USA v. Popejoy

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHWESTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. 6:23-cr-03086-MDH-1
)
CARL POPEJOY, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant’s pro se motion requesting compassionate release. (Doc.
52). Defendant is serving a 78-month sentence for receipt and distribution of child pornography.
Defendant moves for a reduction in sentence to time served. Defendant argues that extraordinary
and compelling reasons exist due to medical circumstances.
The Government opposes Defendant’s requests arguing he is not entitled to appointment
of counsel in a sentence modification proceeding, he has not demonstrated extraordinary and
compelling reasons justifying a reduction, and the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) do not
justify a reduction in sentence.
On October 10, 2024, Popejoy pleaded guilty to a one-count indictment charging receipt
and distribution of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) and (b)(1). (Doc. 28).
At sentencing, this Court found that his total offense level was 34, with a criminal history category
of I, yielding an advisory Sentencing Guidelines range of 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment. (Doc.
38, PSR ¶ 52). This Court sentenced Popejoy to 78 months’ imprisonment, followed by a 10-year
term of supervised release. (Doc. 37). On March 31, 2026, Popejoy filed the instant motion seeking
immediate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) due to medical circumstances. (Doc. 48).
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Popejoy is currently incarcerated at the Federal Medical Center located in Butner, North Carolina,
with a projected release date of April 21, 2030.
STANDARD
A district court cannot grant a § 3582(c)(1)(A) reduction unless the defendant meets three
conditions: (1) an extraordinary and compelling reason exists; (2) a sentencing reduction would be
consistent with U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, including that the defendant is not a danger to another person
or the community; (3) and the § 3553(a) factors weigh in favor of compassionate release. See
United States v. Crandall, 25 F.4th 582, 583 (8th Cir. 2022).
DISCUSSION
A. Appointment of Counsel
Defendant moves this Court to appoint counsel to assist him with his motion to reduce
sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (Doc. 49). Defendant has no right to counsel in this
instance. The Eighth Circuit has determined that a defendant does not have a Sixth Amendment
right to counsel in connection with a Section 3582(c) motion. See United States v. Brown, 565 F.3d
1093, 1094 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Harris, 568 F.3d 666 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Webb, 565 F 3d 789, 793-95 (11th Cir. 2009) (defendant did not have the right to counsel for a
motion for compassionate release). Therefore, Defendant’s Motion to Appoint Counsel is
DENIED.
B. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13
Defendant seeks relief under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(A) based on his medical conditions.
The Government argues he has not demonstrated extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying
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a reduction. However, in a previous motion for compassionate release that was denied for failure
to exhaust administrative remedies, the Government conceded that Defendant had demonstrated
an “extraordinary and compelling reason” in his terminal illness. (Doc. 44). Nevertheless, then and
now, the Government argues the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) do not justify a reduction
in sentence.
C. § 3553(a)
The Government asks the Court to deny the motion based on the § 3553(a) factors. The
Court has broad discretion in weighing the § 3553(a) factors, although it is not required to address
every factor. See United States v. Milton, 11 F.4th 597, 601 (8th Cir. 2021); see also United States
v. Webster, 611 F. Supp. 3d 194 (E.D. Va. 2020) (“Even if a defendant meets the eligibility criteria
for compassionate release, the Court retains discretion over whether to grant that relief.”). In
making this determination, the district court must determine that “[t]he defendant is not a danger
to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) . . . .”
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(2). This includes considering the person’s character; physical and mental
condition; their past conduct; their criminal history; and whether, at the time of the offense, the
person was on probation or parole. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3). Moreover, the court must consider
“the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by
the person’s release.” Id. Should the district court conclude the defendant does not pose a danger
to any person or the community, it must then continue to evaluate the factors under § 3553(a). See
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); United States v. Marcussen, 15 F.4th 855, 859 (8th Cir. 2021).
The Government argues the § 3553(a) factors—including the nature of the offense, the
history and characteristics of the defendant, and the need to protect the public and provide
deterrence—caution against granting Defendant’s motion.
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In support of that argument the Government states: Popejoy had downloaded files as early
as July 2018 (PSR ¶ 8); he used a Tor browser to engage in distribution of child pornography (PSR
¶ 9); and he had significant health issues at that time, and it did not prevent him from using
advanced technology to receive and distribute child pornography.
The Government cautions that Defendant does not appear to have strong social or familial
support and that will create obstacles including finding an appropriate home plan and finding
appropriate social interactions that will help him navigate his health issues, his substance abuse,
and any mental health or sexual issues that led him to consume child pornography. (PSR ¶¶ 40 –
42). Further, there are several unanswered questions as to whether he can comply with his sex
offender requirements and restrictions.
Defendant has served just over 18 months, approximately 23 percent of his significantly
below-guidelines 78-month sentence, and significantly less than the five-year statutory minimum
sentence. The Government argues a reduction to time served would be a significant downward
variance, leading to unjust sentencing disparity from other defendants who were convicted of
similar offenses. The Court agrees. Releasing Defendant early would not reflect the seriousness of
his offense, deter future illegal conduct, deter others from committing the same crimes, provide
just punishment, promote respect for the law, or protect the community. Coupled with the lack of
a detailed home release plan as required by 28 C.F.R. § 571.61(a), the Motion for Compassionate
Release is DENIED.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, and in the Government’s opposition (Doc. 52), Defendant’s
Motion for Compassionate Release is hereby DENIED.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Appoint Counsel is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 12, 2026 	/s/ Douglas Harpool
DOUGLAS HARPOOL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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