Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ALEXANDER GABRIEL ANTEPARA 	)
BENITES 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. 6:26-cv-3210-MDH
)
JIM ARNOTT, et. al., 	)
)
Respondents. 	)
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner has been detained by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and parole
has been terminated without prior written notice. Pending is his Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus in which he argues federal statutes and the Due Process Clause require that he be released
or granted a hearing. The Court agrees with Petitioner’s Constitutional arguments, and on that
basis, it concludes the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner, Alexander Gabriel Antepara Benites, is a citizen of Ecuador who entered the
United States approximately November 22, 2023, through Arizona. On November 24, 2026, he
was issued a Notice to Appear for his immigration court hearing. The immigration court was
originally scheduled for February 4, 2027.
On December 17, 2025, the Petitioner was briefly detained in St. Louis, Missouri during a
traffic stop in which he was riding as a passenger. The driver of the vehicle was reportedly a target
of an ongoing DEA investigation, but the Petitioner himself was not the subject of that
investigation. Although a Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien noted the presence of a large
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quantity of unidentified white pills in connection with the stop, no criminal charges were filed
against the Petitioner, and there is no indication that he was personally implicated in any criminal
conduct. Following the traffic stop, a detainer was issued by Enforcement and Removal
Operations, and the Petitioner was taken into ICE custody. He has no prior criminal history.
Petitioner filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under
the United Nations Convention Against Torture, Form I-589. After his arrest in December 2025,
the government filed a Motion to Pretermit his asylum application. The immigration judge granted
the government’s motion on March 4, 2026. Petitioner represented himself at this hearing.
Petitioner appealed this decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals on April 2, 2026. To this
date, Petitioner remains in Greene County Jail. He has not been given a bond hearing.
If Petitioner had been charged with a crime arising out of the traffic stop, or otherwise, he
would be entitled to appear before a U.S. Magistrate and be considered for release on bond pending
any disposition of pending charges. He has not been charged with any crime but the Government
contends he may be held in custody but denied the opportunity before a judge for bond
consideration.
Now, he has filed this writ seeking release, or at a minimum, any process at all. The matter
has been fully briefed by each party. Petitioner bases the writ on statutory and Constitutional
grounds under the Fifth Amendment.
While the statutory grounds upon which Petitioner relies has, for the past twenty-nine years
and five presidential administrations, been interpreted to mean that he was entitled to a bond
hearing during his removal proceedings, the new presidential administration has adopted a novel
interpretation of that statutory scheme.
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A divided panel of the 8th Circuit recently agreed with this administration’s interpretation,
in a decision still subject to rehearing, en banc rehearing, or appeal. At this time, however, this
Court is bound by the panel’s interpretation of the statutory scheme. So, given this change in long
standing statutory interpretation, this Court is left to analyze the writ on Constitutional grounds.
While on these facts, it is apparent to the Court that no process has been afforded to
Petitioner and he has been deprived of his rights under the Fifth Amendment, courts have typically
relied on a more detailed and contextualized analysis, and the Court will do so below.
DISCUSSION
“No person shall … be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
U.S. Const. amend. V. First, Alexander Gabriel Antepara Benites is a person. He is a person who
was exercising civil liberties for almost 3 years. Those liberties were stripped by government
action. What is left for this Court to decide is whether he received due process of law in those
actions. Respondents claim issuance of a Notice to Appear satisfied Petitioner’s Due Process
rights.
Respondents claim Petitioner is treated as an “applicant for admission” under 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2)(A), and therefore he is entitled to no process beyond the issuance of a Notice to Appear.
They contend they can detain him for an indefinite period of time without any opportunity for a
hearing. Respondents rely heavily on Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103
(2020) and Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 123 S. Ct. 1708, 1714, 155 L. Ed. 2d 724 (2003).
However, these cases recognize limited procedural rights in the admission context, not the
detention context, and are factually distinct from the case at hand.
