Ribas v. Besler

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
VICTOR MANUEL RIBAS,
Plaintiff,
v.
MEGAN BESLER,
Defendant.
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Case No. 4:24-CV-00632-SPM
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions. (ECF No. 60). The
motion has been fully briefed. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned
United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 636(c)(1). (ECF No. 15). For the following
reasons, the motion will be denied.
I. 	Background
On December 23, 2024, Plaintiff advised the Court that the parties reached a settlement in
this case through alternative dispute resolution. (ECF No. 38). On December 30, 2024, the Court
entered an order vacating all deadlines and hearings set in the Case Management Order (ECF No.
22) and directing Plaintiff to file dismissal papers within 30 days. (ECF No. 39). On January 29,
2025, the parties filed a joint motion requesting an additional 21 days to finalize the settlement
agreement and file dismissal papers, and the Court granted the request. (ECF Nos. 41, 42).
On February 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Enforce Settlement communicating a
disagreement between the parties on the issue of liquidated damages in the settlement agreement
and suggesting that the parties confer with their prior mediator, the Honorable Thomas Prebil, to
resolve the dispute. (ECF No. 43). Defendant filed a response on February 26, 2025, consenting
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to further discussions with the mediator. (ECF No. 45). On February 27, 2025, the Court entered
an order denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Settlement, without prejudice, finding the motion
premature and moot considering the parties’ agreement to attempt to resolve their dispute over
settlement terms by conferring with the mediator. (ECF No. 46). The parties did not propose, and
the Court did not impose, a deadline by which the parties were to complete their conference with
the mediator.
On August 11, 2025, having received no update from the parties regarding the status of this
case, the Court set the matter for an attorney’s-only status hearing, which took place via Zoom on
August 18, 2025. (Docs. 47, 48). At the status hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel represented to the Court
that the parties remained in dispute over certain details of the settlement agreement and that the
parties had not re-engaged with the mediator as contemplated in the Court’s February 27, 2025,
Order. Plaintiff’s counsel explained that a personal medical procedure he underwent led to
scheduling disruptions and seemed to attribute the parties’ failure to re-engage with the mediator
to that procedure. Plaintiff’s counsel represented that he has since recovered and requested an
additional 30 days for the parties to complete settlement discussions before their prior mediator,
Judge Prebil.
Counsel for Defendant disputed Plaintiff’s counsel’s version of events. Defense counsel
represented that, since the Court’s February 27 Order, he had contacted Plaintiff’s counsel on six
occasions to attempt to schedule a time for further discussions in front of Judge Prebil. Defense
counsel represented that Plaintiff’s counsel made no response to these communications but,
instead, filed a new lawsuit in state court on behalf of Plaintiff against Defendant. Defense counsel
removed the new state case to this court on April 24, 2025. That case, styled Ribas v. Besler, Case
No. 4:25-cv-00570-CDP, is currently pending before U.S. District Judge Catherine D. Perry.
Defense counsel represented, and a review of the case docket confirms, that he has filed a motion
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to dismiss the new lawsuit, in part, on grounds that it is barred by the parties’ prior settlement in
this case. Judge Perry has not ruled on Defendant’s motion.
Neither attorney explained why they failed to advise the Court of these developments after
representing, in February, that both parties intended to re-engage with the mediator to resolve what
appeared to be a relatively narrow dispute in an otherwise negotiated settlement agreement.
Notwithstanding the parties’ failure to justify a nearly six-month delay of this case, on August 19,
2025, the Court directed Defendant to either (i) consent to re-engaging with the mediator to resolve
the parties’ dispute or, if not consenting to re-engaging with the mediator, (ii) instead file a motion
seeking other relief from the Court. (ECF No. 49).
On September 25, 2025, Defendant filed the instant motion for miscellaneous relief and/or
sanctions, requesting dismissal of the case with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(b) and that Defendant be awarded attorney’s fees. In the alternative, Defendant seeks (i)
dismissal of the case with or without prejudice, (ii) enforcement of the parties’ memorandum of
understanding, or (iii) an order directing the cost of any further mediation to Plaintiff. In response,
Plaintiff argues Defendant is not entitled to the requested relief because the parties had a genuine
dispute about the scope of a negotiated liquidated damages provision and the Court should either
permit the parties to return to mediation or enforce the settlement in a manner consistent with
Plaintiff’s interpretation of the scope of liquidated damages negotiated by the parties.
