USA v. Nosovitch

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
MACE ANTHONY NOSOVITCH,
Defendant.
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No. 4:23-cr-00274-JMD-1
ORDER ADOPTING THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The Court, having reviewed de novo the report and recommendation from United
States Magistrate Judge Joseph S. Dueker, ECF 162, DENIES Defendant Mace Anthony
Nosovitch’s (1) motion to suppress evidence (residence), ECF 63, (2) motion to suppress
evidence (autos), ECF 65, and (3) motion to suppress evidence (jail calls, jail texts, etc.), ECF
67. The Court sustains, adopts, and incorporates the report, supplementing its reasoning
here. The Court DENIES Nosovitch’s request for a plenary hearing, ECF 169 at 19–20.
Analysis
Upon a timely objection, the Court reviews the motions and the report de novo. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The report persuasively addresses Nosovitch’s three motions to
suppress evidence, and the Court is not persuaded by his subsequent objections.
The Court adds only this: the basis for Nosovitch’s motions largely rest on an appeal
to close technicalities, but those are not the kinds of alleged errors that, if proven, justify the
extraordinary remedy of suppressing evidence. “[S]uppression is not an automatic
consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation. Instead, the question turns on the culpability
of the police and the potential of exclusion to deter wrongful police conduct.” United States
v. Houck, 888 F.3d 957, 959–60 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S.
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135, 137 (2009)). The exclusionary rule is a judicially created prudential remedy, and “there
is always a ‘high obstacle for those urging application of the rule.’” Lange v. California, 594
U.S. 295, 317 (2021) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. and Parole v.
Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364–365 (1998)). Excluding evidence “obstructs the truth-finding
functions of judge and jury,” creating a “downstream risk that ‘some guilty defendants may
go free or receive reduced sentences.’” Id. at 317 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
907 (1984)) (cleaned up). Courts may apply the remedy only when needed to deter
“intentional conduct that was patently unconstitutional.” Herring, 555 U.S. at 143.
The magistrate judge’s report persuasively establishes why Nosovitch’s arguments
about the sufficiency of indictments, search warrants, and seizures are not correct. But even
if he could establish a Fourth Amendment violation, it would not justify suppressing
evidence. Consider, for example, his first objection. Nosovitch was initially charged with
violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), which prohibits lying to a firearms dealer in connection with
an attempt to obtain a firearm. Nosovitch was asked by the firearms dealer to fill out a
questionnaire form, and on the question whether he was “subject to a court order …
restraining you from harassing, stalking or threatening your child or intimate partner or
child of such partner,” Nosovitch answered “no” even though he knew a restraining order had
been issued against him. Nosovitch argues that his answer was technically truthful because
the form elsewhere defined “restraining order” narrowly. In other words, he says that even
though his statement was false when considering the ordinary meaning of the question he
answered, his statement was true when the question is interpreted in light of a definition
provision located in small type several pages later. Even if everything Nosovitch says is true,
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and even if this amounted to a Fourth Amendment violation, this is not a case of “intentional
conduct that was patently unconstitutional,” Herring, 555 U.S. at 143, so the remedy of
exclusion is not available. That is especially true because Nosovitch’s theory is highly
attenuated. He is no longer being charged with lying on a firearms form; he is now being
charged with attempting to hire somebody to murder his wife, a completely different offense
he allegedly committed while being detained on the now-dismissed charge.
The Court also rejects Nosovitch’s request for the Court to hold a plenary hearing.
Nosovitch concedes that the Court is not required to hold one. The relevant “statute calls for
a de novo determination, not a de novo hearing.” United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 674
(1980). A de novo hearing would not assist the Court here.
Conclusion
The Court accepts, adopts, and incorporates in full the report’s recommendation to
reject Nosovitch’s motions. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Nosovitch’s (1) motion to
suppress evidence (residence), ECF 63, (2) motion to suppress evidence (autos), ECF 65, and
(3) motion to suppress evidence (jail calls, jail texts, etc.), ECF 67, are each DENIED. His
request for a plenary hearing, ECF 169 at 19–20, is also DENIED.
Dated this 19th day of December, 2025
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JOSHUA M. DIVINE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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