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The petitioner in Thuraissigiam did not seek release from custody; he sought additional
review of his asylum claim. The Court expressly noted that “the legality of his detention is not in
question.” Id. at 122. Petitioner here does not ask this Court to admit him or to alter his immigration
status, so the only holding in Thuraissigiam is inapposite. Here, Petitioner seeks only what due
process requires: an opportunity to have his custody reviewed.
The facts in Thuraissigiam are distinct from the facts of the present case. The petitioner
there was apprehended “25 yards” inside the United States, effectively at the border. Id. at 139. By
contrast, Mr. Antepara Benites has lived in the United States for almost 3 years. He was arrested
during a traffic stop that resulted in no charge or citation.
These distinctions are dispositive and Thuraissigiam is inapposite. A lengthy discussion of
the plenary power to control which individuals outside the United States may be permitted to enter
is not the relevant question here. The issue here is whether the United States can suddenly and
indefinitely detain a three-year resident without prior notice and with zero review or oversight.
The court in Demore did not discuss detention of all noncitizens, it explicitly discussed
“detention during removal proceedings for a limited class of deportable aliens” who had committed
serious crimes. Id. at 518. It found that mandatory detention under §1226(c) was constitutionally
permissible for the specific subset of people Congress listed including aggravated felons who had
already had their Due Process rights during their criminal proceedings. Id. at 510. The court in
Demore did not rule out Constitutional challenges for people like Petitioner who have no criminal
convictions or other factors which mandate classification under §1226(c). Demore does not
preclude Petitioner’s Due Process claim.
Due Process Analysis
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"Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the [Due Process] Clause protects." Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 679 (2001). Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental
decisions which deprive individuals of “liberty” or “property” interests within the meaning of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).
The Court disagrees with Respondents’ argument that Petitioner’s Due Process rights are
limited solely to the issuance of a Notice to Appear. Under Mathews, Due Process is “flexible”
and:
identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires
consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected
by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893 (emphasis added).
Private Interest
Undoubtedly, the private interest at stake here “is the most elemental of liberty interests—
the interest in being free from physical detention[.]” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529, 124
S.Ct. 2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004). Petitioner has been held in a county jail—in conditions
indistinguishable from criminal incarceration— since December 17, 2025. He is unable to return
to his family and the life he has created over the last 3 years. Every day that passes under this
unlawful detention is a day that cannot be recovered. See Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842,
851 (2d Cir. 2020) (first Mathews factor strongly satisfied where petitioner was "locked up in jail"
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and "could not maintain employment or see his family or friends or others outside normal visiting
hours").
Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
After the Fifth Circuit’s ruling on interpretation of the statutory arguments in this case, the
court in Alfonzo-Mujiuca v. Thompson, Case No. SA-26-CA-00457-XR (W.D. Tx. 03/13/2026)
found that the risk of erroneous deprivation of petitioners’ rights in these cases is high. The Court
found:
Our immigration law has long recognized that noncitizens have an interest in an
individualized hearing prior to detention in connection with immigration
proceedings. See Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 101. And the Supreme Court has
required individualized hearings for deprivations of interests less fundamental
than Petitioner's interest in freedom from detention. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 268 (1970) (requiring an individualized hearing prior to the
termination of welfare benefits). Here, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
Petitioner's rights is high. Without an individualized hearing, there is substantial
risk that noncitizens with a substantial presence in the United States who pose
neither flight risk nor danger to the community will be detained. An
individualized assessment before an immigration judge substantially reduces
this risk. Cf Demore, 538 U.S. at 531-32 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (reasoning
that "due process requires individualized procedures to ensure there is at least
some merit to the" charge and detention). An individualized analysis ensures the
purpose of detention is not punitive.
Alfonzo-Mujiuca at 23.
“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews at 333. Petitioner’s continued detention
without an opportunity to be heard is the type of erroneous deprivation Mathews intends to stop.
The basis for his detention and sudden unexplained detention deserves a hearing. He has no
criminal convictions.
