Smith v. Caring for Montanans, Inc. et al

1:22-cv-00050MtdFeb 18, 2026

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Case 1:22-cv-00050-SPW-KLD Document 69 Filed 02/18/26 Page 1 of 16

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA

BILLINGS DIVISION

VICTORIA SMITH, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, CV 22-50-BLG-SPW-KLD

Plaintiff,

ORDER REJECTING
vs. FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATION

HEALTH CARE SERVICE
CORPORATION and JOHN DOES 1-
10,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Victoria Smith (“Smith”) brings this putative class action for a breach
contract claim and an alleged violation of Montana’s Unfair Trade Practices Act
(“UTPA”). (Doc. 47). Defendant Health Care Service Corporation, doing business
as Blue Cross Blue Shield of Montana (“Blue Cross”), moved to dismiss both claims.
(Docs. 50, 51, 61). United States Magistrate Judge Kathleen L. DeSoto entered her
Findings and Recommendation (Doc. 66) and recommends granting Blue Cross’s
Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint (Doc. 50).

Smith timely filed an objection. (Doc. 67). A party is entitled to de novo
review of the findings and recommendation to which it specifically objects. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). A court reviews for clear error the findings

and recommendation to which no party timely objects. McDonnell Douglas Corp.

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v. Commodore Bus. Machs., Inc., 656 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th Cir. 1981). For the
reasons stated herein, the Court rejects Judge DeSoto’s Findings and
Recommendation and denies Blue Cross’s Motion.
I. Background!
Smith underwent a total left hip replacement surgery in 2004. (Doc. 47 at 2).
The hip replacement eventually failed, and she underwent a second left hip surgery
in May 2018. (/d. at 3). At the time of her second surgery, Smith was insured under
a Blue Cross health care plan (“Plan”) she purchased through the Health Insurance
Marketplace®. (/d.).
The Plan contained several provisions addressing Blue Cross’s right of
subrogation:
Subrogation
1. To the extent that Benefits have been provided or paid under this
Contract, The Plan may be entitled to subrogation against a
judgment or recovery received by a Member from a third party
found liable for a wrongful act or omission that caused the Injury
requiring payment for Benefits.
2. The Member will take no action through settlement or otherwise
which prejudices the rights and interest of The Plan under this
Contract.
3. Ifthe Member intends to institute an action for damages against

a third party, the Member will give The Plan reasonable notice
of intention to institute the action. Reasonable notice will include

' Consistent with the standards applicable to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) motions, the
following facts are taken from Smith’s Amended Class Action Complaint for Declaratory
Judgment, Damages, and Injunctive Relief and Demand for Jury Trial (Doc. 47) and other evidence
upon which her pleading necessarily relied on, the authenticity of which is not disputed.

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information reasonably calculated to inform The Plan of facts
giving rise to the third-party action and of the prospects for
recovery.

4. | The Member may request that The Plan pay a proportional share

of the reasonable costs of the third-party action, including
attorney fees. If The Plan elects not to participate in the cost of
the action, The Plan waives 50 percent of its subrogation interest.

5. The right of subrogation may not be enforced until the Member

has been completely compensated for the injuries.
(Doc. 51-1 at 4).

At some point after her failed hip replacement, Smith filed suit against the
manufacturer of her prosthetic hip replacement. (Doc. 47 at 3). Her claims against
the manufacturer included strict liability, failure to warn, negligence, breach of
warranties, violations of the Montana Consumer Protection Act, and punitive
damages claims. (/d.).

On December 13, 2019, Smith’s attorney, Jory Ruggerio, wrote to Blue Cross,
seeking “written confirmation that [Blue Cross was] not asserting any right to
subrogation or reimbursement” from medical expenses Blue Cross paid in relation
to Smith’s failed prosthetic hip. (Doc. 51-2 at 2; Doc. 47 at 3-4). Ruggerio “d[id]
not believe any subrogation claim [would] lie” under Montana’s made-whole
doctrine. (Doc. 51-2 at 2). If Blue Cross did assert a subrogation interest, Ruggerio
requested that it “identify the specific policy language . . . to which [it] believe[d]

[a] subrogation interest ar[ose],” “identify the . . . medical expenses to which [it]

claim[ed] a subrogation interest,” and “explain why . . . [a] subrogation interest

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would survive Montana’s [m]Jade[-w]hole requirement.” (/d.). Blue Cross did not
respond.

