USA v. Troupe

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v. 	No. 4:24-cr-555-MAL
RONALD M. TROUPE,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Having 	reviewed 	de 	novo 	the 	report 	and 	recommendation 	from 	the
magistrate judge1, Doc. 53, the Court accepts the recommendation and DENIES
Defendant Ronald M. Troupe’s motion to suppress evidence, Doc. 32. The Court fully
sustains, adopts, and incorporates the report, supplementing its reasoning here.
Analysis
Because Troupe objects to the report, the Court reviews the motion and the
report de novo. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). 	The Court conducted a de novo review of
all 	matters 	relating 	to 	Troupe’s 	motion—including 	a 	thorough 	review 	of 	the
evidentiary hearing held before the magistrate judge and the parties’ briefing—and
finds that the magistrate judge’s report persuasively addresses the motion. 	The
Court is not persuaded by Troupe’s subsequent objections to the report which raise
the same arguments and issues that were before the magistrate judge.
The Court adds that Troupe’s objections, even if correct, fall far short of
showing the kind of conduct that, if proven, justify the extraordinary remedy of
suppressing evidence. 	“[S]uppression is not an automatic consequence of a Fourth
Amendment violation. Instead, the question turns on the culpability of the police and
the potential of exclusion to deter wrongful police conduct.” United States v. Houck,
888 F.3d 957, 959–60 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135,
1 United States Magistrate Judge Shirley P. Mensah.
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137 (2009)). 	The exclusionary rule is a judicially created prudential remedy, and
“there is always a ‘high obstacle for those urging application of the rule.’” 	Lange v.
California, 594 U.S. 295, 317 (2021) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Pennsylvania
Bd. of Prob. And Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364–65 (1998)). 	Excluding evidence
“obstructs the truth-finding functions of judge and jury,” creating a “downstream risk
that ‘some guilty defendants may go free or receive reduced sentence.’ ” 	Id at 318.
(citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984) (citation modified)). 	The
remedy is only appropriate when needed to deter “intentional conduct that was
patently unconstitutional.” Herring, 555 U.S. at 143.
The Court agrees with the magistrate judge’s report that neither Troupe’s
Fourth 	nor 	Fifth 	Amendment 	rights 	were 	violated. 	The 	report 	persuasively
establishes why. And Troupe’s objections to the portions of the report addressing the
alleged Fourth Amendment violations do not persuade the Court otherwise. But even
if Troupe could establish a Fourth Amendment violation, this would not justify
suppressing any evidence because Troupe fails show that the officers engaged in
“intentional conduct that was patently unconstitutional.” Id.
For example, Troupe objects that an officer dispatched to a high-crime gas
station to search for and question a black male named Que who, according to a 911
caller, had been harassing a woman at the gas station just 20 minutes before, see Doc.
53 at 7, did not have reasonable suspicion to briefly detain him for an investigation
because he was driving a “large” gray “12-to-15 person van” rather than a gray
“pickup truck” as described by a 911 caller the day before Doc. 54 at 8; Doc. 42 at 50–
51. 	But the call that the officer was actually responding to described the suspect’s
vehicle as just a gray “truck.” The “pickup truck” call was from the day before, and it
was only forwarded to the officer because it was possibly—but not necessarily—
related. 	Doc. 42 at 12–13. 	That so, the “pickup truck” call is not dispositive as to
whether the officer had a reasonable suspicion to briefly detain Troupe. Just because
a suspect’s “truck” might be a “pickup truck” does not mean that it must be a “pickup
truck.”
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The officer reasonably could have suspected that Troupe’s vehicle was the
“truck” described in the call she was responding to. 	As the magistrate judge noted,
“it is not unusual for people to use the word ‘truck’ to describe large vehicles.” 	Doc.
53 at 3. That is especially true for distressed 911 callers in the heat of the moment.
Indeed, in this particular officer’s experience, it was not uncommon for people calling
the police to mix up trucks and vans. Doc. 42 at 19–20. She had responded to calls
describing a truck before that she would have described differently. 	Id. at 20. 	But
even if it was unusual, it is not so unusual that the officer’s brief investigatory
detention 	of 	Troupe, 	given 	the 	totality 	of 	the 	circumstance, 	“was 	patently
unconstitutional.” Herring, 555 U.S. at 143. Such objections fall far short of showing
the type of unconstitutional conduct that comes close to justifying suppressing
evidence that might let a guilty defendant go free.
Conclusion
The 	Court 	accepts, 	adopts, 	and 	incorporates 	in 	full 	the 	report’s
recommendation to deny Troupe’s motion. 	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
Troupe’s motion to suppress evidence, Doc. 32, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED,
This 6th day of March, 2026.
___________________________________
MARIA A. LANAHAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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