USA v. Gruber

4:25-cr-00111MtdJan 23, 2026

Full text

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
GREAT FALLS DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TYSON RONDO GRUBER,
Defendant.
Cause No. CR 25-111-GF-BMM
ORDER
INTRODUCTION
A federal grand jury indicted Tyson Rondo Gruber (“Gruber”) on one count
of prohibited person in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(3), one count of prohibited person in possession of a firearm in violation of
18 U.S.C. §922(g)(8), and one count of possession of a stolen firearm in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §922(j). (Doc. 1.) Gruber filed a motion to dismiss the indictment
(Doc. 25.) The Court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss on January 15, 2026.
(Doc. 34.)
BACKGROUND
Law enforcement received a tip on February 12, 2024, that Gruber had been
breaking into storage units and trading stolen items for large quantities of
methamphetamine. (Doc. 33 at 3.) Law enforcement officers obtained a search
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warrant and searched Gruber’s residence. (Id.) Officers seized fentanyl,
methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, cash that appeared to be proceeds of drug
sales, and 14 firearms from Gruber’s residence. (Id.) The state charged Gruber for
drug possession and trafficking. (Id.) Gruber failed to appear at his arraignment.
(Id.)
A law enforcement officer from Hill County noticed a vehicle behaving
suspiciously in the parking lot of a closed business at 2:00 A.M. on July 24, 2024.
(Id.) The officer observed the driver of the vehicle start to back out of the parking
lot, see the law enforcement vehicle, pull back into the parking lot, recline the
driver’s seat, and appear to try to conceal himself from the officer. (Id. at 4.) The
officer approached the vehicle and observed a man in the driver’s seat who
appeared to be unconscious, or pretending to be unconscious. (Id.) The man was
sweating profusely and breathing rapidly. (Id.) The officer observed a rifle in the
back seat of the vehicle. (Id.)
The officer knocked on the window and attempted to get the attention of the
man in the vehicle for over four minutes. (Id.) The officer believed that the man in
the vehicle was Gruber based on prior experience. (Id.) The officer requested
medical assistance as he was concerned for Gruber’s wellbeing. (Id.) EMTs arrived
on the scene and attempted to get Gruber’s attention. (Id.) EMTs and law
enforcement officers broke a passenger window to gain access to the vehicle after
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another ten minutes of trying to wake Gruber from outside the vehicle. (Id.)
Officers removed Gruber from the vehicle and found a knife in his front pocket
and what appeared to be a throwing star in his right chest pocket. (Id. at 5.)
Officers conducted a field sobriety test on Gruber at the scene. (Id.) Gruber
passed the sobriety test and the officer stated in his report that Gruber was not
“impaired.” (Id.) The Government asserts that it expects that the officer would
testify at trial to “clarify that [] his statement that Gruber was not impaired did not
mean that Gruber was not under the influence of methamphetamine, only that he
was not in physical danger warranting transporting him by medical vehicle rather
than patrol vehicle.” (Id.)
Gruber was subject to a protective order issued on August 4, 2022. (Id.) The
Montana state justice court issued an order of protection for Gruber’s ex-girlfriend
and minor child restraining Gruber from “assaulting, threatening, abusing,
harassing, following or stalking” his ex-girlfriend and child for twelve years. (Id. at
5-6.) Deputy/Process Server Mark Hernandez at the Gallatin County Detention
Center in Bozeman served the protection order on Gruber personally on the same
day that the order was issued. (Id.)
A grand jury indicted Gruber on October 2, 2025, on one count of prohibited
person in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), one count
of prohibited person in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.
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§922(g)(8), and one count of possession of a stolen firearm in violation of 18
U.S.C. §922(j). (Doc. 1.) The indictment also included a forfeiture allegation
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(d). (Id.) Officers arrested Gruber on October 15, 2025,
and Gruber appeared for his arraignment on October 21, 2025. (Doc. 7.) Gruber
was released from custody on December 21, 2025, with the condition that he
remain at the Connections Corrections Program. (Doc. 23.) Gruber filed a motion
to dismiss the indictment on December 24, 2025. (Doc. 25.)
LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 7(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that an
indictment contain a “plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential
facts constituting the offense charged.” F. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1). An indictment that
contains the following information complies with Rule 7(c): 1) alleges each element
of the crime charged, United States v. Awad, 551 F.3d 930, 935 (9th Cir. 2009); and
2) sets forth the essential facts necessary to inform the defendant of what he is
charged, United States v. Blinder, 10 F.3d 1468, 1476 (9th Cir. 1993).
These requirements ensure that the defendant possesses sufficient information
to prepare a defense and plead double jeopardy if charged in a different case. Awad,
551 F.3d at 935. An indictment that “tracks the words of the statute charging the
offense is sufficient so long as the words unambiguously set forth all elements
necessary to constitute the offense.” United States v. Givens, 767 F.2d 574, 584 (9th
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Cir. 1985). The indictment is to “be read in its entirety, construed according to
common sense, and interpreted to include facts which are necessarily implied.” Id.
DISCUSSION
Gruber argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) is unconstitutional on its face and
as applied to Gruber. (Doc. 26 at 2.) Gruber further alleges that 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(3) is void for vagueness as applied to Gruber and violates his Fifth
Amendment right to due process. (Id.) Gruber also argues that 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8)
is unconstitutional as applied to Gruber. (Id.) The Court will address each issue in
turn.
I. The Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(3)
Section 922(g)(3) prohibits persons who are unlawful users of, or who are
addicted to, a controlled substance from “receiv[ing] any firearm or ammunition
which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). Gruber contends that § 922(g)(3) is unconstitutional both on its
face and as applied to him.
a. Facial Challenge
Gruber acknowledges that the Ninth Circuit recently decided in United
States v. Stennerson, 150 F.4th 1276, 1285 (9th Cir. 2025), that § 922(g)(3) is
facially constitutional. (Doc. 26 at 5.) Gruber asks the Court to stray from this
precedent and find that § 922(g)(3) is facially unconstitutional. (Id. at 5-7.) Gruber
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argues that because addiction is lifelong disease, § 922(g)(3) acts as a permanent
ban on firearm ownership. (Id. at 6.) Gruber contends that such a severe
prohibition was not envisioned by any historical analog so § 922(g)(3) cannot be
constitutional and Stennerson was decided incorrectly. (Id. at 7.)
The Court recognizes that addiction presents an ongoing, lifelong struggle.
The Court sees that § 922(g)(3) may serve as a permanent ban on firearm
ownership for those people who suffer from addiction throughout their life. Such
realities do not compel the Court to abandon recent precedent. The Ninth Circuit in
Stennerson reasoned that “the restriction that [§ 922(g)(3)] imposes ‘is consistent
with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation’” because it is facially
constitutional at least when applied to those people who are presently intoxicated.
150 F.4th at 1285 (quoting New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597
U.S. 1, 24 (2022)). The Fifth Circuit and Eighth Circuit have reached the same
conclusion. See United States v. Connelly, 117 F.4th 269, 282 (5th Cir. 2024); see
United States v. Veasley, 98 F.4th 906, 918 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 304
(2024).
“[To challenge] a statute as facially unconstitutional is the “‘most difficult
challenge to mount successfully,’ because it requires a defendant to ‘establish that
no set of circumstances exists under which the [law] would be valid.’” United
States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 693 (2024) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481
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U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). Gruber does not argue that no set of circumstances exists
under which § 922(g)(3) would be valid or that Stennerson wrongly concluded that
constitutional circumstances exist. Gruber has not met the high burden of proving
that § 922(g)(3) is facially unconstitutional. The Court declines to abandon binding
Ninth Circuit precedent. The Court concludes that § 922(g)(3) proves facially
constitutional.
b. As Applied Challenge
Gruber also challenges § 922(g)(3) as applied to him. Gruber focused his as
applied challenge through the factors outlined in United States v. Harris, 144 F.4th
154 (3d Cir. 2025). The Court will analyze Gruber’s challenge both under the
Ninth Circuit’s history and tradition test and the Third Circuit Harris factors.
i. History and Tradition
The Second Amendment guarantees that “the right of the people to keep and
bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. No question exists that §
922(g)(3) implicates the ability “to keep and bear Arms” as it provides for a
categorical ban on possession of firearms. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 32. The Government
must overcome the presumption that the Second Amendment constitutionally
protects Gruber’s possession of firearms. Stennerson, 150 F.4th at 1282. The
Government must establish that our “historical tradition of firearm regulation”
supports § 922(g)(3)’s restriction on gun possession by users of illegal drugs.
