Graham v. Farmers Insurance Exchange et al

6:23-cv-00053MtdFeb 13, 2026

Full text

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
HELENA DIVISION
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Mark Graham (“Graham”) brought a putative class action against
Defendants Farmers Insurance Exchange and Mid-Century Insurance Company
(collectively “Farmers”), alleging claims for breach of contract and violation of the
Montana Unfair Trade Practices Act (“UTPA”). Graham also seeks a declaration
that Farmers’ subrogation practices violate Montana law. (Doc. 4.) Graham filed a
motion for attorney fees (Doc. 55), a motion to certify class under Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Doc. 53), and a motion to compel discovery and
for sanctions (Doc. 57).
U.S. Magistrate Judge DeSoto issued Findings and Recommendations on
December 23, 2025, denying the motion for attorney fees, denying the motion to
MARK GRAHAM,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FARMERS INSURANCE
EXCHANGE and MID-CENTURY
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants.
CV-23-53-H-BMM
ORDER ON OBJECTIONS TO
FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
Case 6:23-cv-00053-BMM-KLD Document 75 Filed 02/13/26 Page 1 of 17
2
certify class, and granting, in part, and denying, in part, the motion to compel.
(Doc. 66.) Graham filed an objection to Magistrate Judge DeSoto’s Findings and
Recommendations on January 6, 2026. (Doc. 68.) The Court held a hearing on
February 2, 2026. (Doc. 72.) The Court permitted the parties to file supplemental
briefs after the hearing. (Id.)
BACKGROUND
Magistrate Judge DeSoto previously has addressed the background of the
case in greater detail. (Doc. 34 at 2-4.) The underlying facts of the matter involve a
head-on collision that occurred on April 2, 2023, on Highway 93 in Montana.
(Doc. 10 at 2.) Mark Graham was severely injured in the accident, and his wife
Janice Graham was killed. (Id.) The other vehicle was driven by Michael Howell.
(Id.) Mid-Century Insurance Company (“Mid-Century”) insured Graham’s car.
(Doc. 10 at 1; Doc. 59 Ex. 2 at 1-2.) Farmers was underwritten by Mid-Century
Insurance Company at the time. (Doc. 34 at 2, citing Doc. 4 ¶ 9.) Graham made a
claim for property damage with Farmers after the accident. (Doc. 34 at 2, citing
Doc. 4 ¶ 11.) Farmers opened the claim and prepared an evaluation of the property
damage claim. (Doc. 34 at 2, citing Doc. 4 ¶ 12.)
Dispute exists concerning the following facts and communications by
Farmers. Farmers issued an initial check to Graham for the cash value of the
vehicle plus “License/Transfer Fees.” (Doc. 28 at 3; Doc. 54 Ex. 5 at 1; and Doc.
Case 6:23-cv-00053-BMM-KLD Document 75 Filed 02/13/26 Page 2 of 17
3
56 Ex.1 at 2.) Graham “disagreed with the valuation” and refused to deposit the
check. (Doc. 54 Ex. 5 at 1.) Farmers also contacted Michael Howell’s insurer,
United Financial Casualty Company (“Progressive”). Farmers notified Progressive
of Farmers’ intent to subrogate. (Doc. 24 at 4; Doc. 28 at 4.)
Graham, through his counsel, requested that Farmers withdraw any
subrogation demand issued to Progressive. (Doc. 23 Ex. 13 at 2; Doc. 28 at 4.)
Farmers subsequently discontinued its subrogation efforts, if only for a time. (Doc.
54 at 13; Doc. 63 at 19.) Graham filed the complaint in this matter on August 9,
2023, and an amended complaint on August 31, 2023. (Doc. 1; Doc. 4.) The
amended complaint alleges claims for breach of contract and violation of the
Montana UTPA, and seeks a declaration that Farmers’ subrogation practices violate
Montana law. (Doc. 4.)
Graham accepted a payment from Progressive for property damage, to
include loss of use of the vehicle, after having filed the amended complaint. (Doc.
63 Ex. 23.) Graham filed a motion for partial summary judgment on November 13,
2023. (Doc. 14.) The motion sought a declaratory judgment, pursuant to Count 1 of
the amended complaint. (Doc. 15 at 12). Farmers issued a new payment to Graham
on November 17, 2023, to reflect an updated valuation for the vehicle. (Doc. 28 at
4; Doc. 56 at 5).
