USA v. McPeters

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
PARIS McPETERS,
Defendant.
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Case No. 4:24CR465 JMD (SPM)
REPORT, RECOMMENDATION AND
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE REGARDING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE AND STATEMENTS
All pretrial motions in the above cause were referred to the undersigned United States
Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b). Defendant Paris McPeters is charged in an
indictment with being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1).
Currently pending before the Court is McPeters’s Motion to Suppress evidence police seized
from his vehicle on June 18, 2024. ECF No. 35. In the motion, McPeters asserts the firearms he
is charged with unlawfully possessing were seized following an unconstitutional search of his
vehicle. ECF Nos. 35 & 60. McPeters also moves to suppress custodial statements he made on
grounds that he was interrogated in violation of the Fifth Amendment and his statements led to
the unlawful search and unlawful seizure of the firearms police found in his vehicle. The United
States has filed responses opposing these arguments. ECF Nos. 41 & 68.1
1 McPeters has separately moved for dismissal of the indictment on grounds that 18 U.S.C.
§922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment both on its face and as applied to him. ECF No. 36.
With leave of Court, McPeters has also asserted additional pro se arguments challenging the
constitutionality of §922(g)(1). ECF Nos. 49, 69 & 70. The United States has filed responses
opposing these arguments. ECF Nos. 40 & 67. The Court will address McPeters’s motion to
dismiss the indictment in a separate Report and Recommendation.
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The undersigned has carefully considered the parties’ written submissions, the applicable
law, and evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing. For the reasons discussed below, this
Court recommends that the motion suppress evidence and statements be denied.
I. 	B ACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL H ISTORY
On September 4, 2024, a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging McPeters
with knowingly unlawfully possessing a firearm on or about June 18, 2024, after having been
previously convicted of one or more crimes, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1). McPeters was
arrested on September 11, 2024, and, on the same day, he was arraigned at an initial appearance.
Through counsel, McPeters requested and was initially granted until October 11, 2024, to file
pretrial motions. McPeters requested additional time to file pretrial motions and, on June 9, 2025,
McPeters filed the motion to suppress evidence and statements currently pending before the
Court. On June 10, 2025, with leave of court, McPeters filed his motion to dismiss the
indictment. ECF No. 36. On June 24, 2025, the United States filed its response opposing
McPeters’s motion. See ECF No. 41.
On August 8, 2025, at the request of McPeters’s counsel the Court held a case status
hearing at which the Court discussed the possibility of McPeters representing himself
considering McPeters’s insistence that his court-appointed attorney press certain issues regarding
the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. §922(g). Following the case status hearing, and after conferring
with the assigned District Judge, the Court granted McPeters leave to file a pro se motion raising
a limited constitutional challenge to 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1).
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Thereafter, on September 9, 2025, the undersigned held an evidentiary hearing on
McPeters’s suppression motion.2 The United States offered the testimony of Hazelwood Police
Officer Erik Eickhoff. The United States also introduced police body worn camera footage
(Govt. Ex. 1); the Hazelwood Department Operational Guideline (Govt. Ex. 2); and a Tow Sheet
for Bolins Towing (Govt. Ex. 3). McPeters offered no additional witnesses or evidence but cross-
examined Officer Eickhoff. Officer Eickhoff’s testimony was credible and consistent with the
video footage admitted into evidence. At the close of the evidentiary hearing, the parties
requested and were granted time to request a transcript of the hearing and to file post-hearing
briefs. The transcript of the evidentiary hearing was filed on September 16, 2025. ECF No. 57.
Post hearing briefing was completed on December 29, 2025. ECF Nos. 60, 67, 68 & 70. Based
upon the evidence adduced at the hearing, the oral arguments made on the record, and the written
submissions of the parties, the undersigned makes the following findings of fact and conclusions
of law.