II. 	Discussion
A. 	Rule 41(b) Dismissal for Failure to Prosecute
Under Rule 41(b), the Court may dismiss a case if Plaintiffs “fail[ ] to prosecute or to
comply with [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] or a court order.” See also Holly v. Anderson,
467 F.3d 1120, 1121 (8th Cir. 2006) (“A district court may sua sponte dismiss an action under
Rule 41(b) for the plaintiff's deliberate failure to comply with a court order.”). The dismissal under
this provision is deemed to be an “adjudication on the merits” (i.e., with prejudice), “[u]nless the
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dismissal order states otherwise.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Rule 41(b)’s dismissal “power enables the
district courts to ensure the expeditious handling of cases and to protect the rights of opposing
parties to be free of prejudice caused by a litigant's dilatory conduct.” Hutchins v. A.G. Edwards
& Sons, Inc., 116 F.3d 1256, 1260 (8th Cir. 1997).
To determine whether dismissal is appropriate, the Court “employs a balancing test that
focuses foremost upon the degree of egregious conduct which prompted the order of dismissal and
to a lesser extent upon the adverse impact of such conduct upon both the defendant and the
administration of justice in the district court.” Rodgers v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 135 F.3d 1216,
1219 (8th Cir. 1998) (citation modified). The Eighth Circuit has warned that the “sanction imposed
by the district court must be proportionate to [Plaintiffs’] transgression[s], and that dismissal with
prejudice is an extreme sanction and should be used only in cases of willful disobedience of a court
order or continued or persistent failure to prosecute a complaint.” Smith v. Gold Dust Casino, 526
F.3d 402, 405 (8th Cir. 2008) (citation modified and emphasis in original).
In this case, the “egregious conduct” Defendant accuses Plaintiff of engaging in is failure
to prosecute this action in good faith, first, by ignoring defense counsel’s attempts to comply with
the Court’s February 27th Order directing the parties to re-engage in settlement discussions with
Judge Prebil and, second, by filing a new lawsuit in state court on behalf of Plaintiff against
Defendant. However, as noted above, Plaintiff’s counsel explained that a personal medical
procedure he underwent led to scheduling disruptions—a fact that was not disputed by defense
counsel. Although counsel’s medical procedure does not explain away all of the delay (for
example, counsel filed a new lawsuit during this same timeframe), based on the limited record
before it, this Court cannot say that Plaintiff’s counsel engaged in deliberate delay or deliberately
ignored a Court order to re-engage with the mediator.
Defendant also argues Plaintiff’s bad faith failure to prosecute is evident by his attempt to
unilaterally change the material terms of the parties’ settlement as represented by an enforceable
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memorandum of understanding (“MOU”); his repeated breach of the confidentiality provision of
the MOU by failing to file MOU-related content under seal; and his multiple motions for
extensions of time. However, Defendant has failed to explain how this alleged conduct by Plaintiff
translates into deliberate violation of an order of this Court or a deliberate delay of the prosecution
of this case. As noted above, “a litigant’s dilatory conduct” is the focus of Rule 41(b)’s dismissal
power for an alleged failure to prosecute. See Hutchins, 116 F.3d at 1260 (emphasis added). The
Court need not find that Plaintiff “acted in bad faith, only that [he] acted intentionally as opposed
to accidentally or involuntarily,” Rodgers, 135 F.3d at 1219, when he “continued or persistent[ly]
fail[ed] to prosecute a complaint.” See Smith, 526 F.3d at 405 (discussing standard for a Rule 41(b)
dismissal with prejudice) (citation modified).
