USA v. Woods

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. 4:24-cr-00485-SRC
)
EUGENE WOODS, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
Memorandum and Order
Eugene Woods has three pending pretrial motions before the Court: (1) a motion to
dismiss, doc. 32; (2) a motion to suppress statements, doc. 33; (3) and a motion to suppress
evidence, doc. 34.
I. 	Procedural history
The Court referred Woods’s motions to United States Magistrate Judge John M.
Bodenhausen pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). See doc. 1. On August 25, 2025, Judge
Bodenhausen issued a Report and Recommendation, recommending that the Court: (1) deny
Woods’s Motion to Dismiss, doc. 32; (2) grant Woods’s Motion to Suppress Statements Under
the Fifth Amendment and Miranda v. Arizona, doc. 33; and (3) deny Woods’s Motion to
Suppress Evidence Under the Fourth Amendment, doc. 34. Doc. 58 at 33 (The Court cites to
page numbers as assigned by CM/ECF.). Woods filed timely objections to the R&R, doc. 59, the
United States responded to Woods’s objections, doc. 61, and Woods filed a reply, doc. 62.
II. 	Standard
When a party objects to a magistrate judge’s R&R, the district judge must conduct a de
novo review of the portions of the report, findings, or recommendations to which the party
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objects. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (“A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination
of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which
objection is made.”); United States v. Lothridge, 324 F.3d 599, 600 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)). In making its de novo determination, the Court reviewed the record related
to Woods’s motions.
III. 	Statement of facts
For convenience, the Court includes the findings of fact from the R&R with supporting
citations. The Court has noted any modifications, based on its de novo review, below.
Preston Billingsley is a patrol officer with the City of Hazelwood, Missouri, Police
Department. 	[Doc. 54, Evid. Tr. at 61:17–62:10.] As of the evidentiary hearing,
Officer Billingsley had about six years of law enforcement experience, including
four with Hazelwood. [Id.] Officer Billingsley is assigned to “the neighborhood
patrol group.” [Id. at 62:5–62:6.] His duties include responding to calls for service
and patrolling within the city limits. [Id. at 62:17–62:20.]
At about 7:17 a.m., on July 6, 2024, Officer Billings[ley] was dispatched to a
Phillips 66 gas station relative to a reported theft from a vehicle. [Doc. 54, Evid.
Tr. at 62:21–63:6.] Officer Billings[ley] testified that the victim parked his work
truck next to the gas station while visiting a neighboring establishment. 	[Id. at
63:15–63:17.] When the victim returned, “he discovered that his shoulder strap bag
was missing from his work vehicle.” 	[Id. at 63:17–63:19.] 	The victim reported
that the bag contained a Glock 17 firearm. [Id. at 64:1–64:7.] Officer Billingsley
reviewed video surveillance footage from the gas station and observed a male exit
a Jeep Cherokee, enter the work truck, exit with the victim’s bag, and drive away
in the Jeep. [Id. at 64:20–64:24.]
Doc. 58 at 2.
The Court notes that the R&R uses “Officer Billings” at times, see, e.g., id. at 2, but the
Court finds that the correct spelling is “Officer Billingsley.” Doc. 54, Evid. Tr. at 61:4–61:7.
Officer Billingsley explained that the City of Hazelwood uses a license plate reader
system called “Flock.” [Id. at 65:8–65:9.] Using the Flock system, he was able to
identify the license plate on the Jeep Cherokee he observed in the gas station
surveillance footage. [Id. at 65:9–66:4.] Officer Billingsley explained that the Jeep
in the surveillance footage had distinctive stickers that were visible in the images
obtained from the Flock system. [Id. at 65:16–65:22.] With this information, he
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was able to identify the license plate information for the Jeep Cherokee, and
thereafter “positively identify” the make, model, and VIN of the suspect’s vehicle.
[Id. at 66:2–66:4.]
Officer Billingsley testified that REJIS is a law enforcement tool used to share
information between law enforcement agencies in the area. 	[Id. at 66:7–66:11.]
Officer Billingsley entered the Jeep Cherokee information into the REJIS database
as a vehicle that was wanted relative to the bag and firearm theft. 	[Id. at 66:7–
66:18.] He also entered the stolen firearm into REJIS. [Id. at 66:19–66:21.]
Doc. 58 at 2–3.
The Court notes that the R&R states that Officer Billingsley entered the Jeep into the
REJIS database as a vehicle wanted relative to the bag and firearm theft, id. at 3, but the
transcript specifies that the Jeep was entered as wanted for stealing a firearm from a vehicle (not
the bag). See doc. 54, Evid. Tr. at 66:7–66:18.
Joel Carvajal is a patrol officer with the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department
(SLMPD). [Id. at 8:2–8:22.] As of the evidentiary hearing, Officer Carvajal had
about two years of experience. [Id. at 8:5–8:8.] Officer Carvajal’s duties include
responding to calls for service. [Id. at 8:13–8:17.]
Officer Carvajal was on duty during the late-afternoon/early-evening hours of July
6, 2024. [Id. at 8:18–8:20.] At that time, he was operating alone in a marked patrol
car in the area of Hampton Avenue and I-44. [Id. at 8:23–9:3, 12:1–12:5.] At about
5:50 p.m., Officer Carvajal received information regarding a “license plate reader
hit” for a Jeep Grand Cherokee that was wanted out of Hazelwood. [Id. at 10:7–
10:22, 11:11–11:17.] 	Officer Carvajal testified that the information was relayed
from a detective in the “real-time crime center” (RTCC) which is a camera unit.
[Id. at 10:25–11:12.] 	He further explained that the information was relayed first
from RTCC and then from the dispatcher. 	[Id. at 11:20–11:25.] 	The Jeep was
located at a QuikTrip on Hampton Avenue, which was about 30 seconds from
Officer Carvajal’s location. [Id. at 12:6–12:20.]
At the hearing, the [United States] played portions of the dispatch recording, [Ex.
2 at 00:00–3:49], which included the report from the RTCC detective, [see doc. 54,
Evid. Tr. at 13:20–16:2.] The detective advised that there was a green Jeep Grand
Cherokee on the lot of the QuikTrip and that the vehicle was “wanted for stealing
a firearm today” out of Hazelwood. 	[Ex. 2 at 00:23–00:45.] 	Officer Carvajal
testified that he also communicated with the RTCC detective via cell phone so that
the detective could instruct Officer Carvajal where the Jeep was located. [Doc. 54,
Evid. Tr. at 15:15–15:23.] The dispatch recording corroborates his testimony. [See
Ex. 2 at 00:00–3:49.]
