USA v. Ford

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	)
)
No. 6:24-cr-03132-MDH-1
)
WEST PHARRIS FORD, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is Defendant West Pharris Ford’s Motion to Suppress. (Doc. 39).
The Government has filed its suggestions in opposition. (Doc. 41). Mr. Ford has not filed a reply and
the time to do so has passed. The Court held a hearing on this matter on December 18, 2025. (Doc.
44). The issue is now ripe for consideration. For the reasons that follow, it is recommended that the
motion be DENIED.
I. 	Findings of Fact
Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the Court submits the following proposed
findings of fact:
1. 	On November 16, 2022, a narcotics detective with the Springfield Police Department
(“SPD”) contacted patrolling officer Eric Dye and shared that he suspected a passenger
vehicle would be transporting narcotics in the area. The narcotics detective directed
Officer Dye to initiate a traffic stop if he observed any traffic violation. (Tr. 4:16-5:14).
2. 	At approximately 2:00 a.m., Officer Dye observed a white Pontiac G6 bearing Missouri
license plates TE7HOH traveling at about 45 mph in a 60 mph zone. Officer Dye also
Case 6:24-cr-03132-MDH Document 46 Filed 12/23/25 Page 1 of 14

noticed the vehicle’s driver side tires repeatedly touching or crossing the dotted white
roadway lines. (Doc. 39 at 1-2; Tr. 5:15-19; Tr. 14:21-23).
3. 	Officer Dye conducted a computer check of the license plate and learned it was registered
to a Mercury passenger vehicle. (Doc. 39 at 2; Doc. 41 at 1; Tr. 20:1-7). Officer Dye
suspected the driver was impaired and noting the license plate violation, initiated a traffic
stop. (Doc. 41 at 1; Tr. 5:20-24).
4. 	West Pharris Ford was the driver of the vehicle. Mr. Ford informed Officer Dye that he
was delivering the vehicle from St. Louis to a car dealership in Springfield. He stated he
did not know the name of the dealership and was unaware of the mismatched license plate,
as the vehicle did not belong to him. (Doc. 41 at 2; Tr. 6:2-18).
5. 	Mr. Ford showed Officer Dye the GPS route on his phone, which indicated a destination
of 1510 North Glenstone Avenue, Springfield, Missouri. (Tr. 6:19-23). Mr. Ford stated he
did not have identification because he had left his wallet at a bank but verbally provided
Officer Dye with his identifying information. (Doc. 41 at 2).
6. 	Based on his prior knowledge, Officer Dye knew that 1510 North Glenstone Avenue
corresponded to a Casey’s gas station rather than a car dealership. (Doc. 41 at 2).
7. 	Officer Dye ran Mr. Ford’s information through his computer system. He learned that Mr.
Ford had a suspended driver’s license. Officer Dye asked Mr. Ford to step out of the
vehicle. (Doc. 41 at 2; Tr. 20:24-25).
8. 	When he emerged from the vehicle, Mr. Ford was hunched over. He told Officer Dye his
hunched posture was due to a previous gunshot wound to his back. (Doc. 41 at 2). Mr.
Ford asked to use the restroom, but Officer Dye informed him that he would need to wait
until the investigation was complete. (Doc. 41 at 2).
Case 6:24-cr-03132-MDH Document 46 Filed 12/23/25 Page 2 of 14