Case 6:23-cv-00053-BMM-KLD Document 75 Filed 02/13/26 Page 3 of 17
4
Dispute exists over the following series of facts. In short, Graham accepted a
reduced payment after Farmers indicated a mistake had been made. (Doc. 63 at 31,
n.5; Doc. 56 Ex. 1 at 2.) Graham has since indicated that he “agreed with the
valuation and cashed the check.” (Doc. 54 at 13.) Graham thereafter filed notice
with the Court that Farmers’ updated payment had rendered moot his request for
declaratory relief. (Doc. 29.)
Magistrate Judge DeSoto held oral arguments on Graham’s motion for
partial summary judgment and Farmers’ motion to dismiss on September 9, 2024.
(Doc. 33.) Graham withdrew his motion for partial summary judgment at oral
argument in light of the updated and accepted payment from Farmers. (Doc. 34 at
1.) Magistrate Judge DeSoto entered a Findings and Recommendation on the
motion to dismiss and motion for partial summary judgment on September 20,
2024. (Doc. 34.) Magistrate Judge DeSoto ordered that Graham’s oral motion to
withdraw his motion for summary judgment be granted and recommended that
Farmer’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint be granted as to Count 1
(wherein Graham sought declaratory judgment). (Doc. 34 at 10-11.) The Court
entered an order adopting the Findings and Recommendation on October 18, 2024.
(Doc. 35.)
Magistrate Judge DeSoto held an informal discovery conference on January
16, 2025. (Doc. 47.) Magistrate Judge DeSoto held a second discovery conference
Case 6:23-cv-00053-BMM-KLD Document 75 Filed 02/13/26 Page 4 of 17
5
on April 17, 2025. (Doc. 51.) Graham filed the three instant motions in July of
2025 (Docs. 53, 55, 57.) Magistrate Judge DeSoto entered Findings and
Recommendations denying the motion for attorney fees, denying the motion to
certify class, and granting, in part, and denying, in part, the motion to compel.
(Doc. 66.) Graham filed an objection to Magistrate Judge Desoto’s Findings and
Recommendations. (Doc. 68.)
LEGAL STANDARD
The Court reviews de novo findings and recommendations to which
parties object. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The Court reviews for clear error
all other findings and recommendations. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Commodore
Bus. Mach., Inc., 656 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th Cir. 1981). Where a party’s objections
constitute perfunctory responses argued in an attempt to engage the district court in
reargument of the same arguments made in the original response, however, the Court
will review the applicable portions of the findings and recommendations for clear
error. Rosling v. Kirkegard, 2014 WL 693315 *3 (D. Mont. Feb. 21, 2014) (internal
citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
Graham objects to Magistrate Judge DeSoto’s Findings and
Recommendations denying class certification and denying attorney fees. (Doc. 68
at 1.) The Court will address each issue in turn.
Case 6:23-cv-00053-BMM-KLD Document 75 Filed 02/13/26 Page 5 of 17
6
I. Class Certification
Graham argues that class certification proves appropriate because he alleged
a programmatic violation of Montana’s made whole doctrine. (Id. at 5.) Graham
contends that Ferguson v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 180 P.3d 1164 (Mont. 2008), and
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011), support his claim that these
allegations present a common question suitable for class treatment. (Doc. 68 at 5.)
Graham asserts that the common question of whether Farmers programmatically
violates Montana’s made whole doctrine predominates over any individual claims
handling decisions such that a Rule 23(b)(3) class would be appropriate. (Id. at 8.)
Class relief proves appropriate where the underlying issues are common to
the entire class and the questions of law apply to each class member. Gen. Tel. Co.
of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki,
442 U.S. 682, 701 (1979)). Courts limit claims that fall under the class action
umbrella to those class claims that are “fairly encompassed by the named
plaintiff’s claims.” Id. at 156 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Northwest v. EEOC, 446
U.S. 318 (1980)). A class may be established if the following criteria exists: (1)
numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4) adequacy of representation.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (1-4).
A. Rule 23(a)
Case 6:23-cv-00053-BMM-KLD Document 75 Filed 02/13/26 Page 6 of 17
7
Graham challenges Magistrate Judge DeSoto’s conclusion that he failed to
prove commonality, typicality, and the requirements of Rule 23(b). (Doc. 68 at 14-
15.) Farmers argues that Graham’s challenges fail as he lacks standing to assert his
potential class action claims as he already has been made whole and potentially has
received a double recovery. (Doc. 70 at 9.) Farmers further contends that Graham
cannot prove that his putative class complaint meets the standard for commonality
and typicality as there are significant individual questions that must be answered as
to each subrogation claim before a “made whole” violation can be established. (Id.
at 15.)
