Arteaga Photos, Ltd. v. Honz et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
ARTEAGA PHOTOS, LTD., )
)
Plaintiff, )
v. ) No. 4:24-cv-01664-CMS
)
ROBERT HONZ, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss of Defendant Jordan Parnass Digital
Architecture, LLC, (Doc. 28). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
According to the Complaint of Plaintiff Arteaga Photos, Ltd., (Doc. 1), Defendant
Valley Capital LLC, d/b/a/ Gateway BMW Motorcycles (“Gateway”), operates a
motorcycle dealership. (Doc. 1 at 4). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Blue Mavi, Inc.,
d/b/a The Designery, and Jordan Parnass Digital Architecture, LLC, (“Digital
Architecture”) participated in designing Gateway’s showroom and promoted and sold a
wall-sized reproduction of a photograph belonging to Plaintiff for display in the
showroom. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Gateway continues to display the photograph in its
showroom. Id.
The photograph in question depicts the partially completed Gateway Arch
monument (“the Work”). (Doc. 1 at 3). Plaintiff alleges the photograph was taken on
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October 28, 1965, by Robert F. Arteaga. Id. Robert Arteaga did business as a sole
proprietor under the name of Arteaga Photos. Id. In 1973, Robert Arteaga sold all his
assets and rights in Arteaga Photos to his sons, Wayne and Eldon Arteaga. Id. Wayne and
Eldon then created Arteaga Photos, Ltd., as an entity to own the assets and rights sold to
them by their father. Id. Plaintiff Arteaga Photos, Ltd., alleges it “is the sole owner of all
rights, titles, and interest in, and to, the copyright for the Work.” (Doc. 1 at 4).
Attached to Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Dismiss, (Doc.
29), is a Certificate of Registration, (Doc. 29, Ex. A). The Certificate lists “Arteaga
Photos, Ltd.” as the “Copyright claimant” and the refers to that “Organization Name” as
having “Rights and Permissions.” Id. The effective date of registration is November 27,
2009, and the date of first publication is identified as October 7, 2009. Id.
Plaintiff filed the instant action in this Court on December 9, 2024. (Doc. 1). In its
Complaint, Plaintiff brings one count alleging the Defendants violated its copyright in the
Work under 17 U.S.C. § 501 and requesting damages for copyright infringement. (Doc. 1
at 5). Section 501(b) provides: “The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under
a copyright is entitled, subject to the requirements of section 411, to institute an action for
any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it.”
Defendant Digital Architecture filed its Motion to Dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1)
and 12(b)(6). (Doc. 29).
LEGAL STANDARDS
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)
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Defendant Digital Architecture moves the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint
under Rule 12(b)(1) because Plaintiff fails to allege any facts to suggest it has standing as
a legal or beneficial owner of the copyright to the Work, and because Plaintiff fails to
allege any facts to suggest the Work was not a “work for hire” (Doc. 29 at 6, 10).
“‘Article III standing must be decided first by the court and presents a question of
justiciability; if it is lacking, a federal court has no subject-matter jurisdiction over the
claim.’” Schumacher v. SC Data Ctr., Inc., 912 F.3d 1104, 1105 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting
Miller v. Redwood Toxicology Lab., Inc., 688 F.3d 928, 934 (8th Cir. 2012)). The United
States Supreme Court instructs “that the ‘irreducible constitutional minimum’ of standing
consists of three elements.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016) (quoting
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). “The plaintiff must have (1)
suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the
defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id.
(citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61).
Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff lacks standing is aimed at the first element:
whether Plaintiff has adequately alleged an injury in fact. (Doc. 29 at 6). This turns on the
question of whether Plaintiff has adequately alleged that it owns the Work. Id. If Plaintiff
does not own the Work, Defendant argues, it could not have suffered an injury from
Defendant’s use of the Work. (Doc. 29 at 9–10).
Preliminarily, to decide what standard to apply in reviewing Defendant’s Motion,
this Court must decide whether Defendant makes a facial or factual challenge to
Plaintiff’s standing and this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. A factual challenge under
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Rule 12(b)(1) challenges “‘the existence of subject matter jurisdiction . . . in fact,
irrespective of the pleadings, and matters outside the pleadings, such as testimony and
affidavits, are considered.’” Branson Label, Inc. v. City of Branson, Mo., 793 F.3d 910,
914–15 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511
(5th Cir. 1980)).
A facial challenge, on the other hand, is restricted to the face of the pleading, and
“‘the court merely [needs] to look and see if plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of
subject matter jurisdiction.’” Id. at 914 (quoting Menchaca, 613 F.2d at 511). If the
challenge is facial, the plaintiff’s pleadings are accepted as true, as they would be in the
context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See id. at 914 (quoting Osborn v. United States, 918
F.2d 724, 729 n. 6 (8th Cir. 1990)).