9. 	Officer Dye conducted a frisk of Mr. Ford to check for weapons. He did not locate any
illicit items. Officer Dye then asked for permission to search the vehicle, which Mr. Ford
granted. (Doc. 41 at 2; Tr. 7:1-23).
10. 	Officer Dye retrieved his Police Service Dog (“PSD”), Ivan from the patrol vehicle and
commanded him to begin a search of the car. Ivan is trained to detect methamphetamine,
heroin, marijuana, and cocaine. Ivan alerted to the presence of narcotics in a dark canvas
bag located on the front passenger floorboard. (Doc. 41 at 2; Tr. 8:2-10).
11. 	Officer Dye located a black digital scale with a white powdery residue inside the canvas
bag. Based on his training and experience, the substance was consistent with a controlled
substance. (Tr. 8:11-20). Officer Dye did not find any additional drug-related contraband
inside the vehicle. (Doc. 41 at 2-3). After completing the vehicle search, Officer Dye
contacted the narcotics detective, who was communicating with a confidential informant
in real time. The confidential informant advised that if the drugs were not located under
the hood of the vehicle, they would be on Mr. Ford’s person. (Doc. 41 at 2-3; Tr. 9:1-5).
12. 	Officer Dye returned to Mr. Ford and asked if he still needed to use the restroom. Mr. Ford
said yes. Officer Dye told Mr. Ford he would need to check him one more time before he
could use the restroom. Officer Dye instructed Mr. Ford to face the patrol vehicle and
spread his legs apart, and Mr. Ford complied. (Doc. 41 at 3; Tr. 9:19-23).
13. 	Officer Dye felt a bulge near Mr. Ford’s groin area that he believed to be a foreign object.
(Tr. 10:1-11). Officer Dye instructed Mr. Ford to turn around and face him. Officer Dye
lifted Mr. Ford’s shirt and observed the top of a plastic bag tucked into his waistband
behind the belt buckle. Mr. Ford attempted to pull his shirt back down. (Doc. 41 at 3; Tr.
10:13-23).
Case 6:24-cr-03132-MDH Document 46 Filed 12/23/25 Page 3 of 14

14. 	Officer Dye informed Mr. Ford that he was going to detain him until he could determine
what was on his person. (Tr. 10:24-11:3). Officer Dye placed a handcuff on Mr. Ford’s left
wrist. Before the second handcuff could be applied, Mr. Ford attempted to pull away.
Officer Dye’s backup officer assisted with apprehending Mr. Ford and placing him in
handcuffs. (Doc. 41 at 3; Tr. 11:4-9).
15. 	A search of Mr. Ford, incident to arrest, revealed several plastic bags concealed in his
underwear. (Doc. 41 at 3; Tr. 11:13-15).
16. 	The bags contained thirty green round pills, five grams of a white powdery substance,
thirty grams of a white powdery substance, which field tested positive for cocaine, thirty-
two grams of white powdery substance, which field tested positive for cocaine, and sixty-
four grams of a white powdery substance, which field tested positive for fentanyl. (Doc.
41 at 3-4). Two cell phones were also seized from the vehicle and taken into evidence.
17. 	Mr. Ford was transported to Greene County Jail. (Doc. 41 at 4).
II. Discussion
On December 10, 2024, a federal grand jury in the Western District of Missouri indicted Mr.
Ford for knowingly and intentionally possessing, with the intent to distribute, 40 grams or more of a
mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of N-phenyl-N-[1-(2-phenylethyl-4-piperidinyl]
propenamide (fentanyl), a Schedule II controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(B), and knowingly and intentionally possessing, with the intent to distribute, a mixture or
substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). On November 14, 2025, Mr. Ford filed the instant motion
seeking suppression of all evidence obtained, observations made, and statements taken from Mr. Ford
as a result of the November 16, 2022, search. (Doc. 39 at 11-12). The motion challenges the
Case 6:24-cr-03132-MDH Document 46 Filed 12/23/25 Page 4 of 14

constitutionality of the traffic stop and search of Mr. Ford’s person, arguing that it violated his rights
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
A. Legal Standard
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The
Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Metro
Omaha Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 991 F.3d 880, 884 (8th Cir. 2021) (citing Camara
v. Mun. Ct. of City & Cty. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)). Traffic stops are a type of
seizure and therefore must be reasonable. United States v. Sanchez, 955 F.3d 669, 674 (8th Cir. 2020);
see United States v. Martinez, 358 F.3d 1005, 1009 (8th Cir. 2004). “[A] traffic stop is reasonable if
it is supported by either probable cause or an articulable and reasonable suspicion that a traffic
violation has occurred.” United States v. Williams, 39 F.4th 1034, 1041 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting United
States v. Walker, 840 F.3d 477, 483 (8th Cir. 2016)). “Any traffic violation, however minor, provides
probable cause for a traffic stop.” United States v. Hanel, 993 F.3d 540, 543 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting
United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 915 (8th Cir. 1994)). Objectively reasonable mistakes of
law or fact may still justify a valid stop. United States v. Walker, 840 F.3d 477, 483 (8th Cir. 2016).
Once an officer has probable cause for the stop, it is immaterial if the stop is merely pretext for another
investigation. See United States v. Frasher, 632 F.3d 450, 453 (8th Cir. 2011).
Under the Fourth Amendment, citizens have the right to “be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion” on to their persons. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). During a valid stop,
officers may conduct a pat-down search for weapons to ensure officer safety if they have objectively
reasonable suspicion that a person might be armed and dangerous. United States v. Stokes, 62 F.4th
1104, 1108-09 (8th Cir. 2023). In considering whether reasonable suspicion exists, the court shall
Case 6:24-cr-03132-MDH Document 46 Filed 12/23/25 Page 5 of 14

