Robinson v. Dikeland Sewer District

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION
KIMBERLY ROBINSON, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 4:25-cv-00955-DGK
)
DIKELAND SEWER DISTRICT, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
This is a debt collection case. 	Pro se Plaintiff Kimberly Robinson alleges Defendant
Dikeland Sewer District violated her rights under the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act
(“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et. seq., and under Missouri law while collecting unpaid sewer
charges.
Now before the Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss Count I of Plaintiff’s amended
complaint for failure to state a claim under the FDCPA and to decline supplemental jurisdiction
over the remaining state law claims. 	ECF No. 22. 	For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s
motion is GRANTED. 	Count I is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Counts II through IV are
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 	Defendant’s alternative
motion for a more definite statement is DENIED AS MOOT.
Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires a complaint to contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief.” A claim may be dismissed if it
fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In ruling on a
motion to dismiss, a court “must accept as true all of the complaint’s factual allegations and view
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them in the light most favorable to” the plaintiff. 	Stodghill v. Wellston School Dist., 512 F.3d
472, 476 (8th Cir. 2008).
To avoid dismissal, a complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” 	Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 	“A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The plaintiff need not demonstrate the claim is probable, only that it
is more than just possible. 	Id. 	Rule 8 “does not require detailed factual allegations” to show
facial 	plausibility, 	“but 	it 	demands 	more 	than 	an 	unadorned, 	the-defendant-harmed-me
accusation.” Id. “Asking for plausible grounds to infer [a defendant’s liable conduct] . . . simply
calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence”
thereof. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
In reviewing the complaint, a court construes it liberally and draws all reasonable
inferences from the facts in the plaintiff’s favor. 	Monson v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 589 F.3d 952,
961 (8th Cir. 2009). A court generally ignores materials outside the pleadings but may consider
materials that are part of the public record or materials that are necessarily embraced by the
pleadings. Miller v. Toxicology Lab. Inc., 688 F.3d 928, 931 n.3 (8th Cir. 2012).
A pro se complaint must be liberally construed, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
(1976), and “pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties,” Fed.
Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402 (2008). “However, this standard does not excuse
pro se complaints from alleging sufficient facts to support the claims advanced.” 	Gerstner v.
Sebig, LLC, 386 Fed. App’x 573, 575 (8th Cir. 2010) (modified, citation omitted). A court will
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not “supply additional facts” or “construct a legal theory for plaintiff that assumes facts that have
not been pleaded.” Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004).
Background
This is Plaintiff’s second suit against Defendant arising from the same sewer account.
On December 21, 2020, she filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis under the name
Ix Kelem Lum’a. Lum’a v. Dikeland Sewer Dist., No. 4:20-cv-00997-SRB (W.D. Mo. Dec. 30,
2020). 	The court denied her motion because the complaint failed to state a claim under the
FDCPA:
Here, Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege that Dikeland is a
“debt collector.” Plaintiff does not allege that Dikeland’s principal
purpose is the collection of debts. 	Plaintiff does not allege that
Dikeland regularly collects or attempts to collect debts owed to
another. 	Finally, Plaintiff does not allege that Dikeland used any
alternative name which would indicate that a third person was
attempting to collect a debt. Although Plaintiff summarily alleges
that Dikeland is “a debt collector,” such conclusions do not state a
claim.
Id. at 3.
Given Plaintiff’s pro se status, the court allowed her to file an amended complaint by
January 21, 2021, and warned that “if Plaintiff fails to timely file an amended complaint, or if the
amended complaint does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted, this case will be
dismissed without further notice.” 	Id. at 4–5. 	No amended complaint was filed, and the case
was dismissed on January 28, 2021, “under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).” 	Lum’a v. Dikeland
Sewer Dist., No. 4:20-cv-00997-SRB (W.D. Mo. Jan. 28, 2021).
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Plaintiff filed this action on December 9, 2025.1 	That same day, Plaintiff also filed a
motion for summary judgment along with her complaint. 	ECF No. 2. 	The Court denied
summary judgment as premature. ECF No. 4. Defendant then moved to dismiss, ECF No. 6, but
before the Court ruled, Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 7. 	Defendant
again moved to dismiss. ECF No. 22. The relevant allegations are as follows.
