Jackson v. Steris Corporation

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
ALENCIA JACKSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 4:26 CV 186 CDP
)
STERIS CORPORATION, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Alencia Jackson proceeds in this removed action pro se and in
forma pauperis, having been granted IFP status in state court before defendant
Steris Corporation removed the case to federal court. After removal and upon my
direction, Jackson filed an amended complaint on a Court-provided form,
whereupon Steris then filed a motion for more definite statement. Jackson filed a
“memorandum” in response, reasserting her claims in an apparent effort to cure the
alleged deficiencies. Upon initial review of Jackson’s amended complaint and
memorandum, however, I must dismiss her claims under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim. I will deny as moot Steris’s motion for
more definite statement.
I. Background
On December 15, 2025, self-represented plaintiff Alencia Jackson filed this
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action in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Missouri, raising several
employment-related claims against her former employer, Steris Corporation,
including claims of wrongful termination, hostile work environment, harassment,
retaliation, defamation, and unlawful retention of earned wages. Upon Jackson’s
filing of her petition, the state court granted her leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
On February 6, 2026, Steris removed the case to this Court, invoking federal
question jurisdiction under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act as well as diversity
jurisdiction. Finding no federal question jurisdiction appearing on the face of
Jackson’s petition and being unable to discern whether the amount in controversy
met diversity jurisdiction requirements, I ordered Jackson to file an amended
complaint on a Court-provided form and gave specific instructions on how to
complete the form and how to set forth claims for relief under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See ECF 9, Memo. & Ord. (Feb. 10, 2026).
Jackson filed an amended complaint on March 30, 2026, asserting only
federal claims. Steris moved for more definite statement, primarily arguing that
Jackson failed to draft her amended complaint in accordance with the instructions
in my Order. In response to Steris’s motion, Jackson filed a memorandum
reasserting her claims for relief. In reply, Steris contends that Jackson’s second
attempt to amend her complaint again fails to comply with this Court’s directives.
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II. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)
Jackson was granted IFP status in state court upon the filing of her petition
in that forum. That IFP status followed her to this Court upon removal. Tsuchiya
v. Texas, No. 4:14-CV-64-O, 2014 WL 1329127, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2014)
(listing cases), report and recommendation adopted, 2014 WL 12859928 (N.D.
Tex. Apr. 1, 2014). See also Duncan v. Gegan, 101 U.S. 810, 812 (1879) (after
removal, federal court takes up the case where the state court left off); 28 U.S.C. §
1450 (all orders had in an action prior to its removal from a state court to a federal
district court remain in full force and effect until modified or dissolved by the
district court). As Jackson is proceeding pro se and IFP, I review her complaint
sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), which directs the Court to dismiss
such an action if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted. Id.
III. Discussion
In her original petition filed in state court, Jackson asserted employment-
related claims against Steris. As stated in my February 10 Order, Jackson’s
petition did not allege that Steris violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act; nor did
the face of the petition show any other basis upon which to invoke federal question
jurisdiction. Regarding Steris’s assertion of diversity jurisdiction, neither the
petition nor the notice of removal clearly set out the amount in controversy. I
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therefore directed Jackson to file an amended complaint to properly and clearly
assert her claims.
In her amended complaint filed March 30, 2026, Jackson made several
factual allegations upon which she asserted five claims for relief, all alleging
violations of federal statutory law: Count 1 – Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964; Count 2 – Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); Count 3 – Occupational
Safety and Health Act (OSHA); Count 4 – Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA); and
Count 5 – False Claims Act (FCA). Jackson attached to her amended complaint
the EEOC’s Notice of Right to Sue issued on September 29, 2025. In her
memorandum filed April 14, 2026, Jackson refined her Title VII claims to ones of
wrongful termination, harassment, and retaliation (Counts 1-3); and maintained her
asserted claims under the ADA, OSHA, FLSA, and FCA (Counts 4-7).
For the following reasons, none of Jackson’s claims states a claim on which
relief can be granted. I will therefore dismiss the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
A. Count 5 – OSHA
Violations of OSHA regulations “do not independently create private rights
of action.” Chew v. American Greetings Corp., 754 F.3d 632, 637 (8th Cir. 2014).
Because Jackson cannot bring a private claim against Steris based on an alleged
OSHA violation, Count 5 fails to state an actionable claim for relief and must be
dismissed. See Hurlburt v. Lohr Distrib. Co., No. 4:17 CV 2733 JMB, 2018 WL
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3870109, at *8 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 15, 2018).