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Once Officer Carvajal positively identified the Jeep Cherokee in question, he
noticed that it was unoccupied, so he positioned his patrol vehicle on the other side
of the parking lot. [ Doc. 54, Evid. Tr. at 16:21–17:6.] Officer Carvajal observed
a man, later identified as Woods, “running out of the QuikTrip with numerous
items.” [Id. at 17:22–18:3.] Officer Carvajal activated the lights and siren of his
marked vehicle and positioned it to prevent Woods from driving away. [Id. at 19:4–
19:5.] Officer Carvajal testified that he observed Woods to be wearing a chest bag
or cross-body bag across his chest, and that he knew it was easy to hide and retrieve
firearms with such bags. [Id. at 19:15–20:7.]
Doc. 58 at 3–4.
The Court notes that while the R&R was unclear as to whether Officer Carvajal observed
the bag before or after he drew his gun, the Court finds that the transcript supports that Officer
Carvajal observed the bag after he had drawn his gun. See doc. 54, Evid. Tr. at 19:7–19:20.
Officer Carvajal drew his weapon, pointed it at Woods, and directed him to exit the
vehicle and to lay on the ground. 	[Id. at 19:6–19:14, 20:13–20:17.] 	Officer
Carvajal testified that he observed Woods reach for the bag with his right hand. [Id.
at 21:9–21:14.] Woods eventually complied and went to the ground. [Id. at 20:16–
20:20.] 	Officer Carvajal removed the bag from Woods and tossed it to the side.
[Id. at 38:22–39:10.] Officer Carvajal explained that he took these actions because
he considered this to be a “felony stop” and he had safety concerns. [Id. at 20:24–
21:14.]
The body camera and dash camera recordings in evidence corroborate Officer
Carvajal’s testimony concerning the initial moments of his encounter with Woods.
[See Ex. B (Officer Carvajal’s dash camera) at 00:00–2:00; Ex. B (Officer
Carvajal’s body camera) at 0:00–2:05.] For example, Woods was slow to exit the
Jeep and when he did, he was wearing a one-strap, cross-body bag which would be
the same as or similar to the bag stolen earlier that day. [Ex. B (Officer Carvajal’s
body camera) at 00:34–1:07.] The video confirms that Woods reached for the bag,
and Officer Carvajal’s reaction is entirely consistent with an officer’s reasonable
safety concerns. [Id. at 1:04–1:34.]
Doc. 58 at 4–5.
The Court notes that when Officer Carvajal tells Woods, “Don’t f*cking reach, dude,”
Woods responds with, “I’m not, bro. I ain’t got nothing. Check it, bro. Ain’t nothing in there,
man.” Ex. B (Officer Carvajal’s body camera) at 1:20–1:30. Based on the video, it appears that
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Officer Carvajal and Woods are discussing Woods’s reaching for the bag. See id. Woods’s
request to have Officer Carvajal search his bag came before his hands were handcuffed, but
while Officer Carvajal had his firearm drawn. See id.
Shortly after Officer Carvajal ordered Woods to the ground, another officer arrived.
[Id. at 21:15–21:18; see also Ex. B (Officer Carvajal’s body camera) at 01:20–
1:35.] 	Officer Carvajal handcuffed Woods for safety reasons while the police
further investigated the situation. 	[Doc. 54, Evid. Tr. at 21:19–22:3.] 	Officer
Carvajal testified that he handcuffed Woods within about one minute of his first
contact with him. 	[Id. at 38:19–38:21; see also Ex. B (Officer Carvajal’s body
camera) at 00:36–1:50.] 	The officers contacted the Hazelwood Police who
requested that the SLMPD officers “sit with the [Jeep] until they got some people
out there to tow the vehicle.” [Doc. 54, Evid. Tr. at 22:4–22:9.] The Hazelwood
Police also asked the SLMPD officers to hold Woods for further questioning. [Id.
at 22:10–22:17.]
After securing Woods, Officer Carvajal confirmed that Woods ran out of QuikTrip
because Woods had stolen “a couple of hot dogs [and] a drink.” 	[Id. at 22:22–
23:13.]
Doc. 58 at 5.
The Court notes that the transcript reflects that the prosecutor asked Officer Carvajal
what he learned when he went into the “7-Eleven,” which the Court believes was a mistaken
reference to QuikTrip, since “7-Eleven” doesn’t bear any relevance to this case. Doc. 54, Evid.
Tr. at 22:22–23:13.
The officers also ran a record check and learned that Woods had an outstanding
bench warrant from the City of St. Louis. 	[Id. at 23:14–23:18.] 	According to
records produced by the [United States, Ex. 3], the warrant was issued in May 2021,
with a bond set at $250. The officers eventually decided to arrest Woods on the
outstanding warrant and for stealing from QuikTrip. [Id. at 27:21–28:3.]
Doc. 58 at 5.
The Court notes that Officer Carvajal testified that Woods was also arrested on “his
wanted card from Hazelwood.” Doc. 54, Evid. Tr. at 27:21–28:3.
Based on the request from the Hazelwood police, the SLMPD police did not search
the Jeep but generally secured the scene. 	[Id. at 28:7–28:24.] 	Officer Carvajal
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testified that, had Hazelwood not requested that the SLMPD hold the Jeep, the
SLMPD would have inventoried the Jeep prior to having it towed. [Id. at 28:25–
29:12.] This testimony was corroborated by the body camera recording submitted
as evidence wherein the officers can be heard discussing inventorying the Jeep.
[Ex. C at 43:20–45:20.]
During the evidentiary hearing, it was revealed that two Glock firearm magazines
were recovered from the bag by an officer named Taluva, and that the SLMPD
officers placed the bag and magazines inside the Jeep. [Doc. 54, Evid. Tr. at 44:5–
45:1; Ex. C at 40:00–45:20.] Those items were not inventoried or documented by
the SLMPD in any report. [Id. at 45:13–46:17.] Officer Carvajal testified that such
information probably should have been in a report. [Id.]
Based on the available record, it appears [to Judge Bodenhausen] from the video
recordings and hearing testimony that the SLMPD officers were in contact with the
Hazelwood Police via cell phone, and that the Hazelwood Police asked the SLMPD
officers to place the bag and magazines in the Jeep for them. [See doc. 54, Evid.
