Unilever Manufacturing (US), Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local No. 838

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION
UNILEVER MANUFACTURING (US),
INC.,
Petitioner/Plaintiff,
v.
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 838,
Respondent/Defendant.
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Case No. 4:24-cv-00751-DGK
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This is a review of an arbitration award. Petitioner/Plaintiff Unilever Manufacturing (US),
Inc. (“Unilever”) operates a food processing and manufacturing facility (the “Factory”) in
Independence, Missouri. Ruben Marquez worked at the Factory, and he was a union member of
the Respondent/Defendant International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local No. 838 (the “Union”).
On July 25, 2023, after an investigation, Unilever terminated Mr. Marquez for falsifying his time
reporting on July 10, 2023. The Union then filed a grievance on Mr. Marquez’s behalf. After the
parties were unable to resolve the dispute, the parties submitted the dispute to binding arbitration
as required by the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (the “CBA”).
The exact issue submitted to arbitration was: “Did [Unilever] discharge [Mr. Marquez]
with just cause? If not, what shall the remedy be?” After holding a hearing, the arbitrator found
that Unilever lacked just cause for the termination and ordered Unilever to reinstate Mr. Marquez
with full back pay, benefits, and seniority. Unilever then filed this case to vacate the award, and
the Union countersued to enforce the award.
Now before the Court are: (1) the Union’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 17;
and (2) Unilever’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 19. Finding that there is no genuine
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dispute of material fact and that the Union is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Court
GRANTS the Union’s motion and DENIES Unilever’s motion. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS
Unilever to abide by the arbitration award.
Standards of Review
The parties ask the Court to review the arbitration award. 	In doing so, the Court must
“extend an extraordinary level of deference to the decision of the arbitrator.” 	Electrolux Home
Prods. v. United Auto. Aerospace & Agr. Implement Workers of Am., 416 F.3d 848, 853 (8th Cir.
2005) (quotation marks omitted). 	This means that the Court’s “review of a final arbitration
decision is extremely narrow.” Trailmobile Trailer, LLC v. Int’l Union of Elec., Elec., Salaried,
Mach. & Furniture Workers, AFL-CIO, 223 F.3d 744, 746 (8th Cir. 2000). This deference and
narrow review window flows from the “federal policy [that] favors the resolution of private labor
disputes by arbitration to which the parties agreed.” 	Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v.
United Food & Com. Workers, 739 F.3d 1136, 1139 (8th Cir. 2014) (hereinafter Boehringer).
In reviewing the award, the Court does “not sit to hear claims of factual or legal error by
an arbitrator as an appellate court does in reviewing decisions of the lower courts.” 	United
Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987). This means that the
Court is “not authorized to reconsider the merits of an award even though the parties may allege
that the award rests on errors of fact or on misinterpretation of the contract.” Id. at 36; see also
Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n on behalf of Peterson v. Nat’l Football League, 831 F.3d
985, 995 (8th Cir. 2016) (“Courts are not permitted to review the merits of an arbitration decision
even when a party claims that the decision rests on factual errors.”). 	In fact, “as long as the
arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of [her]
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authority, that [the Court] is convinced [she] committed serious error does not suffice to overturn
[her] decision.” Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. at 38.
Although the Supreme Court has made clear that great deference is owed to the arbitrator’s
decision, her power is “not unlimited.” 	Boehringer, 739 F.3d at 1140. 	So an award can be
overturned if—among other things—it is shown that the award fails to “draw its essence from the
collective bargaining agreement.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
The parties here use summary judgment as the procedural mechanism for review. 	A
movant is entitled to summary judgment if it “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Material facts are those facts “that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,”
and a genuine dispute over material facts is one “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court
makes this determination by viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party
and drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656
(2014). Here, that party is Unilever. See Crain v. Crain, 72 F.4th 269, 279 (8th Cir. 2023).
“In reaching its decision, [the Court] should not weigh the evidence, make credibility
determinations, or attempt to determine the truth of the matter.” Leonetti’s Frozen Foods, Inc. v.
Rew Mktg., Inc., 887 F.3d 438, 442 (8th Cir. 2018). To survive summary judgment, the nonmoving
party must substantiate its allegations with “sufficient probative evidence that would permit a
finding in [its] favor based on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy.” 	Mann v.
