Meyers v. Target Corporation et al

9:25-cv-00053MtdFeb 10, 2026

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
MISSOULA DIVISION
This action was originally brought by Plaintiff Brandon Meyers (“Meyers”)
in the Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County (DV-15-2025-
432-WS), on March 14, 2025, against Defendants Target Corporation (“Target”)
and John Does 1–10. (Doc. 8.) Target timely removed the action to this Court,
invoking diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). (Doc. 1.) Target then
moved to dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 6.)
The Court subsequently granted Meyers leave to amend his Original Complaint
(Doc. 8), and denied Target’s motion to dismiss as moot. (Doc. 13.)
Meyers filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. 14) on May 6, 2025, whereupon
Target filed the Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) that is presently
before the Court (Doc. 15). The Motion is fully briefed and ripe for the Court’s
review. (See Docs. 15, 17, 18.) For the following reasons, the Court finds Target’s
BRANDON MEYERS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TARGET CORPORATION and JOHN
DOES 1–10,
Defendants.
CV 25-53-M-TJC
ORDER
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motion should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I. 	BACKGROUND
When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must
accept all material allegations in the complaint as true. Usher v. City of Los
Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). The following facts are taken from
Meyers’ Amended Complaint.
In January 2023, Meyers was hired as the Store Director of the Target store
in Kalispell, Montana. (Doc. 14 at ¶ 10.) Meyers, who is male, had female
supervisors. (Id. at ¶ 40.) During his employment, Meyers alleges he was “treated
poorly by his female coworkers and supervisors … in an embarrassing, harassing,
and humiliating manner.” (Id. at ¶¶ 42–43.) Meyers alleges he was subjected to
“sexual harassment and inappropriate comments referencing his gender and was
told that he needed to have ‘big dick energy’ at work.” (Id. at ¶ 31.) Meyers
reported this to Target Human Resources, which initiated an investigation but took
no corrective action. (Id. at ¶¶ 32–33.) Meyers alleges he was treated poorly at
work after his report. (Id. at ¶¶ 33–34.)
On May 7, 2024, Target terminated Meyers’ employment. (Id. at ¶ 17.) In
the months leading up to his termination, Meyers had received favorable
employment reviews, and he had completed any applicable probationary period.
(Id. at ¶¶ 15–16.)
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Meyers’ Amended Complaint presents three causes of action: wrongful
termination (Count One), in violation of the Wrongful Discharge from
Employment Act (“WDEA”) (codified at Mont. Code Ann. §§ 39-2-901–915)1;
retaliation (Count Two), in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(“Title VII”) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17) and the Montana Human
Rights Act (“MHRA”) (codified at Mont. Code Ann. Title 49); and discrimination
in employment (Count Three), in violation of Title VII and the MHRA.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
“Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper only when the complaint either (1)
lacks a cognizable legal theory or (2) fails to allege sufficient facts to support a
cognizable legal theory.” Li v. Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir. 2013). The
Court’s standard of review under Rule 12(b)(6) is informed by Rule 8(a)(2), which
requires that a pleading contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78
(2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
1 Count One does not specify that it is based on the WDEA in the same way that
Counts Two and Three specify the statutes on which they are based. (See Doc. 14
at 3, 4, 6.) Count One does, however, reference specific WDEA provisions (id. at
¶¶ 21, 23) and Meyers explicitly mentions the WDEA in his statement of facts
common to all counts (id. at ¶ 13). It is clear, in any event, that Count One is
premised on a violation of the WDEA since the viability of simultaneous WDEA
and MHRA claims is a central issue in the parties’ dispute over whether Meyers’
Amended Complaint should be dismissed. (See Docs. 15, 17, 18.)
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To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Id. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted). “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. A plausibility determination is context-specific, and courts must
draw on judicial experience and common sense in evaluating a complaint. Levitt v.
Yelp! Inc., 765 F.3d 1123, 1135 (9th Cir. 2014). “[I]n practice, a complaint …
must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material
elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562 (2007) (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford
Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)).
A court considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion must accept as true the
allegations of the complaint and must construe those allegations in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Wyler Summit P’ship v. Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc., 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998). However, “bare assertions …
amount[ing] to nothing more than a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements’ … for
the purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss, are not entitled to an assumption of
truth.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Such assertions do nothing more than state a legal
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conclusion, even if the conclusion is cast in the form of a factual allegation. Id.