Tr. at 28:7–28:15; Ex. C at 43:00–44:50.] Officer Carvajal, who was a relatively
new officer at the time[, see doc. 54, Evid. Tr. at 8:5–8:8,] asked his more
experienced officers how to handle this situation and complied with their directions.
[Id. at 51:15–51:23.] Some of this exchange was included in [Woods’s] Exhibit C,
which was a portion of the body camera recording of SLMPD Officer Curt.
Officer Billingsley testified that he spoke with an officer on the scene of the
QuikTrip incident and that the suspect’s description led Officer Billingsley to
conclude that it was the same person he suspected of the theft earlier that day. [Doc.
54, Evid. Tr. at 67:11–67:23.] Officer Billingsley also learned that the [sic] Woods
was going to be arrested by the SLMPD so he put in a wanted for Woods so that he
would be held. [Id. at 67:24–68:5.]
Most of the details regarding the towing and search of the Jeep are not in the record.
The hearing transcript and exhibits establish that, during the morning of July 7,
2024, Hazelwood Detective Makil Walker applied for and received a warrant to
search the Jeep. [Id. at 68:24–70:17; Ex. 1A; Ex. 1B; Ex. 1C.] The warrant was
issued by St. Louis County Judge Dillon-Amelung. [Doc. 54, Evid. Tr. at 70:9–11;
Ex. 1C.] Officer Billingsley testified that, based on the warrant, the police searched
the Jeep and recovered the victim’s shoulder bag, the firearm, magazines, and drug
paraphernalia. [Id. at 70:19–71:9.]
Also on July 7, 2024, Officer Billingsley retrieved Woods from the St. Louis Justice
Center and transported him to Hazelwood where he was booked for the theft. [Id.
at 71:10–71:19.] After booking him, Officer Billingsley placed Woods in a suspect
interview room and advised him of his Miranda rights using a written form. [Id. at
72:7–73:20; Ex.4; Ex. 5.] 	[Judge Bodenhausen found] that Woods was provided
constitutionally satisfactory Miranda warnings, he understood his rights, he
reviewed the form, and he clearly indicated he did not want to speak when he wrote
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“NO” next to the portion of the form which read, “Knowing and understanding your
rights and under no promises, threats, or other coercion of any kind, do you wish to
talk about this incident at this time.” [Ex. 4.] Thereafter, Woods changed his mind
and decided to speak with Officer Billingsley. [Ex. 5 at 00:00–05:20.]
What happened between the time Woods invoked his right to remain silent and
when he changed his mind is best understood by reference to the video recording
of the interview, which is documented in [the United States’] Exhibit 5. With his
Motion to Suppress Statements[, doc. 33,] Woods offered a transcript of the relevant
exchange between Officer Billingsley and Woods. [Doc. 33 at 3–5.] The [United
States] has not disputed the accuracy of that transcript. 	[Judge Bodenhausen]
reviewed the proffered transcript and the recording and [found] that the transcript
appears sufficiently accurate. Accordingly, it is reproduced as follows:
Billingsley: 	And then here it’s asking, do you want to talk yes or no? So you just
type, write in yes or no. Sign, print. 	You’re gonna read this
statement here. Just make sure it’s all okay with you.
Woods: 	Right here? [reading quietly]
Billingsley: 	Yes or no, and then print. And sign.
Woods: 	So what if I don’t want to talk about it?
Billingsley: 	If at any point when we start talking and you wish to stop talking,
you can do that. So if you say yes now and then we start having a
conversation and you change your mind later on, you can do that.
Woods: 	Well, I mean, what about, like, don’t want to talk right now?
Billingsley: 	Then I’m gonna present my case as is to St. Louis County with or
without your statement.
Woods: 	It don’t make no sense for me to say nothing because you know what
I’m saying. You will present it anyway, right?
Billingsley: 	Yeah, but I think your cooperation probably goes a long way with,
with the prosecution and our judge. 	So if we talk and whatever
statements you make, if it’s clean and honest statements, I’m sure
that’ll go a long way. If you refuse to talk, then they only have my
side of the story, they only have my evidence. 	And you haven’t
offered any statements to refute or to say, yeah, uh, you know what,
I messed up or not, so it’s really up to you.
Woods: 	[writes “NO” on the form asking if he wishes to talk about the
incident]
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Billingsley: 	[sees Woods write “NO” and asks:] Okay. You don’t want to make
a statement?
Woods: 	[Shakes head no]
Billingsley: 	All right. Do you know why you’re here?
Woods: 	Yeah.
Billingsley: 	For what?
Woods: 	They say I stole that gun off the, um, gas station lot or something.
Billingsley: 	Okay, yep. 	That’s pretty much. 	That’s the, that’s the thing. So if
you don’t want to talk. You don’t have to talk about it. I have more
than sufficient evidence to move forward.
Woods: 	Yeah, but, um like, I’m not being no a-hole or nothing bad, not
talking. I just don’t want to, know what I’m saying, put myself in a
worser position, man. You know what I’m saying?
Billingsley: 	I understand. Well, I. I think it’s already a position, but it’s gonna
be. It is what it is. Come on.
Woods: 	You said [unintelligible]?
Billingsley: 	Yeah.
Woods: 	Come on, man. We can talk.
Billingsley: 	So you do want to talk? Okay.
Woods: 	I mean, is it gonna make it any better for me, man?
Billingsley: 	Me personally, I would say being honest and truthful, I can tell the
judge and prosecutor that.
Woods: 	Yeah. I’m not, uh, being untruthful. I’m just ain’t saying nothing.
Uh, you know what I’m saying? I mean, you say you already got
the case, so what we need to talk about?
Billingsley: 	I 	think 	your 	cooperation 	will 	show 	your 	willingness 	to 	the
prosecution that you want to resolve this and do right. That’s all I’m
saying.
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Woods: 	Hey man, look –
Billingsley: 	I’m not gonna. You said no, I’m not gonna force you into. If you
don’t want to talk that’s fine.
Woods: 	But I don’t want you to invent, you know, be all, you know, in your
feelings and try to dog me out about it.
Billingsley: 	I’m not in my feelings. Look, don’t. Look, I’ve built the case. The
evidence will speak for itself. 	I don’t have to say a word to the
prosecution. 	All I gotta do is hand them a report with all of my
evidence, and they gonna make a decision. I don’t even have to say
anything. So you talking or not talking is no disrespect to me. All
right?
