Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
FRANK MARTIN AYALA SUAREZ, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. 6:26-cv-3169-MDH
)
JIM ARNOTT, et. al., 	)
)
Respondents. 	)
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner has been detained by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and parole
has been terminated without prior written notice. Pending is her Verified Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus in which she argues federal statutes and the Due Process Clause require that she
be released or granted a hearing. The Court agrees with Petitioner’s Constitutional arguments, and
on that basis, it concludes the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner, Frank Martin (“Karolina”) Ayala Suarez entered the United States without
inspection on or about August 2, 2023, and was placed under arrest before being released on her
own recognizance. She received a Notice to Appear (NTA), charging her with having entered the
United States without inspection, and was placed in removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(6)(A)(i). On July 30, 2024, Petitioner, with the assistance of counsel, filed an I-589,
Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal with the Immigration Court.
Petitioner has no criminal history. On March 17, 2025, Petitioner received notice of an in-
person hearing scheduled for September 19, 2025, at the Miami, Florida Immigration Court. When
Petitioner appeared for her hearing at the Miami, Florida Immigration Court, the Judge granted
Case 6:26-cv-03169-MDH Document 11 Filed 04/09/26 Page 1 of 10

2
DHS’s opposed motion to dismiss. As she left the courtroom on September 19, 2025, she was again
arrested and detained by ICE. She was initially held in DHS custody at Krome County Detention
Center in Miami, Florida before being transferred to East Camp Montana in El Paso, Texas.
Petitioner had been compliant with all terms of her release and has no criminal history.
Nearly two months after detaining her, on November 4, 2025, DHS filed a Notice and Order
of Expedited Removal, charging her with not being in possession of a valid entry document. 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). On November 6, 2025, DHS administered a credible fear interview
and determined that she did not establish a reasonable possibility of persecution in a country to
which she may be removed because there is no reasonable possibility that she would suffer the
harm she fears, and Petitioner had not established a reasonable possibility of torture in a country
to which she may be removed because she had not established that there is a reasonable possibility
that she would suffer severe physical or mental pain or suffering. Following this decision,
Petitioner requested Immigration Judge review.
On December 17, 2025, Petitioner was scheduled for review of the DHS Credible Fear
Determination on December 19, 2025, before the Immigration Court in El Paso, Texas. This
hearing was rescheduled twice before Petitioner was transferred to Greene County Jail in
Springfield, Missouri on December 26, 2025. On February 9, 2026, Petitioner appeared with
counsel via video for her review of the DHS credible fear determination. The judge ordered that
the DHS credible fear determination is vacated, specifically finding that Petitioner rebutted the
presumption of asylum ineligibility and that Petitioner established a significant possibility of
eligibility for asylum.
Case 6:26-cv-03169-MDH Document 11 Filed 04/09/26 Page 2 of 10

3
On February 21, 2026, Petitioner received a new NTA, again charging her with having
entered the United States without inspection and not being in possession of a valid entry document.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).
On March 11, 2026, Petitioner was denied bond by an immigration judge in the Kansas
City, Missouri Immigration Court. The judge ruled he was bound to deny the request for bond
pursuant to the precedent set in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). Pursuant
to Respondents’ new policy on interpretation of immigration statutes, Petitioner remains subject
to mandatory detention. Petitioner is currently detained at Greene County Jail in Springfield,
Missouri.
Petitioner has filed this writ seeking release, or at a minimum, any process at all. The matter
has been fully briefed by each party. Petitioner bases the writ on statutory and Constitutional
grounds under the Fifth Amendment.
While the statutory grounds upon which Petitioner relies has, for the past twenty-nine years
and five presidential administrations, been interpreted to mean that he was entitled to a bond
hearing during his removal proceedings, the new presidential administration has adopted a novel
interpretation of that statutory scheme.
A divided panel of the 8th Circuit recently agreed with this administration’s interpretation,
in a decision still subject to rehearing, en banc rehearing, or appeal. At this time, however, this
Court is bound by the panel’s interpretation of the statutory scheme. So, given this change in long
standing statutory interpretation, this Court is left to analyze the writ on Constitutional grounds.
While on these facts, it is apparent to the Court that regarding evaluation of danger or flight
risk, no process has been afforded to Petitioner and she has been deprived of her rights under the
Case 6:26-cv-03169-MDH Document 11 Filed 04/09/26 Page 3 of 10