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Stennerson, 150 F.4th at 1282 (citing Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24). Modern laws pass
this test if they are “‘relevantly similar’ to laws that our tradition is understood to
permit,” especially in “[w]hy and how [they] burden the right.” United States v.
Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 692 (2024) (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29). Though our
Second Amendment law looks to history and tradition, it is not “trapped in amber.”
Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 691. Modern regulations must rest on historical “principles”
but need not be a “historical twin.” Id. at 692.
Stennerson concluded that “our nation's tradition of firearms regulation at
least supports restricting possession of firearms by those who are presently
intoxicated and, therefore, hindered in their ability to exercise sound judgment and
self-control.” 150 F.4th at 1285. The Ninth Circuit determined that “the restriction
that [§ 922(g)(3)] imposes ‘is consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of
firearm regulation’” because it is facially constitutional at least in those
circumstances. Id. (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24). The Court faces the question of
whether these same historical analogs also support § 922(g)(3)’s restriction on gun
possession as applied to Gruber.
The Court recently addressed two as applied challenges to § 922(g)(3). See
United States v. Devine, No. CR 24-11-H-BMM, 2025 WL 3563272 (D. Mont.
Dec. 12, 2025), and United States v. Dahl, No. CR-25-57-GF-BMM, 2025 WL
3564714 (D. Mont. Dec. 12, 2025). The Court determined in both cases that §
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922(g)(3) proved constitutional as applied to the defendants. Devine, 2025 WL
3563272 at *6; Dahl, 2025 WL 3564714, at *6. The Court reasoned that “Duarte
seems to suggest that any categorical ban may be constitutional if the legislature
imposed the ban upon a class of people it perceived to be dangerous.” Devine,
2025 WL 3563272 at *3. The Court concluded that “[a]mple evidence exists that
Congress perceived unlawful drug users to present a ‘special danger of misuse’ for
firearm possession.” Id. Whether the defendant was presently intoxicated was not a
conclusive factor in the Court’s analysis in Devine and Dahl.
The Court further determined that although Duarte and Stennerson do not
explicitly foreclose an as applied challenge to § 922(g)(3), the decisions
functionally prevent the success of an as applied challenge to these provisions.
Devine, 2025 WL 3563272 at *3. The Court concluded that “the only potential as
applied challenge by a person charged under § 922(g)(3) would be to argue that
they do not qualify as a drug user under the statute.” Id. Gruber does not appear to
be making such a challenge and the Court’s additional analysis in Devine and Dahl
demonstrates that such challenges properly present questions for the jury. Id. at *4-
5. Gruber argues instead that the nature of drug addiction ensures that a person
who is once addicted to drugs is properly considered an addict for their entire lives.
The Court finds that the principles and reasoning of Stennerson, Duarte, Rahimi,
and Bruen, in addition to the Court’s analysis in Devine and Dahl, demonstrate that
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§ 922(g)(3) is constitutional as applied to Gruber. The Court will address the
additional arguments made by the parties.
ii. Third Circuit Factors
The Third Circuit in Harris determined that “history and tradition justify §
922(g)(3)'s restrictions on those who pose a special danger of misusing firearms
because they frequently use drugs.” Harris, 144 F.4th at 156. The Third Circuit
remanded the case to the district court as it concluded that it lacked “enough facts
to tell whether the law's restrictions [were] constitutional as applied to [the
defendant.]” Id. The Third Circuit identified several, non-exhaustive factors for the
district court to consider in assessing “how [the defendant’s] drug use affected his
mental state and riskiness.” Id. at 165. The following factors would be relevant:
• The length and recency of the defendant's use during and shortly
before his gun possession;
• The drug's half-life;
• Whether use of the drug affects a person's judgment, decision-making,
attention, inhibition, or impulse control;
• Whether the drug may induce psychosis;
• The drug's interference with a user's perception of his own
impairment; and
• The long-term physical and mental effects of the use of that drug.