Woods: 	Look, come on, man, I’m gonna make a statement.
Billingsley: 	All right have a seat.
[Ex. 5 at 00:00–5:20; see also id.]
About five minutes total elapsed from the time Woods and Officer Billingsley
entered the interview room until Woods indicated he wanted to make a statement.
[See Ex. 5 at 00:00–5:20.] After Woods stated that he wanted to make a statement,
the parties sat back down at the table in the interview room. [Id at 05:14–05:20.]
Officer Billingsley crossed out the “NO” on the warning and waiver form, wrote
down “YES” and asked Woods to initial the form next to the word “YES.” [Id. at
05:25–05:35; Ex. 4.] Woods initialed the form. [Ex. 5 at 05:35–05:39.] Thereafter,
Officer Billingsley briefly summarized the evidence he had, including video
evidence showing Woods stealing the bag from the truck. [Id. at 05:55–6:20.]
Officer Billingsley testified that he interviewed Woods a second time, about an hour
later, in the holding area. [Doc. 54, Evid. Tr. at 96:5–96:21.] He did not provide
new Miranda warnings. [Id. at 101:9–101:19.] He testified that it was his normal
practice to say something like, “‘With your rights in mind,’ and ask whatever
questions that need to be asked.” [Id.] This second interview was not recorded and
was only addressed briefly by the parties during the evidentiary hearing. 	[Id. at
96:22–97:9.]
Doc. 58 at 5–10.
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IV. 	Discussion
A. 	Motion to dismiss
“[T]o preserve the issue for further review,” Woods objects to the Judge Bodenhausen’s
recommendation to deny his Motion to Dismiss. Doc. 59 at 1–2. Having reviewed the record,
the Court agrees with Judge Bodenhausen’s conclusion that Eighth Circuit precedent requires the
Court to deny Woods’s Motion to Dismiss, doc. 32, and overrules Woods’s objection, doc. 59 at
1–2. See doc. 58 at 10.
B. 	Motion to suppress statements
Judge Bodenhausen recommends granting Woods’s Motion to Suppress Statements,
detailing his reasoning with a lengthy and thoughtful analysis. Doc. 58 at 26–33. The United
States has not filed any objection to the Judge Bodenhausen’s findings or conclusions on the
Motion to Suppress Statements. See doc. 61 at 3 n.1. Accordingly, the Court adopts Judge
Bodenhausen’s findings and conclusions of law related to Woods’s Motion to Suppress
Statements, doc. 58 at 26–33, and grants Woods’s Motion to Suppress Statements, doc. 33.
C. 	Motion to suppress evidence
Woods objects to Judge Bodenhausen’s recommendation to deny his Motion to Suppress
Evidence. Doc. 59 at 2–6. The Court addresses each of Woods’s objections issues in turn.
1. 	Detention of the Jeep and Woods
Woods objects to the Judge Bodenhausen’s “conclusion that the initial seizure and
detention were investigatory stops that need only meet the reasonable-suspicion standard from
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).” Doc. 59 at 2. Additionally, Woods objects to Judge
Bodenhausen’s “conclusion that Officer Carvajal had reasonable suspicion to detain the Jeep and
Mr. Woods at the QuikTrip.” Id. at 3. Woods argues that his initial seizure “was a de facto arrest
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requiring probable cause.” Id. at 2. Woods raised this argument in his motion, see doc. 34 at 6–
7, but it was not addressed in the R&R, see doc. 58.
The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable . . . seizures.” U.S. Const. amend
IV. The Supreme Court has held that “the police can stop and briefly detain a person for
investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that
criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if the officer lacks probable cause.” United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). “In making reasonable-
suspicion determinations, reviewing courts ‘must look at the “totality of the circumstances” of
each case to see whether the detaining officer has a “particularized and objective basis” for
suspecting legal wrongdoing.’” United States v. Martinez-Cortes, 566 F.3d 767, 769 (8th Cir.
2009) (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)). “In developing this
suspicion, officers may ‘rely on information provided by other officers as well as any
information known to the team of officers conducting the investigation.’” United States v.
Johnson, 31 F.4th 618, 622 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Allen, 705 F.3d 367, 370
(8th Cir. 2013)).
“An investigative detention may start lawfully yet not stay that way.” Pollreis v. Marzolf,
9 F.4th 737, 744 (8th Cir. 2021). “[A]n initially reasonable investigative stop can become
unreasonable if it was ‘excessively intrusive in its scope or manner of execution.’” Id. at 745
(quoting El-Ghazzawy v. Berthiaume, 636 F.3d 452, 457 (8th Cir. 2011)). “A de facto arrest takes
place “if the officers’ conduct is more intrusive than necessary for an investigative stop.” United
States v. Raino, 980 F.2d 1148, 1149 (8th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). “To establish an
unreasonably prolonged detention, the [complaining party] must show that the officer detained
him beyond the amount of time otherwise justified by the purpose of the stop and did so without
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reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Donnelly, 475 F.3d 946, 951–52 (8th Cir. 2007). The
Eighth Circuit has “observed that this line ‘can be hazy.’” Pollreis, 9 F.4th at 745 (citation
omitted). “An investigative detention can become an arrest if it ‘lasts for an unreasonably long
time or if officers use unreasonable force.’” Id. (quoting Waters v. Madson, 921 F.3d 725, 736
(8th Cir. 2019)). “There is ‘no rigid time limitation on Terry stops,’ . . . but a stop may be too
long if it involves ‘delay unnecessary to the legitimate investigation of the law enforcement
officers.’” United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 917 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v.
Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985)).
To determine whether an investigative stop became an arrest, the Court must consider
several factors:
(1) the number of officers and police cars involved; (2) the nature of the crime and
whether there is reason to believe the suspect might be armed; (3) the strength of
the officers’ articulable, objective suspicions; (4) the erratic behavior of or
suspicious movements by the persons under observation; and (5) the need for
immediate action by the officers and lack of opportunity for them to have made the
stop in less threatening circumstances.
Pollreis, 9 F.4th at 745. The Court addresses each factor in turn.
First, the Court considers “the number of officers and police cars involved.” Id. 	When
analyzing this factor, the Eighth Circuit has considered whether the number of officers
“display[ed] an excessive police presence.” United States v. Childers, 73 F.4th 960, 964 (8th Cir.