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Consideration of Materials Outside the Pleadings
Target has filed exhibits to support its Motion to Dismiss. (Docs. 15-2, 15-
3, 16-1.) Consequently, before the Court can reach a conclusion on Target’s
Motion, the Court must first determine whether it may consider materials presented
outside the pleadings.
In general, a court cannot consider materials outside the complaint in
deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Khoja v. Orexigen
Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 998 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Cervantes v. City of
San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1274 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Review is limited to the complaint;
evidence outside the pleadings … cannot normally be considered in deciding a
12(b)(6) motion.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted). The Federal Rules
make clear that if a court does consider documents outside the pleadings, a Rule
12(b)(6) motion must be converted to a motion for summary judgment. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) …, matters outside the
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be
treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.”). In certain circumstances,
however, extrinsic evidence may be considered without converting a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to a motion for summary judgment. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d
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668, 688–90 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence
201, courts may take judicial notice of matters of public record without converting
a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment).
Target has attached as exhibits, and requested that the Court take judicial
notice of, right-to-sue letters that Meyers received from the Montana Human
Rights Bureau (“MHRB”) and the United States Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”), as well as the underlying charges that Meyers dual-filed
with these administrative agencies.
Federal Rule of Evidence 201 allows courts to “judicially notice a fact that is
not subject to reasonable dispute because it … can be accurately and readily
determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed.
R. Evid. 201(b)(2). Courts routinely take judicial notice of letters from
government agencies that indicate a complainant has exhausted their administrative
remedies and has a right to sue in state or federal court. E.g., Wyatt v. City of
Burlingame, 2017 WL 565303, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2017); Pruitt v. J.P.
Morgan Chase & Co., 2016 WL 11794182, at *3 n.2 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 2016);
Vashisht-Rota v. Harrisburg Univ., 2023 WL 35216, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2023);
Burch v. Bellagio Hotel & Casino, 2014 WL 4472411, at *2 n.2 (D. Nev. Sept. 9,
2014). Doing so does not convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary
judgment. E.g., Johnson v. County of Nassau, 411 F. Supp. 2d 171, 178 (E.D.N.Y.
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2006); Rullan v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Sanitation, 2011 WL 1833335, at *1 n.1
(S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2011); Golden v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., 319 F. Supp. 3d
358, 366 n.2 (D.D.C. 2018).
Meyers does not dispute the authenticity of the attached documents, nor does
he disagree that it is appropriate for the Court to take judicial notice of them. (See
Doc. 17.) Accordingly, the Court will take judicial notice of the right-to-sue letters
from the MHRB and the EEOC, as they were issued by government agencies and
their authenticity is not in question. The Court will also take judicial notice of the
charges that Meyers dual-filed with these agencies, but such notice is limited to the
existence of the charges, the dates of their filing, and that certain allegations were
made.
Having taken judicial notice, the Court notes the following details regarding
the right-to-sue letters that are relevant in determining whether Meyers properly
states claims under Title VII, the MHRA, and the WDEA.
Meyers filed a complaint with the MHRB that was received by the agency
on May 23, 2024. (Doc. 15-2 at 9.) On November 19, 2024, the MHRB notified
Meyers that it was dismissing his complaint and that he had 90 days to commence
proceedings in district court. (Id. at 5.) Thus, Meyers had to file suit related to
those charges on or before February 17, 2025. See Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-512(3)
(“If the charging party fails to commence a civil action within 90 days after the
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dismissal has been issued, the claim is barred.”).
Meyers’ charge to the MHRB was dual-filed with the EEOC, which issued a
dismissal to Meyers on December 16, 2024. (Doc. 16-1 at 2.) The dismissal from
the EEOC informed Meyers that he had 90 days within which to file a lawsuit
based on the dismissed charges, meaning he would need to file his charges on or
before March 16, 2025. See Scholar v. Pac. Bell, 963 F.2d 264, 266–67 (9th Cir.