II. 	FACTUAL FINDINGS
At the time of the evidentiary hearing, Officer Erik Eickhoff had worked as a patrol
officer for the Hazelwood Police Department (HPD) for four years. Before that, he was a patrol
officer with the Bellefontaine Police Department for five years. On June 18, 2024, after
observing a 2009 Lincoln MKX changing lanes without utilizing its blinker, Officer Eickhoff
initiated a traffic stop of the Lincoln for failure to maintain a single lane. The Lincoln stopped in
the middle of the intersection of Howdershell Rd. and Riverwood Estates Blvd. Officer Eickhoff
testified that Howdershell Road is a busy county road, and he was concerned that the vehicle had
2 At the evidentiary hearing, the parties agreed the Court could decide the motion to dismiss
based on their written submissions and offered no oral argument or evidence with respect to the
motion to dismiss.
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stopped at the junction of two busy roads and was taking up a lane of traffic for passing
motorists.
Officer Eickhoff, who was wearing a body camera, contacted the driver, later identified
as Defendant McPeters. The entire interaction between Officer Eickhoff and the defendant was
captured on the officer’s body camera video recording, which was admitted into evidence as
Govt. Exhibit 1. After collecting McPeters’s identification and insurance card, Officer Eickhoff
returned to his marked patrol vehicle and conducted a REJIS computer inquiry of the defendant’s
information. The inquiry reflected that there was an active warrant for McPeters’s arrest for
Involuntary Manslaughter and Assault Second Degree. At that point, Officer Eickhoff
determined he would need to arrest McPeters on the warrant and tow the vehicle pursuant to the
HPD tow policy.
The Hazelwood tow policy authorizes “[a]ny Police Officer within Hazelwood
jurisdiction . . . [to] authorize a towing company to remove abandoned property to a place of
safety.” Govt. Exh. 3, p. 2. The tow policy allows an officer to tow “[a]ny unattended abandoned
property illegally left standing upon any highway or bridge if the abandoned property is left in a
position or under such circumstances as to obstruct the normal movement of traffic where there
is no reasonable indication that the person in control of the property is arranging for its
immediate control or removal.” Id. The Hazelwood tow policy further allows an officer to tow
“[a]ny abandoned property for which the person operating such property is arrested for an
alleged offense for which the officer is required to take the person into custody and where such
person is unable to arrange for property's timely removal.” Id.
Officer Eickhoff testified that he believed the vehicle would need to be towed because
McPeters would be taken into custody and because the location of the vehicle made it a traffic
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hazard. Considering the nature of outstanding warrants, Officer Eickhoff also called for back-up
in part for officer safety. Hazelwood Police Officer Edward Meyer arrived as back-up and
Officer Eickhoff placed McPeters under arrest on the warrant but did not immediately advise
McPeters of his Miranda rights. Officer Eickhoff requested a tow truck and requested that the
HPD dispatch run a criminal history of McPeters. Officer Eickhoff subsequently advised
McPeters that police would be towing his vehicle and would need to conduct an inventory search
of the vehicle.
In the interest of public safety, including the safety of officers and the tow truck driver,
before searching McPeters’s vehicle, Officer Eickhoff asked McPeters if he had any firearms or
drugs in the vehicle. McPeters responded “yeah” as he was looking at the officer. Officer
Eickhoff explained that, based on his training and experience, McPeters’s response to his
question as to whether there were guns or drugs in the vehicle established probable cause to
search the vehicle. Officer Eickhoff asked McPeters what he had in the vehicle, but McPeters did
not answer, stating only, “I mean, you know”. Govt. Ex 1 at 10:57. Officer Eickhoff testified
that, based on his interactions with McPeters, he advised Officer Meyer that they would be
looking for either a firearm or drugs in McPeters’s car.
Officer Eickhoff explained that his search of McPeters’s vehicle was both an inventory
search pursuant to the HPD tow policy as well as a search for contraband based on probable
cause. During their search of the vehicle, the officers found and seized Anderson Manufacturing
5.56 caliber semi-automatic rifle with a loaded 100 round drum magazine, a second loaded 100
round 5.56 caliber drum magazine, a Smith & Wesson .40 caliber semi-automatic pistol bearing
with a loaded 50 round drum, multiple other magazines and 357 additional rounds of
ammunition. Officer Eickhoff received confirmation that McPeters was a convicted felon,
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advised McPeters of his Miranda rights, and generated a police report for felon in possession of
a weapon.