2023). In Woods’s Motion to Suppress, he claims that “two officers and two police vehicles
were present when Mr. Woods was handcuffed.” Doc. 34 at 6. The record supports that Officer
Carvajal was the only officer on scene when he ordered Woods out of the Jeep and onto the
ground. Doc. 54, Evid. Tr. at 21:15–21:18.; Ex. B (Officer Carvajal’s body camera) at 00:00–
01:28. Another officer, however, did arrive shortly after Woods laid on the ground. Ex. B
(Officer Carvajal’s body camera) at 00:00–01:32. That officer held Woods’s arms so Officer
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Carvajal could place Woods in handcuffs. Id. at 01:29–02:05. Two officers and two police cars
are not a display of an excessive police presence given that officers had reasonable suspicion that
Woods possessed the stolen firearm. See Childers, 73 F.4th at 964 (concluding that seven police
officers on scene “did not display an excessive police presence given that an illegal firearm
discharge had been reported involving three individuals in a public park”). As such, this factor
weighs in favor of an investigative stop.
Second, the Court considers “the nature of the crime and whether there is reason to
believe the suspect might be armed.” Pollreis, 9 F.4th at 745. When examining this factor, the
Eighth Circuit has considered whether the “nature of the suspected crime elevated police
concerns for the safety of the public and themselves” and whether “[i]t was reasonable to believe
that the persons [officers] identified and approached might be armed.” See Childers, 73 F.4th at
964. Woods claims that Officer Carvajal knew only that the Jeep was wanted in connection with
theft of a firearm, that Officer Carvajal had no information that Woods was a suspect, and that
neither Woods’s behavior nor appearance suggested he was armed. Doc. 34 at 7. The record
supports—and Woods concedes—that Officer Carvajal knew that the Jeep was involved in a
theft of a firearm. Officer Carvajal testified that the fact the Jeep was wanted for its involvement
in the theft of a firearm raised safety concerns for him. Doc. 54, Evid. Tr. at 18:9–18:16.
Because the Jeep was wanted for its involvement in theft of a firearm, Officer Carvajal had
reasonable suspicion that the driver of the wanted vehicle was armed. As such, this factor
weighs in favor of an investigative stop.
Third, the Court considers “the strength of the officers’ articulable, objective suspicions.”
Pollreis, 9 F.4th at 745. Woods claims that Officer Carvajal “knew almost nothing.” Doc. 34 at
7. Specifically, Woods claims that Officer Carvajal did not know when the theft occurred, if the
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Jeep belonged to the theft victim or suspect, or anything about the suspect. Id. The record
reflects that—regardless of whether he knew the date—Officer Carvajal knew the Jeep was
wanted in connection of a theft of a firearm. Doc. 54, Evid. Tr. at 17:4–5. Additionally, after
identifying the Jeep as the wanted vehicle, Officer Carvajal observed a man, later identified as
Woods, “running out of the QuikTrip with numerous items”—which were later determined
stolen—and entering the Jeep. See id. at 17:25–18:3; 23:1–23:13. Officer Carvajal had
articulable, objective suspicions that Woods was engaged in criminal activity. Officer Carvajal
had reasonable suspicion that: (1) the Jeep was associated with a theft of a firearm; (2) the driver
of the Jeep committed the theft, and (3) the driver of the Jeep possessed the stolen firearm. As
such, this factor weighs in favor of an investigative stop.
Fourth, the Court considers “the erratic behavior of or suspicious movements by the
persons under observation.” Pollreis, 9 F.4th at 745. Woods claims that he “did not act
erratically or suspiciously” and “complied with Officer Carvajal’s commands.” Doc. 34 at 7.
However, the record reflects that Officer Carvajal observed a man, later identified as Woods,
“running out of the QuikTrip with numerous items”—which were later determined stolen—and
entering the wanted Jeep. See doc. 54, Evid. Tr. at 17:25–18:3; 23:1–23:13. Woods took his
time getting out of the Jeep and did not appear anxious or particularly hurried when Officer
Carvajal ordered him out of the Jeep. See Ex. B (Officer Carvajal’s body camera) at 00:00–1:30.
Before exiting the Jeep, Woods reaches for his chips, hot dogs, and soda in attempt to exit the
Jeep with them. Id. at 00:40–1:05. He then changes his mind, placing the chips and hot dogs on
his dash, exiting the Jeep, and placing his soda on the ground. Id. Woods eventually lays on the
ground and “reached for his bag with his right hand” before the officers placed him in handcuffs.
Doc. 54, Evid. Tr. at . 21:9–21:12; see also Ex. B (Officer Carvajal’s body camera) at 0:56–1:05.
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Officer Carvajal testified that the bag raised concerns because it’s “easy to hide a firearm inside
those bags.” Doc. 54, Evid. Tr. at 20:2–20:5. As such, this factor weighs in favor of an
investigative stop.
Fifth, the Court considers “the need for immediate action by the officers and lack of
opportunity for them to have made the stop in less threatening circumstances.” Pollreis, 9 F.4th
at 745. Woods claims that “Officer Carvajal could have made the stop in less threatening
circumstances.” Doc. 34 at 7. Additionally, Woods claims that Officer Carvajal could have
called “RTCC to confirm that the Jeep he was looking at was the Jeep at issue in the report” and
that “[n]othing indicated that Mr. Woods would have attempted to flee or destroy evidence.” Id.
The Court has already established above that it was reasonable for Officer Carvajal to fear for his
safety because the Jeep was wanted in connection with theft of a firearm, Woods was slow to
comply, and Woods disobeyed commands. At the time of the stop, Officer Carvajal was on scene
by himself and feared for his safety. Doc. 54, Evid. Tr. at 16:4–18:28. Additionally, Officer
Carvajal testified that he called RTCC for assistance in finding the car. Id. at 16:13–16:23. As
such, this factor weighs in favor of an investigative stop.