1992) (“The requirement for filing a Title VII civil action within 90 days from the
date EEOC dismisses a claim constitutes a statute of limitations … [if a] claimant
fails to file within [the] 90-day period, the action is barred accordingly.”) (internal
citation omitted).
B. 	Whether Meyers’ Amended Complaint Fails to State a Claim
Target contends that Meyers’ Amended Complaint should be dismissed in
its entirety because he fails to state a claim under the WDEA, the MHRA, and Title
VII. (Doc. 15-1 at 3.) Target argues that Meyers’ WDEA claim cannot be
maintained because the MHRA provides the sole avenue for pursuing claims that a
person was discharged due to sex-based discrimination. (Id. at 9–12.) Target also
argues that Meyers’ MHRA claims are time-barred because they were not filed
within 90 days of Meyers’ receipt of the right-to-sue letter from the MHRB. (Id. at
14–15.) Finally, Target argues that Meyers’ Title VII claims are time-barred
because they were not filed within 90 days of Meyers’ receipt of the right-to-sue
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letter from the EEOC. (Id. at 15–16.) Because Meyers’ Original Complaint was
filed 88 days after the EEOC issued its right-to-sue letter, Target also argues that
Meyers’ Title VII claims in the Amended Complaint do not relate back to the sole
charge of wrongful termination in the Original Complaint. (Id. at 16–18.)
Meyers, for his part, maintains that Montana law allows him to
simultaneously pursue remedies under both the WDEA and MHRA (Doc. 17 at 7–
8, 12); that his MHRA and Title VII claims in the Amended Complaint relate back
to his Original Complaint (id. at 3–7); and moreover, that Target should be
judicially estopped from arguing that these claims do not relate back (id. at 8–11).
Because the Court finds that the Title VII claims do relate back, Meyers’
arguments regarding judicial estoppel will not be addressed.
1. 	Meyers’ MHRA Claims are Time-Barred
Meyers was issued a right-to-sue letter from the MHRB on November 19,
2024, meaning that he needed to bring a lawsuit by February 17, 2025. Meyers’
Original Complaint was filed in state court on March 14, 2025. Target argues,
therefore, that the MHRA claims Meyers asserts in the Amended Complaint are
time-barred.
Meyers does not dispute Target’s arguments that his MHRA claims are time-
barred. (See Doc. 17.) He also does not present any arguments of his own as to
equitable tolling or estoppel such that the February 17 deadline would have been
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extended. Nor does he provide any facts to indicate that he appealed the MHRB’s
determination such that the February 17 deadline would be voided.
As noted above, the MHRA is clear that, “[i]f the charging party fails to
commence a civil action within 90 days after the dismissal has been issued, the
claim is barred.” Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-512(3). Accordingly, Meyers’ MHRA
claims are untimely and must be dismissed with prejudice.
2. 	Meyers’ Title VII Claims are Not Time-Barred
Although Meyers’ Original Complaint was not filed within the 90-day
deadline provided by the MHRB, it was filed within the 90-day deadline provided
by the EEOC—the deadline outlined in the EEOC right-to-sue letter was March
16, 2025, and Meyers’ Original Complaint was filed on March 14, 2025. The
Original Complaint does not, however, mention Title VII, the EEOC, exhaustion of
administrative remedies, or that its sole count of wrongful termination is premised
on federal law. Nevertheless, if the Title VII claims in the Amended Complaint
relate back to the Original Complaint, then they are not untimely because “[a]n
otherwise time-barred claim in an amended pleading is deemed timely if it relates
back to the date of a timely original pleading.” ASARCO, LLC v. Union Pac. R.R.
Co., 765 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 2014).
Relation back is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), which
provides that “[a]n amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original
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pleading when the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the
original pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B). The relation back doctrine is
applied liberally, with the goal of deciding cases on their merits rather than on
procedural technicalities. ASARCO, 765 F.3d at 1005. Thus, an amended pleading
can relate back even “if it includes allegations that were expressly disclaimed in
the original pleading.” Id.
“An amended claim arises from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence
if it will likely be proved by the same kind of evidence offered in support of the
original pleading.” Id. at 1004 (internal quotations and citations omitted). “[T]he
original and amended pleadings [must] share a common core of operative facts so
that the adverse party has fair notice of the transaction, occurrence, or conduct
called into question.” Martell v. Trilogy Ltd., 872 F.2d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1989).
