USA v. Waller et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 25-03165-03-CR-S-BP
)
KRISTY NAOMI JUEL NORTON, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence. (Doc. 112.) This action
has been referred to the undersigned for the purpose of hearing and processing all pretrial motions
to suppress evidence. 	Defendant moves for suppression of “any and all evidence or statements
derived as the result of the November 6, 2024, pretextual and warrantless search and seizure [] by
Deputy First Class Robert Malone and others of the contents of a [] Nissan Rogue bearing license
plate 0DF-P93” as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Id. at 1. The Government filed Suggestions in
Opposition to the Motion. (Doc. 126.)
On March 10, 2026, the undersigned conducted a hearing on the Motion. The Government
was represented by Assistant U.S. Attorney Hannah Lucas, and Defendant appeared in person with
attorney Marsha Jackson. Robert Malone and Dakota Millard testified as witnesses. Upon review,
it is RECOMMENDED that the Motion to Suppress Evidence be denied.
I. 	Findings of Fact 1
Robert Malone (“Dep. Malone”) is a Deputy K-9 handler with the Howell County Sheriff’s
Office, where he has worked for three years. Tr. at 4. Dep. Malone and his partner, K-9 Spice,
1 The facts set forth are taken from the testimony adduced and evidence presented at the hearing. See Transcript
(doc. 138) (“Tr.”) and Government Exhibits 1 and 2 (doc. 135).
Case 6:25-cr-03165-BP Document 143 Filed 05/13/26 Page 1 of 11

2
are dual certified for detecting methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine through the North American
Police Working Dog Association and the Fulton, Missouri Police Canine Association as of October
2024. Tr. at 4-5, 14.
Dakota Millard (“TFO Millard”) is an investigator with the South Central Drug Task Force
through the Missouri State Highway Patrol and has been since February 2024. 	Tr. at 17. 	TFO
Millard has received Basic and Advanced Narcotics Training. Tr. at 17-18.
Prior to November 6, 2024, TFO Millard was aware that in 2023, the South Central Drug
Task Force conducted a traffic stop of a suspect coming from St. Louis, Missouri, with a large
quantity of narcotics, and the suspect advised investigators that Defendant and a Jody Cates used
St. Louis as a source of supply. Tr. at 20. In October 2024, a confidential reliable source informed
TFO Millard that Defendant was purchasing large quantities of methamphetamine and fentanyl in
St. Louis and driving them back to Howell County stored in a black lockbox. Tr. at 18, 24. Next,
using the LPR FLOCK system, TFO Millard identified the van that Defendant normally drove and
found camera hits showing Defendant’s van traveling to St. Louis and returning. Tr. at 21.
On November 6, 2024, TFO Millard placed a GPS tracker on Defendant’s van pursuant to
a search warrant. Tr. at 21. On the same date, TFO Millard observed Defendant’s van park for a
long period at the residence of a Jeff Sanders, the owner of a 2011 Nissan Rogue (“Rogue”). Tr.
at 21. Next, TFO Millard used the LPR FLOCK system to confirm that the Rogue traveled to St.
Louis that day and was travelling back to Howell County. Tr. at 21.
TFO Millard then contacted Dep. Malone, who was on patrol. Tr. at 5. TFO Millard asked
Dep. Malone to conduct a traffic stop on the Rogue and provided the license number for the
vehicle. 	Tr. at 4, 14. 	TFO Millard advised Dep. Malone the Rogue was possibly trafficking
narcotics. Tr. at 15.
Case 6:25-cr-03165-BP Document 143 Filed 05/13/26 Page 2 of 11