consider the totality of circumstances in light of the officer’s experience and specialized training.
United States v. Preston, 685 F.3d 685, 689 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Davis, 457 F.3d
817, 822 (8th Cir. 2006)).
If the police fail to abide by the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule, a judicially
prescribed remedial measure, “forbids the use of improperly obtained evidence at trial.” Martinez
Carcamo v. Holder, 713 F.3d 916, 922 (8th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). The exclusionary rule
extends to “evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality or ‘fruit of a poisonous
tree.’” United States v. Tuton, 893, F.3d 562, 568 (8th Cir. 2018). For there to be “fruit,” there must
first be a “poisonous tree,” that is, “an illegal search or seizure” or “an illegality.” United States v.
Finley, 56 F.4th 1159, 1166 (8th Cir. 2023) (internal citations omitted).
B. Officer Dye had probable cause to conduct a traffic stop.
Mr. Ford argues that the traffic stop was pretextual and that Officer Dye lacked probable cause
or reasonable suspicion to justify the stop of his vehicle. (Doc. 39 at 4-7). The Government contends
that Officer Dye had authority to stop Mr. Ford after discovering that the license plates attached to
the Pontiac G6 he was driving was registered to a different vehicle. (Doc. 41 at 5-7). In the alternative,
the Government argues that Officer Dye had probable cause to conduct a traffic stop when he saw the
vehicle veering over the highway divider lines. (Id.). The Court recommends that the District Judge
find that Officer Dye had probable cause to conduct a traffic stop.
“To comply with the Fourth Amendment, a traffic stop must be supported by probable cause
or reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Moua, 145 F.4th 929, 933 (8th Cir. 2025) (citing United
States v. Linnell, 93 F. 4th 1102, 1105 (8th Cir. 2024)). Courts apply an objective reasonableness
standard to determine whether a traffic stop was based on probable cause or was merely pretextual.
United States v. Mallari, 334 F.3d 765, 766 (8th Cir. 2003). “An officer is justified in stopping a
Case 6:24-cr-03132-MDH Document 46 Filed 12/23/25 Page 6 of 14

motorist when the officer ‘objectively has a reasonable basis for believing that the driver has breached
a traffic law.’” Id. at 766-67 (quoting United States v. Thomas, 93 F.3d 479, 485 (8th Cir. 1996).
Subjective intent is not determinative in deciding whether the stop was reasonable. See Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
Missouri law requires all vehicles operated on Missouri highways to be registered. Mo. Rev.
Stat. § 301.020.1. When a motor vehicle is registered, the Director of Revenue issues license plates
unique to each registration. § 301.030. License plates must be attached to the vehicle that corresponds
with their registration. §§ 301.130.5, 301.320. In Springfield, where Mr. Ford was stopped, failure to
display a proper license plate is a violation of Springfield Code of Ordinances. Code of Ordinances
Sec. 106-10. “Any traffic violation, however minor, provides probable cause for a traffic stop.” Hanel,
993 F.3d at 543. Under Missouri law, an officer has probable cause to detain a driver who operates a
vehicle displaying license plates registered to another vehicle. State v. Reed, 157 S.W.3d 353, 357
(Mo. Ct. App. 2005).
Officer Dye testified that he ran the plates on the Pontiac G6 and determined they were
registered to a Mercury vehicle. (Tr. 5:15-19, 20:1-7). He stopped Mr. Ford because the license plates
on the vehicle he was driving were registered to another vehicle. (Tr. 5:20-24). This alone provides
probable cause for the traffic stop. See Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 301.130.5, 301.320 (license plates must be
attached to the vehicle that corresponds with their registration); Hanel, 993 F.3d at 543 (“Any traffic
violation, however minor, provides probable cause for a traffic stop.”). Further, when Officer Dye ran
Mr. Ford’s information, he discovered that Mr. Ford was operating the vehicle with a suspended
license. Driving with a suspended license is an additional traffic violation. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 302.321;
Springfield Code of Ordinances Sec. 106-9. Officer Dye had probable cause to conduct the traffic
Case 6:24-cr-03132-MDH Document 46 Filed 12/23/25 Page 7 of 14