Defendant has not shown either that delay in this case can be attributed solely to Plaintiff,
or that Plaintiff has deliberately disobeyed a court order. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff neglected
this action, but Defendant also allowed this action to sit idle for nearly six months. The Court
acknowledges that its February 27 Order did not impose a deadline by which the parties were to
complete negotiations in front of Judge Prebil, but Defendant made no filings—or other
communications—to alert the Court that Plaintiff’s counsel was thwarting Defendant’s efforts to
schedule time with the mediator by failing to respond to emails and/or phone calls. The Court was
unaware that the parties had not returned to the mediator until, six months later, it sua sponte
ordered the parties to update the Court at a case status hearing. While the Court is troubled by the
evident breakdown in communication between the parties following the February 27 Order,
Defendant has not pointed to actions by Plaintiff demonstrating either a pattern or persistent failure
to prosecute this action. The Court disagrees with Defendant that Plaintiff’s various requests for
deadline extensions constitute such evidence.
Defendant alternatively asks the Court to dismiss the case without prejudice. The Court
doubts dismissal would be appropriate in this case even if the conduct relied on by Defendant
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constituted a deliberate violation of the Court’s February 27 Order by Plaintiff that resulted in
delay of this case. The Eighth Circuit has cautioned courts to “first consider whether any less-
severe sanction could adequately remedy the effect of the delay on the [C]ourt and the prejudice
to the opposing party.” Smith, 526 F.3d at 406 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Keefer
v. Provident Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 238 F.3d 937, 941 (8th Cir. 2000) (“[B]efore imposing the
sanction of dismissal, fairness requires a court to consider whether a lesser sanction is available or
appropriate.”). While it is not required, courts are also cautioned to warn Plaintiffs that they are
“skating on the thin ice of dismissal” before dismissing a case under Rule 41(b). Rodgers, 135
F.3d at 1221. As noted above, Defendant has not previously brought the issue of Plaintiff’s dilatory
behavior before the Court, and the Court declines to exercise the “extreme sanction” of dismissal
in the first instance. Smith, 526 F.3d at 405. The Court reiterates that Defendant also prevented the
speedy disposition of this case by failing to take any further action with the Court for almost six
months.
Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendant’s request for dismissal under Rule 41(b).
B. Enforcement of the MOU
An alternative request from Defendant is the Court’s enforcement of the parties’ MOU.
Defendant cites state case law favoring litigation settlements and holding certain MOUs to be
legally enforceable, but Defendant presents no authority suggesting that the Court’s sanction
powers are a permissible or appropriate means for settlement enforcement.1
The parties’ settlement dispute centers on the liquidated damages provision. Defendant
insists that the mutual obligations of this provision are self-evident, given that such damages flow
from violation of the MOU’s mutual non-disparagement provision. Plaintiff responds that he
plainly intended for the liquidated damages provision to apply only to Defendant because there are
1 Although Plaintiff also has requested enforcement of the MOU in his opposition to Defendant’s
motion for sanctions, Plaintiff has not filed a motion for such action by the Court.
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no allegations in the action that Plaintiff has previously disparaged Defendant such that damages
for further disparagement would apply. It appears to the Court—without making any findings
regarding the MOU itself— that the parties’ filings display a genuine dispute regarding the scope
of the liquidated damages provision. Enforcement (and interpretation) of the MOU constitutes a
separate legal action from the imposition of sanctions and is more appropriately addressed through
dedicated briefing on a motion for such action. See, e.g., Morris v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, No.
4:23-CV-39 RLW, 2024 WL 1655407, at *2-3 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 17, 2024) (discussing different
standards for a motion to enforce a settlement and a motion for sanctions). The parties formerly
agreed to return to mediation for what currently presents as a genuine settlement dispute, and the
Court concurs that this is the most efficient solution.