Yarnell, 497 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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Undisputed Material Facts1
Unilever is a company that processes and manufactures food at facilities throughout the
United States. The Factory is one such facility. At all relevant times, the Union was the exclusive
collective bargaining representative of certain employees who worked at the Factory. The Union
and Unilever respectively qualify as a labor organization and an employer under the relevant
sections of the National Labor Relations Act and Labor Management Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 152, 29 U.S.C. § 185.
On or around March 1, 2023, Unilever and the Union entered into the CBA. It remained
effective through March 1, 2026. 	In most relevant part, the CBA provides a grievance and
arbitration procedure for any disputes that arise under the CBA. If a dispute cannot be resolved at
the initial grievance steps, the dispute proceeds to mandatory arbitration. 	The CBA granted
Unilever the authority to “promulgate reasonable shop rules and regulations. ECF No. 5-1 at 5.
The CBA also provides that Unilever “shall have the right to discharge any coworker for just
cause.” Id. at 54.
At all relevant times, Mr. Marquez was employed as a Skilled Operator at the Factory. He
was part of the Union, and he was covered under the CBA. On July 10, 2023, at around 5 a.m.,
Mr. Marquez’s supervisor called him to work an unscheduled overtime shift. This shift—like his
typical ones—was scheduled to be from 6 a.m. through 6:30 p.m. Mr. Marquez agreed and arrived
1 To resolve the motion, the Court must first determine the undisputed material facts. The following facts are drawn
heavily from the mostly undisputed facts presented by the parties. The Court excluded legal conclusions, argument
presented as fact, and proposed facts not properly supported by the record or admissible evidence. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56; L.R. 56.1. The Court also excluded a few of the parties’ facts that violated the Local Rule’s requirement that
each fact be set forth in a separately numbered and supported paragraph. See L.R. 56.1(a), 56.1(b)(2); see also
Strickland v. Kansas City, Mo. Bd. of Police Comm’rs., No. 4:23-cv-00313, ECF No. 174 at 2–5 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 25,
2025) (denying summary judgment motion where both parties routinely violated this rule). Most importantly, to the
extent the parties were arguing over each other’s description of hearing testimony, exhibits, or other documents, the
Court went directly to the source material to properly state the fact.
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for his shift at 5:58 a.m. Mr. Marquez was assigned to clean a palletizer, which is a machine that
is used to stack products onto pallets for storage and shipping.
At around 9:00 a.m., Mr. Marquez went to speak to Carol Cummings, Unilever’s
Administrative Coordinator at the Factory. Ms. Cummings’ duties included payroll. Mr. Marquez
had previously learned about his wages being garnished, so he was seeking information from Ms.
Cummings about a possible exemption from the garnishment. 	Ms. Cummings gave him a
Release/Stay of Garnishment Form (the “Form”) that she told him needed to be signed by a judge
for Mr. Marquez to be eligible for an exemption. 	She also told him that the form had to be
submitted back to her by 9:30 a.m. that day for it to be processed for the upcoming paycheck.
Around this same time, Mr. Marquez started feeling anxious. 	He had previously been
diagnosed with anxiety and depression, and he was previously taking medication for those
ailments. His doctor worked at a medical center in Kansas City, Missouri. Mr. Marquez then told
his supervisor that he was stressed out over what he was going through and needed Family Medical
Leave Act (“FMLA”) leave so he could see his doctor. Mr. Marquez’s supervisor agreed.
Mr. Marquez left the Factory at 9:08 a.m. According to Mr. Marquez, he first went to his
doctor’s office, but he was told that the doctor could not see him. 	So Mr. Marquez made an
appointment for another day. Mr. Marquez stated he was at the office for around ten minutes.
Mr. Marquez then went to the courthouse so he could get the Form signed. Mr. Marquez
stated that the courthouse was only about five minutes from his doctor’s office and was on the way
back to the Factory. Mr. Marquez stated that he was at the courthouse for at most ten minutes, and
he had the form signed at that time. He then drove back to the Factory.
