USA v. Hill et al

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 1:25-cr-00062-KSL Document118 _ Filed 11/17/25 Page1of14

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA

BILLINGS DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CR 25-62-BLG-SPW-2
Plaintiff,
ORDER ON MOTION TO
VS. SUPPRESS
NATHAN WILNAU,
Defendant.

Before the Court is Defendant Nathan Wilnau’s Motion to Suppress. (Doc.
93). Wilnau seeks to suppress all evidence obtained pursuant to a state court search
warrant issued on June 16, 2023, which authorized the collection of his cell-site
location data. (Ud. at 1). He argues that the confidential informant who served as
the basis for the warrant was unreliable, and that the information provided was not
sufficiently corroborated. (Doc. 94 at 16, 18). The Government opposes the Motion.
(Doc. 101).

For the following reasons, the Court denies Wilnau’s Motion.
I. Background

On June 15, 2023, Montana Division of Criminal Investigation Agent Michael
Bennett met with a confidential source of information (SOI) in Billings, Montana.
(Doc. 102-1 at 2). At the time, the SOI was under investigation for possession of

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U.S. GOVERN

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dangerous drugs with the intent to distribute. (/d.). Specifically, the SOI had been
found in possession of psilocybin mushrooms and approximately 80 to 90 grams of
suspected methamphetamine. (/d. at 3). The SOI, who was on probation with the
State of Montana, admitted to both using and distributing methamphetamine. (/d. at
2).

During the interview, Agent Bennett questioned the SOI about unidentified
drug users and distributors in the Billings area. (/d.). The SOI disclosed that a
woman named Christina Hill, who resided in Billings but was originally from San
Francisco, California, and a man known as “Nate” were partners in distributing
methamphetamine locally. (7d. at 2-3). According to the SOI, Hill was the leader
of the operation and Nate acted as a “lieutenant.” (/d. at 2). The SOI stated that Hill
and Nate lived together. (/d. at 3).

The SOI further reported that $35,000 had been sent to San Francisco via UPS
earlier that morning. (Jd. at 2-3). Once the money was received, a shipment
containing 50 pounds of methamphetamine was expected to be sent to Cody,
Wyoming. (/d. at 3). The SOI claimed that Nate would travel to Cody in a red
Dodge Durango to retrieve the methamphetamine and return to Billings. (/d.).

The SOI provided a description of Hill and Nate’s residence and allowed
Agent Bennett to review text messages on the SOI’s phone. (/d.). The SOI also

gave Agent Bennett phone numbers for both Hill and Nate. (/d.). Agent Bennett

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confirmed that the number provided for Nate was saved in the SOI’s contacts under
the name “Nate.” (/d.). He then conducted an open-source search of the number
and determined it was registered with Verizon Wireless. (/d.). In a text exchange
between the SOI and Hill, Hill instructed the SOI to have the “fungus” ready—a
term Agent Bennett recognized as slang for psilocybin mushrooms. (/d.).

Agent Bennett corroborated much of the SOI’s information. That same day,
Montana Probation and Parole searched the SOI’s residence and seized psilocybin
mushrooms, consistent with the text messages between the SOI and Hill. (Jd).
Agent Bennett also verified that the phone number provided for Hill matched the
one listed on her public Facebook profile. (/d.).

Agent Bennett conducted surveillance at the residence described by the SOI
and observed Hill standing in front of a red Dodge Durango with Wyoming license
plates. (/d.). The vehicle matched the SOI’s description of the one Nate would drive
to Wyoming to pick up the methamphetamine. (/d.).

The SOI did not provide a last name for Nate, but Agent Bennett identified
Nate as Defendant Nathan Wilnau. (/d. at 2-3). A review of law enforcement
records revealed a prior traffic stop involving both Hill and Wilnau, during which
they were found together in a vehicle and in possession of methamphetamine. (Id.
at 3). Agent Bennett also reviewed their criminal histories, which included prior

drug-related convictions. (/d.).

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On June 16, 2023, Agent Bennett applied for a search warrant to obtain GPS
data from the cell phone number associated with Nate. (/d. at 1). He requested
historical location data dating back to May 1, 2023, including call detail records,
tower location data, available GPS, and precision location information. (Id. at 2).
He also sought real-time GPS pings for a 30-day period from Verizon Wireless.
(id.).

