Hemme v. The City of St. Joseph, Missouri et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
ST. JOSEPH DIVISION
SANDRA LYNN HEMME,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE CITY OF ST. JOSEPH, MISSOURI;
JAMES ROBERT HAYES; TERRY
BOYER; RONALD FISHER; STEVEN
FUESTON; MIKE HIRTER; HOWARD
KEMPER; JOHN MUEHLENBACHER;
LLOYD PASLEY,
Defendants.
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Case No. 5:25-cv-06132-RK
ORDER
Plaintiff Sandra Lynn Hemme brings this wrongful-conviction lawsuit asserting various
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Missouri law against the City of St. Joseph, Missouri, (“City”),
seven members of the City’s police force, and an investigator of the Buchanan County Prosecutor’s
Office. 	The following motions are pending before the Court: (1) the City’s motion for more
definite statement of the Second Amended Complaint, (Doc. 66); (2) Defendants Steven Fueston
and Howard Kemper’s motion for more definite statement of the Second Amended Complaint,
(Doc. 67); and (3) Plaintiff’s motion to file a third amended complaint, (Doc. 79). 	Defendants
Fueston and Kemper joined in the City’s motion for more definite statement, but did not file
suggestions in support or a reply brief. (Doc. 67.) Plaintiff responded and the City filed a reply.
(Docs. 69, 75.) Only the City has filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a third
amended complaint; Plaintiff filed a reply. (Docs. 83, 84.) After careful consideration and for the
reasons stated below, the Court ORDERS that the City and Defendants Fueston and Kemper’s
motions for more definite statement, (Docs. 66, 67), are DENIED, and Plaintiff’s motion for leave
to file a third amended complaint, (Doc. 79), is GRANTED.
Background
In Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that seven members of the
City’s police force and an investigator of the Buchanan County Prosecutor’s Office (“Officer
Defendants”) framed her for the November 12, 1980 murder of Patricia Jeschke, causing her to be
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wrongfully convicted and spend forty-three years in prison. 	Plaintiff asserts ten counts against
various defendants including six claims pursuant to § 1983 (Counts 1 through 6) and four state tort
law claims (Counts 7 through 10).
The Complaint was filed on July 24, 2025. On September 18, 2025, the City timely filed
its answer and a partial motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. (Docs. 12, 14.) Plaintiff filed
a First Amended Complaint on October 1, 2025, which rendered the City’s partial motion to
dismiss moot. 	(Doc. 16.) 	On October 15, 2025, the City filed its answer to the First Amended
Complaint and a similar partial motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. (Docs. 18, 19.) On
November 12, 2025, Defendants Fueston and Kemper filed their answer to the First Amended
Complaint. (Doc. 28.)
Pursuant to the Court’s Scheduling Order, the deadline to amend the pleadings was March
30, 2026. (Doc. 29.) On March 12, 2026, Plaintiff filed an unopposed motion for extension of
time to amend the pleadings to May 29, 2026. (Doc. 47.) The Court granted Plaintiff’s unopposed
motion for extension of time, and the deadline to amend the pleadings was extended to May 29,
2026. (Doc. 48.) On May 29, 2026, Plaintiff filed an unopposed motion for leave to file a second
amended complaint, which the Court granted the same day. (Docs. 60, 61.) The Second Amended
Complaint added supplemental facts learned concerning Plaintiff’s damages as well as a timeline
pertaining to her postconviction proceedings. (Doc. 62.)
The City and Defendants Fueston and Kemper filed their respective motions for more
definite statement of the Second Amended Complaint on June 12, 2026. (Docs. 66, 67.)
On July 22, 2026, Plaintiff moved for leave to file a third amended complaint for the sole
purpose of adding Dr. Richard Jacks, the Chief Psychiatrist at St. Joseph State Hospital in 1980,
as a defendant. (Doc. 79.) Plaintiff seeks to add Dr. Jacks to the already alleged Counts relating
to Plaintiff’s coerced confession.