While he was waiting for the tow truck to arrive, Officer Eickhoff filled out a Tow
Inventory Report as required by the HPD tow policy. Govt. Exh. 2. Officer Eickhoff explained
that he did not list the guns, magazines, and ammunition on the tow form because those items
were seized as evidence in their investigation, removed from McPeters’s vehicle, and
documented in the police report. Officer Eickhoff testified that it was his standard operating
procedure in filling out tow forms to list only items left in the vehicle that officers believed were
of value—items such as jewelry, laptop computer—and that might entice someone to break into
the towed vehicle. Officer Eickhoff acknowledged there were tools and other items in the
vehicle, but he did not list any of those items on the tow inventory report because, based on their
condition, he did not believe them to be of much, if any, value.
III. 	DISCUSSION
McPeters does not dispute that Officer Eickhoff had probable cause to stop and arrest him.
Rather, McPeters contends that the evidence from his vehicle must be suppressed because, in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, the officers unlawfully searched his car prior to having it
towed. See ECF No. 35, p. 1. McPeters also contends that suppression is required because Officer
Eickhoff’s decision to search the car for drugs or guns was predicated on pre-Mirandized
statements he made after he was taken into custody. Id. McPeters argues those statements were
obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment and any evidence they yielded should be suppressed
as the fruit of the poisonous tree. Id. The Court will address each alleged constitutional violation
in turn.
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A. 	FOURTH AMENDMENT V IOLATION
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from “unreasonable searches and seizures” by
the government. U.S. Const. amend. IV. For a search to be reasonable, the government generally
must obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before “physically intruding on constitutionally
protected areas” or otherwise searching areas or items in which an individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8-10 (2013). “In the absence of a warrant,
a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement.” Riley
v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2482, (2014).
Based on the factual findings, there is no question the officers conducted a warrantless
search of McPeters’s car after he was taken into custody on the outstanding warrant for
involuntary manslaughter and assault. According to Officer Eickhoff, he and Officer Meyer
searched McPeters’s car for two reasons: First, to inventory any valuables left in the vehicle
before having it towed and second, based on probable cause, to search for contraband;
specifically, drugs or guns. Thus, as the United States asserts in its opposition, the search at issue
requires consideration of two different exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment: the automobile and inventory search exceptions.
The “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement “‘authorizes officers to search a
vehicle without a warrant if they have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of
criminal activity.’” United States v. Davis, 569 F.3d 813, 816 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). See also United States v. Shackleford, 830 F.3d 751,
753 (8th Cir. 2016) (“Probable cause to believe that an automobile contains contraband or
evidence of criminal activity has long been held to justify a warrantless search of the automobile
and seizure of the contraband.”). Probable cause to search exists when there is “a fair probability
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that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 238 (1983); see also United States v. Bieri, 21 F.3d 811, 815 (8th Cir. 1994) (Probable
cause exists when “there are sufficient facts to justify the belief by a prudent person that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be searched.”). The Supreme
Court has described probable cause as “a practical, nontechnical conception” that is based on
“common sense conclusions about human behavior.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 231. It is a “fluid
concept” that turns on “the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts” and is not
“readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Id. at 232. In determining whether
probable cause exists, courts must analyze the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
intrusion. Id. at 238.
The Supreme Court has also recognized inventory searches as an exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987). Under
this exception, “a police officer, after lawfully taking custody of an automobile, may conduct a
warrantless inventory search of the property to secure and protect vehicles and their contents within
police custody.” United States v. Williams, 777 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir. 2015). As the Eighth
Circuit has held, when conducting a valid inventory search, police are “engaging in their
community caretaking function—not their criminal investigatory function;” as such, “they do not
need a warrant or probable cause.” United States v. Taylor, 636 F.3d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 2011).
The United States bears the burden of showing that its conduct complied with the inventory search
exception to the warrant requirement. Id.
1. 	The search fell within the inventory search exception
Based on the foregoing factual findings, even though Officer Eickhoff observed (and his
body camera recorded) items such as tools, a bag, and trash, in McPeters’s car, he did not list those
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items on the Tow Inventory Report. Officer Eickhoff explained he believed that, based on their
condition, those items were of little value. The officer further explained his practice was to
document only items such as jewelry and computers that were of high value and/or that might
entice a would-be thief to break into the vehicle. McPeters argues Officer Eickhoff’s failure to
inventory anything in his vehicle despite the presence of several tools, including power tools,
coupled with statements made by the officers before and during the search about what they
expected to find in his car demonstrates the officers used the pre-tow inventory as a pretext to
conduct an unlawful investigatory search. See ECF No. 60, p. 10.