3
Dep. Malone observed the Rogue with the same license number travelling eastbound on
US 60 in Howell County. Tr. at 5, 14. Dep. Malone measured the speed of the Rogue with a radar
gun and determined it was travelling at 71 mph in a 65-mph speed limit zone. 	Tr. at 6. 	Dep.
Malone caught up with the Rogue in his vehicle, then initiated a traffic stop. Tr. at 7. At 9:58
p.m., Dep. Malone exited his vehicle, approached the Rogue, and advised the occupants that he
stopped them for exceeding the posted speed limit. Tr. at 7; Gov’t Ex. 1. Dep. Malone observed
Defendant in the driver’s seat of the Rogue along with a passenger, Jody Cates, and a dog also in
the Rogue. 	Tr. at 7; Gov’t Ex. 1. 	On Dep. Malone’s request, Defendant provided her driver’s
license but could not provide proof of insurance. Tr. at 8; Gov’t Ex. 1. Dep. Malone twice asked
Defendant where she was coming from, to which she replied she was returning from a doctor’s
appointment for a heart condition but did not provide the location of the appointment. Gov’t Ex.
1. At 10:01 p.m., Dep. Malone asked Defendant to exit the Rogue, then returned to his vehicle to
check Defendant’s information. Tr. at 8; Gov’t Ex. 1.
While Dep. Malone was checking Defendant’s information, TFO Millard spoke with
Defendant, who made no incriminating statements and requested a lawyer. Tr. at 19-20. At 10:09
p.m., Dep. Malone exited his vehicle and TFO Millard advised him that there was reasonable
suspicion to perform a K-9 search on the Rogue. Tr. at 9; Gov’t Ex. 1. Mr. Cates and the dog
were removed from the Rogue, and at 10:12 p.m., Dep. Malone and K-9 Spice performed a cursory
search around the exterior of the Rogue. Tr. at 9; Gov’t Ex. 1. K-9 Spice circled the Rogue three
or four times before she got on task, as this was her first deployment and they were on the side of
a four-lane highway, creating a distraction. Tr. at 9, 12. At 10:15 p.m., K-9 Spice sniffed at the
driver’s side door window, causing her breathing to change and her body to lock up, indicating an
alert to the presence of narcotics in the Rogue. Tr. at 10; Gov’t Ex. 1. Dep. Malone then returned
Case 6:25-cr-03165-BP Document 143 Filed 05/13/26 Page 3 of 11

4
K-9 Spice to his vehicle, approached Defendant, advised her that his dog had positively alerted to
the presence of narcotics in the Rogue, and asked her where the drugs were located. 	Tr. at 10;
Gov’t Ex. 1. Defendant responded with a denial. Tr. at 10; Gov’t Ex. 1.
At 10:18 p.m., Dep. Malone and TFO Millard began to search the interior of the Rogue.
Tr. at 10, 21; Gov’t Ex. 1. Dep. Malone found a glass pipe in a bag between the console and the
driver’s seat. Tr. at 10. In the back seat, TFO Millard found a large black lockbox partially sticking
out of a backpack. 	Tr. at 11, 13, 21, 26. 	Dep. Malone removed the lockbox from the Rogue,
placed it on the ground in front of his vehicle, and deployed K-9 Spice on it. Tr. at 11, 22; Gov’t
Ex. 1. Upon sniffing the lockbox, K-9 Spice completely changed her behavior, pawing at the box
and breathing differently, indicating an alert to the presence of narcotics in the lockbox. Tr. at 11,
22; Gov’t Ex. 1.
TFO Millard secured the still-unopened lockbox, while Dep. Malone issued a warning to
Defendant for the traffic stop then took her to the Howell County Jail for processing. Tr. at 11-12.
The next morning, TFO Millard obtained a search warrant signed by a Howell County Circuit
Court Judge for the lockbox. Tr. at 22; Gov’t Ex. 2. TFO Millard then opened the lockbox and
found a large quantity of narcotics, specifically 368 grams of methamphetamine, 261 fentanyl
capsules, and a 5.74-gram gray solid containing cocaine, fentanyl, and tramadol. Tr. at 23-24.
III. 	Conclusions of Law
The Fourth Amendment protects persons from unreasonable searches and seizures by the
government. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; United States v. Va Lerie, 424 F.3d 694, 701 (8th Cir.
2005). 	“[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357
Case 6:25-cr-03165-BP Document 143 Filed 05/13/26 Page 4 of 11

