Flenoid v. Henry's Towing Service, LLC et al

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
LARRY LEXXLOU FLENOID, II, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
vs. 	) 	Case No. 6:25-cv-03362-MDH
)
HENRY’S TOWING SERVICE, LLC et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER
Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Pro Se Motions to Compel Insurance and Indemnification
Disclosures, Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 6); Compel Recognition
(Doc. 7); Recusal, Reassignment, and Alternative Motion for Change of Venue (Doc. 25); and
Plaintiff’s Final Response, Record Preservation Statement, Renewed Request for Return of
Property, and Notice of Intent to Seek Appellate Review. (Doc. 55). The Defendants have not filed
a response and the time to do so has elapsed. The motions are now ripe for adjudication on the
merits. For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s Pro Se Motions are DENIED.
BACKGROUND
This case arises from the repossession of Plaintiff’s personal vehicle. Plaintiff Larry
LexxLou Flenoid II is a resident of the State of Missouri. Defendants Greene County Sheriff Jim
Arnott, Deputies Gold, Schilling, and Kelley are all employees of the Greene County Sheriff’s
Department and are being sued in their individual and official capacities. Plaintiff additionally lists
Defendants Greene County, Missouri, Greene County Sheriff’s Office, Obsidian Insurance
Case 6:25-cv-03362-MDH Document 63 Filed 04/27/26 Page 1 of 9

2
Company and Amguard Insurance Company as Defendants in his First Amended Complaint
(“Complaint”).1, 2
While Plaintiff’s Complaint is scarce of factual allegations, Plaintiff alleges that on May
13, 2025, that he was detained against his will without a lawful basis and that his vehicle was
subsequently seized and transferred to Henry’s Towing Service, LLC. Plaintiff further alleges that
he requested Henry’s Towing Service, LLC to return his vehicle, but Defendants claimed the
vehicle was abandoned. Plaintiff then alleges various misconduct and obstruction from judges,
clerks, and court personnel ranging from the St. Louis County Probate Court to the Circuit Court
of Greene County, Missouri.
Plaintiff’s Complaint lists seven different counts: Count I - Unlawful Detention (Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment); Count II - Unlawful Seizure/Conversion; Count III - Denial of
Access to the Courts; Count IV - Due Process Violations; Count V - Civil Rights (42 U.S.C. §
1983); Count VI - Failure to Train/Supervise; and Count VII - Intimidation/Retaliation. Plaintiff
brings his current motions seeking a variety of requests. The Court will take each motion in turn.
1 Plaintiff additionally lists Defendants Bryan Feemster, Doug Ankrom, Misty Walters, Kim Nakashima-Moran,
Aaron Freeman, the Missouri Department of Social Services, Missouri Attorney General’s Office, Greene County
Commission, and the St. Louis County Probate Court in this action. However, On April 9, 2026, this Court held a
Telephone Conference with the parties to ascertain the claims and factual allegations Plaintiff is attempting to assert.
(Doc. 58). Pursuant to that Telephone Conference, the Court Ordered that Plaintiff is granted leave to file a Seconded
Amended Complaint and to list only the parties and claims that are directly related to the actions or omissions
stemming from the May 13, 2025, and November 14, 2025, incidents with the Greene County Sheriff’s Department.
Id. Plaintiff was instructed that he may pursue claims against Defendants Greene County, Missouri; the individually
listed Greene County Deputies; and Henry’s Towing Service, LLC. Id. While Plaintiff has yet to file his Second
Amended Complaint, the Court notes the Defendants in that Order and will omit for purposes of this motion Plaintiff’s
other named Defendants in his First Amended Complaint.
2 On December 2, 2025, the Court granted in part Plaintiff’s Pro Se Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis.
(Doc. 4). As part of this Court’s Order Plaintiff was not permitted to proceed against the Greene County Sheriff’s
Department as it is not a suable entity. Id. To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to reraise the Greene County Sheriff’s
Department as a Defendant in this case, the Greene County Sheriff’s Department is hereby dismissed. Additionally,
the Court informed Plaintiff that he may not sue the insurance companies directly during the April 9, 2026, Telephone
Conference. As such, to the extent Plaintiff attempts to sue Obsidian Insurance Company and Amguard Insurance
Company, those parties are likewise dismissed.
Case 6:25-cv-03362-MDH Document 63 Filed 04/27/26 Page 2 of 9