To be valid, “[t]he search of a vehicle to inventory its contents must . . . be reasonable
under the totality of the circumstances, and may not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to
discovery incriminating evidence.” Taylor, 636 F.3d at 464 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
United States v. Hall, 497 F.3d 846, 851 (8th Cir. 2007) and Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990)).
In evaluating whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a purported inventory search was a
“ruse” used by police to search for incriminating evidence the Eighth Circuit has consistently
considered the following two factors: (1) did police adhere to standardized procedures established
for conducting an inventory search and (2) even if police failed to adhere to standardized
procedures, was there “something else” present to suggest that the police were engaging in their
criminal investigatory function, not their caretaking function in searching the vehicle? See Taylor,
636 F.3d at 464-65 (reversing district court’s denial of defendant’s suppression motion where
police failed to adhere to standardized procedure requiring a complete inquiry of all contents and
the “something else” suggesting inventory search was pretextual was the officer’s testimony that
the basis for the traffic stop, arrest, tow, and inventory search was the officer’s belief defendant
had narcotics in his vehicle and but for that belief officer would not have arrested defendant,
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impounded his vehicle, or inventoried the contents of his truck); Hall, 497 F.3d at 851 (upholding
denial of suppression motion on grounds that even if officer failed to abide by standardized
procedures, the “something else” was not present because police had legitimate reason to tow when
property owner asked police to tow defendant’s vehicle from its property); United States v.
Rowland, 341 F.3d 774, 779-81 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding failure by law enforcement to follow
standardized procedures in place coupled with other facts suggested law enforcement “sifted
through the vehicle’s contents searching only for and recording only incriminating evidence”).
Citing the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Rowland, McPeters argues suppression is
warranted because, based on the evidence presented in this case, “police raised the inventory
search banner in an after-the-fact attempt to justify a simple investigatory search for
incriminating evidence.” 341 F.3d at 780. However, there are significant distinctions between the
facts on which the Eighth Circuit rested its conclusions in Rowland and the facts presented here.
For example, in Rowland, the Eighth Circuit found that the first factor—did police follow their
own standardized procedures—weighed against the police. Specifically, the court in Rowland
found that the tow policy required officers to complete an inventory of “all property in the
vehicle.” Id. at 779 (emphasis added). Even though the vehicle contained an “enormity of stuff”
such as a purse, a cellphone, an incomplete set of tools, and a dog, officers testified that they
documented only things that “might be used as possible evidence.” Id. at 779-80 (emphasis
added).
In contrast, the evidence presented here demonstrates that the HPD tow policy required
officers to complete a Tow Inventory Report but did not specify how that report should be
completed. Unlike the tow policy in Rowland, the evidence presented here suggests Officer
Eickhoff was free to exercise his discretion in deciding how to fulfill the requirement that he
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complete a Tow Inventory Report. The Eighth Circuit has held that officers may use discretion in
conducting inventory searches “so long as that discretion is exercised according to standard
criteria and on the basis or something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity.’”
Hall, 497 F.3d at 851 (quoting Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987) (holding
warrantless inventory search valid if it is conducted pursuant to standardized police procedures
and not done in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation)). Officer Eickhoff testified that
his body camera recorded all items he observed in McPeters’s car and, in following his
department’s tow policy, it was his “standard operating procedure” to only inventory items he
deemed to be of high value—in other words items that would likely entice a would-be thief to
break into the towed vehicle. While the undersigned may not agree entirely with Officer
Eickhoff’s approach, this Court cannot say, based on the evidence of record, his interpretation
contravened the HPD policy, was unreasonable, or otherwise made in bad faith. Brigham City,
Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403-404 (2006) (“the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is reasonableness” and “[a]n action is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,
regardless of the individual officer’s state of mind, as long as the circumstances, viewed
objectively, justify the action”).