As described above, Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to allege any facts to
suggest it has standing as a legal or beneficial owner of the copyright to the Work, and
that Plaintiff fails to allege any facts to suggest the Work was not a work for hire (Doc. 29
at 6, 10). These obviously are facial challenges, and do not attack the validity of the facts
alleged in the Complaint. Indeed, Defendant refers to its own Rule 12(b)(1) motion as a
facial challenge. See (Doc. 29 at 5).
Thus, this Court may review only the face of the pleading and will accept
Plaintiff’s factual statements as true, as it would pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Branson
Label, Inc., 793 F.3d at 914–15 (quoting Osborn , 918 F.2d at 729 n. 6).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
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Defendant also moves the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). See (Doc. 29 at 9–10). To properly state a copyright
infringement claim, Plaintiff must plead two elements: “(1) ownership of a valid
copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.” Feist
Publ’ns., Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991); see also
MPAY Inc. v. Erie Custom Comput. Applications, Inc., 970 F.3d 1010, 1016 (8th Cir.
2020).
The only element challenged in Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is Plaintiff’s
ownership of the copyright. Defendant repeats the same arguments as in its Rule 12(b)(1)
motion: Plaintiff fails to allege any facts to suggest it has standing as a legal or beneficial
owner of the copyright to the Work, and Plaintiff fails to allege any facts to suggest the
Work was not a work for hire (Doc. 29 at 6, 10).
For a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), it “must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); Lustgraaf v. Behrens, 619 F.3d 867, 873
(8th Cir. 2010). The facts in the complaint must “raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “‘Threadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.’” Usenko v.
MEMC LLC, 926 F.3d 468, 472 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court “‘must accept as true
all of the complaint’s factual allegations and view them in the light most favorable to the
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Plaintiffs.’” Stodghill v. Wellston Sch. Dist., 512 F.3d 472, 476 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Burton v. Richmond, 276 F.3d 973, 975 (8th Cir. 2002)). The court is “‘not bound to
accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
ANALYSIS
Because the same legal standard applies to Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)
motions, and Plaintiff makes the same legal arguments in both motions, the Court
considers them together.
Plaintiff Adequately Pled Ownership of the Copyright.
Defendant challenges the adequacy of Plaintiff’s allegations of ownership of the
copyright. Defendant first suggests that Plaintiff did not adequately allege a chain of title
providing it with ownership, (Doc. 29 at 8–9), and argues more generally that “Plaintiff
alleges no facts to suggest an ownership interest in the copyright to the photograph.”
(Doc. 29 at 9).
Plaintiff’s Complaint plainly states: Robert Arteaga was the original photographer;
Robert Arteaga “did business as a sole proprietor under the trade name Arteaga Photos”;
Robert Arteaga transferred all the assets and rights of Arteaga Photos, including the
Work, to Wayne and Eldon Arteaga in 1973; and “Wayne and Eldon Arteaga created
Arteaga Photos, LTD as the legal entity to own th[ose] assets and rights.” (Doc. 1 at 3).
The Complaint additionally alleges, “Arteaga Photos LTD. is the sole owner of all rights,
titles, and interest in, and to, the copyright for the Work” and “Arteaga Photos LTD.
remains the owner of the registered Work.” (Doc. 1 at 4).
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Defendant nonetheless points out that the Complaint does not specify that the
Arteaga brothers in fact transferred the assets and rights to the Work to Arteaga Photos,
Ltd., after they received the assets and rights and created Arteaga Photos, Ltd., for the
express purpose of owning those assets and rights. (Doc. 29 at 9). Defendant slices the
allegations of the chain of title a bit thin. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires
only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief,” and the Complaint goes on to plainly allege that Arteaga Photos, Ltd., is the sole
owner of the copyright and remains the owner of the registered Work. Plaintiff need only
plead ownership of the copyright, Feist, 499 U.S. at 361; MPAY, 970 F.3d at 1016, and
these are factual allegations of ownership that the Court must accept as true, see
Stodghill, 512 F.3d at 476.
Even if Plaintiff had not otherwise adequately pled ownership, the Certificate of
Registration is adequate to meet a facial challenge under Rule 12(b)(1) and a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiff’s Complaint references
the Certificate of Registration (Doc. 1 at 4). In its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant does not
question the authenticity of the Certificate (Doc. 29 at 13), and even attaches the
Certificate to its Memorandum in Support (Doc. 29, Ex. A).
“‘Though matters outside the pleading may not be considered in deciding a Rule
12 motion to dismiss, documents necessarily embraced by the complaint are not matters
outside the pleading.’” R&R Propane, LLC v. Tiger Payment Solutions, LLC, 756
F.Supp.3d 734, 738 n. 2 (E.D. Mo. 2024) (quoting Ashtanti v. City of Golden Valley, 666
F.3d 1148, 1151 (8th Cir. 2012)). “Documents necessarily embraced by the pleadings
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include documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no
party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading.” Id. (quoting
Ashtanti, 666 F.3d at 1151). The Certificate is necessarily embraced by the pleadings and
also is attached to the pleadings.