Id. Harris instructs future courts confronting § 922(g)(3) challenges to consider
these factors “in determining whether someone's drug use suggests that he ‘likely
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poses an increased risk of physical danger to others if armed.’” Id. (quoting
Pitsilides v. Barr, 128 F.4th 203, 212 (3d Cir. 2025)).
The Court recently analyzed the application of the Harris factors with Ninth
Circuit precedent. Devine, 2025 WL 3563272 at *4-5; Dahl, 2025 WL 3564714, at
*4-5. The Court considered whether it would be appropriate to conduct the fact-
based, individualized analysis pre-trial required by Harris. The Court concluded
that United States v. Grubb, 135 F.4th 604 (8th Cir. 2025), provided persuasive
reasoning that a pretrial resolution, such as required in Harris, would be
appropriate only when the parties have agreed to stipulated facts such that the
factual evidence stands undisputed. Devine, WL 3563272, at *4-5.
The lack of procedural guidance from Harris further troubles the Court. No
rule of evidence or procedure requires the Government to present all the evidence
in its case at this point in the litigation. Devine, WL 3563272, at *4-5. The Court
found persuasive Grubb’s reasoning that given the uncertain legal universe and the
standards of Rule 12, “the government is entitled at this juncture to make a fulsome
record on facts surrounding the commission of the offense and any other facts that
may be relevant to resolving a constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(3).” Devine,
WL 3563272, at *5 (quoting Grubb, 135 F.4th at 608).
The Court has not been persuaded by Gruber to adopt a different approach.
The Court also remains bound by Duarte, yet it will address the Harris factors to
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be thorough and avoid future litigation should the U.S. Supreme Court determine
an individualized analysis would be required. The Court briefly will address the
Harris factors although the parties provided limited argument on the facts.
The available information indicates that Gruber was heavily involved in
drug distribution and trafficking and seemingly had been struggling with substance
use around the timeframe of the arrest. Law enforcement officers were familiar
with Gruber and with Gruber’s alleged prolonged and well-known drug use. The
facts further indicate that Gruber may have been under the influence of
methamphetamine at the time of arrest, although he was not so impaired as to need
a medical transport. Gruber’s level of impairment at the time of arrest remains in
dispute. The law enforcement officer who conducted a field sobriety test noted that
Gruber was “not impaired.” The law enforcement officer also observed Gruber
sweating profusely, breathing rapidly, and presenting completely unresponsive for
around 14 minutes to officers’ attempts to get his attention from outside the
vehicle. Methamphetamine, fentanyl, and drug paraphernalia were found at
Gruber’s residence around six months before his arrest.
Gruber possessed one firearm at the time of arrest and several more were
found at his residence in the months before his arrest. It is both common sense and
scientifically proven, that methamphetamine, and to some extent, fentanyl, have
serious effects on a person’s judgment, decision-making, attention, inhibition, and
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impulse control. Methamphetamine, at least when used regularly, can induce
psychosis. Each of these drugs interferes with a user’s perception of his own
impairment. Each one of these drugs also causes some form of long-term effects
whether physical or mental. The Court finds that the Harris factors demonstrate
that § 922(g)(3) is constitutional as applied to Gruber.
c. Vagueness Challenge
A criminal law is unconstitutionally void if it is “so vague that it fails to give
ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it
invites arbitrary enforcement.” Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 595 (2015).
A law is not unconstitutionally vague simply because it is difficult to determine
whether it has been violated in a particular case. An unreasonable amount of
indeterminacy or subjectivity must exist regarding what conduct could be
prohibited in the first place. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 306 (2008).
A strong presumption of a statute’s constitutionality exists when a defendant
raises a void-for-vagueness argument. United States v. Harris, 185 F.3d 999, 1003
(9th Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32
(1963)). Defendants in the Ninth Circuit are limited to as-applied challenges unless
the law implicates First Amendment freedoms. United States v. Rodriguez, 360
F.3d 949, 953 (9th Cir. 2004). A statute is not unconstitutionally vague “if its
language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when
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measured by common understanding and practices.” Panther v. Hames, 991 F.2d
576, 578 (9th Cir. 1993). “In an as-applied challenge, a statute is unconstitutionally
vague if it fails to put a defendant on notice that his conduct was criminal.” United
States v. Harris, 705 F.3d 929, 932 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v.
Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1257 (9th Cir. 2009)) (citation omitted).
Stennerson concluded that § 922(g)(3) was not unconstitutionally vague as
applied to the defendant because his “drug use was sufficiently consistent,
‘prolonged,’ and close in time to his gun possession to put him on notice that he
qualified as an unlawful user of drugs under § 922(g)(3).” 150 F.4th at 1286.
Gruber argues that the same logic does not apply because law enforcement
determined that Gruber was not impaired at the time of arrest. (Doc. 26 at 11.)
Gruber questions what “close in time” means when applied to his case and argues
that the term is too vague to be constitutionally applied to him. (Id.)
Stennerson provides additional guidance in considering how courts should
understand § 922(g)(3). 150 F.4th at 1286-87. Stennerson cites extensive case law
that provides numerous interpretations of what “unlawful user” means and thus
how to apply § 922(g)(3). Id. Stennerson does not imply that § 922(g)(3) is
constitutionally applied only to a defendant who was impaired during arrest, or
when there is clear proof of recent drug use. Id. Stennerson recognizes that courts
have rejected vagueness challenges to § 922(g)(3) when a defendant’s drug use
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was “regular and ongoing[.]” Id. at 1287. Stennerson cited United States v. Cook,
970 F.3d 866, 877 (7th Cir. 2020), which noted “[t]he uniform rejection of as-
applied vagueness challenges to section 922(g)(3)” and concluded that “simply
because it may sometimes be difficult to determine if an individual's drug use
meets section 922(g)(3)’s standard for liability does not signify that the statute is
impermissibly vague.” Stennerson, 150 F.4th at 1286-87.
The throughline between Stennerson and the large body of case law
analyzing § 922(g)(3) is that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied
to a defendant who has admitted that they are an addict and has used illegal drugs
during the relevant time period. Gruber has admitted to suffering from addiction
and there is evidence that he used illegal drugs during the period in which he
possessed a firearm. Gruber had a reputation for prior, prolonged, and well-known
drug use. A person of ordinary intelligence would have understood that Gruber’s
conduct violated § 922(g)(3). To the extent Gruber wants to argue that he does not
qualify as an unlawful drug user or did not use drugs sufficiently close in time to
the incident such that he could not have known he was considered an unlawful
drug user, those issues must be raised at trial. The Court remains bound by its
previous orders in Devine and Dahl, which note that pretrial resolution of these
factual disputes is possible only when the parties have stipulated to the relevant
facts. Devine, WL 3563272, at *5 (citing Grubb, 135 F.4th at 608). The parties here
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have not made such stipulations. Pretrial resolution of these potential factual
disputes proves improper. The Court concludes that § 922(g)(3) is not
unconstitutionally vague as applied to Gruber.
II. The Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) as Applied to
Gruber
Section 922(g)(8) provides in pertinent part that it is unlawful for any person
to possess a firearm or ammunition when that person is subject to a court order
that:
“(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice,
and at which such person had an opportunity to participate;
(B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate
partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or person, or
engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner in reasonable
fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; and
(C)
(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to
the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or
(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or child
that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury.”
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). Gruber was charged under § 922(g)(8)(c)(ii). (Doc. 1.)
The U.S. Supreme Court determined in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S.
680, 692 (2024), that 18 U.S.C.§922(g)(8) is facially constitutional. The U.S.
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Supreme Court in Rahimi held that its analysis “starts and stops with Section
922(g)(8)(C)(i) because the Government offers ample evidence that the Second
Amendment permits the disarmament of individuals who pose a credible threat to
the physical safety of others.” Id. at 693.
Rahimi did not need to decide “whether regulation under Section (C)(ii),
Section (C)(i)'s closest neighboring provision, is also permissible.” United States v.
VanDyke, 157 F.4th 1082, 1085 (9th Cir. 2025). The Ninth Circuit and other Courts
of Appeal have determined that because much of Rahimi’s discussion “is framed
with respect to Section 922(g)(8) as a whole,[,]” Rahimi “provides the analytical
framework applicable to Section (C)(ii) as well as Section (C)(i).” VanDyke, 157
F.4th at 1085. The Ninth Circuit concluded that it would be appropriate to apply
the Rahimi framework in addressing an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(8)(c)(ii).