4
Fifth Amendment, courts have typically relied on a more detailed and contextualized analysis, and
the Court will do so below.
DISCUSSION
“No person shall … be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
U.S. Const. amend. V. First, Frank Martin (“Karolina”) Ayala Suarez, is a person. She is a person
who was exercising a liberty interest in not being detained. Those liberties were stripped by
government action. What is left for this Court to decide is whether she received due process of law
in those actions. Respondents claim issuance of a Notice to Appear satisfied Petitioner’s Due
Process rights.
Respondents claim Petitioner is treated as an “applicant for admission” under 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2)(A), and therefore she is entitled to no process beyond the issuance of a Notice to
Appear. They contend they can detain her for an indefinite period of time without any opportunity
for a hearing. Respondents rely heavily on Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103
(2020) and Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 123 S. Ct. 1708, 1714, 155 L. Ed. 2d 724 (2003).
However, these cases recognize limited procedural rights in the admission context, not the
detention context, and are factually distinct from the case at hand.
The petitioner in Thuraissigiam did not seek release from custody; he sought additional
review of his asylum claim. The Court expressly noted that “the legality of his detention is not in
question.” Id. at 122. Petitioner here does not ask this Court to admit her or to alter her immigration
status, so the only holding in Thuraissigiam is inapposite. Here, Petitioner seeks only what due
process requires: an opportunity to have her custody reviewed.
Case 6:26-cv-03169-MDH Document 11 Filed 04/09/26 Page 4 of 10

5
The facts in Thuraissigiam are distinct from the facts of the present case. The petitioner
there was apprehended “25 yards” inside the United States, effectively at the border. Id. at 139. By
contrast, Ms. Ayala Suarez has lived in the United States for over two years. She was arrested on
September 19, 2025, while leaving the courtroom where the proceedings in her asylum case took
place. Petitioner had been compliant with all terms of her release and has no criminal history
These distinctions are dispositive and Thuraissigiam is inapposite. A lengthy discussion of
the plenary power to control which individuals outside the United States may be permitted to enter
is not the relevant question here. The issue here is whether the United States can suddenly and
indefinitely detain a twenty-three-year resident.
The court in Demore did not discuss detention of all noncitizens, it explicitly discussed
“detention during removal proceedings for a limited class of deportable aliens” who had committed
serious crimes. Id. at 518. It found that mandatory detention under §1226(c) was constitutionally
permissible for the specific subset of people Congress listed including aggravated felons who had
already had their Due Process rights during their criminal proceedings. Id. at 510. The court in
Demore did not rule out Constitutional challenges for people like Petitioner who have no criminal
convictions or other factors which mandate classification under §1226(c). Demore does not
preclude Petitioner’s Due Process claim.
Due Process Analysis
"Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the [Due Process] Clause protects." Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 679 (2001). Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental
decisions which deprive individuals of “liberty” or “property” interests within the meaning of the
Case 6:26-cv-03169-MDH Document 11 Filed 04/09/26 Page 5 of 10

6
Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).
The Court disagrees with Respondents’ argument that Petitioner’s Due Process rights are
limited solely to the issuance of a Notice to Appear. Under Mathews, Due Process is “flexible”
and:
identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires
consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected
by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893 (emphasis added).
Private Interest
Undoubtedly, the private interest at stake here “is the most elemental of liberty interests—
the interest in being free from physical detention[.]” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529, 124
S.Ct. 2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004). Petitioner has been held in a county jail—in conditions
indistinguishable from criminal incarceration— since September 19, 2025. She is unable to return
to her family and the life she has created. Every day that passes under this unlawful detention is a
day that cannot be recovered. See Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020) (first
Mathews factor strongly satisfied where petitioner was "locked up in jail" and "could not maintain
employment or see his family or friends or others outside normal visiting hours").
Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
After the Fifth Circuit’s ruling on interpretation of the statutory arguments in this case, the
court in Alfonzo-Mujiuca v. Thompson, Case No. SA-26-CA-00457-XR (W.D. Tx. 03/13/2026)
Case 6:26-cv-03169-MDH Document 11 Filed 04/09/26 Page 6 of 10