3
DISCUSSION
I. 	Motion to Compel Insurance and Indemnification Disclosures
Plaintiff seeks an order compelling Defendants to produce mandatory insurance and
indemnification disclosures as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. Plaintiff argues that
despite proper demand, Defendants have failed to provide complete disclosures identifying
coverage that may satisfy all or part of a judgment. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants
have 	not 	produced 	declaration 	pages, 	policy 	numbers, 	limits, 	reservation-of-right 	letters,
excess/umbrella polices, or governmental self-insurance/indemnification provisions applicable to
the counts within his Complaint. Plaintiff states that these disclosures are automatic and not
contingent on liability.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 governs the parties duty to disclose as well as the
general provisions governing discovery. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) specifically details
the time for initial disclosures and states:
A party must make the initial disclosures at or within 14 days after the parties’ Rule
26(f) conference unless a different time is set by stipulation or court order, or unless
a party objects during the conference that initial disclosures are not appropriate in
this action and state the objection in the proposed discovery plan. In ruling on the
object, the court must determine what disclosures, if any, are to be made and must
set the time for disclosure.
(Emphasis added). Here, not all parties have been served in this case and thus the Court has not
filed a Rule 16 Notice to the parties setting the timing for a Rule 26(f) conference. Once service
has been effectuated to the parties in this case, the Court will issue a Rule 16 Notice setting forth
the deadlines for when the parties are to have a Rule 26(f) conference and when a proposed
scheduling order is due to the Court. Once the parties have their Rule 26(f) conference the
Defendants will have 14 days after that date to provide the initial disclosures as mandated by Rule
Case 6:25-cv-03362-MDH Document 63 Filed 04/27/26 Page 3 of 9

4
26. Until that time, Plaintiff’s motion is premature. For these reasons, Plaintiff’s Pro Se Motion to
Compel Insurance and Indemnification Disclosures is DENIED.
II. 	Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint
Plaintiff next asks the Court for leave to file a second amended complaint. Plaintiff argues
that newly disclosed insurance and indemnification information materially affects allegations
regarding scope of employment, policy/custom, negligent supervision, and claims-handling
conduct. Plaintiff states that the proposed additions in his amended complaint will clarify acts
within scope triggering indemnity; Monell policy/custom allegations tied to coverage; bad-
faith/negligent 	claims-handling 	facts; 	and 	will 	add 	declaratory 	relief 	specifying 	coverage
obligations.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 governs amended and supplemental pleadings. It states
in relevant part:
(a) Amendments Before Trial.
(1) Amending as a Matter of Course. A party may amend its pleading once as a
matter of course no later than:
(A) 21 days after serving it, or
(B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days
after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service3 of a motion
under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), Whicher is earlier.
(2) Other Amendments. In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only
with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court should
freely give leave when justice so requires.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 (a)(1)-(2). Leave “should normally be granted absent good reason for denial.
The classic ‘good reasons’ for rejecting an amendment are: ‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory
motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice
to the non-moving party, or futility of amendment.’” Popp Telcom v. Am. Sharecom, Inc., 210 F.3d
Case 6:25-cv-03362-MDH Document 63 Filed 04/27/26 Page 4 of 9