According to Plaintiff, Defendant “is a sewer utility operating in Missouri.” ECF No. 7
¶ 2. 	She alleges federal question jurisdiction, “because this action arises under the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act,” and supplemental jurisdiction “over related state-law claims.” 	Id. ¶¶
3–4. 	Plaintiff alleges she “lost her job in 2019 and fell behind on sewer payments” and that
Defendant then “ceased billing Plaintiff, concealing the true balance.” 	Id. ¶¶ 6–7. 	She further
alleges Defendant “imposed 5% compound interest without any written agreement or prior
disclosure to Plaintiff” and “imposed disconnection and reconnection fees, including but not
limited to a $764.04 disconnection fee and additional reconnection charges, none of which were
disclosed in the service contract or otherwise agreed to by Plaintiff.” 	Id. ¶¶ 8–9. 	She also
contends that Defendant “mailed billing statements via postcard, exposing Plaintiff’s alleged
debt to the public,” “disclosed Plaintiff’s alleged debt to neighbors and Plaintiff’s realtor,”
1 In her initial filings, Plaintiff cites several cases that the Court could not locate and do not appear to exist. ECF
No. 1-1. 	Plaintiff also cites multiple cases for propositions they do not support and for quotations they do not
contain. For example, DIRECTV, Inc. v. Cephas, 294 F. Supp. 2d 760, 764 (M.D.N.C. 2003) is quoted as saying
that the FDCPA applies to entities “functioning as debt collectors, regardless of original creditor status”, ECF No. 1-
1 at 2, but that sentence appears nowhere within that opinion which addressed whether demand letters alleging theft
fell within the reach of North Carolina’s state counterpart to the FDCPA. 	Goldstein v. Hutton, Ingram, Yuzek,
Gainen, Carroll & Bertolotti, 374 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir. 2004) is cited for the proposition that “Courts have
consistently held that municipalities, utilities, and public districts may be considered debt collectors,” ECF No. 1-1
at 2, but that case addresses when a lawyer or a law firm becomes a debt collector; no public entity appears in it.
“These errors bear the hallmarks of artificial intelligence hallucinations.” Mills v. City of St. Louis, No. 4:25-CV-
1219-MTS, 2025 WL 3470293, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 3, 2025). Plaintiff certified that her pleading “is supported by
existing law.” 	ECF No. 1 at 6; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2). 	“Providing the Court with fake cases and forged
quotations cannot be squared with Rule 11(b).” See Mills, 2025 WL 3470293, at *1; see also Sanders v. United
States, 176 Fed. Cl. 163, 170 (2025) (collecting cases where courts have sanctioned pro se litigants for citing fake,
AI-generated cases and legal misstatements). Pro se status relaxes what the Court expects of a filing’s form; it does
not remove the duty to read a case before telling a court what it holds. Although the Court could impose significant
sanctions on Plaintiff, it declines to do so because it is dismissing this case.
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“recorded a lien based on disputed charges,” “threatened foreclosure,” “threatened to cause
Plaintiff’s water service to be disconnected,” and “represented that laws prohibited Plaintiff from
bringing water onto her property for use.” Id. ¶¶ 10–14, 16. Plaintiff claims that after Defendant
“disconnected Plaintiff’s sewer service based on disputed charges,” she was told that “water
service could not be provided to a property lacking functional sewer service,” leaving her
without running water. Id. ¶¶ 19, 21–22.
Count I, the sole federal claim, alleges Defendant “engaged in debt collection activity by
attempting to collect payment of an alleged debt through the use of coercive measures” and that
its “conduct brings it within the scope of 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6), as Defendant used methods and
practices characteristic of a debt collector.” Id. ¶¶ 41–42. Counts II through IV allege violations
of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, slander of title, and unjust enrichment. Id. ¶¶ 48–
56.
Discussion
I. 	Plaintiff fails to state an FDCPA claim.
To state a prima facie case for a violation of the FDCPA, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the
plaintiff is a consumer; (2) the defendant is a debt collector; (3) the debt collector attempted to
collect a debt; and (4) the debt collector violated the FDCPA in some manner. 	Dunham v.
Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 663 F.3d 997, 1001 (8th Cir. 2011)).
Plaintiff’s claim fails, because she has not plausibly alleged that Defendant is a debt
collector. Thus, Plaintiff fails to state an FDCPA claim.
Plaintiff’s claim fails, because the FDCPA controls the conduct of debt collectors, not
creditors. 	See Schmitt v. FMA All., 398 F.3d 995, 998 (8th Cir. 2005) (observing that “[a]
distinction between creditors and debt collectors is fundamental to the FDCPA, which does not
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regulate creditors’ activities at all”). The Act defines a debt collector as “any person who uses
any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of
which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or
indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). A
creditor, by contrast, is “any person who offers or extends credit creating a debt or to whom a
debt is owed.” 	Id. § 1692a(4). 	A creditor only becomes a debt collector if “in the process of
collecting his own debts,” he “uses any name other than his own which would indicate that a
third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts.” Id. § 1692a(6).
Plaintiff’s allegations only make Defendant a creditor to whom Plaintiff owed a debt:
Defendant supplied her sewer service, she “fell behind on sewer payments,” and Defendant
pursued the resulting balance. 	ECF No. 7 ¶¶ 2, 6, 10. 	Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant
used any other name to collect its debts, and every communication attached to her amended
complaint displays Defendant’s own name on its letterhead. See ECF No. 7-1; see also Duhart
v. LRAA Collections, 652 F. App’x 483, 484 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding that ambulance provider
was a creditor where it “was attempting to collect its own debt, and used its own name to do
so”). And Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant is a sewer district, not a debt-collecting business,
so the FDCPA does not apply. 	See Reygadas v. DNF Assocs., LLC, 982 F.3d 1119, 1125 (8th
Cir. 2020) (describing the FDCPA’s “principal purpose” definition as reaching an entity whose
“most important aim” is to collect debts). Thus, under the FDCPA, Defendant is a creditor and
not a debt collector.
Though Plaintiff asserts Defendant “acted in the capacity of a debt collector,” ECF No. 7
¶¶ 42, 46, she “may not simply label in a complaint a defendant as a ‘debt collector’ for statutory
purposes; rather, [she] must plead sufficient facts to show [Defendant] [is a] ‘debt collector[].’”
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Nwonwu v. Johnson, No. 6:22-CV-03060-MDH, 2022 WL 17093937, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 21,
2022). She has not done so.
In 	her 	opposition, 	Plaintiff 	argues 	that 	“[d]iscovery 	may 	reveal 	facts 	concerning
Defendant’s billing arrangements, fee assessments, collection practices, and relationships with
third-party entities that bear directly upon Defendant’s characterization of its role under the
FDCPA.” ECF No. 25 at 4. But this reverses the order of things. Rule 8 “does not unlock the
doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678–79.
Because Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendant is a debt collector, she fails to state
an FDCPA claim. 	And because this is Plaintiff’s third attempt to plead an FDCPA claim, the
Court dismisses Count I with prejudice, as further attempts at amendment would be futile.
II. 	The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
Count I was Plaintiff’s only federal claim. 	While the Court has “broad discretion to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state-law claims,” Thomas v. United Steel
Workers Local 1938, 743 F.3d 1134, 1141 (8th Cir. 2014), it “may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under [§ 1367](a) if . . . [it] has dismissed all claims over
which it has original jurisdiction,” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). “The factors a court should consider
in determining whether to exercise jurisdiction over pendent state law claims are judicial
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” 	Wilson v. Miller, 821 F.3d 963, 970 (8th Cir.
2016). “When a district court dismisses federal claims over which it has original jurisdiction, the
balance of interests usually will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the
remaining state law claims.” 	In re Canadian Imp. Antitrust Litig., 470 F.3d 785, 792 (8th Cir.
2006).
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The balance of interests weighs in favor of declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the remaining state law claims in this case. 	This case remains in the initial stages of
litigation, so there is little, if any, interest in judicial economy or convenience and fairness to the
parties. Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, Defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 22) is
GRANTED. 	Count 	I is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 	Counts II through 	IV are
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 	Defendant’s alternative
motion for a more definite statement is DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 	September 24, 2026 	/s/ Greg Kays
GREG KAYS, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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