Mr. Marquez returned to the factory around 10:21 a.m. In total, Mr. Marquez was gone
from the facility for around one hour and thirteen minutes. When he returned to the Factory, he
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gave the now-signed Form to Ms. Cummings. According to Unilever’s investigation, Mr. Marquez
also later clocked out at 1:20 p.m. and clocked in at 1:46 p.m., and Mr. Marquez was allegedly on
a video eating during this time. For this shift, Mr. Marquez was allotted a thirty-minute unpaid
lunch break and two fifteen-minute unpaid breaks. 	Mr. Marquez was released from his shift at
4:00 p.m.
At the end of his shift, Mr. Marquez submitted a Missed Punch Form, a form intended for
employee to use if they forget to clock out during their shift, indicating that he had left the facility
for lunch and FMLA-related reasons. On the Missed Punch Form, Mr. Marquez listed “Lunch –
Out Punch” as 9:08 a.m. and “Lunch – In Punch” as 10:21 a.m. and added the words “this time is
for FMLA & Lunch.” 	According to Mr. Marquez, he submitted this form to let his supervisor
know that he had taken FMLA leave for that part of the morning. Mr. Marquez did not eat lunch
during this time, but he included lunch in the form because he was gone over an hour.
Unilever does not manage the FMLA time for its employees, MetLife does. Mr. Marquez
reported the above time to MetLife as FMLA leave. MetLife approved this time as FMLA leave.
After receiving the Missed Punch Form, Ms. Cummings notified Rachael Marie Morales,
Unilever’s Human Resource People Partner at the Factory, that the information contained on the
Missed Punch Form conflicted with Ms. Cummings’ knowledge of Mr. Marquez’s activities.
Given that Mr. Marquez had used the time to get the Form signed, Ms. Cummings questioned
whether he appropriately reported the time as FMLA leave and lunch. Ms. Morales then initiated
an investigation, interviewing Ms. Cummings, Mr. Marquez, and Mr. Marquez’s supervisor about
the events of July 10, 2023.
During the investigation, Mr. Marquez admitted he visited the courthouse to get the Form
signed between 9:08 a.m. and 10:21 a.m. on July 10, 2023. Mr. Marquez also stated that during
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that same period, he had driven to his doctor’s office in Kansas City, Missouri, to schedule an
appointment with his doctor because of his stress and anxiety related to his wage garnishment.
Mr. Marquez also submitted a doctor’s note and a written statement during the
investigation. The doctor’s note stated he was in the doctor’s office from approximately 9 to 10
a.m. on July 10, 2023. In the written statement about the incident, Mr. Marquez said:
I left work on that day because I was stressed out over the garnishment and things
going on in the plant [and] in my life. Left FMLA (sic) went to my doctors try to
see him he was not []available (sic) so I made an appointment and decided to stop
by (sic) the courthouse to pick up the judgment for the garnishment came back to
work gave to [Cummings] to try to get in before the payroll so my check will not
get hit so hard.
On July 25, 2023, Mr. Marquez came in for a voluntary shift. He was terminated for his
alleged falsification of records related to the incident on July 10, 2023. Prior to his termination,
Mr. Marquez had not received any discipline related to this incident. 	Ms. Morales even
characterized him as a good worker. According to Ms. Morales, the company does not track an
employee’s whereabouts when they are on FMLA leave. Unilever does not dock an employee’s
time if they stop for gas or grab some food on the way back from a doctor’s appointment. Ms.
Morales has never disciplined an employee for the same.
Before the incident, Plaintiff had taken FMLA leave for anxiety and depression. He had
never had an FMLA leave request denied, never been disciplined for taking FMLA leave, and
never been told that the reason for FMLA leave did not qualify. According to Mr. Marquez, when
he took the leave time at issue in the Missed Punch Form, he believed it was covered by the FMLA.
After his termination, the Union started a grievance for Mr. Marquez. In accordance with
the CBA, after initial stages of the grievance process were unsuccessful, they submitted the dispute
to arbitrator Cynthia Stanley. 	The issues presented to the arbitrator were: (1) whether Unilever
discharged Mr. Marquez with just cause?; and (2) if not, what shall the remedy be?