Target argues that Meyers’ Title VII claims in Counts Two and Three do not
relate back to his Original Complaint because, in his brief opposing Target’s first
motion to dismiss, Meyers averred that the Original Complaint “encompasses
separate conduct, which is independent of the MHRA or retaliation/discrimination
claims.” (Doc. 10 at 2.) Target also quotes language from Meyers’ brief
indicating that the Original Complaint is based on “[f]acts independent and
separate from the facts asserted in the EEOC charge,” which have “nothing to do
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with the EEOC charge and meet the pleading standards for wrongful termination
all on their own.” (Id. at 10.) In his brief in opposition to Target’s present Motion,
however, Meyers asserts that “the initial Complaint asserts the same conduct and
facts that the retaliation and discrimination claims assert in the Amended
Complaint.” (Doc. 17 at 4.)
Looking to the substance of the Original and Amended Complaints rather
than the parties’ characterizations of them, the Court finds that, liberally applying
Rule 15(c), Meyers’ Title VII claims for discrimination and retaliation in his
Amended Complaint relate back to his Original Complaint. The Title VII claims
clearly arise from the same common core of operative facts set out in the Original
Complaint: alleged sexual discrimination experienced by Meyers during his
employment with Target, and his eventual termination for reporting the
discrimination.
The Original Complaint alleges that sexist comments were directed at
Meyers, and that his termination by Target was in retaliation for reporting this
conduct. (Doc. 8 at ¶¶ 16–17.) Similarly, the Amended Complaint alleges that
Meyers experienced and then reported sexual harassment and discrimination at
Target and there “was a causal connection between [Meyers’] reporting of the
conduct and Target’s adverse employment action.” (Doc. 14 at ¶¶ 27–29, 42–45.)
Thus, Meyers’ new legal theories in the Amended Complaint depend on the same
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facts set out in his Original Complaint. Cf. Williams v. Boeing Co., 517 F.3d 1120,
1132–34 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that new legal theories depending on different
facts do not relate back). Meyers would need to use the same kind of evidence to
prove the claim in his Original Complaint as he will need to prove his Title VII
claims. The Original Complaint therefore put Target on fair notice of the conduct
that forms the basis of Meyers’ Title VII claims, even though these specific claims
were not enumerated. Accordingly, Meyers’ Title VII claims in Counts Two and
Three of the Amended Complaint are not time-barred and are not subject to
dismissal on that basis.
3. 	Meyers Fails to State a Claim under the WDEA
In briefing the present Motion to Dismiss, Target presents substantially the
same argument regarding Meyers’ WDEA claim as it did in briefing its motion to
dismiss Meyers’ Original Complaint: Meyers fails to state a claim under the
WDEA because claims of wrongful discharge due to sexual discrimination can
only be brought under the MHRA. (Doc. 6-1 at 6–8; Doc. 15-1 at 9–12.) In
response, Meyers argues that plaintiffs can pursue simultaneous WDEA and
MHRA claims, and that his WDEA claim need only be dismissed if and when the
Court reaches an affirmative determination that Meyers’ termination violated the
MHRA. (Doc. 17 at 12.)
/ / /
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In general, the WDEA “provides the exclusive remedy for a wrongful
discharge from employment.” Mont. Code Ann. § 39-2-902. The WDEA does not
apply, however, to a discharge “that is subject to any other state or federal statute
that provides a procedure or remedy for contesting the dispute,” including statutes,
like the MHRA, that prohibit unlawful employment actions based on sex. § 39-2-
912(1)(a).
The MHRA provides the “exclusive remedy” for any of the acts it lists as
prohibited discriminatory practices. § 49-2-512(1). These prohibited practices
include retaliation for filing complaints of sexual discrimination, § 49-2-301, as
well as sex-based employment discrimination of any kind, § 49-2-303(1)(a). As
noted above, the MHRA also contains specific administrative procedures that must
be followed before a person can file a lawsuit based on violations of the MHRA.
§§ 49-2-501–512. Because of this, litigants may attempt “to characterize a claim
in such a way so as to avoid the exclusive procedures set forth in the MHRA.” Lay
v. Mont. Dep’t of Mil. Affs., 351 P.3d 672, 675 (Mont. 2015).
