Whitney v. American Airlines

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
STACIE WHITNEY, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
vs. 	) 	Case No. 4:25-cv-1295-MTS
)
AMERICAN AIRLINES, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Defendant 	American 	Airlines 	seeks 	the 	dismissal 	of 	pro 	se 	Plaintiff 	Stacie
Whitney’s Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. 	Doc. [53]; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 	The Court has reviewed
Plaintiff’s 	Second 	Amended Complaint, 	Doc. [51], as 	well as all the briefing on
Defendant’s Motion, Doc. [54]–[56]. 	After due consideration, the Court concludes that,
even when taking Plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations “as true” and granting “all
reasonable inferences” in her favor, see Lustgraaf v. Behrens, 619 F.3d 867, 872–73 (8th
Cir. 2010), she has failed to plead a plausible claim of discrimination and retaliation
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), see Hager v. Ark. Dep’t of Health,
735 F.3d 1009, 1014–15 (8th Cir. 2013) (explaining that a discrimination complaint must
contain enough factual allegations to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level”).
*
Plaintiff alleges that 	she worked as a Customer Service Agent 	and later a
Customer Assistant Representative for Defendant in St. Louis. Plaintiff has “ADHD and
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documented hearing loss,” and she states that those impairments “substantially limit
major life activities.” Doc. [51] ¶ 8. She “disclosed her disabilities [to Defendant] during
new-hire training in August 2022.” 	Id. ¶ 9. 	Around thirty-two months later, Defendant
terminated Plaintiff’s employment, and she later filed this action alleging one count of
disability discrimination and one count of retaliation under the ADA. 	Id. ¶¶ 62–77. 	For
at least two reasons, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint fails to state a claim.
First, Plaintiff’s pleading fails to show that she has a disability under the ADA.
While 	she 	states 	that 	her 	attention-deficit/hyperactivity 	disorder 	and 	hearing 	loss
substantially limit major life activities, she pleads no facts supporting that conclusion.
See Hale v. King, 642 F.3d 492, 502 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of
ADA claim where plaintiff “failed to allege facts from which [the court] can reasonably
infer that [his] medical conditions substantially limited a major life activity”); see also
Cook v. George’s, Inc., 952 F.3d 935, 941 (8th Cir. 2020) (Stras, J., dissenting)
(concluding that dismissal of ADA claim should be affirmed based on the complaint’s
reliance on “a conclusory assertion lacking even a single fact in support” of a required
element even though the issue was not raised below).
Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder and hearing loss can qualify as disabilities
under the ADA, but not in all cases. 	See Rodriguez v. Alcoa Inc., 805 F. Supp. 2d 310,
316 (S.D. Tex. 2011); Pepper v. Brown Univ., 701 F. Supp. 3d 201, 208 (D.R.I. 2023),
aff’d, No. 23-2041, 2025 WL 3531603 (1st Cir. Sept. 12, 2025). 	See also Samuels v.
Kan. City Mo. Sch. Dist., 437 F.3d 797, 801 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting a “medical diagnosis
of an impairment” alone is “insufficient” to establish a disability under the ADA).
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Hearing loss, for example, can mean an individual has only a “slight inability” “to
perceive sound.” 	See Hearing Impairment, Stedman’s Medical Dictionary (Nov. 2014).
Without pleading facts showing that her impairments substantially limit major life
activities, an ADA element “of threshold importance,” Plaintiff does not state a claim.
See Lundquist v. Rice Mem’l Hosp., 121 F. App’x 664, 667 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam);
see, e.g., Davis v. Chenega Corp., 4:24-cv-1381-MTS, 2024 WL 5106473, at *1 (E.D.
Mo. Dec. 13, 2024). See also Joseph A. Seiner, Pleading Disability, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 95,
133 (2010) (noting a complaint should “include the specific major life activity that is
affected by the impairment” and “any relevant factual detail” showing that the identified
activity is “substantially limited”).
Second, Plaintiff has not linked her impairments or the exercise of her rights under
the ADA to any adverse action. While Plaintiff need not have pleaded “facts establishing
a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas in order to defeat a
motion to dismiss,” her pleading needed to contain enough facts to state a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face. 	See Hager, 735 F.3d at 1014. 	Her Second Amended
Complaint does not do so. 	No factual allegations connect her alleged disabilities to any
adverse action taken by Defendant. 	See Chalfant v. Titan Distrib., Inc., 475 F.3d 982,
991 (8th Cir. 2007) (explaining that an “adverse action by itself is not sufficient for a
successful claim under the ADA” because “the disability must be a motivating factor in
the employer’s decision for the adverse action”).