Despite McPeters’s suggestions to the contrary, Officer Eickhoff’s admission that one of
his aims in conducting the search was to look for drugs or guns does not prevent the search from
being a lawful inventory search. The Eighth Circuit has held that the presence of an investigative
motive “does not invalidate an otherwise valid inventory search.” United States v. Arrocha, 713
F.3d 1159, 1164 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Garner, 181 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir.
1999)). Even conclusive evidence of an investigatory motive on the part of law enforcement will
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not taint an inventory search, “as long as their sole purpose is not to investigate a crime.” United
States v. Petty, 367 F.3d 1009, 1013 (8th Cir. 2004).
The evidence presented here makes clear that the decision to search McPeters’s car was
precipitated, first and foremost, by Officer Eickhoff’s realization that there was an active warrant
for McPeters’s arrest for involuntary manslaughter and assault. McPeters was the only occupant
in his vehicle, which was in a busy intersection and situated in a way that would potentially
endanger other motorists if left in place. At that point, Officer Eickhoff realized he would need to
take McPeters into custody and thus would need to tow McPeters’s vehicle. Based on the
evidence presented, what began as circumstances that would likely require an inventory search
evolved into a parallel criminal investigation only after McPeters answered “yeah” in response to
Officer Eickhoff’s question asking if there were drugs or guns in his car.
The facts in this case stand in contrast to the facts of Rowland, where the court concluded
the search looked more like an investigative search in part because “law enforcement called for a
drug-sniffing dog to be brought to the scene;” “both [suspects] were detained, even though they
were not arrested;” officers “repeatedly asked Rowland whether there was contraband in the
vehicle;” and “Deputy Madison and Sergeant Thomas . . . testified the search was partly
conducted to investigate the possibility Rowland might be trafficking narcotics.” Rowland, 341
F.3d at 780. In sum, the evidence of record in this case makes clear that investigating a crime
was not the sole purpose of the pre-tow search conducted by Officers Eickhoff and Meyer. As
such, the fact that officers conducting the inventory search may have also been on the lookout for
incriminating items does not prevent this Court from finding that the search fell within the
inventory search exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. United States v.
Harris, 795 F.3d 820, 821 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding in conducting inventory searches police may
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“keep their eyes open for potentially incriminating items they might discover in the course of an
inventory search, as long as their sole purpose is not to investigate a crime”).
2. 	The officers had probable cause to search for contraband
Suppression is not warranted even if the search did not constitute a valid inventory search
because the pre-tow search of McPeters’s vehicle also falls within the automobile exception to
the warrant requirement. As is more fully discussed above, the “automobile exception” to the
warrant requirement “authorizes officers to search a vehicle without a warrant if they have
probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity.” Davis, 569 F.3d at
816 (internal quotations omitted); see also Shackleford, 830 F.3d at 753 (“Probable cause to
believe that an automobile contains contraband or evidence of criminal activity has long been
held to justify a warrantless search of the automobile and seizure of the contraband.”).
Based on the factual findings, Officer Eickhoff arrested McPeters on an active warrant
for Involuntary Manslaughter and Assault Second Degree. Officer Eickhoff advised McPeters
that his vehicle was going to be towed and that they would need to do an inventory search of the
vehicle. The officer then asked McPeters if there were any firearms or drugs in the vehicle and
McPeters responded “yeah.” At that point, the officer was aware of McPeters’s outstanding
warrants and presumably his criminal history, which he asked dispatch to run when he first
encountered McPeters. Given McPeters’s response to the officer’s question, based on the totality
of circumstances, Officer Eickhoff had probable cause to search the vehicle for firearms and
drugs.
When probable cause exists to believe that contraband is located inside the vehicle, a
police officer may search the passenger compartment and trunk under what is known as the
automobile exception. United States v. Smith, 990 F.3d 607, 612 (8th Cir. 2021). If probable
cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the
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vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search. Id. In sum, even if the search
somehow did not constitute a valid inventory search, the search of the vehicle following
Defendant’s arrest was lawful because it was based upon probable cause.
B. 	FIFTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION
McPeters argues police violated his Fifth Amendment rights by obtaining statements from
him after he was taken into custody but before he was advised of his Miranda rights. ECF No. 35,
p. 1. McPeters contends any evidence found because of his unwarned statements should be
suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree. Id. Under the Fifth Amendment, “[n]o person . . .