“In any judicial proceedings the certificate of a registration made before or within
five years after first publication of the work shall constitute prima facie evidence of the
validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate.” 17 U.S.C. § 410. Here,
the Certificate was registered on November 27, 2009, within five years after the first
publication of the Work on October 7, 2006. (Doc. 29, Ex. A). Therefore, it is prima facie
evidence of the facts, including ownership, stated therein. See Kennedy v. Gish, Sherwood
& Friends, Inc., 143 F.Supp.3d 898, 905 (E.D. Mo. 2015).
In sum, Plaintiff’s allegations of ownership “contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true,” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678, to support Plaintiff’s ownership of the Work
and an injury in fact to, and standing of, Plaintiff to bring this lawsuit, see Spokeo, Inc.,
578 U.S. at 338.
Plaintiff Need Not Allege That the Work Was Not a Work for Hire.
Defendant’s second argument, that the Complaint fails to deny that the Work was a
“work for hire,” is legally meaningless and does not change the outcome here.
Central to this point is the Certificate of Registration attached to Defendant’s
Memorandum in Support. (Doc. 29, Ex. A). The Certificate identifies the “Author” and
“Copyright claimant” of the Work as “Arteaga Photos, Ltd.,” and states that “Rights and
Permissions” belong to “Arteaga Photos, Ltd.” (Doc. 29, Ex. A). Defendant, nevertheless,
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disputes Plaintiff’s ownership of the Work because the “Authorship” section of the
Certificate listing “Arteaga Photos, Ltd.” as the author also is marked “Yes” regarding
whether the “Work was made for hire.” Id.; (Doc. 29 at 12).
Defendant argues that the “Work was made for hire” designation on the Certificate
means that Arteaga Photos must have created the Work for someone else – the actual
owner – who hired Robert Arteaga. (Doc. 29 at 13). Defendant cites 17 U.S.C. § 201(b):
“In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work
was prepared is considered the author . . . , and . . . owns all of the rights comprised by
the copyright.” (Doc. 28 at 5). Plaintiff responds that the “work for hire” designation is
“inaccurate” and “erroneous” and should be disregarded by the Court. (Doc. 32 at 7–8).
In the circumstances presented here, the “work for hire” designation on the
Certificate is irrelevant to Plaintiff’s ownership of the copyright as a matter of law. For
example, in Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3 Tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp.2d 627, 633 (S.D.N.Y.
2011), plaintiff EMI, Inc., sued defendant MP3 Tunes, LLC, for copyright infringement.
As part of its evidence of ownership of the works at issue, EMI produced similar
certificates of registration listing EMI as the owner and registering EMI’s copyrights as
“works for hire.” Id. at 646–47. Contrary to Defendant’s argument here, that meant the
works “were created by an employee [of EMI] within the scope of employment,” not that
EMI had been hired as an employee by someone else – the true owner of the copyright –
to create the works. Id. at 647. The court cited 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) for the proposition that
“facts stated within a valid registration are presumed true” and, thus, the defendant, not
the plaintiff, bore the burden to prove “the works were not ‘made for hire.’” Capitol
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Records, 821 F. Supp. at 647. In other words, the defendant bore the burden to prove that
the employees of EMI who created the works did so outside the scope of their
employment and that, therefore, the employees, not EMI, were the true owners of the
works. Capitol Records, 821 F. Supp. at 647.
Thus, Defendant’s argument that the “work for hire” designation on the Certificate
means that Robert Arteaga was hired by, and created the photograph at issue for, the true
owner, (Doc. 29 at 12–13), flips the doctrine on its head. In fact, Defendant cites caselaw
for precisely the opposite proposition that “work for hire” creates “‘a presumption that
the copyright belongs to the person at whose “instance and expense” the work was
done.’” (Doc. 29 at 11) (quoting Arthur Retlaw & Assocs., Inc. v. Travenol Labs., Inc.,
582 F.Supp. 1010, 1013–14 (N.D. Ill. 1984)). The caselaw is not incorrect, Defendant’s
interpretation is. Pursuant to Section 201(b) and the caselaw, the fact that the Certificate
states, erroneously or not, that the “Work was made for hire” means, at best for
Defendant, that Arteaga Photos hired someone else to create the photograph and is prima
facie evidence that Plaintiff is the owner of the photograph.
Thus, to plead a copyright infringement claim and its ownership of the Work,
Plaintiff need not plead the Work was not a “work for hire,” and its failure to do so is not
a legal basis to dismiss the Complaint.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff adequately has pled its ownership of the copyright to the Work under 17
U.S.C. § 501. As a matter of law, whether the Work was a “work for hire” is not a basis to
dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint. Thus, Plaintiff also adequately has pled an injury in fact
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from Defendant’s use of the Work and standing to sue for that injury under Article III of
the United States Constitution. See Spokeo, Inc., 578 U.S. at 338 (quoting Lujan, 504
U.S. at 560–61).
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss of Defendant Jordan Parnass Digital
Architecture, LLC, (Doc. 22), is DENIED.
Dated this 19th day of December, 2025.
_____________________________________
CRISTIAN M. STEVENS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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