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The arbitrator heard opening arguments from Unilever’s and the Union’s respective
counsel. 	Unilever then presented testimony from Ms. Cummings and Ms. Morales as well as
various documents. Unilever’s position was that its investigation showed that Mr. Marquez had
falsified his Missed Punch Form, and that was a terminable offense under several company rules.
The Union called Mr. Marquez as a witness, and its position was that Mr. Marquez believed the
time was covered by the FMLA. 	The above events were taken from their testimony and the
admitted documents, so the Court does not recite them in more detail here.
But one issue that arose at the hearing is relevant to one of Unilever’s arguments addressed
below, so it is recited in detail here. 	At the hearing, Unilever’s counsel attempted to develop
evidence that Mr. Marquez was not preapproved for FMLA anxiety and stress leave on July 10,
2023. 	Instead, Unilever’s counsel wanted to show that Mr. Marquez had been preapproved for
FMLA related to physical therapy. 	In doing so, the following exchanges happened between
Unilever’s counsel (Mr. Lignowski), Mr. Marquez, and the arbitrator:
Q. So your plan all along was to go to the courthouse, right?
A. It was there. Yes.
ECF No. 18-2 at 116.
**********
Q. But you already testified that part of the time was traveling to the
courthouse, going to the courthouse, and coming back from the
courthouse, correct?
A. Correct.
ECF No. 18-2 at 120.
***********
Q. Okay. Were you approved for FMLA leave though, for stress and anxiety?
A. No.
Q. You were not.
A. On this day?
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Q. Yes. On this day, were you approved to take FMLA leave for stress and
anxiety?
A. Yes, I was. I mean, because I was trying to get that -- forgive me, I’m a
little bit nervous.
ARBITRATOR STANLEY: I know. Just take your time.
THE DEPONENT: Okay. I’m sorry.
ARBITRATOR STANLEY: You’re okay. Could you ask the question again?
MR. LIGNOWSKI: Yes. Let me just step back.
Q. So I’m talking about July 10th. As of July 10th, you were under – you were
approved for FMLA leave, right?
A. Yes.
Q. And that was for a specific purpose.
A. Yes.
Q. Right? So you had submitted documentation and you had a doctor. Do you
remember -- let me ask you a question about this. Do you -- did you treat with a Dr.
Philip, last name Philip?
A. Yes, that’s the primary doctor.
Q. Okay. And you had submitted an FMLA certification where Dr. Philip had been
your doctor, right?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. That was not for stress and anxiety, correct?
A. It has been before.
Q. No, no. At the time you submitted this certification and this is for the time period
of July 10th. We’re covering the period of July 10th. You had submitted an FMLA
certification, but it was not for stress and anxiety, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. So the approval, this is what I’m trying to get to, the approval that you
had as of July 10th, was an FMLA approval for something other than stress and
anxiety? It was for a physical reason, right? You were attending physical therapy
sessions, am I right?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. I was.
Q. You were approved to take FMLA leave to attend physical therapy sessions.
A. Yes.
Q. On July 10th.
A. Yes.
Q. So when you say that you went to the doctor for stress and anxiety --
ARBITRATOR STANLEY: I understand your point.
MR. LIGNOWSKI: Okay.
ARBITRATOR STANLEY: Okay?
MR. LIGNOWSKI: Okay.
ARBITRATOR STANLEY: Yes, thank you.
MR. LIGNOWSKI: I don’t have anything further.
ARBITRATOR STANLEY: Thank you.
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ECF No. 18-2 at 122–25.
After the hearing, the parties submitted post-hearing briefs. 	The arbitrator then issued a
decision. 	In that decision, among other things, the arbitrator listed the issue presented, directly
quoted the “just cause” provision from the CBA, and quoted Unilever’s rules that prohibited
falsifying company records and allowed for immediate discharge for falsification of records. ECF
No. 1-2 at 2. The arbitrator then provided a statement of factual findings and a separate analysis.
Id. at 3–5. The analysis stated as follows:
Just cause has been exhaustively examined over the years; however, a useful
statement of its basics was set forth by Arbitrator Carroll R. Daugherty in Enterprise
Wire Co. (46 LA 359 (1966)):
1. NOTICE: Did the employer give to the employee forewarning or foreknowledge
of the possible or probable consequences of the employee’s disciplinary conduct?