stop and to instruct Mr. Ford to exit the vehicle based on the inconsistent license plates and suspended
driver’s license.
Even if Officer Dye lacked probable cause to stop Mr. Ford’s vehicle based on the license
plate violation, the traffic stop was lawful because Officer Dye had reasonable suspicion that Mr. Ford
was impaired. Moua, 145 F.4th at 934; Mallari, 334 F.3d at 767; see Navarette v. California, 572 U.S.
393, 402 (2014) (recognizing that weaving on the roadway is a common sign of intoxication). Officer
Dye saw Mr. Ford’s car repeatedly touch or cross the white dotted roadway dividing lines and
observed Mr. Ford was driving 45 mph in a 60 mph zone at 2:00 in the morning. (Doc. 41 at 1). These
observations provided Officer Dye with reasonable suspicion that the driver was impaired by drug or
alcohol use. United States v. Behrens, No. 24-2543, 2025 WL 2103088, at *2 (8th Cir. July 28, 2025)
(finding an officer observing a vehicle driving at inconsistent speeds, including ten miles per hour
below the speed limit, was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion that a driver was impaired).
Mr. Ford further argues that the court must scrutinize an officer’s credibility in cases where
the stop may have been pretextual. (Doc. 39 at 6). At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Ford alleged Officer
Dye was not credible because he was not truly waiting to conduct a breathalyzer test on Mr. Ford and
he submitted an allegedly incomplete report. (Tr. 35:3-11; 36:9-11). However, an officer’s subjective
intent to initiate a traffic stop is irrelevant once probable cause is established. United States v. Fuehrer,
844 F.3d 767, 772 (8th Cir. 2016). As explained above, Officer Dye had probable cause to stop Mr.
Ford for a traffic violation. Mr. Ford’s bare assertion that the stop was pretextual is unsupported by
fact or controlling case law.
Accordingly, this Court recommends the District Judge find that the initiation of the traffic
stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
C. The traffic stop was not unreasonably prolonged.
Case 6:24-cr-03132-MDH Document 46 Filed 12/23/25 Page 8 of 14

Mr. Ford argues next that the traffic stop was unreasonably prolonged and constituted an
unreasonable seizure. (Doc. 39 at 7-11). The Government argues the stop was not unreasonably long
because Mr. Ford consented to the vehicle search, the search was completed within five minutes of
the initial stop, and the results of the search created independent reason for Officer Dye to continue
his investigation. (Doc. 41 at 7-10). The Court recommends that the District Judge find that the traffic
stop was not unreasonably prolonged.
A traffic stop constitutes a seizure and therefore “must be supported by reasonable suspicion
or probable cause.” Behrens, 2025 WL 2103088, at *2 (quoting United States v. Houston, 548 F.3d
1151, 1153 (8th Cir. 2008)). Stops “exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop
was made” generally violate “the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.” Moua, 154
F.4th at 935 (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 575 US. 348, 350 (2015)). “Once an officer finishes
the tasks associated with a traffic stop, it is unreasonable to further detain the vehicle’s occupants
unless something occurs during the stop to generate reasonable suspicion to justify the further
detention.” Id. (quoting United States v. Austin, 104 F.4th 695, 699 (8th Cir. 2024)).
“[T]here is no per se time limit on all traffic stops.” Moua, 154 F.4th at 935 (internal citations
omitted). “An officer need only act diligently to pursue the mission of the stop. An officer’s mission
may evolve during the stop, as when the officer develops ‘reasonable suspicion of drug-related
activity during the routine traffic-stop tasks.’” Id. “To have reasonable suspicion, a police officer must
be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant further investigation.” United States v. Allen, 43 F.4th 901, 907-08
(8th Cir. 2022). “The Court reviews the totality of the circumstances to determine if an officer had
reasonable suspicion to extend a traffic stop.” Id. at 908.
Case 6:24-cr-03132-MDH Document 46 Filed 12/23/25 Page 9 of 14