Agent Bennett signed the warrant application at 1:10 p.m. on June 16, 2023,
and presented it to Montana State District Court Judge Colette B. Davies, who found
probable cause and signed the warrant at 1:14 p.m. (/d. at 5-6, 9). Verizon Wireless
subsequently provided “[r]Jeal time GPS coordinate data in 15-minute increments
between 06/16/2023 and 06/22/2023” for the phone. (Jd. at 10).

Using the GPS data, Agent Bennett tracked the phone as it traveled to Cody
and returned to Billings. (Doc. 101-1 at 3-4). He then contacted Montana Highway
Patrol Trooper Erick Fetterhoff, who conducted an investigative traffic stop for a
moving violation. (/d. at 4). Wilnau was a passenger in the vehicle and admitted
there was enough narcotics in the vehicle to “go to jail.” (/d.). The vehicle was
ultimately seized and searched pursuant to a search warrant, and agents discovered
approximately ten pounds of methamphetamine inside. (Jd. at 5—7).

///
/T1

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II. Legal Standard

A defendant may challenge the admissibility of evidence prior to trial under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(C), which governs motions to suppress
evidence. The foundation for such challenges lies in the Fourth Amendment, which
guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.

“In order to effectuate the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures, [the United States Supreme] Court... conferred
upon defendants in federal prosecutions the right, upon motion and proof, to have
excluded from trial evidence which had been secured by means of an unlawful search
and seizure.” Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968) (citing Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)).

When law enforcement violates a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights, the
exclusionary rule mandates that “all evidence seized as a result of the [violation]
must be suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree.” United States v. Morales, 252
F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2001). A defendant has the ultimate burden of proof on a
Fourth Amendment motion to suppress. United States v. Caymen, 404 F.3d 1196,
1199 (9th Cir. 2005).

/T/
///

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III. Discussion

Wilnau first urges the Court to apply state law in evaluating probable cause
for the search warrant under the Stored Communications Act (SCA), 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2701-2713. He then contends that the warrant application failed to establish
sufficient probable cause. The Court considers each argument in turn.

A. Stored Communications Act

Evidence obtained through a search and seizure that complies with federal
constitutional standards is admissible in federal court. United States v. Chavez-
Vernaza, 844 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1987); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206
(1960); United States v. Miranda-Guerena, 445 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 2006). Wilnau
incorrectly contends that the SCA mandates the application of state substantive law
in evaluating the validity of the search warrant. The SCA merely sets forth
jurisdictional requirements for issuing so-called “ping” warrants and permits state
courts to authorize the collection of cell phone location data. See United States v.
Bundy, 195 F. Supp. 3d 1170, 1173 (D. Or. 2016).

The Court reviews each provision of the SCA cited by Wilnau and concludes
neither supports his position.

1. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)
Wilnau first relies on 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), which permits the government to

compel disclosure of electronic communications through a warrant issued under

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either the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or, for state courts, “state warrant
procedures.” 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), (b)(1)(A). He argues this language requires the
Court to assess probable cause under Montana law. (Doc. 94 at 10).

In response, the Government cites United States v. Westfall, 142 F.4th 1208,
1213 (9th Cir. 2025), which clarified that the SCA “only addresses the specific
method or particular way to issue a warrant”—not the substantive standard for
probable cause. (citation modified). The Ninth Circuit explained “state warrant
procedures” means only that “[t]he SCA incorporates provisions of state law that
address specific methods for issuing a warrant. When state courts . . . authorized to
issue warrants under state law issue warrants under the SCA, they must follow state
law governing warrant procedures.” Westfall, 142 F.4th at 1216 (internal citations
omitted).

The Ninth Circuit in Westfall cited Montana Code Annotated § 46-5-221 as
governing state warrant procedures. Jd. at 1217. The statute specifies who may
apply for a warrant, permits applications in person, electronically, or by phone, and
requires they be made under oath or affirmation. Mont. Code Ann. § 46-5-221. Like
federal law, it mandates that the warrant application “state[] facts sufficient to
support probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed.” Id.
§ 46-5-221(1). However, it does not establish a Montana-specific substantive

standard for probable cause.