Ruggerio sent a second letter on February 22, 2021, again seeking “written
confirmation that [Blue Cross was] not asserting any right to subrogation or
reimbursement.” (Doc. 51-3 at 2). He repeated his belief that no subrogation claim
“would lie” and again requested the same information he previously sought, should
Blue Cross elect to assert a subrogation interest. (/d.).

Blue Cross, through its subrogation vendor, Rawlings & Associates
(“Rawlings”), wrote to Ruggerio on March 12, 2021. The “letter serve[d] as notice
... that [Blue Cross] has a reimbursement and/or subrogation lien/claim to the extent
of benefits paid on behalf of [Smith].” (Doc. 51-4 at 3). The letter continued:

This lien applies to any amount recoverable by the enrollee, whether by
judgment, settlement, or otherwise, related to the injuries that gave rise
to the medical benefits paid by [Blue Cross]. Neither you nor the
member has any right to release or resolve [Blue Cross’s] claim in any
manner. Accordingly, do not engage in any conduct that might impair
or alter [Blue Cross’s] reimbursement or subrogation rights in any
manner, including but not limited to entering into any settlement which
purports to release or discharge in any way the medical expense claims
covered by [Blue Cross]. Furthermore, do not distribute any settlement
funds unless and until you have received written confirmation from our
office that our client’s subrogation and reimbursement rights have been
properly accounted for and discharged.

(Id.).
Ruggerio responded on March 15, 2021, thanking Rawlings for the

information “regarding [the] potential lien.” (Doc. 51-5 at 2). He requested that “if
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[Blue Cross did] claim a lien,” it needed to provide him with the exact amount of the
lien, the dates and services for which Blue Cross claimed reimbursement or
subrogation, and “a legal explanation of how [the] lien survives Montana’s [m]Jade[-
whole [d]octrine.” (/d.). Three days later, Rawlings responded with a letter from
Michelle Nadab, who advised that she would be handling lien matters for the file,
and noted that they needed additional information to finalize the matter. (Doc. 51-6
at 2).

By April 2021, Smith’s suit against the prosthetic hip manufacturer resolved
(Doc. 47 at 10), and as far as the Court is aware, there was no correspondence
between Ruggerio and Rawlings until the following year.

On February 11, 2022, Ruggerio wrote to Rawlings, seeking to finalize the
matter. He stated:

Nearly a year ago, we requested if [Blue Cross] did claim a lien in this

matter, to provide this firm with the exact amount of the lien, the dates

and services for which your client claimed a reimbursement or

subrogation right, and a legal explanation of how this lien survives

Montana’s [ml]ade[-w]hole doctrine. In addition, we asked for a

complete copy of any health plan(s) through which Ms. Smith was

insured, including the subrogation and reimbursement provisions. You

have sent no response. Therefore, we assume there are no charges for

which you request subrogation.
(Doc. 51-7 at 2). The letter advised Rawlings that Blue Cross’s “assertion of lien

without proof that such a lien complie[d] with Montana’s [m]ade[-w]hole doctrine

interfere[d], perhaps tortuously, with his [sic] right to resolve her personal injury

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claims.” (/d.). Ruggerio requested a response within seven days if Blue Cross “ha[d]
any legal argument as to why payments made under. .. Smith’s health plan(s) g[a]ve
rise to a lien that [was] not extinguished by Montana’s [m]Jade[-w]hole doctrine.”
(Id. at 3).

Rawlings responded by letter on February 15, 2022. (Doc. 51-8). Rawlings
enclosed a four-page summary of $42,245.56 in medical expenses paid by Blue
Cross on behalf of Smith, and advised Ruggerio:

If you have information that indicates our client has paid claims that are

not listed on the attached summary, please advise so we may

investigate. As you are aware, the amount of the claim may increase

if additional health benefits are paid. Therefore, please contact me prior

to settlement to obtain the final amount.

(Id. at 2) (emphasis in original).

Smith filed this putative class action in state court on March 2, 2022,
and Blue Cross removed the case to this Court on May 23, 2022, based on
diversity jurisdiction. (Docs. 1, 3). Smith’s original complaint included three
claims for relief: declaratory judgment, breach of contract, and insurance bad
faith. (Doc. 3 at 8-10). Blue Cross moved to dismiss, alleging it had not
enforced a right to subrogate and thus was not required to conduct a made-
whole analysis. (Doc. 7). Judge DeSoto entered a findings and

recommendation on March 7, 2023, recommending that Blue Cross’s motion

be granted. (Doc. 34).