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Balancing of Interests
The final factor directs the Court to weigh the private interests at stake and the risk of
erroneous deprivation of those interests against Respondents’ interests in persisting with the
regulation, including the fiscal and administrative burdens of an additional or substitute procedural
requirement. Mathews at 335. The government identifies no interest in detaining Petitioner based
on danger, flight risk, or obstruction of removal. A bond hearing would not undermine immigration
enforcement; it would ensure that detention is exercised lawfully and in accordance with the
Constitution. Here, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without Due Process is
minimal.
In sum, the Mathews factors weigh in favor of Petitioner, and the court finds that his
continued detention violates his Due Process rights. Petitioner shall be immediately released.
Release is the customary remedy in habeas proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (the habeas shall
"dispose of the matter as law and justice require."); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,484 (1973)
(finding "that the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody").
Additionally, ordering a bond hearing under these circumstances would require the Immigration
Judge to do that which he believes he lacks authority to do following Matter of Yajure Hurtado,
29 I&N Dec. 216, 220 (BIA 2025), and would be futile.
Immigration courts have concluded there is no jurisdiction to conduct a bond hearing. DHS
provides no alternative mechanism for individualized custody review. Petitioner has no forum,
administrative or judicial, through which he may seek release based on his circumstances. This is
not minimal process. It is zero process. Respondents’ position, that no such process is required,
cannot be reconciled with the Fifth Amendment.
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Attorneys’ Fees
Petitioner requests an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. Pursuant to the EAJA,
a court shall award to a prevailing party fees and other expenses incurred by that party in any civil
action, brought by or against the United States, unless the court finds that the position of the United
States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust. 28 U.S.C §
2412(d)(1)(A). To be eligible for fees under the EAJA, a petitioner must submit an application
within thirty days of final judgment, and the petitioner's net worth must be less than two million
dollars at the time the civil action was filed. See id. §§ (d)(1)(B), (d)(2)(B)(i). The EAJA was
enacted with the purpose of removing the financial disincentive for individuals challenging or
defending against government action and encouraging challenges to improper government action
as a means of helping formulate better public policy. See, e.g., Comm'r, I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S.
154, 163 (1990) (“[T]he specific purpose of the EAJA is to eliminate for the average person the
financial disincentive to challenge unreasonable governmental actions.” (citation omitted));
Boudin v. Thomas, 732 F.2d 1107, 1114 (2d Cir. 1984) (“The EAJA was passed partly to encourage
challenges to improper actions by government agencies. The drafters perceived legal actions as
helping to formulate public policy.” (citations omitted)).
As explained throughout, the Court finds the position of the United States is not
substantially justified. Respondents’ assertion that Petitioner’s procedural Due Process rights are
limited solely to the issuance of a Notice to Appear is misguided. Thus, Petitioner may pursue an
award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act.
CONCLUSION
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The Court concludes Petitioner’s right to procedural due process has been violated, and he
is entitled to immediate release. Accordingly, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is
GRANTED as follows.
1. Respondents are ORDERED to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing within 7 days of
the date of this Order.
2. If the Government takes the position that they are now without authority to grant bond
under Matter of Yajure Hurtado, Petitioner shall be released during the pendency of his
asylum claim or other final disposition of his immigration case absent the filing of criminal
charges or other significant change of circumstances1.
3. Petitioner shall promptly report to the Court any failure to comply with this Order by
Respondent.
4. Petitioner may submit an application for fees under the EAJA within thirty days of the
entry of final judgment.
5. It is FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents are enjoined from relocating Petitioner
outside the jurisdiction of this Court prior to compliance with this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 23, 2026
/s/ Douglas Harpool
DOUGLAS HARPOOL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
1 Traditionally, Due Process protections would have been fulfilled by a bond hearing assessing the
appropriateness of detention by evaluating flight risk and danger. But since the Government now takes the position
that there is no eligibility for bond, an alternative to fulfill Due Process must be identified.
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