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. Amend. V.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448-450, 455 (1966), the Supreme Court recognized that
custodial interrogations have the potential to undermine the privilege conferred by the Fifth
Amendment against self-incrimination by possibly exposing a suspect to physical or psychological
coercion. To guard against such coercion, the Court established a prophylactic procedural
mechanism that requires a suspect to receive a warning before any custodial interrogation begins.
Id. at 444. Unless suspects are warned of their Fifth Amendment rights, any pretrial statements
elicited from them are inadmissible at trial. Id. at 492. The protections set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in Miranda are triggered only when a defendant is both in custody and being
interrogated. United States v. Hatten, 68 F.3d 257, 261 (8th Cir. 1995).
In opposing McPeters’s motion, the United States asserts McPeters’s pre-Miranda
statements are admissible under the public safety exception to Miranda, articulated by the Supreme
Court in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984). See ECF No. 41, p. 9-10. This Court agrees.
Under the public safety exception, even if Miranda warnings were not yet given, a suspect's answer
may be admitted into evidence if it was obtained in response to a question asked in furtherance of
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public safety and not designed solely to solicit testimonial evidence. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655–56,
659; see United States v. Williams, 181 F.3d 945, 954 n. 13 (8th Cir.1999). The Eighth Circuit has
held that the public safety exception “applies when ‘police officers ask questions reasonably
prompted by a concern for the public safety.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Liddell, 517 F.3d 1007,
1009 (8th Cir. 2008)). The public to be protected can include the officers themselves and,
considering “the risk of police officers being injured by the mishandling of unknown firearms or
drug paraphernalia,” there is a sufficient public safety basis for officers to ask a suspect who has
been arrested and secured whether there are weapons or contraband in a car, apartment, or other
place police are about to search. Liddell, 517 F.3d at 1009-10 (defendant’s statement he knew a
gun was in his car fell within the public safety exception where, upon discovering an unloaded
pistol in defendant’s car, the officers asked him if there was anything else in the car that they
needed to know about that could hurt them); see also United States v. Luker, 395 F.3d 830, 831-
32 (8th Cir.2005) (the public safety exception applied when the arresting officers, who were aware
of the suspect's history of methamphetamine use, asked the suspect before searching his vehicle
whether there was anything in it that was not supposed to be there or that could hurt them and
suspect responded that his shotgun was in the trunk); United States v. Everman, 528 F.3d 570, 572-
73 (8th Cir. 2008) (officers’ pre-Miranda warning questioning of arrestee about whether he had
any weapons on him fell within the public safety exception to Miranda; rangers acted reasonably
where the rangers knew that Everman had an associate nearby; rangers were in a remote and
isolated area with two men with known criminal records).
In this case, it was objectively reasonable for Officer Eickhoff to ask McPeters if he had
anything in this car such as drugs or firearms. When he asked the question, Eickhoff had just
arrested McPeters based on an active warrant for involuntary manslaughter and assault. He had
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decided that the car McPeters had been driving would need to be towed because it was positioned
in a place that would pose a danger to other motorists. Based on the HPD tow policy, Eickhoff
knew he (and/or other officers) would need to conduct an inventory search and then turn the car
over to a tow truck driver, who could also be at risk if the car contained dangerous items. Under
the totality of circumstances, there was a sufficient public safety basis for officers to ask McPeters
whether there were weapons or other contraband in his car before proceeding with a search. In
sum, McPeters’s motion to suppress statements should be denied because the questions Officer
McFarland asked of McPeters were reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety,
including the officer’s own safety, and, therefore, falls outside the requirements of Miranda.
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Defendant McPeters’s Motion to Suppress
Evidence and Statements (Doc. 35) be DENIED.
The parties are advised that they have fourteen (14) days in which to file written
objections to this report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1), unless an
extension of time for good cause is obtained, and that failure to file timely objections may result
in a waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. See Thompson v. Nix, 897 F.2d 356 (8th Cir.
1990).
Trial in this case will be set by separate order before the Honorable Joshua M. Divine.
SHIRLEY PADMORE MENSAH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dated: January 29, 2026.
Case: 4:24-cr-00465-JMD-SPM Doc. #: 73 Filed: 01/29/26 Page: 16 of 16 PageID
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