When considering the totality of the circumstances, analysis of the factors favor
concluding that the investigative stop was not transformed into an arrest. See Pollreis, 9 F.4th at
746 (concluding that the investigative detention did not become an arrest based on the “totality
of the circumstances,” even though the officer put the suspects in handcuffs). Although Officer
Carvajal approached Woods’s vehicle with his weapon drawn and ordered him to the ground,
those measures did not transform the encounter into a de facto arrest. The Eighth Circuit “has
held that neither the partial blocking of a suspect’s automobile nor the officers’ approach to a
suspect’s car with guns drawn elevates an investigative stop into an arrest ‘if the police action is
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reasonable under the circumstances.’” Raino, 980 F.2d at 1149 (quoting United States v. Jones,
759 F.2d 633, 638 (8th Cir. 1985)). Likewise, the Eighth Circuit has held that “drawing a firearm
and handcuffing the suspect does not automatically transform an investigatory stop into an arrest
under Terry” when “an officer has reason to believe a suspect is armed.” Childers, 73 F.4th at
964 (quoting Johnson, 31 F.4th at 623). Here, as previously stated, Officer Carvajal had
reasonable suspicion that: (1) the Jeep was associated with a theft of a firearm; (2) the driver of
the Jeep committed the theft, and (3) the driver of the Jeep possessed the stolen firearm. Officer
Carvajal encountered Woods at a QuikTrip with consumers. The use of Officer Carvajal’s drawn
weapon and firm commands were therefore justified as a precautionary safety measure during a
lawful investigatory stop. “[A]n officer may take such steps as are ‘reasonably necessary to
protect [his] personal safety and to maintain the status quo’ so that the limited purposes of the
stop may be achieved.” Raino, 980 F.2d at 1149 (quoting United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221,
235 (1985)). Once the scene was secure, Officer Carvajal promptly verified Woods’s identity
and determined probable cause for arrest. Doc. 54, Evid. Tr. at 23:1–23:18; Ex. B (Officer
Carvajal’s body camera) at 04:00–07:47. The level of force used was proportionate to the
potential danger and did not exceed the scope of a permissible Terry stop.
Accordingly, the Court overrules Woods’s objections, doc. 59 at 2–3.
a. 	Miscellaneous objections
Woods objects to terms used during the evidentiary hearing and in the R&R. Doc. 59 at
3.
i. 	Use of the term “suspect”
Woods takes issue with Officer Carvajal referring to Woods as a “suspect” during his
testimony at the evidentiary hearing. Doc. 59 at 3. Specifically, Woods takes issue with Officer
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Carvajal testifying that he set up a surveillance “[b]elieving that the suspect would go to the
vehicle if [Officer Carvajal] wasn’t there.” Doc. 54, Evid. Tr. at 17:10–17:14; see also doc. 59 at
3. This lacks merit. At some point (and rather quickly), Woods became a suspect. So, Officer
Carvajal referring to Woods as a suspect in his testimony may merely reflect that once Officer
Carvajal determined Woods to be a suspect, he used that term to refer to Woods generally rather
than to denote Woods’s status at any given point during the events in question.
The use of the term “suspect” does not affect the Court’s determination on any of
Woods’s motions now before the Court. The Court therefore overrules Woods’s objection, doc.
59 at 3.
ii. 	Use of the term “robbery”
Woods also takes issue with the Judge Bodenhausen’s conclusion that “Officer Carvajal
had a reasonable suspicion that (1) the Jeep was associated with a robbery earlier that day; and
(2) that the driver of the Jeep was likely the person who committed the robbery and possessed
the stolen property.” Doc. 58 at 13; see also doc. 59 at 3. Woods points out that “there was no
evidence of a robbery.” Doc. 59 at 3. The Court agrees that the record reflects the Jeep was
wanted in connection with a theft of a firearm (not a robbery). See, e.g., doc. 54, Evid. Tr. at
174–5. While that distinction could under some circumstances have relevance to a court’s
analysis of a particular scenario, the Court finds it has no relevance here. The robbery/theft-of-
firearm distinction does not alter the Court’s analysis of the facts because the totality of the
evidence more than supports a finding of reasonable suspicion. As explained above, the Court
finds Officer Carvajal had reasonable suspicion that: (1) the Jeep was associated with a theft of a
firearm; (2) the driver of the Jeep committed the theft, and (3) the driver of the Jeep possessed
the stolen firearm. The Court therefore overrules Woods’s objection, doc. 59 at 3.
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iii. 	Observing Woods’s bag
Woods takes issue with the Judge Bodenhausen’s conclusion that Officer Carvajal’s
“suspicion increased when Officer Carvajal observed Woods rapidly leaving the QuikTrip
wearing a cross-body band [sic] and carrying items in his hands and entering the wanted Jeep.”
Doc. 58 at 13; see also doc. 59 at 3. The Court agrees with Woods that Officer Carvajal testified
that he saw the cross-body bag after he exited the patrol car with his firearm aimed at Woods.
Doc. 54, Evid. Tr. at 19:4–19:22. This finding does not affect the Court’s determination of any
of Woods’s motions now before the Court.
2. 	Search of the bag
Woods challenges the search of his bag, which led to the discovery of two magazines.
Doc. 59 at 3–5. The Court addresses each of Woods’s arguments below in addition to whether
Woods gave officers consent to “check” his bag.
a. 	Woods’s consent
Exhibit B (Officer Carvajal’s body camera) shows that Officer Carvajal tells Woods,
“Don’t f*cking reach, dude,” and Woods responds with, “I’m not, bro. I ain’t got nothing.
Check it, bro. Ain’t nothing in there, man.” Exhibit B (Officer Carvajal’s body camera) at 1:20–
1:30. While neither the parties nor the R&R addressed this request by Woods, the Court on de
novo review finds, based on Officer Carvajal’s body-camera evidence, that Woods requested
Officer Carvajal to search his bag, thereby providing consent. See id. And as discussed above,
Woods requested to have Officer Carvajal search his bag before the officers handcuffed him, but
while Officer Carvajal had his firearm drawn. See id.
“[T]he question [of] whether a consent to a search was in fact ‘voluntary’ or was the
product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the
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totality of all the circumstances.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). “In
deciding whether a consent was voluntary, courts should require the prosecution to prove
voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Chaidez, 906 F.2d 377, 380
(8th Cir. 1990).
“The following characteristics of persons giving consent are relevant when assessing the
voluntariness of their consent: (1) their age, (2) their general intelligence and education,
(3) whether they were intoxicated or under the influence of drugs when consenting, (4) whether
they consented after being informed of their right to withhold consent or of their Miranda rights,
and (5) whether, because they had been previously arrested, they were aware of the protections
afforded to suspected criminals by the legal system.” Chaidez, 906 F.2d at 381 (cleaned up).