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Smith timely objected to the findings and recommendation (Doc. 35),
and this Court rejected the recommendation to the extent that the case should
have been analyzed under a Rule 12(b)(1) ripeness theory (Doc. 40 at 7-8).
The Court adopted Judge DeSoto’s finding that Blue Cross did not assert a
subrogation lien against Smith. (/d. at 10).

Smith appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed
this Court’s ruling under Rule 12(b)(1), but affirmed the conclusion that the
February 15, 2022 letter from Rawlings to Ruggerio did not constitute
enforcement of a subrogation right. (Doc. 44 at 3). The Ninth Circuit
remanded the case with instructions to allow Smith to amend her complaint.

Smith filed her Amended Class Action Complaint for Declaratory
Judgment, Damages, and Injunctive Relief and Demand for Jury Trial
(“Amended Complaint”) on July 10, 2024. (Doc. 47). Though the caption
and prayer for relief reflect a declaratory judgment claim and request, the
Amended Complaint alleges only two claims: breach of contract and violation
of Montana’s UTPA.” The new factual allegations raised by Smith center on

the March 12, 2021 letter from Rawlings to Ruggerio.

2 Where, as here, subject matter jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, the Court applies
the substantive law of Montana, as the forum state. Med. Lab’y Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad.
Cos., 306 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 2002).

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II. Legal Standard

A motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal
sufficiency of a pleading. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 739 (9th Cir. 2001). To
survive a 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). A claim is plausible if the complaint alleges enough facts to draw a
reasonable inference that the accused is liable. Jd. Though the complaint does not
need to provide detailed factual allegations, it cannot merely assert legal
conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

When ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, a court must accept the complaint’s well-
pled factual allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant. Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987).
“Dismissal . . . is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal
theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v.
Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008).

III. Discussion
A. — Breach of Contract Claim
Blue Cross’s argument moving to dismiss Smith’s claims is straightforward:

Blue Cross did not enforce its right to subrogate and therefore was not required to

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conduct a made-whole analysis under Montana law. (Doc. 51 at 25-28). Judge
DeSoto recommends granting the Motion, finding that “Smith does not allege facts
demonstrating that Blue Cross asserted or enforced or collected a right of
subrogation” which would trigger a made-whole analysis. (Doc. 66 at 15). Because
no Montana case is directly on point, Judge DeSoto analogized this case to Cramer
v. John Alden Life Ins., 763 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D. Mont. 2011), to conclude that
merely notifying Smith of Blue Cross’s subrogation rights under the Plan did not
amount to such a right. (Doc. 66 at 17). She further reasoned that Smith’s own
response undercut her claim that Blue Cross asserted a lien, as she herself described
the Rawlings’ correspondence as a “potential lien.” (/d. at 16). Finally, she rejected
Smith’s argument that Blue Cross improperly enforced its right of subrogation by
failing to state it was conducting a made-whole analysis, finding instead that the
parties’ correspondence was “exactly the type[] of information an insurer would
need . . . to conduct a made-whole analysis.” (/d. at 17).

Smith objects and argues that Judge DeSoto erred in three respects: (1) by
mistakenly premising the Recommendation on Cramer; (2) by incorrectly
characterizing Smith’s use of the term “potential lien” as fatal to her claim; and (3)
by erroneously speculating that Blue Cross intended to conduct a made-whole

analysis in its correspondence. Reviewing de novo, the Court agrees with Smith,

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sustains the objections, and finds that she has plausibly stated a claim for relief under
her breach of contract theory.

Regarding Smith’s first objection, the Court agrees that Cramer is inapposite
to the case here. In Cramer, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 1202, plaintiff Stefanie Cramer
brought a putative class action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(“ERISA”) asserting claims for declaratory relief, benefits, and equitable relief for
breach of fiduciary duty. After she was injured in a December 2009 car accident,
Cramer settled with the tortfeasor’s insurance and recovered medical-pay benefits
from her own carrier, Farmers Insurance Exchange (“Farmers”). Jd. at 1201.
Cramer was also covered under an ERISA-governed health insurance plan with
Assurant, which had paid $1,900.92 in accident-related medical expenses. Id.
Ingenix, Assurant’s subrogation vendor, notified Cramer of its right to subrogate,
and asked her to consult with Ingenix before settling so it could confirm the final
lien amount. Jd. In early April 2010, Ingenix again requested a status update and
asked Cramer’s counsel to contact it before settling. Jd.