After learning that Mr. Ford was driving with a suspended license, Officer Dye asked him to
exit the vehicle. (Doc. 41 at 2). When Mr. Ford exited the vehicle hunched over, Officer Dye
conducted a search of Mr. Ford’s person to check for weapons. (Id.); see Austin, 104 F.4th at 699
(permitting officers to conduct a protective pat-down search for weapons during a traffic stop). Mr.
Ford then gave Officer Dye permission to search the vehicle. (Doc. 41 at 2); see Moua, 154 F.4th at
935 (“When a motorist gives consent to search his vehicle, he necessarily consents to an extension of
the traffic stop.”). Ivan, Officer Dye’s PSD, was already in the cruiser, and Officer Dye retrieved the
dog immediately upon receiving consent to search the car for drugs. (Doc. 41 at 2). During the search,
Ivan alerted to the presence of narcotics. (Id.). Taken together, these factors justify prolonging the
traffic stop. Allen, 43 F.4th at 908. Nothing about the stop indicates an unreasonable delay.
Even if the stop took longer than five minutes, Officer Dye had reasonable suspicion to
continue the traffic stop. “An officer’s suspicion of criminal activity may reasonably grow over the
course of a traffic stop as the circumstances unfold and more suspicious facts are uncovered.” United
Stats v. Magallon, 984 F.3d 1263, 1278 (8th Cir. 2021) (internal citations omitted). “The suspicious
facts must be specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from these
facts, amount to reasonable suspicion that further investigation is warranted.” Id. (internal citations
omitted). Officer Dye knew the license plates attached to Mr. Ford’s Pontiac G6 were registered to a
Mercury vehicle. He knew Mr. Ford was driving with a suspended license, did not own the vehicle,
and claimed to be traveling to a used car dealership that he could not name, located at an address that
Officer Dye knew to be a Casey’s gas station. See United States v. Sanchez, 955 F.3d 669, 675 (8th
Cir. 2020) (“A reasonable officer could find it inherently suspicious that someone would lend their
truck to unlicensed drivers. . . .”); United States v. Pacheco, 996 F.3d 508, 512 (8th Cir. 2021) (noting
a defendant’s “odd” answers to questions about routine travel plans contributed to officer’s reasonable
Case 6:24-cr-03132-MDH Document 46 Filed 12/23/25 Page 10 of 14

suspicion of criminal activity to extend traffic stop). Finally, before the traffic stop concluded, Officer
Dye learned that Mr. Ford might have drugs on his person. (Tr. 25:17-25). The facts Officer Dye
learned throughout the traffic stop warranted extending the stop to conduct further investigation into
potential drug activity.
Mr. Ford relies on Rodriguez v. United States for the proposition that conducting a dog sniff
search during a traffic stop unreasonably prolongs the stop. (Doc. 39 at 10-11). This argument fails
for two reasons. First, unlike in Rodriguez, Mr. Ford consented to the search. See Rodriguez, 575 U.S.
at 352. Second, the question before the Court in Rodriguez was “whether police routinely may extend
an otherwise-completed traffic stop, absent reasonable suspicion, in order to conduct a dog sniff.”
Id. at 353 (emphasis added). Rodriguez addressed dog sniffs following completed traffic stops where
the officer has no reasonable suspicion that the driver is impaired or other criminal activity is afoot.
Here, Officer Dye had reasonable suspicion that Mr. Ford might be impaired. The stop’s purpose was
to investigate both the license plate violation and whether Mr. Ford was driving impaired. Mr. Ford
consented to the search of the car. During the traffic stop, Officer Dye communicated by phone with
another officer and learned that Mr. Ford may have drugs on his person. See United States v. Robinson,
664 F.3d 701, 703 (8th Cir. 2011) (“When multiple officers are involved in an investigation, probable
cause may be based on their collective knowledge and need not be based solely on the information
within the knowledge of the arresting officer as long as there is some degree of communication.”).
Officer Dye had sufficient reasonable suspicion to extend the stop beyond checking the license plate.
Thus, Mr. Ford’s reliance on Rodriguez is misplaced.
Accordingly, this Court recommends that the District Judge find that the traffic stop was not
unreasonably prolonged.
Case 6:24-cr-03132-MDH Document 46 Filed 12/23/25 Page 11 of 14