2. REASONABLE RULE OR ORDER: Was the employer’s rule or managerial
order reasonably related to (a) the orderly, efficient, and safe operation of the
employer’s business, and (b) the performance that the employer might properly
expect of the employee?
3. INVESTIGATION: Did the employer, before administering the discipline to an
employee, make an effort to discover whether the employee did in fact violate or
disobey a rule or order of management?
4. FAIR INVESTIGATION: Was the employer’s investigation conducted fairly
and objectively?
5. PROOF: At the investigation, did the “judge” obtain substantial evidence or
proof that the employee was guilty as charged?
6. EQUAL TREATMENT: Has the employer applied its rules, orders and penalties
even-handedly and without discrimination to all employees?
7. PENALTY: Was the degree of discipline administered by the employer in a
particular case reasonably related to (a) the seriousness of the employee’s proven
offense, and (b) the record of the employee in his service with the employer?
The problem with the Company’s case starts early in the just cause analysis.
Grievant had used FMLA for doctor’s appointments for anxiety and depression
before and it was not denied by the Company’s carrier. This FMLS leave was not
denied by the carrier. How was Grievant to know that he was misusing FMLA, if
indeed he was, without notice?
Grievant lacked intent to falsify the documents. Grievant’s statements, both verbal
and written, were precisely the same as his testimony. He did not think there was
any problem with his stopping at the courthouse, as he assumed he could use his
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lunch time for that. But the HR employees saw this as a violation of the FMLA
usage, despite the fact that the carrier later covered the claim.
There seems little reason that a Company that valued this employee’s work would
fire him for going to the courthouse for five to ten minutes, which he cited as part
of his lunch. Grievant did not falsify Company documents. He told the exact truth.
The fact that HR disagreed with his usage does not make him guilty of falsification.
Further in the just cause analysis, the Company did not accrue proof that Grievant
violated the rules, nor did the punishment fit the “crime.” Just cause has not been
met.
Id. at 4–5. The arbitrator then ordered Mr. Marquez’s reinstatement with full back pay, benefits,
and seniority. Id. at 5. Unilever then filed this case, and the Union countersued.
Discussion
Unilever argues that the arbitration award here must be overturned because: (1) the award
fails to draw its essence from the CBA; (2) the arbitrator erroneously prohibited Unilever from
introducing pertinent and material evidence to support its position; and (3) the award violates
public policy. The Union argues that the award draws its essence from the CBA, and there is no
other basis to overturn the award.2
I. 	The arbitration award draws its essence from the CBA.
Unilever initially argues that the arbitrator “ignored” the plain language of the CBA when
she “ignored” the company rules that permitted Unilever to terminate Mr. Marquez. ECF No. 20
at 21–22. 	The Union counters that the arbitrator conducted the CBA-required “just cause”
analysis, and in doing so, she found that Mr. Marquez did not violate the company rules. Unilever
softens its position in reply, arguing the arbitrator did not “meaningfully consider” the work rules.
ECF No. 24 at 7.
2 Before addressing these arguments, the Court must commend the parties for the excellent briefing in this case. Each
side cited the controlling caselaw, as required by the Court’s Initial Standing Order (ECF No. 6), and each side made
the strongest possible arguments based on the record evidence and controlling caselaw.
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The Union has the better arguments. 	The CBA set forth the governing standard for
termination and the arbitrator’s ultimate review, that is, Unilever “shall have the right to discharge
any coworker for just cause.” ECF No. 5-1 at 54. And that is the exact issue the parties stipulated
that the arbitrator must decide. At the start of her opinion, the arbitrator cited this language. ECF
No. 1-2 at 2. 	And contrary to Unilever’s arguments, she also cited the company rules that
falsification of company records is prohibited and “may subject” an employee to “immediate
discharge.” 	Id. 	After providing her factual findings, the arbitrator then conducted the required
“just cause” analysis. And as one part of that analysis, she explicitly found that Mr. Marquez did
not falsify company documents, and thus, did not violate the company rules. 	Id. at 5; see also
Meridian Med. Techs., Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of
Am., Loc. Union No. 688, 158 F.4th 924, 930 (8th Cir. 2025) (“The arbitrator reasonably decided
that at the heart of all dishonest, false, or fraudulent acts is the intent to deceive.”). So there is no
basis to claim that the arbitrator ignored or did not meaningfully address the company rules that
gave discretionary authority to the company to fire Mr. Marquez for falsification of records.3
At bottom, Unilever disagrees with the arbitrator’s determination, because it believes that
it presented sufficient evidence to prove that Mr. Marquez falsely reported his time as FMLA
leave, and thus, it had just cause to terminate him. But after hearing the testimony of the witnesses,
reviewing the submitted documents, and conducting an analysis under the CBA’s “just cause”
provision, the arbitrator disagreed with Unilever. See Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Loc. Union No.
