taylor v. Cnty. of Pima, 913 F.3d 930, 937 (9th Cir. 2019)
(Graber, J., concurring) (citing McMillian v. Monroe Cnty., 520 U.S. 781 (1997)).
The determination of whether an official is a state or local policymaker “is made
on a function-by-function approach by analyzing under state law the organizational
structure and control over the [relevant official].” Goldstein v. City of Long Beach,
715 F.3d 750, 753 (9th Cir. 2013). An officer may act for the state in one capacity
and for the county in another. Weiner, 210 F.3d at 1031 (“Although a California
district attorney is a state officer when deciding whether to prosecute an individual,
this is not to say that district attorneys in California are always state officers for all
purposes.”). Under Montana law, while county attorneys are listed as “county
officers,” Mont. Code Ann. § 7—4—2203(1)(a), their prosecutorial actions are taken
on behalf of the state. Indeed, county attorneys are obligated to “attend the district
court and conduct, on behalf of the state, all prosecutions for public offenses and
represent the state in all matters and proceedings to which it is a party or in which
it may be beneficially interested[.]” Mont. Code Ann. § 7-4—2716(1) (emphasis
added). This is distinguishable from other actions taken by Montana county
attorneys, such as “actions to recover money,” which may be taken on behalf of
“the state or the county.” Mont. Code Ann. § 7-4-2713 (emphasis added). This
can also be distinguished from other, non-prosecutorial roles taken by Montana
county attorneys, such as acting as “the legal adviser [for] the board of county
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commissioners” or other local entities. See Mont. Code Ann. § 7-4-2711.
Ultimately, in the present case, Defendant Ahner was acting as a state official in
prosecuting Thornton. His § 1983 claim against the County based on Defendant
Ahner’s policymaking authority therefore fails. “The County was not the actor; the
state was.” Weiner, 210 F.3d at 1031.
As to Thornton’s second point, the mere fact that his prosecution was
allowed to proceed does not make it policy. The very foundation of Monell is that
a plaintiff cannot establish municipal policy by fiat. “Absent a formal
governmental policy, [a plaintiff] must show a longstanding practice or custom
which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local government entity.”
Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “The custom must be so ‘persistent and widespread’ that it constitutes a
‘permanent and well settled city policy.’” Jd. (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691).
“TG]enerally, a single instance of unlawful conduct is insufficient to state a claim
for municipal liability under section [§] 1983.” Benavidez v. Cnty. of San Diego,
993 F.3d 1134, 1154 (9th Cir. 2021). “Single acts may trigger municipal liability
where fault and causation were clearly traceable to a municipality’s legislative
body or some other authorized decisionmaker.” Jd. (internal quotation marks
omitted). No such facts exist here.
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Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted as to
Thornton’s Monell claim.
Il. State Law Claims
Having determined that one § 1983 claim survives at this stage (fabrication
of evidence), it is appropriate to consider Thornton’s pendant state law claims.
With limited exception, these claims are dismissed with prejudice.
A. Negligence (Count 8)
Thornton alleges that the Individual Defendants were negligent by:
a. Failing to properly examine public records evidencing Plaintiff's
ownership and lawful possession of the property;
b. Authorizing and continuing criminal prosecution against Plaintiff
without probable cause, despite being presented with exculpatory
findings by law enforcement;
c. Preparing, approving, or promulgating false or misleading
documents, and omitting exculpatory information in official
proceedings;
d. Failing to comply with clear professional standards and duties
imposed by law for government officials and law enforcement; [and]
e. Supervising or ratifying actions that foreseeably resulted in injury to
Plaintiff through neglect of established procedures and disregard for
Plaintiff's rights.
(Doc. 12 at | 56.) As was the case with Thornton’s federal claims, Individual
Defendants are absolutely immune from liability for most of this alleged
misconduct. Montana, which also applies a functional test in the prosecutorial
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immunity context, see Renenger v. State, 426 P.3d 559, 564 (Mont. 2018),
recognizes that “[f]iling and maintaining criminal charges are among the many
duties of a prosecutor and when a prosecutor acts within the scope of these duties,
that prosecutor is absolutely immune from civil liability, regardless of negligence
or lack of probable cause,” Rosenthal v. Cnty. of Madison, 170 P.3d 493, 499
(Mont. 2007). That is the case even if the Individual Defendants had “improper
motives,” id., or the prosecutor omitted exculpatory information from the charging
documents, see Renenger, 426 P.3d at 564 (“[A] county attorney’s selection of
particular facts to include in a petition . . . [is a] traditional prosecutorial function[]
protected by absolute immunity.”). However, the Montana Supreme Court has
also distinguished between evaluating evidence assembled by law enforcement,
which would entitle the prosecutor to absolute immunity, see id., and engaging in
investigative or administrative activities, which would entitle the prosecutor to
only qualified immunity, Reinlasoder v. City of Billings, 455 P.3d 477, at *1
(Mont. 2020). Consistently, only Thornton’s negligence allegation premised on
the preparation of false documents, (see Doc. 12 at { 56(d)), can proceed at this
stage. The remainder of this claim is dismissed without leave to amend.
B. Abuse of Process
Thornton alleges that the Individual Defendants abused process by
prosecuting him with criminal trespass to harass, coerce, and intimidate him and to
22
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interfere with his “lawful property rights.” (Doc. 12 at [J 60, 66.) Because this
claim is based entirely on Thornton’s criminal charges and prosecution, it is barred
by prosecutorial immunity. See Rupnow v. Mont. State Auditor & Comm’r of Ins.,
542 P.3d 384, 391 (Mont. 2024) (“His complaint seeks civil liability from the State
and its agents for traditional prosecutorial functions—bringing and pursuing
criminal charges.”)