7
found that the risk of erroneous deprivation of petitioners’ rights in these cases is high. The Court
found:
Our immigration law has long recognized that noncitizens have an interest in an
individualized hearing prior to detention in connection with immigration
proceedings. See Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 101. And the Supreme Court has
required individualized hearings for deprivations of interests less fundamental
than Petitioner's interest in freedom from detention. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 268 (1970) (requiring an individualized hearing prior to the
termination of welfare benefits). Here, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
Petitioner's rights is high. Without an individualized hearing, there is substantial
risk that noncitizens with a substantial presence in the United States who pose
neither flight risk nor danger to the community will be detained. An
individualized assessment before an immigration judge substantially reduces
this risk. Cf Demore, 538 U.S. at 531-32 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (reasoning
that "due process requires individualized procedures to ensure there is at least
some merit to the" charge and detention). An individualized analysis ensures the
purpose of detention is not punitive.
Alfonzo-Mujiuca at 23.
“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews at 333. Petitioner’s continued detention
without an opportunity to be heard is the type of erroneous deprivation Mathews intends to stop.
The basis for her detention and evaluation of her danger or flight risk deserves a hearing. Nothing
in the record shows Petitioner poses a danger or flight risk. She has lived in the United States for
over two years and has a zealously pursued her asylum claim.
Balancing of Interests
The final factor directs the Court to weigh the private interests at stake and the risk of
erroneous deprivation of those interests against Respondents’ interests in persisting with the
regulation, including the fiscal and administrative burdens of an additional or substitute procedural
requirement. Mathews at 335. The government identifies no interest in detaining Petitioner based
Case 6:26-cv-03169-MDH Document 11 Filed 04/09/26 Page 7 of 10

8
on danger, flight risk, or obstruction of removal. A bond hearing would not undermine immigration
enforcement; it would ensure that detention is exercised lawfully and in accordance with the
Constitution. Here, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without Due Process is
minimal.
In sum, the Mathews factors weigh in favor of Petitioner, and the court finds that her
continued detention violates her Due Process rights. Petitioner shall be immediately released.
Release is the customary remedy in habeas proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (the habeas shall
"dispose of the matter as law and justice require."); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,484 (1973)
(finding "that the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody").
Additionally, ordering a bond hearing under these circumstances would require the Immigration
Judge to do that which he believes he lacks authority to do following Matter of Yajure Hurtado,
29 I&N Dec. 216, 220 (BIA 2025), and would be futile.
On March 11, 2026, Petitioner was denied bond by an immigration judge in the Kansas
City, Missouri Immigration Court after an El Paso immigration judge found that that Petitioner
rebutted the presumption of asylum ineligibility and that Petitioner established a significant
possibility of eligibility for asylum because the Kansas City judge is bound to deny the request
for bond pursuant to the precedent set in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).
DHS provides no alternative mechanism for individualized custody review. Petitioner has no
forum, administrative or judicial, through which she may seek release based on her circumstances.
This is not minimal process. It is zero process. Respondents’ position, that no such process is
required, cannot be reconciled with the Fifth Amendment.
Attorneys’ Fees
Case 6:26-cv-03169-MDH Document 11 Filed 04/09/26 Page 8 of 10

9
Petitioner requests an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. Pursuant to the EAJA,
a court shall award to a prevailing party fees and other expenses incurred by that party in any civil
action, brought by or against the United States, unless the court finds that the position of the United
States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust. 28 U.S.C §
2412(d)(1)(A). To be eligible for fees under the EAJA, a petitioner must submit an application
within thirty days of final judgment, and the petitioner's net worth must be less than two million
dollars at the time the civil action was filed. See id. §§ (d)(1)(B), (d)(2)(B)(i). The EAJA was
enacted with the purpose of removing the financial disincentive for individuals challenging or
defending against government action and encouraging challenges to improper government action
as a means of helping formulate better public policy. See, e.g., Comm'r, I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S.
154, 163 (1990) (“[T]he specific purpose of the EAJA is to eliminate for the average person the
financial disincentive to challenge unreasonable governmental actions.” (citation omitted));
Boudin v. Thomas, 732 F.2d 1107, 1114 (2d Cir. 1984) (“The EAJA was passed partly to encourage
challenges to improper actions by government agencies. The drafters perceived legal actions as
helping to formulate public policy.” (citations omitted)).
As explained throughout, the Court finds the position of the United States is not
substantially justified. Respondents’ assertion that Petitioner’s procedural Due Process rights are
limited solely to the issuance of a Notice to Appear is misguided. Thus, Petitioner may pursue an
award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act.
CONCLUSION
The Court concludes Petitioner’s right to procedural due process has been violated, and she
is entitled to immediate release. Accordingly, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is
GRANTED as follows.
Case 6:26-cv-03169-MDH Document 11 Filed 04/09/26 Page 9 of 10

10
1. Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody.
2. Respondents shall make accommodations available for Petitioner until such time as
arrangements can be made for Petitioner to be returned to the location of arrest or other
location agreed by the parties.
3. Petitioner shall promptly report to the Court any failure to comply with this Order by
Respondent.
4. Petitioner may submit an application for fees under the EAJA within thirty days of the
entry of final judgment.
5. It is FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents are enjoined from relocating Petitioner
outside the jurisdiction of this Court prior to compliance with this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 9, 2026
/s/ Douglas Harpool
DOUGLAS HARPOOL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 6:26-cv-03169-MDH Document 11 Filed 04/09/26 Page 10 of 10