53, AFL-CIO v. Sho-Me Power Corp., 715 F.2d 1322, 1326 (8th Cir. 1983) (“The arbitrator
3 Throughout its brief, Unilever suggests that the company rules required Mr. Marquez to be fired. That assumes a
violation the arbitrator did not find. But even if the arbitrator had found that he violated the company rules that gave
them discretionary authority to fire him, that still would not be a basis for overturning the award since she conducted
a broader just cause analysis as required by the CBA. See Boehringer, 739 F.3d at 1141 (“When a CBA acknowledges
management’s right to adopt plant rule unilaterally, that does not include the right to renege on the collectively
bargained agreement that the employer will only discharge an employee for cause.” (quotation marks omitted)); see
also Trailmobile Trailer, LLC, 223 F.3d at 748.
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considered [the discharge for cause provision], the parties’ arguments and witnesses’ testimony,
and concluded that the Utility’s discharge of Thornton did not meet the collective bargaining
agreement’s standards for cause.”). “Having requested that the arbitrator determine whether [Mr.
Marquez] was terminated for just cause, [Unilever] cannot now be heard to complain that the
arbitrator performed that very analysis.” Boehringer, 739 F.3d at 1140; see Trailmobile Trailer,
LLC, 223 F.3d at 747 (same). And more fundamentally, even if this decision were wrong, that is
not a sufficient basis for overturning the award. 	See Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. at 39 (holding that
“improvident, even silly, factfinding” is not a sufficient basis to overturn an arbitration award);
see also Sho-Me Power Corp., 715 F.2d at 1326 (“It is unimportant whether we agree with the
arbitrator’s interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.”).
Unilever also faults the Union for continuously repeating the arbitration award standard in
response to Unilever’s arguments. 	But the Union rightfully does so because the standard is
daunting. 	And more importantly, many—if not most—of Unilever’s arguments run contrary to
the standard. 	As the Eighth Circuit has observed, “[w]hile this standard may seem harsh to the
parties who lose in arbitration, this standard is justified because it is exactly what the parties
mutually agreed upon by electing arbitration over judicial resolution of their conflicts.” 	See
Electrolux Home Prods., 416 F.3d at 853. 	And here Unilever cannot overcome the standard
because the undisputed facts show that the award draws its essence from the CBA.
II. 	The arbitrator did not refuse to hear pertinent and material evidence.
Unilever next argues that the award must be overturned because the arbitrator precluded it
from presenting pertinent and material evidence. 	The Union counters that the arbitrator did no
such thing, and even if she had, it does not require overturning the award.
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“[W]hen the subject matter of a dispute is arbitrable, ‘procedural’ questions which grow
out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition are to be left to the arbitrator.” Misco, Inc., 484
U.S. at 40. To overturn an arbitration award based on an evidentiary ruling, the losing party must
typically show the arbitrator was “guilty of misconduct . . . in refusing to hear evidence pertinent
and material to the controversy.” Id. (quoting and applying 9 U.S.C. § 10(c) to labor arbitration).
This standard is high. See id. “To constitute misconduct requiring vacation of an award, an error
in the arbitrator’s determination must be one that is not simply an error of law, but which so affects
the rights of a party that it may be said that he was deprived of a fair hearing.” El Dorado Sch.
Dist. No. 15 v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 247 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks omitted). In
making evidentiary rulings, “an arbitrator need not follow all the niceties observed by the federal
courts.” Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1997). Arbitrators are given
“discretion to determine whether additional evidence is necessary or would simply prolong the
proceedings.” 	Id. at 19 (quotation marks omitted). 	And “although not required to hear all the
evidence proffered by a party, an arbitrator must give each of the parties to the dispute an adequate
opportunity to present its evidence and argument.” Id. at 20.