IV. False or Misleading Case Citations
In their reply, Defendants highlight Thornton’s citation to a nonexistent
case: Younger v. City of Seattle, 70 F.4th 1099, 1107 (9th Cir. 2023). (See Doc. 35
at 9 (referencing Doc. 34 at 9).) As explained by Defendants, the citation “70
F.4th 1099” leads to an unrelated Eighth Circuit case, and there does not appear to
be a Ninth Circuit case with that title. While Thornton does not respond directly to
this imputation, he subsequently filed a “Verification of Case Citations” that lists
several cases with a note that they have been “verified as legit.” (Doc. 36-2.) This
verification corresponds to his sur-reply, however, and does not address Younger.
Attorneys that have submitted briefs containing Al-generated or fabricated
case citations may be found in violation of Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which requires that legal contentions be “warranted by existing law or
by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b); see Mavy v. Comm’n of Soc. Security Admin., 2025 WL
23
Case 9:25-cv-00083-DWM Document 38 Filed 01/23/26 Page 24 of 27
2355222, at *7 (D. Ariz. Aug. 14, 2025). Under Rule 11, a signature on a filing
“certifies to the court that the signer has read the document, has conducted a
reasonable inquiry into the facts and the law and is satisfied that the document is
well grounded in both, and is acting without any improper motive.” Bus. Guides,
Ine. v. Chromatic Comme ’ns. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 542 (1991).
Consistently, “any party who signs a pleading, motion, or a paper” has “an
affirmative duty to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the facts and the law before
filing.” Jd. at 551. “[T]he applicable standard is one of reasonableness under the
circumstances.” Jd. If Rule 11 has been violated, sanctions may be imposed. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 11(c). “Although Rule 11 applies to pro se plaintiffs, the court must
take into account a plaintiff’s pro se status when it determines whether the filing
was reasonable.” Warren v. Guelker, 29 F.3d 1386; 1390 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Thornton is no ordinary pro se litigant. He has vast
experience with pro se work and has been designated a vexatious litigant by the
United States Bankruptcy Court and the state courts of Montana.
Here, while Defendants have identified only one false case citation used by
Thornton, Younger v. City of Seattle, his briefing contains several more examples.
Although the Younger citation is concerning, the underlying legal proposition—the
initiation of criminal process without probable cause can result in a Fourth
Amendment violation—is sound. See Chiaverini v. City of Napolean, Ohio, 602
24
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U.S. 556, 563 (2024) (“[I]f an invalid charge . . . causes a detention to either start
or to continue, then the Fourth Amendment is violated.”). However, Thornton
cites at least two more nonexistent cases in his sur-reply. (See Doc. 36-1 at 4
(referencing United States v. Craner, 652 F. App’x 560, 562 (9th Cir. 2016),* and
United States v. Smith, 629 F.3d 1082, 1084 (9th Cir. 2011)).) Thornton cites these
cases to support the proposition that a citation mandating a court appearance by
itself constitutes a significant restraint on liberty sufficient to qualify as a “seizure”
under the Fourth Amendment. (See id.) This legal proposition is not sound. See
Karam v. City of Burbank, 352 F.3d 1188, 1193-94 (9th Cir. 2003) (explicitly
rejecting the argument that a compelled court appearance qualifies as a Fourth
Amendment “seizure”). And while a subsequently cited case, Odd v. Malone, 538
F.3d 202 (3d Cir. 2008), exists, it does not contain the language quoted by
Thornton and it was not authored by the judge referenced. (See Doc. 36-1 at 5.)
As the Court performed only a limited survey of his citations, there may be more
false cases or fabricated citations in Thornton’s briefing.
At this early stage in the litigation, a remedy short of Rule 11 sanctions is
appropriate. To be sure, the Court has serious concerns regarding Thornton’s
4 Thornton may have meant to refer to United States v. Craner, 652 F.2d 23 (9th
Cir. 1981). (See Doc. 36-2 at 1 (listing this citation in his “Verification of Case
Citations”).) However, that case discusses the right to a jury in “serious” versus
“petty” crimes; it does not address the Fourth Amendment.
25
conduct as this is neither his first federal court case nor the first time he has
falsified authority. To ensure.that the information provided to the Court is
authentic and accurate, Thornton is required to conventionally file a hard copy of
the complete document for every source of authority cited in any of his filings,
including all cases and statutes. If this remedy is insufficient to prevent further
misconduct, a hearing will be set and Thornton will be given the opportunity to
respond before sanctions are levied.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that:
(1) Defendants' motion to dismiss, (Doc. 32), is GRANTED in PART and
DENIED in PART. The motion is DENIED as to Thornton's Fourteenth
Amendment fabrication of evidence claim (Count III) and his state law negligence
claim (Count VIII) premised on that same conduct insofar as those claims are
brought against Individual Defendants Ahner, Frechette, and Noonan. The
motion is GRANTED in all other respects. Defendant Rolando, Flathead County
and all Thornton's other claims (Counts I, II, IV, V, VI, VII, IX, and part of VIII)
are dismissed with prejudice. A trial schedule will be set by separate order.
(2) On or before February 6, 2026, Thornton must conventionally file a hard
copy of the complete source documents for every legal citation in Docs. 34 and 36-
1. The failure to do so, or an incomplete response, may result in Rule 11
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Case 9:25-cv-00083-DWM Document 38 Filed 01/23/26 Page 27 of 27
proceedings, as discussed above. Furthermore, for all future filings, Thornton must
conventionally file a hard copy of the complete source documents for all cited
authority. The failure to do so may result in his filing being struck from the record
with no further notice to him.
DATED this Daly of January, 2026.
Donald W. Molloy, District Judge
ates Djstrict Court
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