Woods has had substantial and prolonged exposure to the criminal-justice system. At the
time of the incident, Woods was a 48-year-old who had 19 criminal cases brought against him, as
well as numerous arrests without conviction, dating back to at least 1993. See doc. 14. He
explained to the Pretrial Officer that he received his GED in 2009 while incarcerated in the
Missouri Department of Corrections. Id. at 2. No evidence in the record suggests that Woods
was intoxicated or under the influence of drugs when consenting, or that Officer Carvajal told
Woods of his right to withhold consent. Woods told Officer Carvajal to “check” his bag roughly
one minute after they encountered each other and before he was placed in handcuffs. See Ex. B
(Officer Carvajal’s body camera) at 00:34–01:30. Woods has been in federal and state custody
and supervised release or probation multiple times over the 31 years preceding his instant
encounter with law enforcement. Id.
“In examining the environment in which consent was given, courts should ask whether
the person who consented: (1) was detained and questioned for a long or short time, (2) was
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threatened, physically intimidated, or punished by the police, (3) relied upon promises or
misrepresentations made by the police, (4) was in custody or under arrest when the consent was
given, (5) was in a public or a secluded place, or (6) either objected to the search or stood by
silently while the search occurred.” Chaidez, 906 F.2d at 381 (cleaned up).
First, the Court examines whether Woods “was detained and questioned for a long or
short time.” Id. At the time of the consent, Officer Carvajal did not question Woods at all.
Instead, Woods told Officer Carvajal to “check” his bag to prove he “ain’t got nothing” after
Officer Carvajal said, “[d]on’t f*cking reach, dude.” Ex. B (Officer Carvajal’s body camera) at
00:34–1:30. The request came roughly a minute after Woods and Officer Carvajal encountered
each other. Id.
Second, the Court must consider whether Woods “was threatened, physically
intimidated, or punished by the police.” Chaidez, 906 F.2d at 381. Officer Carvajal had his
firearm drawn when he ordered Woods out of the Jeep and onto the ground. Ex. B (Officer
Carvajal’s body camera) at 0:00–1:30. While this complicates the issue at hand, it does not
dispose of it. Although Officer Carvajal had his firearm drawn, Woods didn’t appear intimidated
by Officer Carvajal or concerned about his safety. See Ex. B (Officer Carvajal’s body camera) at
00:00–1:30. Woods took his time getting out of the Jeep and did not appear anxious or
particularly hurried. See id. Before exiting the Jeep, Woods reaches for his chips, hot dogs, and
soda in an attempt to exit the Jeep with them. Id. at 00:40–1:05. He then changes his mind,
placing the chips and hot dogs on his dash, exiting the Jeep, and placing his soda on the ground.
Id. Woods then lays on the ground and is placed in handcuffs. Id. at 00:56–1:50. In short, even
though Officer Carvajal had his firearm drawn, Woods engaged in deliberative and methodical
conduct. This behavior is consistent with Woods’s being a seasoned veteran of law-enforcement
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encounters and is even more so when considering Woods had dashed out of QuikTrip with
apparently stolen goods in his hands. Id.; see also doc. 14 at 3–10.
Third, the Court considers whether Woods “relied upon promises or misrepresentations
made by the police.” Chaidez, 906 F.2d at 381. The record reflects no promises or
representations of any kind by the police.
Fourth, the Court must examine whether Woods “was in custody or under arrest when the
consent was given.” Id. The record reflects that Woods was in custody for roughly a minute.
See Ex. B (Officer Carvajal’s body camera) at 00:34–1:30.
Fifth, the Court must consider whether consent “was [given] in a public or a secluded
place.” Chaidez, 906 F.2d at 381. Woods gave consent in the public space outside of a
QuikTrip, which had several vehicles in the parking lot. See Ex. B (Officer Carvajal’s body
camera) at 00:00–1:30. 	This
Sixth, and lastly, the Court examines whether Woods “either objected to the search or
stood by silently while the search occurred.” Chaidez, 906 F.2d at 381. While Woods objected
to the search of the Jeep, Ex. A (Officer Taluva’s body camera) at 01:55–02:27, he did not object
to the search of the bag. The videos that contain parts of the searches show that Woods remained
silent and expressed no objection to the searches of his bag. Ex. B (Officer Carvajal’s body
camera) at 01:20–03:50; Ex. C at 40:00–41:35. And as noted, Woods said to “check it.” Ex. B
(Officer Carvajal’s body camera) at 1:20–1:30.
After considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding Woods’s stating “check
it,” the Court concludes that Woods’s gave knowing, voluntary consent for Officer Carvajal to
“check” his bag. Accordingly, the Court finds that the search of Woods’s bag did not violate
Woods’s Fourth Amendment Rights. See United States v. Meza-Gonzalez, 394 F.3d 587, 592
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(8th Cir. 2005) (“A consensual search does not violate the Fourth Amendment if the consent was
given voluntarily and without coercion.”). Nonetheless, the Court will address Woods’s
objections.
b. 	Attenuation doctrine
Woods next objects to Judge Bodenhausen’s conclusion that the attenuation doctrine
applies. Doc. 59 at 3–5. Judge Bodenhausen concludes that, even if Officer Carvajal lacked
reasonable suspicion, the Court need not suppress the evidence because the “[d]iscovery of the
outstanding bench warrant and learning that Woods had taken items from QuikTrip without
paying attenuate the taint of any possible constitutional deficiency concerning the initial
seizure.” Doc. 58 at 16.
Woods argues that “even assuming arguendo that police developed a lawful basis to
arrest Mr. Woods after the initial seizure, that does not satisfy the attenuation doctrine by itself.”
Doc. 59 at 4 (emphasis in original). Woods claims that “[e]ven after the attenuating
circumstance, the later discovery of evidence must still occur during a lawful search.” Id. Citing
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 339 (2009), Woods contends that a “lawful search incident to
arrest may only include the arrestee’s person and the areas within his immediate control—those
are the ‘boundaries’ of the exception.” Doc. 59 at 4. Woods claims that the search of his bag
was not a lawful search incident to arrest because he was handcuffed and officers had control of
the bag. Id.
The Eighth Circuit, however, has “rejected the notion that an officer’s exclusive control
of an item necessarily removes the item from the arrestee’s area of immediate control.” United
States v. Perdoma, 621 F.3d 745, 750 (8th Cir. 2010). In this case, officers did remove the bag
from Woods’s person; however, the bag was tossed on the ground only feet away from Woods
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while the officers were handcuffing him. See, e.g., Ex. B (Officer Carvajal’s body camera) at
02:00–03:45, 04:40–04:45, 07:50–07:55, 08:37–08:39, 10:05–12:22; Ex. C 26:02–29:49. As
such, the bag was within “the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon
or evidentiary items.” Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
Under the attenuation doctrine, “[e]vidence is admissible when the connection between
unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some
intervening circumstance, so that ‘the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has
been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.’” Utah v. Strieff,
579 U.S. 232, 238 (2016) (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 (2006)). “The
attenuation doctrine evaluates the causal link between the government’s unlawful act and the
discovery of evidence, which often has nothing to do with a defendant’s actions.” Id. at 238.