By May 2010, Farmers agreed to pay Cramer the $100,000 policy limit but
informed her counsel of a medical lien claimed by Ingenix. Jd. Cramer’s counsel
ultimately secured payment of the full policy limits after promising to hold the

disputed lien amount in trust pending a declaratory judgment against Assurant. Jd.

at 1202.

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To succeed in her equitable relief for breach of fiduciary claim, Cramer had
to show that Assurant violated, or was reasonably likely to violate, ERISA or the
terms of her insurance plan. Jd. at 1211. The plan’s provision at issue stated: “Our
right of subrogation may not be enforced until You have been fully compensated for
Your injuries.” Jd. at 1201 (emphasis added). Cramer argued that Ingenix’s pre-
litigation communications should be construed as “enforcement” of subrogation
because the April 2010 request to contact Ingenix before settlement effectively
prevented her counsel from distributing funds until the lien was resolved. Jd. at
1212-13.

The district court rejected that interpretation. It concluded that the
correspondence reflected an embroiled dispute over whether Cramer had been made
whole and whether subrogation was available—not an attempt to enforce
subrogation. Jd. Construing routine communications or requests for information as
“enforcement,” the court reasoned, would effectively bar insurers from
communicating with insureds or their counsel to determine whether subrogation was
appropriate. Jd. Although Assurant may have “asserted” a right of subrogation, it
did not “enforce” one under the plan’s terms. Jd. Cramer’s claim was therefore
dismissed. Jd. at 1213-14.

Here, unlike Cramer, Smith’s claims are governed by Montana state law, not

federal law. Whereas the district court applied ERISA-specific contract

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interpretation principles in Cramer, this Court must determine whether Blue Cross
“pursu[ed], assert[ed], and/or enforce[ed]” its right of subrogation within the context
of Montana’s made-whole doctrine. (Doc. 47 at 18).

Consistent with the Recommendation, this Court’s prior ruling, and the Ninth
Circuit’s Memorandum, no Montana state case addresses the issue at hand—what
constitutes assertion or enforcement when an insurer is alleged to be seeking money
from an insured. (Doc. 66 at 12-13; Doc. 40 at 10; Doc. 44 at 5). Without such
guidance, Judge DeSoto’s analogy to Cramer is moderately defensible. Both cases
involve nearly the same subrogation policy provision and similarly turn on what
actions trigger enforcement or assertion of a subrogation right. Nevertheless,
Montana law controls, and for this reason, the Court sustains Smith’s first objection.>

Turning to Smith’s second and third objections, the Court sustains both. First,
the Court agrees with Smith that her use of the term “potential lien” in the March
15, 2021 letter is not fatal to her claim. The inquiry is whether Blue Cross’s actions
gave rise to an assertion of its right to subrogation before determining whether Smith
had been made whole. Smith’s characterization of the lien is thus tangential to

whether Blue Cross asserted a lien in the first place. Second, it is not clear at this

3 Smith suggests that her case is more like Swanson v. Hartford Ins. of the Midwest, 46 P.3d 584,
586 (Mont. 2002). In Swanson, the court addressed whether Montana’s made-whole doctrine
applied despite contract language to the contrary after the insurer initially refused to endorse and
release a settlement check. Even if Swanson provides the appropriate legal context, the Ninth
Circuit rejected Smith’s reliance on Swanson, finding it inapposite to her claims. (Doc. 44 at 4).

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juncture whether Blue Cross intended to conduct a made-whole analysis through its
correspondence with Smith. The Court therefore rejects Judge DeSoto’s conclusion
to the extent she found otherwise. (See Doc. 66 at 17).

