Barnett v. Stacey

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
DEWEY AUSTIN BARNETT, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 4:26-CV-00088 RHH
)
JUDGE BRENDA STACEY, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court for review of Plaintiff Dewey Barnett’s complaint and
motion to proceed in forma pauperis. [ECF Nos. 1 and 2]. For the reasons explained below, the
Court will deny plaintiff’s motion and give him 21 days to pay the $405 filing fee.
Plaintiff is incarcerated at the Southeast Correctional Center (SECC) in Charleston,
Missouri. He filed the instant complaint on January 21, 2026, against Brenda Stacey, Circuit Court
Judge in Jefferson County, Missouri.
Plaintiff alleges that Judge Stacey denied him due process and the right of access to courts
after the Missouri Court of Appeals remanded his criminal case for resentencing in May of 2025.
He claims that Judge Stacey failed to procure a waiver of counsel when his appellate attorney was
released after remand, and she failed to provide him “a fair and impartial hearing.” Plaintiff further
complains that Judge Stacey “became deliberately indifferent when Plaintiff attempted to object
to the proceedings.” Plaintiff seeks monetary relief in this action.
Plaintiff is a “prisoner” as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h) and is subject to the provisions
of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (“PLRA”). The PLRA “enacted a variety of reforms
designed to filter out the bad [prisoner] claims and facilitate consideration of the good.” Jones v.
Case: 4:26-cv-00088-RHH Doc. #: 4 Filed: 01/23/26 Page: 1 of 4 PageID #:
<pageID>

Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007). One of those reforms is what is commonly described as the “three
strikes” provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Orr v. Clements, 688 F.3d 463, 464 (8th Cir. 2012). It
provides:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action
or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions,
while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court
of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious,
or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is
under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, brought at least 3 civil actions that were dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Barnett v. Fox, et al., No. 4:25-cv-
00307 SPM (E.D.Mo. May 13, 2025); Barnett v. Fox, No. 4:25-cv-01206 JSD (E.D. Mo. Aug. 27,
2025); and Barnett v. Hill, et al., No. 1:25-cv-00167 JMB (E.D. Mo. Oct. 8, 2025). As a result, this
Court cannot grant him leave to proceed in forma pauperis unless his complaint demonstrates that
he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Having thoroughly reviewed and liberally construed the Complaint, the Court finds that it
does not show that Plaintiff is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. Plaintiff’s
allegations against Judge Stacey and her alleged violations of his civil rights do not establish
imminent danger. As a result, this Court is unable to grant Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Thus, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion and give him 21
days to pay the $405 filing fee.1
1Even if Plaintiff pays the $405 filing fee, the Court is required to review this action, preservice, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for frivolousness, maliciousness and for failure to state a claim. As currently pled,
Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Stacey fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because she
is entitled to judicial immunity from this lawsuit. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). This
immunity applies even when a judge is accused of acting maliciously or corruptly. Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547, 554 (1967). See also Woodworth v. Hulshof, 891 F.3d 1083, 1090 (8th Cir. 2018) (stating that
“judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice”).
Case: 4:26-cv-00088-RHH Doc. #: 4 Filed: 01/23/26 Page: 2 of 4 PageID #:
<pageID>

Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel
Although the Court has denied Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, it will
address Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel. After reviewing Plaintiff’s motion for
counsel, the Court will deny it without prejudice at this time.
In civil cases, a pro se litigant does not have a constitutional or statutory right to appointed
counsel. Ward v. Smith, 721 F.3d 940, 942 (8th Cir. 2013). See also Stevens v. Redwing, 146 F.3d
538, 546 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that “[a] pro se litigant has no statutory or constitutional right to
have counsel appointed in a civil case”). Rather, a district court may appoint counsel in a civil case
if the court is “convinced that an indigent plaintiff has stated a non-frivolous claim…and where
the nature of the litigation is such that plaintiff as well as the court will benefit from the assistance
of counsel.” Patterson v. Kelley, 902 F.3d 845, 850 (8th Cir. 2018). When determining whether to
appoint counsel for an indigent litigant, a court considers relevant factors such as the complexity
of the case, the ability of the pro se litigant to investigate the facts, the existence of conflicting
testimony, and the ability of the pro se litigant to present his or her claim. Phillips v. Jasper Cty.
Jail, 437 F.3d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 2006).
After reviewing these factors, the Court finds that the appointment of counsel is not
warranted at this time. Plaintiff has demonstrated, at this point, that he can adequately present his
claims to the Court. Additionally, neither the factual nor the legal issues in this case appear to be
complex. The Court will entertain future motions for appointment of counsel as the case
progresses.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF
No. 2] is DENIED.
Case: 4:26-cv-00088-RHH Doc. #: 4 Filed: 01/23/26 Page: 3 of 4 PageID #:
<pageID>

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall pay the $405 filing fee within 21 days
of the date of this Order. Plaintiff’s failure to timely pay the $405 filing fee will result in the
dismissal of this case.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel [ECF
No. 3] is DENIED at this time without prejudice.
Dated this_23rd day of January, 2026.
__________________________________________
HENRY EDWARD AUTREY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case: 4:26-cv-00088-RHH Doc. #: 4 Filed: 01/23/26 Page: 4 of 4 PageID #:
<pageID>