B. Count 6 – FLSA
The FLSA establishes minimum standards for wages, hours, and
employment conditions to safeguard workers from unfair labor practices. See
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1, 4 (2011); 29
U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq. It imposes minimum-wage requirements, guarantees
overtime pay for eligible employees who work more than 40 hours in a workweek,
regulates child labor and the labor of other protected employees (e.g., students, the
handicapped, etc.), and provides exemptions from the minimum-wage/maximum-
hour requirements for defined employees. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219. It also prohibits
an employer from retaliating against employees who assert their rights under the
FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).
Nothing in Jackson’s amended complaint or memorandum relates to FLSA’s
minimum-wage, maximum-hour, or protected-status requirements. Accordingly,
because Jackson’s allegations do not relate to matters that fall within the FLSA’s
protections, her claim under the FLSA fails and will be dismissed for failure to
state a claim, including any liberally construed claim of retaliation under the
FLSA. See Birchfield v. Compass Health Network, No. 4:24-cv-01575-SRC, 2025
WL 1454466, at *4 (E.D. Mo. May 21, 2025).
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C. Count 7 – FCA
A plausible claim under the FCA requires proof of false claims. United
States ex rel. Raynor v. National Rural Utils. Co-op. Fin., Corp., 690 F.3d 951,
956 (8th Cir. 2012). The standard of liability under the FCA is “knowing, not
negligent, presentation of a false claim.” Minnesota Ass’n. of Nurse Anesthetists v.
Allina Health Sys. Corp., 276 F.3d 1032, 1053 (8th Cir. 2002). Here, Jackson
alleges that errors in her W2 form created a discrepancy between her reported
hours and pay, which has delayed IRS processing of her 2024 tax return. Jackson
makes no factual allegation that the errors in the W2 were the result of Steris’s
knowing fraud. She therefore fails to state a claim under the FCA on which relief
can be granted, and the claim must be dismissed. Raynor, 690 F.3d at 957.
D. Counts 1-3 – Title VII
Jackson asserted in her state-court petition that she was injured at work
while lifting a 15-gallon drum, that the injury occurred because she was not
properly trained, and that she was harassed and ridiculed for her drum-lifting
method. She asserted that when she complained about the harassment –
particularly from co-worker Kim – the manager told her to clock out. Jackson
thought she was terminated as Steris did not contact her after she left the work site
and she no longer received a paycheck. But after an attorney inquired on her
behalf, she learned that she had not been fired. She returned to work in April 2025,
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which was seven months after the incident.1
The state-court petition further alleged that Kim resumed her harassment
after Jackson returned to work. Upon being accused of bumping into Kim, Jackson
was again told to clock out and go home. According to Jackson, she was allowed
to return to work a few days later after Steris investigated the conduct. Jackson
claimed that several coworkers then began harassing her and that the harassment
rose to a level where she felt threatened. At one point, on June 18, 2025, Jackson
called the police, who were dispatched to the work site and received Jackson’s
report. Steris suspended her later that day. On July 2, 2025, Jackson received a
letter from Steris stating that her employment was terminated effective
immediately.
In her state-court petition, Jackson alleged that the harassment started after
she was injured, that she was wrongfully suspended, that Steris failed to pay her
during the period she was not working, and that Steris falsified her W2 which
affected her tax refund. As noted in my February 10 Order, none of those
allegations gave rise to a federal cause of action.
In her March 2026 amended complaint and April 2026 memorandum filed in
this Court, Jackson reasserts most of the facts alleged in her state-court petition and
claims that the harassment, heightened retaliatory supervision, and termination all
1 Jackson also asserted that she gave birth during that seven-month period.
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violated Title VII. For purposes of this discussion only, I will consider Jackson’s
Title VII claims to relate back to her original state-court petition given that those
claims in the amended complaint(s) arose out of the same conduct, transactions,
and occurrences set forth in that petition. See Thompson v. IP Network Sols., Inc.,
No. 4:14-CV-1239 RLW, 2014 WL 5761127, at *3-4 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 5, 2014)
(quoting Donnelly v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 402, 410 (7th Cir. 1989)).
To state a claim under Title VII, however, Jackson must allege facts
showing that Steris took adverse employment action “because of [her] race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). In neither her state-
court petition nor amended complaint(s) here does Jackson identify her protected
class; nor does she allege facts showing that Steris acted because of any protected
class. I will therefore dismiss Jackson’s Title VII claims under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e) for failure to state a claim. See, e.g., Birchfield, 2025 WL 2467710, at *5.
E. Count 4 - ADA
In her amended complaint and memorandum, Jackson claims that Steris’s
failure to pay her during maternity leave2 violated the ADA and that her resultant
inability to pay bills worsened her post-partum depression.