5
(1967). 	Generally, evidence obtained because of an unlawful search or seizure, and the fruits
therefrom, cannot be used against a defendant and must be suppressed. 	United States v.
Riesselman, 646 F.3d 1072, 1078-79 (8th Cir. 2011).
Defendant primarily argues that because the officers searched the vehicle and seized items
without a warrant, “suppression is required unless the government meets its burden of proving a
clearly delineated exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.” 	(Doc. 112 at 4.)
Defendant also claims the “mere traffic stop for a speeding violation is an orchestrated pretext to
investigate [her] for drug trafficking without proper Fourth Amendment justification.” 	Id. at 5.
And, according to Defendant, there was an “impermissibly prolonged detention” to allow the dog
sniff of the Rogue and the lockbox. 	Id. 	Lastly, Defendant moves for suppression of any
statements, arguing she was not advised of her Miranda rights prior to being questioned. Id.
As follows, the undersigned concludes that these arguments lack merit, finding: A. the
initial traffic stop was supported by probable cause for a speeding violation; B. the detention was
not impermissibly prolonged by the dog sniff of the Rogue, which was supported by reasonable
suspicion; and, C. the Government has shown that the search of the cab of the Rogue was supported
by probable cause under the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement. 	Additionally,
Defendant has withdrawn her motion to suppress any statements. In summary, because there were
no Fourth Amendment violations, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply and the
Motion to Suppress Evidence should be denied.
A. 	The basis for the traffic stop
Defendant claims that the traffic stop for a speeding violation was “an orchestrated pretext
to investigate [her] for drug trafficking without proper Fourth Amendment justification.” Id. A
traffic stop is considered a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. 	Delaware v. Prouse, 440
Case 6:25-cr-03165-BP Document 143 Filed 05/13/26 Page 5 of 11

6
U.S. 648, 653 (1979). To justify the seizure, the stop must be “supported by either probable cause
or an articulable and reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred.” United States v.
Washington, 455 F.3d 824, 826 (8th Cir. 2006). It is well-established that “any traffic violation,
regardless of its perceived severity, provides an officer with probable cause to stop the driver.”
United States v. Jones, 275 F.3d 673, 680 (8th Cir. 2001). “Once an officer has probable cause,
the stop is objectively reasonable and any ulterior motivation on the officer’s part is irrelevant.”
United States v. Frasher, 632 F.3d 450, 453 (8th Cir. 2011).
Here, Dep. Malone measured the speed of the Rogue with a radar gun and determined it
was travelling at 71 mph in a 65-mph speed limit zone, a speeding violation under Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 304.010 	As a result, the traffic stop was supported by probable cause and was objectively
reasonable, regardless of any other subjective intentions. 	Furthermore, at the conclusion of the
stop, Dep. Malone issued a warning to Defendant for the speeding violation. 	Therefore, this
argument provides no basis for suppression.
B. 	The duration of the traffic stop
Defendant contends with no further argument that “K-9 Spice circling the car multiple
times before the pipe was found and then being asked to check the box multiple times was an
impermissibly prolonged detention.” 	(Doc. 112 at 5.) 	The undersigned disagrees with this
contention, as follows.
In determining the reasonableness of a detention, courts look to the law enforcement
purposes to be served by the stop, the time reasonably needed to effectuate such purposes, and
whether the police diligently pursued such purposes. See Williams v. Decker, 767 F.3d 734, 741-
42 (8th Cir. 2014). If prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the purpose, a
constitutionally permissible stop can become unlawful. United States v. Williams, 929 F.3d 539,
Case 6:25-cr-03165-BP Document 143 Filed 05/13/26 Page 6 of 11