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Although Wilnau is correct that Westfall did not involve identical facts, the
decision directly contradicts his interpretation of the SCA. Like the defendant in
Westfall, Wilnau contends that “state warrant procedures” encompasses more than
mere procedural rules. However, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected that argument
in Westfall, 142 F.4th at 1216. The Ninth Circuit’s analysis of probable cause is
particularly instructive and reflects a broader judicial consensus: even when courts
apply state law to govern warrant procedures, they evaluate probable cause under
federal standards. See id. at 1213-15.

Wilnau’s reliance on 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) is therefore misplaced—it does not
support his contention that state law applies.

2. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)

Next, Wilnau cites 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), which states, “In the case of a State
governmental authority, such a court order shall not issue if prohibited by the law of
such State.” Section 2703(d), however, “does not set forth the requirement for
warrants but rather court orders.”! United States v. Ortega-Yescas, No. CR 19-06-
BU, 2019 WL 2299749, at *4 n.2 (D. Mont. May 30, 2019). In the present case, the

state court issued a warrant supported by probable cause, not merely a § 2703(d)

' In Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 319-20 (2018), the Supreme Court held that
§ 2703(d) violates the Fourth Amendment insofar as it authorizes court orders for cell phone
location data based on a standard lower than probable cause.

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order. Accordingly, § 2703(d) is inapplicable and has no bearing on whether state
or federal law governs the probable cause analysis.

The Court therefore applies federal law to assess the sufficiency of the search
warrant application.

B. Probable Cause

Following Wilnau’s discussion on the application of state law, he turns to his
contention that Agent Bennett’s search warrant application lacked probable cause.
Upon review of the application, the Court finds that it was supported by sufficient
probable cause and concludes that the warrant was properly issued.

To be valid, a search warrant “must be supported by an affidavit establishing
probable cause.” United States v. Stanert, 762 F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 1985). “In
reviewing the validity of a search warrant, a court is limited to the information and
circumstances contained within the four corners of the underlying affidavit.” Id.
(citing United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1983)). Even when a search
warrant relies in part on problematic information, it may nevertheless be upheld “as
long as the untainted portions contain a sufficient showing of probable cause to
render the warrant valid.” United States v. Driver, 776 F.2d 807, 812 (9th Cir. 1985).

Probable cause exists when, under the totality of the circumstances, there is
“a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular

place.” United States v. King, 985 F.3d 702, 707 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting United

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States v. Diaz, 491 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2007)). This standard “is not a high
bar.” Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014). It demands less evidence
than would be required to sustain a conviction and “may rest upon evidence which
is not legally competent in a criminal trial.” United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S.
102, 107 (1965) (citations omitted).

Probable cause must be determined by a neutral and detached magistrate.
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). Once that determination is made,
it is entitled to substantial deference by reviewing courts. Jilinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 236 (1983) (citation omitted). The reviewing court’s role is not to second-guess
the magistrate, but to ensure there was a “substantial basis” for concluding that
probable cause existed. King, 985 F.3d at 708 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238). In
making that assessment, “[t]he experience of a trained law enforcement agent is
entitled to consideration.” United States v. Arrellano-Rios, 799 F.2d 520, 523 (9th
Cir. 1986).

When probable cause is based on an informant’s tip, the central question is
reliability. United States v. Williams, 10 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993). “Because
there is no checklist for what makes an informant reliable, courts consider a wide
range of factors.” United States v. Waldeck, 664 F. Supp. 3d 1169, 1179 (D. Mont.
2023). “[C]ourts generally consider whether the informant is identifiable . . . [and]

whether the informant’s basis of knowledge is apparent.” Jd. “[A] known

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informant’s tip is thought to be more reliable than an anonymous informant’s tip.”
United States v. Rowland, 464 F.3d 899, 907 (9th Cir. 2006); see also United States
v. Romain, 393 F.3d 63, 73 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that a face-to-face encounter with
an informant bolsters credibility because it allows officers to directly assess the
informant’s reliability).

Moreover, “information may be sufficiently reliable to support a probable
cause finding if the person providing the information has a track record of supplying
reliable information, or if it is corroborated by independent evidence.” Williams, 10
F.3d at 593. “If information from an informant is shown to be reliable because of
independent corroboration, then it is a permissible inference that the informant is
reliable and that therefore other information that the informant provides, though
uncorroborated, is also reliable.” Jd.; Waldeck, 664 F. Supp. 3d at 1179 (noting that
“whether the informant has a track record for providing good information” weighs
in favor of reliability).