Graham relies heavily on the Montana Supreme Court’s decision in
Ferguson for his assertion that he sufficiently has demonstrated commonality. 180
P.3d at 1166. Graham’s near complete reliance on the abrogated opinion in
Ferguson reflects the strength of his arguments on class certification. Graham fails
to grapple with the effective abrogation of Ferguson in Chipman v. Nw. Healthcare
Corp., 288 P.3d 193, 207 (Mont. 2012). Graham instead argues that “Dukes did not
negate Ferguson’s persuasive authority.” (Doc. 73 at 2.) Graham further fails to
acknowledge that Dukes “departed from [the] minimal standard” applied in
Ferguson. Chipman, 288 P.3d at 207 (citing Dukes, 564 U.S. at 351). Dukes raised
the standard for commonality such that merely presenting a “single issue []
common to all” no longer proves sufficient. Chipman, 288 P.3d at 207 (citing
Case 6:23-cv-00053-BMM-KLD Document 75 Filed 02/13/26 Page 7 of 17
8
Dukes, 564 U.S. at 351); see also Doc. 68 at 14 (quoting Ferguson, 180 P.3d at
1167).
Graham instead must demonstrate a “common contention[,]” the
determination of which would “resolve an issue that is central to the validity of
each one of the claims in one stroke.” Dukes, 564 U.S. at 351. Dukes explicitly
stated that “the raising of common ‘questions’—even in droves” is not what
matters to class certification, but rather it is “the capacity of a class-wide
proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the
litigation.” Id. at 350 [citation omitted]. Dukes noted that “[d]issimilarities within
the proposed class are what have the potential to impede the generation of common
answers.” Id. at 350 [citation omitted].
Magistrate Judge DeSoto accurately characterized the dissimilarities within
the proposed class to include the following: (1) there is “significant potential for
variation among class based on whether Farmers was required to determine if the
insured was made whole[;]” and (2) Graham’s proposed class definitions vary over
whether an individual sought subrogation from Farmers, or whether Farmers
demanded or asserted a right to subrogation. (Doc. 66 at 13.) Magistrate Judge
DeSoto recognized that under the proposed class definitions, the individual facts
could range from where “Farmers merely stated an intention to subrogate in
Case 6:23-cv-00053-BMM-KLD Document 75 Filed 02/13/26 Page 8 of 17
9
correspondence with a third party, to instances where Farmers actually recovered
funds from a third party via subrogation.” (Id.)
Graham does not sufficiently explain how his putative class action will
generate common answers for these disparate factual cases. Graham asserts that the
common answer applicable to all putative class members would be that Farmers
failed to comply with Montana’s made whole doctrine, and damages could be
assessed individually by Farmers. (Doc. 68 at 10.) Graham cites the testimony of
Steven Rodenberg, Farmers Insurance’s Auto Subrogation Supervisor and Rule
30(b)(6) designee, to support his claim of undisputed evidence that Farmers has a
policy not to comply with Montana’s made whole doctrine. (Doc. 73 at 3.)
Rodenberg’s testimony on the matter hardly proves dispositive on Farmers’
policies. Rodenberg merely says that the actions Farmers took in Graham’s case
were consistent with Farmers policies and procedures. (Id., citing Rodenberg
Deposition, pp. 17-18, ln. 14-2.) The Court does not see how this short deposition
transcript provides dispositive, or even persuasive, evidence that Farmers
systemically violates Montana law.
The Court finds that testimony from Daniel Moran, an attorney in Farmers
Insurance Subrogation & Recovery Law Firm, additionally fails to substantiate
Graham’s allegations. (Doc. 73 at 5.) Moran’s testimony may prove somewhat
troubling to the Court as it concerns Farmers’ efforts to actively engage with state
Case 6:23-cv-00053-BMM-KLD Document 75 Filed 02/13/26 Page 9 of 17
10
requirements, but it does not provide sufficient evidence to fulfill the Rule 23(a)
requirements.
Graham further fails to recognize that it remains unclear whether Farmers
violated Montana’s made whole doctrine in each of the putative class members’
cases or whether Farmers even had a duty to comply with Montana’s made whole
doctrine in each of these cases. (Doc. 70 at 15.) The Court would need to analyze
each claim individually to determine whether the proposed class member suffered
an injury, or if Farmers had failed to perform a made whole analysis when
required. (Doc. 66 at 13-14.) As Magistrate Judge DeSoto recognized, “[t]he
resulting multitude of inquiries would be inconsistent with the commonality
standard set out in Wal-Mart v. Dukes and conflicts with the requirement that the
alleged injury be capable of [] ‘classwide resolution . . . in one stroke.’” (Doc. 66 at
14, quoting Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350.) The Court finds unavailing Graham’s
arguments that Magistrate Judge DeSoto applied the wrong standard in her
commonality analysis.