7
544 (8th Cir. 2019). During a traffic stop, an officer “may detain the offending motorist while the
officer completes a number of routine, but somewhat time-consuming tasks related to the traffic
violation[.]” United States v. Barragan, 379 F.3d 524, 528–29 (8th Cir. 2004). An officer may
make inquiries unrelated to a traffic violation, “so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend
the duration of the stop.” Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009).
Here, Dep. Malone stopped Defendant at 9:58 p.m. and completed routine checks by 10:09
p.m., effectively concluding the traffic stop. During these eleven minutes, Dep. Malone pursued
valid purposes in investigating the offense of speeding. 	First, Dep. Malone spoke briefly with
Defendant for approximately three minutes, requesting identification and asking about her route.
Dep. Malone then returned to his vehicle to run routine checks on Defendant and Mr. Cates for
approximately eight minutes. Eleven minutes to complete these tasks is a reasonable amount of
time and Dep. Malone diligently pursued these tasks. At this point, the traffic stop was effectively
completed, apart from the issuance of a warning.
TFO Millard then told Dep. Malone that he should perform a dog sniff of the exterior of
the Rogue based on reasonable suspicion. 	However, an officer may not extend a traffic stop
beyond the duration of time necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, “unless he develops a
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.” United States v. Gastelum, 11 F.4th 898,
902 (8th Cir. 2021). The Supreme Court has held that a dog sniff for narcotics is unrelated to the
purpose of a traffic stop. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 356-57 (2015). Therefore,
absent reasonable suspicion, officers may not extend the duration of a traffic stop to conduct a dog
sniff. Id. at 357.
An officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion to extend a stop and conduct investigations
unrelated to the traffic offense when he has “particularized, objective facts which, taken together
Case 6:25-cr-03165-BP Document 143 Filed 05/13/26 Page 7 of 11

8
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [] suspicion that a crime [is] being
committed.” United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 927 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v.
Beck, 140 F.3d 1129, 1136 (8th Cir.1998)). 	“When multiple officers are involved in an
investigation, probable cause may be based on their collective knowledge and need not be based
solely on the information within the knowledge of the arresting officer as long as there is some
degree of communication.” United States v. Robinson, 664 F.3d 701, 703 (8th Cir. 2011).
At the time of the traffic stop, the officers’ collective knowledge included TFO Millard’s
awareness that in 2023, a suspect in a separate investigation informed officers that Defendant and
Mr. Cates obtained narcotics in St. Louis. Then in October 2024, a confidential reliable source
informed TFO Millard that Defendant was purchasing large quantities of methamphetamine and
fentanyl in St. Louis and driving them back to Howell County. Using the LPR FLOCK system,
TFO Millard then found camera hits showing Defendant’s van traveling to St. Louis and returning.
On the day of the traffic stop, TFO Millard placed a GPS tracker on Defendant’s van
pursuant to a search warrant and observed her van park for a long period at the residence of a Jeff
Sanders. 	TFO Millard then determined that Mr. Sanders owned the Rogue and, using the LPR
Flock system, he confirmed via camera hits that the Rogue had traveled to St. Louis and was
returning to Howell County that evening. 	Lastly, at the traffic stop, TFO Millard observed
Defendant and Mr. Cates in the Rogue.
Based on this knowledge, including the information learned in 2023 that Defendant and
Mr. Cates obtained narcotics in St. Louis along with the recent information from the reliable source
including Defendant’s name and route for obtaining narcotics, corroborated by the camera hits
showing Defendant’s van travelling to and from St. Louis on previous dates, the Rogue travelling
to and from St. Louis on the date of the traffic stop, and the presence of Defendant and Mr. Cates
Case 6:25-cr-03165-BP Document 143 Filed 05/13/26 Page 8 of 11

9
in the Rogue when stopped, the officers had reasonable suspicion that Defendant was transporting
narcotics in the Rogue. See United States v. Hill, 91 F.3d 1064, 1069 (8th Cir. 1996) (reasonable
suspicion justifying investigative stop supported by corroboration of an informant’s tips, reducing
the chances of a reckless or prevaricating tale, thus providing a substantial basis for crediting the
tips). 	As a result, the officers extended the duration of the stop lawfully to conduct a dog sniff
based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Furthermore, the duration of the stop was extended by only six minutes total, from 10:09
p.m., when Dep. Malone completed his routine checks, to 10:15 p.m., when K-9 Spice positively
alerted to the presence of narcotics. 	During these six minutes, the officers acted diligently to
remove Mr. Cates and the passenger dog from the Rogue, deploy K-9 Spice, and conduct the sniff
of the Rogue’s exterior. Under these circumstances, a six-minute detention was not unreasonable.
See United States v. Lyons, 486 F.3d 367, 372 (8th Cir. 2007) (31-minute detention awaiting arrival
of drug dog was not excessive); United States v. Donnelly, 475 F.3d 946, 951, 954 (8th Cir. 2007)
(59-minute detention to wait for a drug dog was reasonable where the officer requested the dog
immediately after developing reasonable suspicion).
Similarly, the dog sniff of the black lockbox lasted approximately one minute before K-9
Spice alerted to the presence of narcotics, also a reasonable amount of time to conduct a dog sniff.
As a result, Defendant’s assertion that the traffic stop was impermissibly prolonged by the dog
sniffs lacks merit, and the Motion should be denied as to this basis.
C. 	Probable cause to search the vehicle
Defendant also contends that because the officers searched the vehicle and seized items
without a warrant, “suppression is required unless the government meets its burden of proving a
clearly delineated exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.” 	(Doc. 112 at 4.)
Case 6:25-cr-03165-BP Document 143 Filed 05/13/26 Page 9 of 11