C. Attorney’s Fees
Finally, Defendant requests that the Court grant her an award of attorney’s fees and costs
for 	any 	further 	mediation.2 	The 	Court 	has 	the 	inherent 	authority 	to 	“fashion 	an
appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process.” Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
v. Haeger, 581 U.S. 101, 107, (2017) (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44-45
(1991)). “[O]utright dismissal of a lawsuit . . . is a particularly severe sanction, yet is within the
court’s discretion. Consequently, the less severe sanction of an assessment of attorney’s fees is
undoubtedly within a court’s inherent power as well.” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45 (citation
modified). The Court “may assess attorney’s fees when a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously,
wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45-46 (citation modified). “A bad
faith finding is specifically required in order to assess attorneys fees.” Gas Aggregation Servs.,
Inc. v. Howard Avista Energy, LLC, 458 F.3d 733, 739 (8th Cir. 2006). Attorney’s fees must be
2 Defendant also has requested attorney’s fees in the event of dismissal with prejudice under
Rule 41(b). Because the Court is declining Rule 41(b) dismissal at this time, it need not take up
the issue of attorney’s fees in that context.
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limited to those that “would not have been incurred in the absence of the sanctioned conduct.”
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 581 U.S. at 110.
The Court does not find the sanctions requested by Defendant to be warranted at this time.
There is insufficient information before the Court to find bad faith (or lack thereof) in the parties’
settlement negotiations and the second lawsuit between the parties. According to Defendant,
Plaintiff attempted to change material terms of the parties’ negotiated settlement—namely, to
make liquidated damages for future disparagement solely Defendant’s obligation, as opposed to a
mutual obligation—in his revisions to the draft agreement. When a dispute between the parties
resulted, Plaintiff then filed the second lawsuit for claims which, in Defendant’s view, properly
belong in the present action and were within the purview of the parties’ binding MOU. Defendant
accuses Plaintiff of “keeping [the second lawsuit] in his back pocket for later[,] like trying to add
pieces to a chess board after the match has already started and ended” and using the second action
“as leverage in Plaintiff’s apparent attempt to further harass Defendant, drive up the litigation
costs, and renegotiate this matter’s resolution.” (ECF No. 60-1 at 6-7).
Plaintiff 	counters 	that 	the 	competing 	settlement 	drafts 	exposed 	a 	genuine
misunderstanding between the parties on an issue that had not been discussed, nor agreed to, during
negotiations. While she concedes that both parties intended for the settlement agreement to include
the claims in her second lawsuit, Plaintiff maintains that the claims in the two lawsuits share no
common facts and need not be prosecuted in the same action. Plaintiff explains that the second
lawsuit was an attempt to preserve her claims when, in her view, Defendant sought to expand the
scope of the liquidated damages provision, introduced a dispute, and thereby brought into question
the status of the settlement.
The Court acknowledges Defendant’s fruitless attempts to schedule mediation and
understands 	Defendant’s 	skepticism 	about 	Plaintiff’s 	explanations 	pertaining 	to 	both 	the
unscheduled mediation and the second lawsuit. The Court agrees that if Plaintiff’s counsel
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deliberately evaded returning to mediation to buy time to file a new lawsuit, such conduct would
constitute bad faith. However, the record is not sufficiently developed to make such a finding and,
for the reasons explained above, the Court is not taking up the issues of interpreting and enforcing
the MOU in the context of Defendant’s present motion for sanctions. Nor have the parties called
on this Court to consider the appropriateness of consolidating the two actions. The Court is
therefore not currently positioned to evaluate, for example, whether either party’s arguments
concerning the liquidated damages provision have a reasonable (as opposed to pretextual) basis,
or whether the claims in the two actions are so interrelated that Plaintiff clearly filed an improper
suit to harass Defendant. If it later appears that Plaintiff has, in bad faith, attempted to use the
second lawsuit against Defendant as some form of leverage in a settlement dispute, the Court may
return to the question of sanctions at such time.
The parties are directed to return to mediation, with set deadlines to ensure that this action
moves forward. The Court continues to encourage the parties to attempt a good faith resolution of
their settlement disputes with Judge Prebil.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 60) is
DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, the Order Referring Case to Alternative Dispute
Resolution (Doc. 23) is amended as follows: the ADR conference(s) before the parties’ designated
neutral, Judge Prebil, shall be concluded no later than March 9, 2026, unless extended by order of
the Court. All other terms and deadlines remain in effect. Any violation of this Order may result
in severe sanctions, up to and including dismissal of this action with prejudice.
SHIRLEY PADMORE MENSAH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dated: January 13, 2026.
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