Graham also objects to Magistrate Judge DeSoto’s conclusion that he failed
to sufficiently plead typicality as required under Rule 23(a). (Doc. 68 at 16.)
Plaintiffs must show that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class” to establish typicality. Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(a)(3). The typicality and commonality requirements “tend to merge” as both
Case 6:23-cv-00053-BMM-KLD Document 75 Filed 02/13/26 Page 10 of 17
11
seek to determine “whether the named plaintiff’s claim and the class claims are so
interrelated that interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately
protected in their absence.” Dukes, 564 U.S. at 349, n. 5. As Farmers points out
and Magistrate Judge DeSoto concluded, Graham has “both apparently received a
double recovery and certainly been made whole.” (Doc. 66 at 16.) Graham does
not address Magistrate Judge DeSoto’s findings that he has been made whole, and
potentially even awarded a double recovery. Graham instead argues that his
“experience” with Farmers exemplified its “standard operating procedure.” (Doc.
68 at 16-17.) An allegedly similar experience does not prove sufficient to plead
typicality when the facts, and alleged injury, vary greatly among Graham’s
proposed class.
It proves unnecessary for the Court to address in detail Farmers’ claims that
Graham does not have standing to assert his class action claims. The Court
concludes that Graham has not plead facts sufficient to demonstrate commonality
or typicality as required under Rule 23(a).
B. Rule 23(b)(3)
Graham next challenges Magistrate Judge DeSoto’s findings and
conclusions concerning his failure to meet the predominance and superiority
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). (Doc. 68 at 17.) The requirements of Rule 23(b)(3)
substantially overlap with the requirements of Rule 23(a). The putative plaintiffs
Case 6:23-cv-00053-BMM-KLD Document 75 Filed 02/13/26 Page 11 of 17
12
must prove that there are “questions of law or fact common to class members” that
can be determined in one stroke. Olean Wholesale Grocery Coop., Inc. v. Bumble
Bee Foods LLC, 31 F.4th 651, 664 (9th Cir. 2022). The 23(b)(3) test is “far more
demanding,” Wolin v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC, 617 F.3d 1168, 1172 (9th
Cir. 2010) (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623–24
(1997)). To establish predominance under Rule 23(b)(3), a plaintiff must prove that
the “proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by
representation.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623-24.
Rule 23(b)(3) further calls upon courts to give careful scrutiny to the
relationship between common and individual questions in a case to assess
predominance and superiority. An individual question involves one where
“members of a proposed class will need to present evidence that varies from
member to member.” Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 577 U.S. 442, 453 (2016).
A common question involves one where “the same evidence will suffice for each
member to make a prima facie showing [or] the issue is susceptible to generalized,
class-wide proof.” Id.
Graham again relies upon Ferguson for his argument that he has sufficiently
plead predominance. (Doc. 68 at 17-18, citing Ferguson, 180 P.3d at 1167.) The
Court does not find persuasive the reasoning and analysis in Ferguson. Graham
argues that a common question predominates of whether Farmers
Case 6:23-cv-00053-BMM-KLD Document 75 Filed 02/13/26 Page 12 of 17
13
programmatically violates Montana’s made whole doctrine. (Doc. 68 at 17.)
Graham fails to effectively argue to the Court why the individual determinations of
fact necessary for the resolution of each potential class members’ claims do not
predominate. The same evidence would not suffice for each member to make a
prima facie showing. Each member of Graham’s proposed class would need to
present individual evidence regarding their claim, their injury, and their experience
with Farmers. See Tyson Foods, 577 U.S. at 453. The Court determines that
Magistrate Judge DeSoto correctly concluded that Graham did not sufficiently
plead predominance under the Rule 23(b)(3) standard.
The Court does not need to address in detail Graham’s arguments that he has
sufficiently plead superiority for the purposes of Rule 23(b)(3). Magistrate Judge
DeSoto properly concluded that Graham’s failure to demonstrate predominance
under Rule 23(b)(3), or commonality and typicality under Rule 23(a), have made it
unnecessary to address superiority. The Court will note, however, that there does
not exist sufficient cohesion to make a class action the superior method of
adjudication in cases like this where it proves necessary to make individualized
factual determinations to resolve the claim of each proposed class member. See
Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 2001), opinion
amended on denial of reh'g, 273 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2001). Zinser concluded that
Rule 23(b)(3) certification proves inappropriate “[i]f the main issues in a case
Case 6:23-cv-00053-BMM-KLD Document 75 Filed 02/13/26 Page 13 of 17
14
require the separate adjudication of each class member's individual claim or
defense.” Id. The Court will deny Graham’s objections to Magistrate Judge
DeSoto’s findings and recommendations concerning class certification.