As an initial matter, pregnancy alone is not per se a qualifying disability
under the ADA. Cf. Gorman v. Wells Mfg. Corp., 209 F. Supp. 2d 970, 975 (S.D.
2 Jackson appears to assert that the seven-month period during which she did not work, believing
she had been fired, included a maternity leave.
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Iowa 2002). But post-partum depression, a pregnancy-related complication, may
rise to the level of an emotional or mental illness under the ADA. See Reilly v.
Revlon, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 524, 539-40 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). The issue here,
however, is that Jackson made no factual assertion in her state-court petition that
she suffered post-partum depression, that she was substantially limited in a major
life activity because of that impairment, or that Steris took adverse action against
her because of it. I cannot conclude, therefore, that the ADA claim raised in
Jackson’s March 2026 amended complaint and April 2026 memorandum relates
back to her December 2025 state-court petition. As a result, the ADA claim –
asserted for the first time on March 30, 2026 – is untimely.
A plaintiff bringing an ADA claim has 90 days from their receipt of the
EEOC’s Notice of Right to Sue within which to file a lawsuit on the claim.
Warren v. Metro Transit, No. 4:20-CV-00781 SRC, 2021 WL 124312, at *2 (E.D.
Mo. Jan. 13, 2021). Failure to timely file such a claim in a civil action may
warrant dismissal. E.g., Braxton v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 728 F.2d 1105, 1108
(8th Cir. 1984). See also Myers v. Vogal, 960 F.2d 750, 751 (8th Cir. 1992) (per
curiam); Dent v. Heartland Coca Cola, No. 4:19-CV-824 SPM, 2019 WL
13272484, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 4, 2019).
Here, the EEOC issued its Notice of Right to Sue to Jackson on September
29, 2025. Presuming Jackson received the Notice three days later on October 2,
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2025, see Hales v. Casey’s Mktg. Co., 886 F.3d 730, 736 (8th Cir. 2018), the 90-
day period within which to bring her ADA claim in a civil action expired
December 31, 2025. Although Jackson filed a civil action in state court on
December 15, 2025, she did not bring her ADA claim nor allege facts that could
arguably support such a claim until she filed her amended complaint in this Court
on March 30, 2026. Indeed, as noted in my February 10 Order, Jackson’s state-
court petition did not allege any facts to support a federal cause of action. As
Jackson did not assert post-partum depression in her state-court petition nor
identify it as a basis for disability discrimination until her amended complaint in
March 2026, her newly asserted ADA claim does not relate back to her state-court
petition and may be dismissed as untimely filed.
Moreover, even if the ADA claim was timely filed, it nevertheless fails to
state a claim on which relief can be granted. In her amended complaint and
memorandum, Jackson asserts that post-partum depression began to affect her after
Steris stopped her paychecks. So it cannot be said that Steris did not pay her
because of her alleged disability. There is no causal connection under the ADA
when the claimed disability manifested after the alleged adverse action. See 42
U.S.C. § 12112(a) (adverse employment action cannot be “on the basis of
disability”); Chalfant v. Titan Distrib., Inc., 475 F.3d 982, 991 (8th Cir. 2007)
(“An adverse action by itself is not sufficient for a successful claim under the
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ADA. . . . [T]he disability must be a motivating factor in the employer’s decision
for adverse action.”); Gruttemeyer v. Transit Auth., 31 F.4th 638, 648 (8th Cir.
2022) (disability must be a motivating factor in employer’s decision to take
adverse action). A plaintiff claiming unlawful discrimination under the ADA must
meet the definition of “disabled” at the time the adverse action occurred. Equal
Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. STME, LLC, 938 F.3d 1305, 1315 (11th Cir. 2019)
(“well settled” that disability under ADA does not include impairments that
manifest after the alleged discrimination) (listing cases).
Because the facts alleged do not show that Steris’s failure to pay Jackson
during her claimed maternity leave was because of her post-partum depression,
Jackson fails to state a claim under the ADA and the claim must be dismissed.
F. Remand to State Court is Not Warranted
In my February 10 Order directing Jackson to file an amended complaint, I
cautioned that “[t]he filing of an amended complaint completely replaces the
earlier filed petition in this action.” (ECF 9 at p. 4.) As Jackson’s amended
complaint and memorandum raise only federal statutory claims, none of which
were raised in Jackson’s state-court petition and all of which will be dismissed for
failure to state a claim, there are no remaining claims to remand to state court. I
will therefore dismiss this removed case instead of remand it to state court.
Accordingly,
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Steris Corporation’s Motion
for More Definite Statement [14] is DENIED as moot.
A separate Order of Dismissal is entered herewith.
CATHERINE D. PERRY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 1st day of July, 2026.
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