5
928, 943 (8th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). The party opposing amendment bears the
burden of proving that some reason exists to deny leave to amend. Roberson v. Hayti Police Dep't,
241 F.3d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 2001). “[W]hether to allow a party to amend her complaint is left to
the sound discretion of the district court[.]” Popoalii v. Corr. Med. Servs., 512 F.3d 488, 497 (8th
Cir. 2008).
The Court has already granted Plaintiff’s request to file a second amended complaint in
this action. (Docs. 58 and 62). Plaintiff having already been granted leave to file a second amended
complaint, the Court will find this motion as moot. For the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s Pro Se Motion
for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint is FOUND AS MOOT.
III. 	Motion to Compel Recognition
Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Recognition asks the Court for recognition of: (1) Plaintiff’s
identity and status as established by certified Missouri records; (2) issuing authority certified by
the Missouri Secretary of State; (3) authentication by the United States Department of State
granting full faith and credit. (Doc. 7, page 1). Plaintiff argues that the record is unrebutted and
further asks that the Court to direct the clerk and the parties to acknowledge the record. Id.
Here Plaintiff has attached a self-titled affidavit of identity, status and authenticated record.
(Doc. 7).3 The affidavit states:
I, Larry LexxLous Flenoid II, being competent to testify and of lawful age, hereby
declare and affirm as follows:
1. I am the living man and affiant herein, acting in my own right and capacity.
2. My identity, status, and record of existence are established by duly issued
public records of the State of Missouri, including a certified record of live birth.
3 Plaintiff’s self-titled affidavit of identity, status, and authenticated record is not notarized but states that he “declare[s]
under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.” (Doc. 7, page 3).
Case 6:25-cv-03362-MDH Document 63 Filed 04/27/26 Page 5 of 9

6
3. The authority of the issuing registrar was formally certified by the Missouri
Secretary of State.
4. Said certification was authenticated by the United States Department of State,
granting full faith and credit to the attached state record.
5. These records are valid, unrebutted, and have not been lawfully challenged,
vacated, or invalidated by any court of competent jurisdiction.
6. Any failure or refusal by a court or agency to recognize these authenticated
records constitutes a denial of full faith and credit and a violation of due process.
7. Copies of the referenced records are maintained in my lawful custody and are
available for inspection upon proper legal demand.
8. This affidavit is made in good faith and under penalty of perjury.
(Doc. 7, page 3). While Plaintiff has submitted his affidavit, he does not provide this Court with
any of the records he wishes the Court to recognize. Further, the records Plaintiff wishes the Court
to recognize have no bearing on the current proceeding or the issues Plaintiff has raised. There is
no issue in this case that would warrant recognition that Plaintiff was born, nor of any identity,
status or other qualification that would bear on the proceedings. As the Court does not have the
records Plaintiff attests are authenticated nor are there any issue that depends on the authentication
Plaintiff requests, the Court will deny the motion. For the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s Pro Se Motion
to Compel Recognition is DENIED.
IV. 	Motion for Recusal, Reassignment, and Alternative Motion for Change of Venue
Plaintiff asks the Court to recuse Judge Douglas Harpool from further proceedings in this
matter; reassign this matter to a different judicial officer; or in the alternative transfer venue to a
district where Plaintiff can obtain a fair and impartial adjudication. In support Plaintiff argues that
he was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, triggering the Court’s statutory duty to effect
service through the U.S. Marshals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). Plaintiff states that he repeatedly
notified the Court that Defendants were refusing service; mail was being returned or interfered
Case 6:25-cv-03362-MDH Document 63 Filed 04/27/26 Page 6 of 9