C. Attorney Fees
Graham argues that the denial of attorney fees undermines the policies
behind Montana’s made whole doctrine as Graham properly is entitled to attorney
fees as he prevailed in obtaining the relief he sought in this suit. (Doc. 68 at 5.)
Graham asserts that he prevailed as Farmers withdrew its earlier subrogation
demand and paid more to Graham after he filed suit. (Id.)
Montana law supplies the rule of decision regarding whether a party has a
substantive right to recover attorney fees. Riordan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., No. CV 07-38-M-DWM-JCL, 2008 WL 2512023, at *2 (D. Mont. June 20,
2008), aff'd, 589 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2009). Montana law follows the “American
Rule,” under which prevailing parties must generally bear their own fees. Montana
recognizes several equitable exceptions to the American Rule, including the
insurance exception, which allows recovery of fees “when the insurer forces the
insured to assume the burden of legal action to obtain the full benefit of the
insurance contract.” Mt. W. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 69 P.3d 652, 660
(Mont. 2003); see also Riordan, 2008 WL 2512023, at *3.
Case 6:23-cv-00053-BMM-KLD Document 75 Filed 02/13/26 Page 14 of 17
15
Brewer and its progeny make clear that the insurance exception to the
American Rule applies only when an insured is “compelled” to litigate, or when
they “ha[ve] to resort to litigation.” Brewer, 69 P.3d at 659; Mlekush v. Farmers
Ins. Exch., 404 P.3d 704, 708 (Mont. 2017). The Court is not persuaded here that
Graham was sufficiently “forced” or “compelled” to litigate in order to receive the
benefit of his insurance policy. Farmers claims that it immediately indicated a
willingness to investigate and consider a higher payment when Graham disputed
Farmers’ valuation. (Doc. 70 at 22.) Farmers argues that Graham “filed the instant
lawsuit rather than engage in informal negotiations for more than a few days.” (Id.)
It appears that Graham potentially could have received the relief he sought—an
increased cash valuation and withdrawal of the subrogation demand—without
having resorted to litigation.
Graham further fails to address Magistrate Judge DeSoto’s discussion of his
“legally insufficient motion” in his repeated assertions that he clearly was the
prevailing party in this action. Magistrate Judge DeSoto emphasizes that she did
not rule on Graham’s motion for partial summary judgment because he voluntarily
withdrew it. Magistrate Judge DeSoto’s order on Graham’s motion to dismiss
“makes clear that the motion for partial summary judgment could not have
prevailed.” (Doc. 66 at 8.) The Court does not see how it would make sense to
Case 6:23-cv-00053-BMM-KLD Document 75 Filed 02/13/26 Page 15 of 17
16
award attorney fees to Graham based on the alleged impact of a legally insufficient
motion.
The Court recognizes the principles behind the insurance exception to the
American Rule and does not suggest that an insurer should be able to avoid
payment when it attempts to correct its wrongful behavior only after litigation
ensues. The Court does not face that situation here. The Court will deny Graham’s
objections to Magistrate Judge DeSoto’s findings and recommendations
concerning attorney fees.
CONCLUSION
The Court concludes that Graham has failed to sufficiently plead
commonality and typicality as required for class certification under Rule 23(a). The
Court further determines that Graham has failed to sufficiently plead predominance
and superiority as required for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3). The Court
lastly concludes that Graham has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to an
award of attorney fees based on the insurance exception to the American Rule. The
Court will adopt Magistrate Judge DeSoto’s findings and recommendations in full.
ORDER
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Magistrate Judge DeSoto’s Findings and
Recommendations (Doc. 66) are ADOPTED IN FULL.
Case 6:23-cv-00053-BMM-KLD Document 75 Filed 02/13/26 Page 16 of 17
17
1. Graham’s Motion for to Certify Class (Doc. 54) is DENIED.
2. Graham’s Motion for Attorney Fees (Doc. 55) is DENIED.
DATED this 13th day of February, 2026.
Case 6:23-cv-00053-BMM-KLD Document 75 Filed 02/13/26 Page 17 of 17

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.