The Court must consider three factors to determine whether the attenuation doctrine applies. Id.
at 239. First, the Court must “look to the ‘temporal proximity’ between the unconstitutional
conduct and the discovery of evidence to determine how closely the discovery of evidence
followed the unconstitutional search.” Id. (citation omitted). Second, the Court must consider
“the presence of intervening circumstances.” Id. (citation omitted). And third, the Court must
examine “the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.” Id. (citation omitted).
Judge Bodenhausen concluded that the first factor, “temporal proximity,” favors
suppression. Doc. 58 at 17. Woods takes issue with Judge Bodenhausen’s statement that “‘very
little time’ passed between the stop’s initiation and the seizure of incriminating evidence from the
cross-body bag.” Doc. 59 at 4 (citation modified); see also doc. 58 at 17. Based on the videos in
evidence, it appears Officer Taluva first searched the bag less than a minute after handcuffing
Woods, Ex. B (Officer Carvajal’s body camera) at 1:30–3:00. However, another video shows
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Officer Taluva removing the magazines from the bag about 40 minutes after Woods’s arrest, Ex.
C at 40:15–41:25. Either way, this factor favors suppression, which favors Woods.
Judge Bodenhausen concluded that the second factor, “the presence of intervening
circumstances,” favors the United States. Doc. 58 at 17. Specifically, the R&R points out that
officers learned two important facts shortly after detaining Woods: “(1) Woods had an
outstanding bench warrant; and (2) Woods had taken several items from QuikTrip without paying
for them.” Id. “Thus, the police encountered additional facts and circumstances that justified
arresting Woods independent of any alleged theft earlier in the day.” Doc. 58 at 17. The Court
agrees with Judge Bodenhausen’s conclusion that this factor favors the United States.
Judge Bodenhausen concluded the third factor, “the purpose and flagrancy of the alleged
official misconduct,” also favors the United States. Id. Specifically, the R&R points out that
“[n]othing in the record suggests anything close to misconduct that would justify the application
of the exclusionary rule based on the decision to block in the Jeep and detain Woods.” Id. at 18;
see also United States v. Lowry, 935 F.3d 638, 643 (8th Cir. 2019) (explaining that “[f]or the
violation to be flagrant, more severe police misconduct is required than the mere absence of
proper cause for the seizure” (quoting Strieff, 579 U.S. at 243)). Woods does not raise any
objections to this specific finding. See doc. 59. The Court agrees with Judge Bodenhausen’s
conclusion that this factor favors the United States.
Having reviewed the record, the Court overrules Woods’s objections, doc. 59 at 3–5, and
finds the attenuation doctrine would apply in the event the initial seizure was unlawful.
3. 	Search of the Jeep
Woods objects to Judge Bodenhausen’s “conclusion that police had probable cause to
search the Jeep and could search it under the automobile exception.” Doc. 59 at 5. “For an
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automobile or other vehicle, the general rule is that officers may conduct a search, without a
warrant, if they have probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime or contraband will be
found inside.” United States v. Crawford, 93 F.4th 436, 440 (8th Cir. 2024) (citing United States
v. Pacheco, 996 F.3d 508, 513 (8th Cir. 2021)). The Jeep was wanted in connection to a theft of
a firearm and officers had probable cause to believe that evidence of the stolen firearm would be
found inside of the Jeep. See doc. 54, Evid. Tr. at 17:4–6. Judge Bodenhausen found, and
Woods did not object, that “Officer Carvajal was working as part of a larger investigatory team.”
Doc. 58 at 15. Specifically, “Hazelwood Police, the SLMPD RTCC, and Officer Carvajal were
working together and cooperatively, and there was sufficient communication between them
concerning the Jeep and why it was wanted.” Id.; see also United States v. Gonzales, 220 F.3d
922, 925 (8th Cir. 2000) (“Probable cause may be based on the collective knowledge of all of the
law enforcement officers involved in an investigation if . . . some degree of communication
exists between them.”). Judge Bodenhausen further found that “before Woods was taken into
custody, the investigative team had amassed substantial evidence, including video evidence,
showing that the driver of the Jeep stole the bag and firearm, that Woods was indeed the driver,
and that Woods was wearing a cross-body bag at the time of his encounter.” Doc. 58 at 22–23.
Judge Bodenhausen therefore concluded that “there was a strong likelihood that evidence of the
crime would be found inside the Jeep.” Id. at 23. Having reviewed the record, the Court agrees
with Judge Bodenhausen that the automobile exception applies. Doc. 58 at 23.
Woods again raises that the R&R erroneously used the term “robbery” instead of “theft of
a firearm.” Doc. 59 at 3. As noted above, the Court finds this has no bearing on the analysis.
Woods next objects to Judge Bodenhausen’s “conclusion that the police could rely on the
warrant to search the Jeep.” Doc. 59 at 5. Woods argues that the warrant search was tainted by
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Woods’s alleged unlawful arrest. Id. Additionally, Woods argues that because officers placed
Woods’s bag into the Jeep and then used the bag’s presence in the Jeep as the basis for probable
cause, any evidence seized from the warrant requires suppression. Id. at 5–6.
The Court has already determined that under the automobile exception officers had
probable cause to search the Jeep without a warrant. Nevertheless, the Court agrees with Judge
Bodenhausen’s conclusion that the judge issuing the warrant had a substantial basis to conclude
that probable cause existed. As such, the Court overrules Woods’s objections. Doc. 59 at 5–6.
V. 	Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court (1) overrules Woods’s [59] objections, except as noted above;
(2) sustains, adopts, and incorporates Judge Bodenhausen’s [58] Report and Recommendation,
excepted as noted above; (3) denies Woods’s [32] Motion to Dismiss; (4) grants Woods’s
[33] Motion to Suppress Statements; and (5) denies Woods’s [34] Motion to Suppress Evidence.
So ordered this 2nd day of December 2025.
STEPHEN R. CLARK
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case: 4:24-cr-00485-SRC Doc. #: 64 Filed: 12/02/25 Page: 26 of 26 PageID #:
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