D. Officer Dye developed independent probable cause to arrest Mr. Ford when Mr. Ford
resisted being placed in handcuffs.
The Government argues in the alternative that Mr. Ford’s resistance to being detained in
handcuffs attenuated any alleged Fourth Amendment violation. (Doc. 41 at 11-14). Mr. Ford did not
file a reply brief and therefore did not address this argument. The Court recommends that the District
Judge find that Officer Dye had independent grounds to arrest and search Mr. Ford based on Mr.
Ford’s resistance.
“[R]esistance to an illegal arrest can furnish grounds for a second, legitimate arrest.” United
States v. Sledge, 460 F.3d 963, 966 (8th Cir. 2006); see United States v. Dawdy, 46 F.3d 1427, 1431
(8th Cir. 1995) (holding “a defendant’s response to even an invalid arrest . . . may constitute
independent grounds for arrest.”). Mr. Ford forfeited any Fourth Amendment protection by resisting
arrest when he attempted to flee as Officer Dye was handcuffing him. When he attempted to flee, Mr.
Ford created probable cause for his arrest on the charge of resisting arrest. See Mo. Rev. Stat. §
575.150.1(1) (“A person commits the crime of resisting arrest if the person reasonably should know
an officer is making an arrest or a lawful stop or detention, and the person “[r]esists the arrest, stop
or detention . . . by fleeing from such officer.”). Mr. Ford was being handcuffed when he began to
resist arrest. He had prior contacts with the criminal justice system. Officer Dye testified that Mr. Ford
attempted to pull away before a second handcuff could be placed on his wrist. (Tr. 11:4-9). Mr. Ford
had to be taken to the ground by two officers in order to be handcuffed. (Id.). Thus, by resisting, Mr.
Ford committed a new, distinct crime, thereby permitting Officer Dye to lawfully arrest him and
search his person incident to arrest. See Sledge, 460 F.3d at 968.
Because probable cause supported Mr. Ford’s arrest, the subsequent search of his person did
not violate the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Blackmon, 662 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. 2011)
(referencing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)). Accordingly, this Court
Case 6:24-cr-03132-MDH Document 46 Filed 12/23/25 Page 12 of 14

recommends that the District Judge find the search of Mr. Ford’s person did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.
E. Suppression of Mr. Ford’s statements is improper.
Mr. Ford seeks suppression of “all statements allegedly taken from the Defendant and others
. . . .” (Doc. 39 at 12). The Government argues that Mr. Ford’s statement should not be suppressed
because questions asked of a motorist temporarily detained during a traffic stop do not require
suppression. (Doc. 41 at 14); see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984). The Court
recommends that the District Court find Mr. Ford’s statements should not be suppressed.
“Persons detained temporarily pursuant to ordinary traffic stops are not ‘in custody’ for the
purposes of Miranda. . . . [A] traveler in a traffic stop is temporarily deprived of freedom of action,
but he is not typically subjected to a degree of restraint that is associated with formal arrest. Miranda
warnings are thus not required.” United States v. Villaneuva, 116 F.4th 813, 820 (8th Cir. 2024)
(referencing Miranda v. Arizona, 348 U.S. 436 (1966)) (internal citations omitted). The only
statements Mr. Ford allegedly made occurred during the traffic stop. Officer Dye was not required to
give Mr. Ford Miranda warnings until he was arrested. Id. Mr. Ford’s briefing does not identify any
statements made after his arrest. Therefore, the Court must assume that Mr. Ford seeks suppression
of statements made during the traffic stop. Eighth Circuit precedent forecloses this argument.
Accordingly, the Court recommends that the District Judge find Mr. Ford’s statements should not be
suppressed.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the District Judge, after making an
independent review of the record and applicable law, enter an order DENYING Defendant West
Pharris Ford’s Motion to Suppress. (Doc. 39).
Case 6:24-cr-03132-MDH Document 46 Filed 12/23/25 Page 13 of 14

Counsel are reminded that each party has fourteen (14) days from the date of receipt of a copy
of this Report and Recommendation within which to file and serve objections. A failure to file and
serve objections by this date shall bar an attack on appeal of the factual findings in the Report and
Recommendation that are accepted or adopted by the District Judge, except on the grounds of plain
error or manifest injustice.
Dates this 23rd day of December, 2025, at Jefferson City, Missouri.
Willie J. Epps, Jr.
Willie J. Epps, Jr.
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
Case 6:24-cr-03132-MDH Document 46 Filed 12/23/25 Page 14 of 14