Id.; United States v. Gordon, 137 F.4th 1153, 1154 (10th Cir. 2025) (holding that §
922(g)(8)(c)(ii) is facially constitutional based on reasoning from Rahimi); see also
United States v. Perez-Gallan, 125 F.4th 204, 207 (5th Cir. 2024) (same).
Gruber challenges the constitutionality of § 922(g)(8) as applied to him.
Gruber has a 12-year protection order filed against him. (Doc. 26 at 14.) Gruber
argues that he did not have an “opportunity to participate” in the hearing on the
order of protection as required by § 922(g)(8). (Id. at 13-14.) Gruber argues that §
922(g)(8) is not constitutional as applied to him because the protection order
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hearing did not meet the standards envisioned by Congress or the Rahimi court,
and does not fit into our history and tradition. (Id. at 14.)
The Ninth Circuit already has concluded that § 922(g)(8)(c)(ii) fits into our
history and tradition. VanDyke, 157 F.4th at 1085. VanDyke relies upon Rahimi and
Duarte in concluding that two historical traditions of firearm regulation support §
922(g)(8)(c)(ii). VanDyke, 157 F.4th at 1085-86. “The first tradition is individual
disarmament based on a judicial determination of dangerousness, as embodied by
the surety and going-armed laws relied upon in Rahimi.” VanDyke, 157 F.4th at
1085. “The second tradition is categorical disarmament, as manifested in laws
forbidding firearm possession by whole groups of people whom ‘the legislature
deemed dangerous.’” VanDyke, 157 F.4th at 1085-86 (quoting Duarte, 137 F.4th at
759) (emphasis in VanDyke). The Ninth Circuit concluded that Rahimi’s reasoning
is analogous when the “justification for the entry of the no-contact order against
[the defendant]—and thus [the] application of Section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii)—was the
state court's implicit determination that [the defendant] posed a threat to the
physical safety of his victim and other protected persons.” VanDyke, 157 F.4th at
1087.
The same reasoning applies here. The Montana state justice court
determined that Gruber posed a threat to the physical safety of his victim and other
protected persons. Gruber has been subject to a judicial determination of
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dangerousness. VanDyke, 157 F.4th at 1086. The same reasoning the Court
employed in Devine and Dahl also applies here even without a judicial
determination of dangerousness. “Duarte and Stennerson conclude that it falls
within our history and tradition to inflict categorical disarmaments on groups
deemed dangerous by the legislature.” Devine, 2025 WL 3563272 at *3; Dahl,
2025 WL 3564714, at *3. “Congress enacted the gun-possession restrictions of
Section 922(g)(C)(i) and (C)(ii) ‘in light of evidence that domestic violence
presents a pervasive problem in American society.’” VanDyke, 157 F.4th at 1088
(quoting United States v. Bena, 664 F.3d 1180, 1184 (8th Cir. 2011)). Gruber was
placed in this category of persons for whom firearm possession has been deemed
dangerous by the legislature.
Gruber states that he was incarcerated at the time of his protection order
hearing and was served at the jail with the order on the day of the hearing. (Id. at
13.) Gruber asserts that he was unable to “practically defend himself,” despite
being summoned in front of the court for the hearing. (Id.) Gruber implies that he
did not have the knowledge or ability to either file a motion to continue or hire an
attorney. (Id. at 13-14.) Gruber also argues that the long length of the protection
order—12 years—is extreme and, in combination with § 922(g)(8), creates a
severe constitutional burden on his Second Amendment rights. (Id.)
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Gruber’s argument fails because Rahimi creates no standard that a defendant
must have been able to practically defend himself, or have been offered a high-
level of participation in the protection order hearing. Rahimi distinguished between
Second Amendment challenges and due process challenges and reasons it need not
address the due process arguments because they were not specifically raised by the
defendant. Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 701 n.2. The Court will address Gruber’s due
process-sounding arguments for the sake of thoroughness.
The Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected the argument that § 922(g)(8) requires a
proceeding with all the due process protections of a criminal trial. United States v.