Conducting a de novo review, the Court ultimately denies Blue Cross’s
Motion, finding that Smith plausibly alleges that Blue Cross asserted a subrogation
lien without first conducting a made-whole analysis. The parties are well aware that
an insurer’s right to subrogation in Montana is limited by the made-whole doctrine.
The doctrine provides “that when the insured has sustained a loss in excess of the
reimbursement by the insurer, the insured is entitled to be made whole for his entire
loss and any costs of recovery, including attorney’s fees, before the insurer can assert
its right of legal subrogation.” Skauge v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 565 P.2d
628, 632 (Mont. 1977) (emphasis added). The doctrine is also codified at Montana
Code Annotated § 33-30-1102(4), which states that a “health service corporation’s
right of subrogation . . . may not be enforced until the injured insured has been fully
compensated for the insured’s injuries.” (emphasis added). Montana courts have
likewise held that “an insurer has a duty to first determine whether the insured has
been made whole before the insurer may collect subrogation.” Ferguson v. Safeco
Ins. of Am., 180 P.3d 1164, 1168 (Mont. 2008) (emphasis added). Montana law thus
holds than an insurer may not enforce or assert or collect a right of subrogation until

it has conducted a made-whole analysis.

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Regardless of the terminology, the Ninth Circuit concluded that, with respect
to Smith’s original complaint, Montana courts would not view the correspondence
with Rawlings as “conduct that triggers and insurer’s duty to conduct a made-whole
analysis.” (Doc. 44 at 4). The panel found that the February 15, 2022 letter sent
from Rawlings’ subrogation department “did not say Blue Cross had a lien, provide
a final amount owed, or demand payment.” (/d. at 5). Considering that these factors
are phrased in the disjunctive, a showing of any one of them would appear to nudge
Smith’s claim across the line from conceivable to plausible at this nascent stage.

Here, the addition of the March 12, 2021 letter does just that. It compels the
Court to reasonably infer that Blue Cross said it had a lien and thus asserted a lien
against Smith without first conducting a made-whole analysis. The letter initially
provides “notice” to Smith that Blue Cross “has a reimbursement and/or subrogation
lien/claim to the extent of benefits paid on behalf of [Smith].” (Doc. 51-4 at 3). This
notice was perhaps a mere recitation of language under the Plan (Doc. 51-1 at 4), but
the letter goes on.

It explains how the lien applies and outlines the rights Smith has under that
lien. Then, the letter states: “do not... enter[] into any settlement which purports
to release or discharge . . . the medical expense claims covered by [Blue Cross]” and

“do not distribute any settlement funds unless and until you have received written

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confirmation from our office that our client’s subrogation and reimbursement rights
have been properly accounted for and discharged.” (Doc. 51-4 at 3).

Read in a light most favorable to Smith, this language plausibly supports her
claim that Blue Cross asserted a right of subrogation before conducting a made-
whole analysis. Indeed, Blue Cross makes no mention of a made-whole analysis. It
instead instructs Smith to refrain from entering settlement or from distributing
settlement funds until Blue Cross’s rights have been “accounted for and discharged.”
A directive to reserve or refrain from settlement, or from distributing settlement
funds, without accounting for the insurer’s subrogation rights, would seem to have
the net effect of an insurer withholding money that would otherwise be paid to the
insured—which has been described by Montana courts as “de facto subrogation.”
See, e.g., Rolan v. New W. Health Servs., 307 P.3d 291, 296 (Mont. 2013) (insurer
received reimbursements and retained them). While the Court is not making such a
determination now, it finds that the allegations, drawn from the March 12, 2021 letter
and accepted as true, permit a reasonable inference that Blue Cross is liable. See
Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 663. The breach of contract claim is therefore adequately pled.

B. UTPA Claim

The Court agrees with Judge DeSoto that Smith did not “abandon[] her UTPA
claim . . . premised on her contention that Blue Cross inappropriately engaged in

subrogation.” (Doc. 66 at 18). Based on the Court’s ruling above, however, the

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Court rejects Judge DeSoto’s recommendation to dismiss Smith’s UTPA claim and
instead finds that Smith has plausibly alleged a claim for relief.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
(1) The Findings and Recommendation (Doc. 66) are REJECTED.
(2) Defendant Health Care Service Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint (Doc. 50) is DENIED.
(3) The above-captioned case shall remain referred to United States
Magistrate Judge DeSoto who will conduct all necessary hearings and
submit to the undersigned proposed findings of fact and a
recommendation for the disposition of all motions excepted from the

magistrate judge’s jurisdiction by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).

~A_
DATED this SS day of February, 2026. De
Pe tedidiiz..

/ SUSAN P. WATTERS
United States District Judge

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