7
with; certain mail was selectively held by the post office; and that Plaintiff lacks funds to
independently remedy service interference. Plaintiff argues that despite notice, the Court has
repeatedly attributed delay to Plaintiff; denied emergency relief solely due to lack of service;
refused to order service or intervene; and continued to deny injunctive relief while ongoing harm
persists causing harm to Plaintiff. Plaintiff states that the Court’s repeated refusal to act after notice
of interference has created an appearance of partiality and has effectively denied Plaintiff
meaningful access to the courts.
Under section 455(a), a judge is required to “disqualify himself in any proceeding in which
his 	impartiality 	might 	reasonably 	be 	questioned. 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	455(a). 	Under 	§ 	455(a),
“disqualification is required if a reasonable person who knew the circumstances would questions
the judge’s impartiality, even though no actual bias or prejudice has been shown.” Fletcher v.
Conoco Pipe Line Co., 323 F.3d 661, 664 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Tucker, 78 F.3d
1313, 1324 (8th Cir. 1996)). The existence of a ruling with which a litigant disagrees does not
constitute a basis for recusal without a clear showing of bias or partiality. Fletcher v. Conoco
Pipeline, Inc., 323 F.3d 661, 665–66 (8th Cir. 2003). An alleged personal bias must “stem from an
extrajudicial source,” not from “the judge’s view of the law[.]” Akins v. Knight, No. 2:15-CV-
4096-NKL, 2016 WL 127594, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 11, 2016), aff’d, 863 F.3d 1084 (8th Cir.
2017). “A party introducing a motion to recuse carries a heavy burden of proof; a judge is presumed
to be impartial and the party seeking disqualification bears the substantial burden of proving
otherwise.” Pope v. Fed. Express Corp., 974 F.2d 982, 985 (8th Cir. 1992).
Here, the Plaintiff bases his Motion for Recusal solely on service issues in this case.
However, this Court has instructed service by the United States Marshals, based upon Plaintiff’s
service information, in its February 4, 2026, Order and instructing service to Greene County,
Case 6:25-cv-03362-MDH Document 63 Filed 04/27/26 Page 7 of 9

8
Missouri in its February 12, 2026, Order. (Docs. 27 and 31).4 To the extent Plaintiff seeks recusal
based on service, this does not rise to the heavy burden of proof necessary for disqualification.
Likewise, Plaintiff’s request for reassignment and change of venue will also be denied. For the
reasons stated, Plaintiff’s Pro Se Motion for Recusal, Reassignment, and Alternative Change of
Venue is DENIED.
V. 	Plaintiff’s Renewed Request for Return of Property
Plaintiff lastly renews his motion that the Court order the immediate return of his vehicle
and personal property. Plaintiff argues that he is continuing to experience irreparable harm without
his vehicle including loss of employment; inability to obtain employment due to withheld
identification documents; loss of transportation; and loss of personal belongings and essential
property including the remains of Plaintiff’s deceased family members. However, as articulated in
the Court’s January 21, 2026, Order, the Plaintiff has not shown that the injunctive relief factors
weigh in favor of granting the relief he seeks. (Doc. 23). The Court continues to be unable to assess
whether Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits and nothing in Plaintiff’s current or past motions
has persuaded the Court that granting of injunctive relief is proper at this stage of the litigation. As
stated previously “the Court will not consider another request for a TRO or injunctive relief until
the time Defendants have been served and are able to respond to Plaintiff’s motion.” (Doc. 23,
pages 3-4). For the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s Pro Se Renewed Request for Return of Property is
DENIED.
CONCLUSION
4 As reflected in the docket sheet, on April 9, 2026, the Clerk’s Office has issued the summons as to Greene County,
Missouri with summons provided to the United States Marshal’s Service for service.
Case 6:25-cv-03362-MDH Document 63 Filed 04/27/26 Page 8 of 9

9
For the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s Pro Se Motion to Compel Insurance and Indemnification
Disclosures is DENIED; Pro Se Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint is FOUND
AS MOOT; Pro Se Motion to Compel Recognition is DENIED; Pro Se Motion for Recusal,
Reassignment, and Alternative Motion for Change of Venue is DENIED; and Plaintiff’s Renewed
Request for Return of Property is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 	April 27, 2026
/s/ Douglas Harpool______________
DOUGLAS HARPOOL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 6:25-cv-03362-MDH Document 63 Filed 04/27/26 Page 9 of 9