Young, 458 F.3d 998, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006). Young emphasizes that the Sixth Circuit
and the Eighth Circuit have “similarly resisted attempts to impose greater
substantive content on the term ‘hearing.’” Id. (citing United States v. Calor, 340
F.3d 428, 431 (6th Cir. 2003), and United States v. Lippman, 369 F.3d 1039, 1042
(8th Cir. 2004), cert. denied 543 U.S. 1080 (2005)).
The Ninth Circuit concluded that “actual notice” does not mean “advance
notice[,]” or notice that hearing would involve a restraining order. Young, 458 F.3d
at 1006-07. Notice of the date, time, and location of the hearing, as well as the
consequence for failing to appear, is sufficient to meet the “actual notice”
requirement. United States v. Meech, No. CR 20-13-BU-DLC, 2020 WL 5847011,
at *7 (D. Mont. Oct. 1, 2020) (same). The Ninth Circuit further determined that the
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“opportunity to participate” does not require “actual participation.” Young, 458
F.3d at 1007.
The Ninth Circuit noted that the Fifth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit agree
that the “plain text of the statute indicates that the ‘opportunity to participate’
requirement is a minimal one.” Id. (citing United States v. Banks, 339 F.3d 267,
267-68 (5th Cir. 2003), and United States v. Wilson, 159 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir.
1998)). The Ninth Circuit concluded that the government only needs to prove that
the proceeding was one in which the defendant “could have objected to the entry of
the order or otherwise engaged with the court as to the merits of the restraining
order.” Young, 458 F.3d at 1007; Meech, 2020 WL 5847011, at 8 (same).
Gruber provides no evidence that the protection order hearing at issue was
insufficient based on the Young standards. Gruber concedes that he had actual
notice of the hearing when he was served at the jail with the notice. Gruber admits
that he was summoned in front of the court but provides no evidence that he was
unable to participate, or object, to any extent. Gruber was not present at the hearing
on the order of protection, yet that does not mean that Gruber lacked the
opportunity to object or take additional steps to participate such as filing an order
to continue. Gruber was not entitled to counsel, to advance notice of the hearing, or
to any additional due process protections other than the minimal level of
participation required by the statute. Moreover, nothing in the record indicates that
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Gruber made any effort to challenge the order of protection during the three-year
period between the issuance of the order on August 4, 2022 (Doc. 26-1), and his
indictment in this case on October 2, 2025 (Doc. 1).
The fact that Gruber’s protection order remains longer than the protection
order served upon the defendant in Rahimi does not invalidate the analysis. Rahimi
emphasized that the temporary nature of § 922(g)(8) was similar to the surety
bonds of limited duration from our tradition and history. 602 U.S. at 699. Rahimi
does not state, or even imply, that a temporary prohibition of longer duration would
be different. Gruber’s protection order, though longer, still imposed only a
temporary and limited restriction on his ability to bear arms. Gruber also was
found in possession of a firearm in July 2024 which was less than two years from
when the protection order had been issued against him. The facts of Gruber’s case
fall squarely within set of circumstances approved in Rahimi. The Court finds that
§ 922(g)(8) is constitutional as applied to Gruber.
CONCLUSION
The Court finds that § 922(g)(3) is constitutional on its face and as applied
to Gruber based both on the reasoning and principles employed in Stennerson and
Duarte, and on the Harris factors. Ample evidence exists in our nation’s history
and tradition of categorical bans on classes of people whom the legislature deemed
dangerous. Congress considered people suffering drug addiction to fall into a class
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of people who presented a “special danger of [firearm] misuse.” Harris, 144 F.4th
at 156. The Court concludes that § 922(g)(3) is not unconstitutionally vague as
applied to Gruber. The Court further finds that § 922(g)(8) is constitutional as
applied to Gruber based on the reasoning from Rahimi, VanDyke, and Young. The
Court will deny Gruber’s motion to dismiss the indictment.
ORDER
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Gruber’s motion to dismiss the
indictment (Doc. 25) is DENIED.
DATED this 23rd day of January, 2026.
Case 4:25-cr-00111-BMM Document 35 Filed 01/23/26 Page 23 of 23

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