Discussion
I. 	Motions for More Definite Statement (Docs. 66, 67)
On June 12, 2026, the City filed its motion for more definite statement of Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e), arguing that Plaintiff
impermissibly lumps all of the defendants together such that it is impossible for the City to know
which factual allegations support which claims. 	(Doc. 66.) 	Defendants Fueston and Kemper
joined the motion but did not provide additional briefing. (Doc. 67.)
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Rule 8(a)(2) “requires only ‘a short plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice’ of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rule 12(e)
provides that “[a] party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive
statement is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably prepare a
response.” “Motions for more definite statement are designed to strike at unintelligibility rather
than lack of detail in the complaint.” Tinder v. Lewis Cnty. Nursing Home Dist., 207 F. Supp. 2d
951, 960 (E.D. Mo. 2001). “A motion for more definite statement should only be granted where
the complaint is ‘so vague or ambiguous that the opposing party cannot respond, even with a
simple denial, in good faith, without prejudice to itself.’” Rodgers v. Knight, No. 2:13-CV-04033-
NKL, 2013 WL 12183669, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 27, 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)). “A motion for more definite statement is ‘not to be used to test the opponent’s case by
requiring him to allege certain facts or retreat from his allegations’ nor is it to be used ‘as a
substitute for discovery in trial preparation.’” Allstate Indem. Co. v. Dixon, 304 F.R.D. 580, 582
(W.D. Mo. 2015) (quoting Tinder, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 960). “Motions for a more definite statement
are rarely granted in light of the liberal notice pleading standard of” Rule 8. J.R.L. ex rel. Lee v.
United States, No. 2:08CV00037 JCH, 2008 WL 4561502, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 10, 2008).
The Second Amended Complaint is far from a “‘shotgun pleading’ . . . in which a plaintiff
asserts every possible cause of action against a host of defendants for actions over a prolonged
period . . . but without facts specific enough that those defendants can respond to the allegations”
like the cases cited by the City. Cf. Boggs v. Am. Optical Co., No. 4:14-CV-1434-CEJ, 2015 WL
300509, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 22, 2015) (“Based on the few facts alleged in the complaint, it is not
plausible that all thirty-two defendants caused Boggs to be exposed to asbestos from two dozen
kinds of products over a twenty-seven year period and in five different geographical locations.”);
Blakely v. Nat’l Credit Adjusters, LLC, No. 4:23-00096-CV-DGK, 2023 WL 3171550, at *1-2
(W.D. Mo. Apr. 28, 2023) (pro se “fill-in-the-blank Petition, which was originally filed in the Small
Claims Court of Jackson County, Missouri” stated “almost no facts” and therefore was insufficient
to alert the defendant as to which claims were brought).
For example, with respect to Defendants Fueston and Kemper, they are mentioned
specifically by name throughout the Second Amended Complaint. 	Plaintiff alleges that
(1) Defendants Kemper and Fueston (sometimes in concert with other Officer Defendants)
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coercively interrogated Plaintiff at least eight times over the course of two weeks, (Doc. 62 at
¶¶ 1-3, 31-37); (2) Defendants Fueston and Kemper knew of Plaintiff’s psychiatric impairments
and took advantage of her vulnerabilities by coercing her into adopting a false confession, (id. at
¶¶ 31-37); (3) Defendant Fueston and Kemper’s coercive tactics included taking Plaintiff to the
scene of the crime and implanting details of the crime in her mind, (id. at ¶ 35); (4) Defendants
Fueston and Kemper, in combination with the other Officer Defendants, suppressed and withheld
critical Brady evidence related to Michael Holman, a St. Joseph police officer who emerged as the
leading suspect in the murder, including that Defendant Fueston discovered the victim’s earrings
in Holman’s home but suppressed that information and Defendant Kemper was aware of and a part
of this conspiracy, (id. at ¶ 47); and (5) Defendant Fueston was tasked with verifying Holman’s
alibi but was unable to corroborate it, (id. at ¶ 45). It is unsurprising that many of the allegations
of Officer Defendants overlap—Plaintiff alleges a shared conspiracy to frame Plaintiff for the
murder.
Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that the City is subject to Monell liability because (1) her
wrongful conviction was caused by the City’s policies, practices, and customs governing
investigations, confessions, handling of evidence, and pretrial detentions, (Id. at ¶¶ 102, 114, 119,
131, 138); (2) Defendant Police Chief ratified and approved Officer Defendants’ misconduct as
final policymaker, (id. at ¶¶ 66, 76, 86-89); and (3) the City’s police department failed to train and
supervise its officers, failed to discipline its officers, and lacked adequate policies which could
have prevented the constitutional violations, and maintained a culture of impunity which permitted
misconduct, (id. at ¶¶ 77-89). 	Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the City is liable for her state-law
claims under a theory of respondeat superior. (Id. at ¶¶ 151, 158, 165.)
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint clearly satisfies Rule 8’s pleading standard with
respect to the City and Defendants Fueston and Kemper. It is not so vague or ambiguous that the
City and Defendants Fueston and Kemper cannot reasonably prepare a response.
Moreover, the City previously filed not only an answer and a motion to dismiss1 the
Complaint, (Docs. 12, 13, 14), but it also filed an answer and a similar partial motion to dismiss
the First Amended Complaint along with supporting memorandum, (Docs. 18, 19, 20). Defendants
Fueston and Kemper answered Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint as well. 	(Doc. 28.) 	The
1 The City argued that it was entitled to sovereign immunity from the state law claims asserted
against it, an assertion the Court rejected. (Docs. 13, 20, 54.)
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pleading style which the City and Defendants Fueston and Kemper take issue with, that is, the
periodic grouping of defendants together rather than naming them individually every time they are
mentioned, was present in the Initial Complaint and First Amended Complaint. 	Thus, the
previously filed answers and motions to dismiss, along with substantive briefing in support,
demonstrate the City and Defendants Fueston and Kemper’s “ability to articulate Plaintiff’s
claim[s] enough to either admit or deny those claims in an answer.” Derby v. Wiskus, No. 4:19-
CV-2271 SRC, 2021 WL 214570, at *8 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 21, 2021).
For these reasons, the City and Defendants Fueston and Kemper’s motions for more
definite statement of the Second Amended Complaint are DENIED.
II. 	Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 79)
Plaintiff moves for leave to file a third amended complaint for the sole purpose of adding
Dr. Jacks as a defendant. (Doc. 79.)
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that once an answer has been filed, “a party
may amend its pleadings only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). While “leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires, plaintiffs
do not have an absolute or automatic right to amend.” United States v. Fairview Health Sys., 413
F.3d 748, 749 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Leave is properly denied when
there has been undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, if the
amendment would cause undue prejudice to the non-movant, or if the amendments would be
futile.” Harris v. SWAN, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 2d 857, 865 (E.D. Mo. 2005) (citing Bell v. Allstate
Life Ins. Co., 160 F.3d 452, 454 (8th Cir. 1998)). 	An amendment is properly considered futile if
the proposed amended pleading could not survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Zutz
v. Nelson, 601 F.3d 842, 850 (8th Cir. 2010).
Additionally, when a party seeks leave to amend outside the deadlines set forth in a
scheduling order, the party must show good cause why the schedule should be modified. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Under Rule 16, “[t]he primary measure of good cause is the movant’s diligence
in attempting to meet the order’s requirements.” 	Rahn v. Hawkins, 464 F.3d 813, 822 (8th Cir.
2006).
Pursuant to the Court’s Scheduling Order, the deadline to amend the pleadings was May
29, 2026. (Docs. 29, 48.) Plaintiff filed the present motion on July 22, 2026, arguing that good
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cause exists to amend the Scheduling Order and Second Amended Complaint based on newly
obtained evidence that implicates Dr. Jacks as a defendant in this case.