Unilever does not come close to proving that the award must be overturned on this basis.
To be sure, the arbitrator indicated to Unilever’s counsel that she understood a line of questioning
about Mr. Marquez’s lack of preapproval for FMLA leave for stress and anxiety on July 10, 2023,
implying that counsel should move on from the topic. When she did so, Unilever’s counsel did
not object or make an offer of proof of what further evidence he would have presented if he were
allowed to continue. And by the time the arbitrator had interjected, Unilever’s counsel had already
asked enough questions about the topic that his position or argument was clear. To the extent that
the arbitrator’s interjection could be construed as an evidentiary ruling, the ruling was not even
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erroneous, much less misconduct. See Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. at 40. Moreover, Unilever had ample
opportunity to present evidence and argument on the issue and any other during its case-in-chief.
See Tempo Shain Corp., 120 F.3d at 20. 	And Unilever took full advantage of that opportunity,
presenting a lengthy argument and several witnesses to show why the company believed that Mr.
Marquez falsified documents. Simply put, there was no evidentiary error here, let alone one that
would justify overturning the award.
III. 	The award does not violate public policy.
Unilever finally argues that the award must be set aside because it violates the FMLA’s
policy against falsifying work records related to leave. The Union counters that no such dominant
policy exists, and even if it did, the arbitrator found that Mr. Marquez did not falsify records.
“[I]f a CBA as interpreted by an arbitrator would violate explicit public policy that is well
defined…by reference to the laws and legal precedents, the Supreme Court has held that we are
obliged to refrain from enforcing the award.” 	Boehringer, 739 F.3d at 1141 (quotation marks
omitted). 	“[T]his narrow exception focuses not on whether [Mr. Marquez’s] behavior violated
well defined and dominant public policy, but on whether the arbitrator’s decision to reinstate [him]
would violate public policy.” Id. 	The “well defined and dominant policy” cannot be based on
“general considerations of supposed public interests.” Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. at 44 (quotation marks
omitted). And even if a “well defined and dominant policy” is established, the party seeking to
overturn the award must show that enforcing the award would violate the policy. See id.
Unilever has failed to establish a “well defined and dominant” policy to invoke this narrow
exception; instead, it relies on general considerations regarding the importance of not falsifying
records. But a general policy against falsifying records does not come close to providing the same
type of critical public health or safety protections like the policies found “well defined and
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dominant” in the few cases cited by Unilever where the Eighth Circuit has invalidated awards on
this basis. See Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Loc. Union 204 of Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers
(AFL-CIO), 834 F.2d 1424, 1427 (8th Cir. 1987) (public policy regarding safety issues arising
from violating secondary containment protocols at a nuclear power plant); Union Pac. R. Co. v.
United Transp. Union, 3 F.3d 255, 262 (8th Cir. 1993) (public policy regarding the use and
possession of drugs and alcohol by on-duty railroad employees). 	To the contrary, the policy
proposed here is much more akin to those that were found insufficient in other Supreme Court and
Eighth Circuit cases. See Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. at 44; Boehringer, 739 F.3d at 1142–43.
But even if Unilever had established such a “well defined and dominant” policy, it never
showed that any such policy was violated or would be violated upon reinstatement. The arbitrator
found that Mr. Marquez did not violate any company rule or regulation against falsifying records.
See id. So for the Court to invalidate the award, the Court would have to engage in impermissible
fact-finding that Mr. Marquez had violated the policy based on facts that the arbitrator did not find.
That it cannot do. See Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. at 44–45.
The Court finds that Unilever “has made nowhere near the factual and legal showing that
would be required for [the Court] to invoke the narrow public policy exemption.” 	Boehringer,
739 F.3d at 1143. Thus, this is not a basis to overturn the award.
Conclusion
For these reasons, the Union’s motion (ECF No. 17) is GRANTED, and Unilever’s motion
(ECF No. 19) is DENIED. Unilever is ORDERED to abide by the arbitration award.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: March 26, 2026 	/s/ Greg Kays
GREG KAYS, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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