Tokas v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
VAIBHAV SINGH TOKAS,
Plaintiff,
v.
U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
SERVICES, et al.,
Defendants.
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No. 4:25-cv-01754-SEP
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court is self-represented Plaintiff Vaibhav Singh Tokas’s Application to
Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees and Costs, Doc. [2], and Emergency Motion
for Expedited Relief and Adjudication, Doc. [3]. Based on Plaintiff’s financial information, the
Court grants his application and waives his filing fee. For the following reasons, the Court
dismisses this action with prejudice. All pending motions are denied as moot.
FACTS AND BACKGROUND
This is Plaintiff’s second time filing a complaint for writ of mandamus, declaratory, and
injunctive relief arising out of his application to become a lawful permanent resident of the
United States. Plaintiff filed a Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) self-petition with the
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) on November 20, 2024, alleging
domestic abuse, discrimination, and homelessness. Tokas v. USCIS, No. 4:25-cv-1740-SEP
(E.D. Mo. filed Nov. 25, 2025) at Doc. [8] at 2. USCIS issued a prima facie determination
confirming Plaintiff’s basic eligibility but has not adjudicated the immigration petition.
Plaintiff first sought a Court order directing USCIS to conduct an expedited humanitarian
review of his immigration petition. See Id at Doc. [1]. The Court denied the request for
expedited review and dismissed the complaint because Plaintiff had not met the requirements for
mandamus relief. Id. at Doc. [14]. Here, Plaintiff no longer seeks expedited humanitarian
review of his petition but seeks a Court order compelling USCIS to adjudicate his immigration
petition “within a reasonable time set by the Court.” Doc. [1] at 7. He seeks adjudication of
both a Form I-360 VAWA Self Petition and a Form I-484 Adjustment of Status Request. Doc.
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[1] at 4. Along with his complaint, he has filed an emergency motion for expedited relief and
adjudication, Doc. [3]. He cites his ongoing physical and mental health struggles and
homelessness as reasons to order the prompt adjudication of his immigration petition.
LEGAL S TANDARD
“Federal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction; they have only the power that is
authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant
thereto.” Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). “Subject matter
jurisdiction refers to the court’s power to decide a certain class of cases.” LeMay v. U.S. Postal
Serv., 450 F.3d 797, 799 (8th Cir. 2006). “Subject-matter jurisdiction is a threshold requirement
which must be assured in every federal case.” Kronholm v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 915 F.2d
1171, 1174 (8th Cir. 1990). It may be raised at any time, and the Court has a duty to consider it
sua sponte. See Wilkins v. United States, 598 U.S. 152, 157 (2023).
DISCUSSION
On review of Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court finds that 8 U.S.C. § 1252 deprives it of
subject matter jurisdiction over this matter. That statute provides, in relevant part:
[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to review—
(i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section 1182(h),
1182(i), 1229b, 1229c, or 1255 of this title, or
(ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary
of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this
subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the
Secretary of Homeland Security, other than the granting of relief under
section 1158(a) of this title.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Because Plaintiff is not asking the Court to review a
judgment, subsection (i) does not bar his suit. The question before the Court is whether
subsection (ii) does.
The Eighth Circuit recently advised that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies if two elements are
present: “(1) a decision or action by the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security
and (2) statutorily specified discretion under Subchapter II of Chapter 12 of Title 8 (8 U.S.C.
§§ 1151–1381) (Subchapter II).” Thigulla v. Jaddou, 94 F.4th 770, 774 (8th Cir. 2024). In
seeking adjudication of his VAWA self-petition under 8 U.S.C § 1229b(2) and his adjustment of
status request under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), Plaintiff purports to challenge delay, and so the first
question is whether the alleged delay qualifies as a “decision or action” for purposes of the
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statute. Although the Eighth Circuit has not addressed whether a delay qualifies as a “decision”
or “action” for purposes of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) in precisely the factual scenario alleged in this
case, it did recently hold that “§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars this court’s jurisdiction to review the
decision to delay adjudicating [a] status adjustment application.” Thigulla, 94 F.4th at 775
(emphasis added). 	In Thigulla, the “decision to delay” was announced as a change in the
priority date for which the applicant’s desired class of visa was immediately available, id. at
775, and the Eighth Circuit did not explicitly address whether or when a “delay” qualifies as a
“decision.” But nothing about the Court’s application of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) to “the decision to
delay adjudicating the status adjustment application” in that case suggests any meaningful
distinction between that case and this one. 1 Id. at 775. Thus, following Thigulla, the Court finds
that each of the delays in adjudicating Mr. Tokas’s applications qualifies as a “decision or
action” for the purposes of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).2
The second element of the § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) analysis—statutorily specified discretion
under Subchapter II—is easily satisfied as to both of Plaintiff’s applications. Thigulla holds that
the process of adjudicating an adjustment of status claim under 1225(a), including setting a
timeframe, is within the Attorney General’s discretion. Thigulla, 94 F.4th at 775. And based on
the statutory text, the same is true of a VAWA petition: “[T]he Attorney General may cancel
removal of and adjust to the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence . . . .”
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (emphasis added). The use of the term “may” implies discretion, as does
1 For example, the Court did not emphasize that the delay had been announced publicly or that it applied
to a category of applicants or in any other way suggest that some delays in adjudicating applications
might not qualify as “decisions” for purposes of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).
2 See also Soni v. Jaddou, 103 F.4th 1271, 1273 (7th Cir. 2024), reh’g denied, 2024 WL 3683115 (7th
Cir. Aug. 6, 2024) (“setting priorities—for example, how many employees to assign to processing
applications under this clause, as opposed to handling other duties—is an ‘action’”); see also, e.g.,
Haydary v. Garland, 2024 WL 4880406, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 25, 2024) (treating inaction in response to
a request as a decision); Chalamalesetty v. Jaddou, 2023 WL 6387976 (D. Neb. Sept. 29, 2023), aff’d,
2024 WL 1920254 (8th Cir. Apr. 30, 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 546 (2024) (“[T]he decision to do one
thing, at a particular pace, instead of another thing is . . . not “inaction” with respect to the lower-priority
task.”); Joshi v. Garland, 728 F. Supp. 3d 1028 (D. Neb. 2024) (“plaintiffs suggest . . . that discretion
doesn’t include the discretion not to act. . . . But that argument is precluded by the Eighth Circuit’s
decision in Thigulla, which applied § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) to discretionary decisions about the decision-
making process, not just the result.”) (citation omitted); cf. Solorio v. Miller, 700 F. Supp. 3d 735,748 (D.
Neb. 2023) (Ҥ 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) expressly strips the Court of jurisdiction to review how USCIS is
prioritizing its work—whether to do one thing at a particular pace instead of another thing or its choice to
consider applications in the order submitted—as that is an ‘action . . . .’”).
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the statutory context. See Thigulla, 94 F.4th at 775 (noting the use of “may” and the Executive’s
broad discretion in the context of immigration); see also Gonzalez v. Cuccinelli, 985 F.3d 357,
366 (4th Cir. 2021) (noting the use of “may” and that “[a] principal theme of immigration law is
protecting Executive discretion”).
Because Plaintiff brings a challenge to discretionary agency actions that are removed
from the Court’s jurisdiction by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), this case must be dismissed.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this matter is DISMISSED with prejudice for lack of
jurisdiction.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all motions pending in the case are denied as moot.
Dated this 6 th day of December 2025.
_______________________________________
SARAH E. PITLYK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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