Plaintiff’s counsel deposed Dr. Jacks on June 26, 2026, and the transcript was certified on
July 13, 2026. 	(Doc. 79-2 at 241.) 	One of Plaintiff’s allegations in the Second Amended
Complaint is that Defendants Fueston, Hirter, Kemper, and Boyer interrogated Plaintiff at the St.
Joseph State Hospital where she was a psychiatric patient and under the influence of antipsychotic
medications. (Doc. 62 at ¶¶ 33-35.) Plaintiff asserts in her motion for leave to file a third amended
complaint that Dr. Jacks was the admitting physician who evaluated Plaintiff when she was
involuntarily admitted to the State Hospital on November 25, 1980. (Doc. 79 at 2; Doc. 79-1 at ¶
32.) 	Dr. Jacks sat in on at least four interrogations of Plaintiff at the State Hospital, observing
Defendant Fueston ask Plaintiff leading questions that caused her coerced and false confession
without intervening. (Doc. 79-1 at ¶ 42.) Dr. Jacks admitted at his deposition that the psychotropic
medications that Plaintiff was taking could have caused her to provide false information in these
interrogation sessions, an admission unknown to Plaintiff prior to Dr. Jack’s deposition, as he had
never been questioned under oath concerning his involvement in Plaintiff’s interrogations and her
eventual confession. (Id. at ¶ 33.)
The City opposes Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend, but it does not dispute that good
cause exists. 	The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has learned additional information since the
original deadline passed which makes amending the Second Amended Complaint appropriate and
Plaintiff diligently attempted to comply with the deadline. Accordingly, good cause exists under
Rule 16 to modify the Scheduling Order.
The City does contend, however, that Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend should be
denied because it is futile and made in bad faith with a dilatory motive. 	(Doc. 83.) 	Plaintiff
represents that Defendants Fueston and Kemper do not oppose the amendment, and that Defendant
Pasley opposes the amendment. However, only the City has filed a brief in opposition.
The City offers no legal argument concerning why it believes the addition of claims against
Dr. Jacks is futile. While the City cites to portions of Dr. Jacks’ testimony that it believes refutes
Plaintiff’s proposed claims, any argument that evidence exists which contradicts Plaintiff’s claims,
even if it were supported, is improper at this stage.
Insofar as the City summarily states that the amendment is made in bad faith and with a
dilatory motive, it likewise offers no legal or factual support for its contention, instead arguing
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only that the addition of Dr. Jacks as a defendant will cause a delay of discovery and resolution of
the case. The City’s argument is rebutted by its own filings and actions thus far in the case. The
City has not answered the Second Amended Complaint, and its motion for more definite statement
was not ripe until July 10, 2026—less than two weeks before Plaintiff’s motion for leave was filed.
The initial discovery deadline was August 31, 2026, and on June 22, 2026, the parties jointly
moved to extend the discovery deadline to November 30, 2026. (Doc. 68.) The Court granted the
parties’ request, and the close of discovery is currently pushed to November 30, 2026 (four months
from now). 	(Docs. 70, 71.) 	The Court finds that Plaintiff’s proposed additional claims offer
minimal changes to the Second Amended Complaint—seeking only to add Dr. Jacks as a defendant
to the already alleged counts, making additional, burdensome discovery by the City unlikely.
For these reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a third amended complaint is
GRANTED.
Conclusion
After careful consideration and for the reasons stated above, the Court ORDERS that
(1) the motions for more definite statement, (Docs. 66, 67), are DENIED; (2) Plaintiff’s motion
for leave to file a third amended complaint, (Doc. 79), is GRANTED; and (3) Plaintiff shall file
her Third Amended Complaint by August 14, 2026.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Roseann A. Ketchmark
ROSEANN A. KETCHMARK, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DATED: August 11, 2026
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