There 	are 	“a 	number 	of 	ways” 	a 	plaintiff 	may 	“support 	an 	inference 	of
discrimination” within a complaint. Golod v. Bank of Am. Corp., 403 F. App’x 699, 703
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n.2 (3d Cir. 2010); accord Cook, 952 F.3d at 939 (noting that the elements of a prima
facie case of ADA discrimination are “part of the background against which a plausibility
determination should be made”). 	Here, Plaintiff failed to provide the facts necessary to
make such an inference. 	For example, Plaintiff does not allege any disability-related
comments or conduct before her termination. 	See Hager, 735 F.3d at 1014; Carrero-
Ojeda v. Autoridad de Energia Electrica, 755 F.3d 711, 720 (1st Cir. 2014) (noting lack
of pleaded “negative comments, complaints, or expressions” by superiors or co-workers).
Nor does she allege 	facts showing that 	similarly situated employees were treated
differently. 	See Hager, 735 F.3d at 1014; Ingram v. Ark. Dep’t of Correction, 91 F.4th
924, 928 (8th Cir. 2024) (noting proffered comparators in the complaint were not
similarly situated in all relevant respects to the plaintiff as required). Despite her burden,
Plaintiff did not “allege sufficient facts to allow the court to draw the reasonable
inference that [Defendant] engaged in discrimination.” 	See Andrews v. City of Hartford,
700 F. App’x 924, 926 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). 	This conclusion is true regardless
of whether the “less restrictive mixed-motive causation standard” or the more stringent
“but-for 	causation 	standard” 	applies 	to 	her 	discrimination 	claim. 	See 	Oehmke 	v.
Medtronic, Inc., 844 F.3d 748, 757 n.6 (8th Cir. 2016). 	See also Davis, 2024 WL
5106473, at *2 n.3.
Plaintiff’s retaliation claim fails for the same reason. 	The Court will assume,
without deciding, that Plaintiff’s March 30, 2025, statement to a manager about her
hearing loss—made as her termination appeared imminent—constituted protected activity
under the ADA. 	But even with that assumption, her pleading fails to allege facts
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allowing for an inference of the required “but-for causal connection” between that
reference to her hearing loss and any adverse action. See Oehmke, 844 F.3d at 758.
Plaintiff’s pleading not only fails to link her impairments or protected activity to
any adverse action, but it also affirmatively “supports an alternative conclusion.” 	See
Ingram, 91 F.4th at 928. 	Plaintiff pleads that Defendant terminated her “based on the
findings of [an] investigation,” Doc. [51] ¶ 48, not based on any disability or protected
activity. 	She also pleads that she had prior “Level 1” and “Level 2” disciplinary actions
taken against her. Id. ¶¶ 18–19, 56b. All these disciplinary actions took place over many
months and occurred long after Plaintiff disclosed her impairments to Defendant at her
new-hire training. Id. ¶ 9; cf. Germanowski v. Harris, 854 F.3d 68, 74–75 (1st Cir. 2017)
(explaining that temporal proximity can support, but does not necessarily establish,
plausibility). Thus, rather than provide facts linking her disability or a protected activity
under the ADA with her termination, she alleges a months-long history of disciplinary
problems, culminating in an investigation that found her culpable for misconduct. 	“As
between that ‘obvious alternative explanation’” for her termination and “the purposeful,
invidious discrimination [Plaintiff] asks [the Court] to infer, discrimination is not a
plausible conclusion.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 682 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 567 (2007)).
* * *
Plaintiff failed to plead facts that show she has a disability under the ADA. Even
if her alleged impairments qualified, Plaintiff also failed to plead facts that plausibly link
her impairments or her assertion of her ADA rights to any adverse action taken against
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her. 	Instead, she pleaded facts showing that Defendant gradually disciplined her for
multiple incidents and eventually fired her, thirty-two months after she disclosed her
impairments, based on the findings of an investigation into her conduct. 	The Court
therefore will grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 	Since the Court previously allowed
Plaintiff to amend her pleading, see Doc. [50] (2026 WL 195922), the Court will dismiss
this action with prejudice.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Second Amended Complaint, Doc. [53], is GRANTED. 	The Court will enter herewith
an Order of Dismissal dismissing this action with prejudice.
Dated this 27th day of April 2026.
MATTHEW T. SCHELP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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