Here, a commonsense reading of the search warrant application supports the
conclusion that probable cause existed. The application established a fair probability
that the cell phone’s contents and location data would yield evidence of drug
trafficking.

Wilnau disputes Agent Bennett’s identification of him as “Nate,” arguing that

it lacked a sufficient basis because it relied primarily on a prior police report placing

1]

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Hill and Wilnau together in a vehicle containing methamphetamine, as well as
Wilnau’s prior drug-related offenses. (Doc. 94 at 18). Although Agent Bennett
referred to Wilnau by name throughout the application, it was not necessary to
establish that “Nate” was in fact Wilnau. The warrant’s objective was to track Nate’s
location and gather evidence of his drug trafficking activities, regardless of his
precise identity. The relevant inquiry in assessing the warrant’s validity is whether
the affidavit demonstrated probable cause that the phone’s location data would yield
evidence of drug trafficking—not whether it established probable cause to arrest
Wilnau. Even after excising Agent Bennett’s identification of Nate as Wilnau, along
with the references to Wilnau’s criminal history and prior traffic stop with Hill, the
affidavit still provided probable cause that the phone’s location data would reveal
evidence of drug trafficking.

The affidavit was based on Agent Bennett’s tip from a known drug user and
distributor implicating “Nate.” Although law enforcement had not previously relied
on this SOI, several factors supported reliability. First, the SOI’s identity was
known, and Agent Bennett interviewed them in person. (Doc. 102-1 at 2). Second,
Agent Bennett assessed the SOI’s basis of knowledge by reviewing their phone,
which contained text messages with Hill that indicated shared involvement in drug

trafficking. (/d. at 3).

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Third, Agent Bennett corroborated key details: the SOI reported that Hill and
Nate distributed drugs in the Billings area, that $35,000 had been sent to San
Francisco (Hill’s hometown), and that methamphetamine would be shipped to Cody,
Wyoming, where Nate would retrieve it in a red Dodge Durango. (/d. at 2-3). Agent
Bennett confirmed Hill’s San Francisco ties and observed Hill and a red Dodge
Durango with Wyoming plates at the Billings residence described by the SOI. (Id.
at 3).

Additional corroboration came from text messages on the SOI’s phone,
including one from Hill instructing the SOI to have the “fungus” ready—a term
Agent Bennett recognized as slang for psilocybin mushrooms. (/d.). Montana
Probation and Parole’s search of the SOI’s residence yielded psilocybin mushrooms,
consistent with those texts. (/d.). Agent Bennett also verified that the phone number
provided for Hill matched the number on her Facebook page, and that the number
for Nate was saved in the SOI’s phone as “Nate.” (/d.).

Finally, Wilnau emphasizes that the SOI was on probation, but this fact does
not undermine their reliability. The SOI made statements against penal interest “by
admitting to the previous use and distribution of dangerous drugs such as
Methamphetamine,” which enhanced their credibility. (/d. at 2). Additionally, the
SOI had a compelling incentive to provide truthful information, as any falsehoods

would jeopardize their prospects for leniency. Their direct involvement in drug

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transactions with Hill, evidenced by text messages, further supports reliability.
Probation status is “simply part of the reliability assessment and do[es] not fatally
undermine the accurate, independently verifiable information that [the SOI]
provided.” Waldeck, 664 F. Supp. 3d at 1180.
IV. Conclusion

Relying solely on the facts contained within the four corners of the search
warrant application,” the Court concludes the informant was reliable and probable
cause existed to issue the warrant. The informant’s statements, supported by Agent
Bennett’s corroboration, provided adequate grounds to believe the cell phone’s data
would yield evidence of drug trafficking.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Nathan Wilnau’s Motion to
Suppress (Doc. 93) is DENIED.

pr
DATED this _/ 7 day of November, 2025.

SUSAN P. WATTERS
United States District Judge

* Wilnau emphasizes the Government’s reliance on facts outside the four corners of the search
warrant application. Specifically, he points to the SOI’s statement that Wilnau was “not going
back to prison,” and the Government’s assertion that this remark further corroborates the
information provided by the SOI. (Doc. 111 at 2). The remaining corroborative facts cited by the
Government, however, appear within search warrant application. Based on those facts alone, the
Court finds that the probable cause standard is clearly satisfied.

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