As this Court has previously noted, “[t]he relationship between the
competing exclusivity provisions of the WDEA and other state or federal anti-
discrimination statutes is not easy to delineate.” Rhoten v. Rocking J. Ranch, LLC,
2021 WL 5447665, at *4 (D. Mont. Nov. 22, 2021). There are, nevertheless, some
general rules:
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If the WDEA claim alleges that the discharge was the result of the
same discriminatory conduct prohibited by the MHRA, then the
MHRA’s exclusivity provisions go into effect and the WDEA claim
must be dismissed. If, on the other hand, the WDEA claim alleges that
the discharge was the result of non-discriminatory conduct separate
and distinct from the discriminatory conduct supporting the MHRA
claim, then both may proceed until an affirmative determination on
the MHRA claim is made.
Id. at *6.
Essentially, a plaintiff is permitted to bring simultaneous WDEA and
MHRA claims so long as the gravamen of the WDEA claim is something other
than that the discharge was the result of discrimination prohibited by the MHRA.
If the Court at some point determines that Meyers’ termination resulted from sex-
based discrimination, then his WDEA claim must be dismissed. But, at this stage,
there has been no determination regarding the cause of Meyers’ discharge, so the
WDEA claim cannot be dismissed on that basis. Instead, the Court must look to
the substance of Meyers’ WDEA claim to determine if it alleges sex discrimination
and thereby spurs the MHRA’s exclusivity provisions. See Lay, 351 P.3d at 675
(“In determining whether the MHRA is applicable, we look to the gravamen of the
party’s complaint, as opposed to the party’s characterization of [their] claims.”).
Meyers does not refer to sex discrimination or retaliation in Count One.
Instead, Meyers asserts that Target lacked good cause for terminating him and
violated its own written personnel policies in doing so. (Doc. 14 at ¶ 19.) Meyers’
WDEA claim recites, nearly word-for-word, elements of wrongful discharge
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enumerated at Mont. Code Ann. §§ 39-2-904(1)(b)–(c). (Doc. 14 at ¶¶ 19–20.) On
the whole, Count One consists of little more than legal conclusions asserting that
Target “manufactured pretextual reasons” for Meyers’ termination and that his
termination was wrongful. (Id. at ¶¶ 18, 22.) Thus, Meyers’ WDEA claim lacks
sufficient factual context to allow the Court to draw an inference that the legal
claims he asserts are supported. It is on this basis that Meyers’ WDEA claim must
be dismissed at this juncture—not because it is excluded by the MHRA, but
because it contains virtually no factual support to state a claim under the WDEA.
That said, it is conceivable that Meyers will be able to bring forth factual
allegations supporting his WDEA claim that have nothing to do with violations of
the MHRA or Title VII. For instance, Meyers alleges that Target violated its
personnel policy in discharging him—an act prohibited by the WDEA—without
specifying which provisions Target allegedly violated. The Court, therefore, has
no basis to evaluate whether Meyers can plausibly state a WDEA claim based on
Target’s violations of its personnel policy that is wholly separate from a sex
discrimination or retaliation claim. The Court also notes that the charges Meyers
dual-filed with the MHRB and EEOC contain factual allegations regarding
Meyers’ termination that appear unrelated to discrimination. (See Doc. 15-2 at 9–
10.)
/ / /
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Therefore, because the Court does not find that amendment of Meyers’
WDEA claim would necessarily be futile, this claim is dismissed without prejudice
and with leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“[A] district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the
pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be
cured by the allegation of other facts.”).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Target’s Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 15) be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:
1. Meyers’ MHRA claims in Counts Two and Three of the Amended
Complaint are dismissed with prejudice.
2. Meyers’ WDEA claim in Count One of the Amended Complaint is
dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend. If Meyers chooses
to file a second amended complaint, he must do so within 14 days of this
Order, or the Court will dismiss the claim with prejudice.
3. Target’s Motion to Dismiss Meyers’ Title VII claims in Counts Two and
Three is denied.
DATED this 10th day of February, 2026.
_______________________________
TIMOTHY J. CAVAN
United States Magistrate Judge
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