10
The undersigned finds that the Government has met its burden by showing the “automobile
exception” to the warrant requirement applies in this matter.
Under the “automobile exception,” a search of a vehicle does not require a warrant if the
search is supported by probable cause. United States v. Brown, 49 F.3d 1346, 1350 (8th Cir. 1995).
Probable cause to search a vehicle exists where there is a “fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found” in that vehicle. Id.
“A dog sniff resulting in an alert on a container, car, or other item, standing alone, gives an
officer probable cause to believe that there are drugs present,” provided the dog is reliable. United
States v. Tuton, 893 F.3d 562, 570 (8th Cir. 2018). In establishing reliability, when “a bona fide
organization has certified a dog after testing [her] reliability in a controlled setting, a court can
presume (subject to any conflicting evidence offered) that the dog’s alert provides probable cause
to search.” Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 246-47 (2013).
Here, the Court has a sufficient basis to trust K-9 Spice’s alerts, as K-9 Spice and her
handler Dep. Malone were dual certified for detecting methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine by
the North American Police Working Dog Association and the Fulton, Missouri Police Canine
Association as of October 2024. And, during the traffic stop, K-9 Spice alerted for the presence
of narcotics at the exterior driver’s window, providing probable cause to search the Rogue.
In addition, the “automobile exception’s scope extends to the automobile and the containers
within it where officers have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained.”
United States v. Keck, 2 F.4th 1085, 1089 (8th Cir. 2021) (citing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S.
565, 580 (1991)). 	And containers within a car that may be lawfully searched includes 	“a
passenger’s personal belongings.” United States v. Murillo-Salgado, 854 F.3d 407, 418 (8th Cir.
2017) (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 302 (1999)). Accordingly, the officers were
Case 6:25-cr-03165-BP Document 143 Filed 05/13/26 Page 10 of 11

11
justified in searching the entire cab of the Rogue and any containers therein that may have
contained narcotics, including the backpack in the backseat.
Therefore, the dog sniff provided probable cause, the “automobile exception” to the
warrant requirement applies, and the Motion should be denied as to this basis.
D. 	Miranda warnings
Defendant claims she was not advised of her Miranda rights prior to questioning 	(Doc.
112 at 5.) During the hearing, however, defense counsel clarified that there are no statements that
Defendant seeks to suppress and she is withdrawing the request to suppress any statements. Tr. at
3, 29. Accordingly, this basis for suppression has been withdrawn.
E. 	Fruit of the poisonous tree
Defendant also asserts that “all evidence and statements derived directly or indirectly from
this warrantless search and seizure are ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’” (Doc. 112 at 1.) Under the
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, the exclusionary rule bars the admission of evidence obtained
directly or indirectly through the exploitation of police illegality. See Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 484-88 (1963). As set forth above, Defendant has withdrawn her request to suppress
any statements. 	Tr. at 29. 	And, because there is no finding that any evidence was obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, it follows that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not
apply. Therefore, this argument lacks merit and presents no basis for suppression.
IV. 	Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Motion to Suppress Evidence be
DENIED.
/s/ David P. Rush
DAVID P. RUSH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
DATE: May 13, 2026
Case 6:25-cr-03165-BP Document 143 Filed 05/13/26 Page 11 of 11