Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
DELVYN MARIO A. C.,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC TOLLEFSON, Sheriff of Kandiyohi
County Jail; DAVID EASTERWOOD,
ICE Field Office Director; DAVID
VENTURELLA, Director of Immigration
and Customs Enforcement;
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary of
U.S. Department of Homeland Security;
TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General,
U.S. Department of Justice; and SIRCE E.
OWEN, Director of Executive Office for
Immigration Review (EOIR),
Respondents.1
Case No. 26-cv-3936 (LMP/EMB)
ORDER GRANTING
HABEAS PETITION
Delvyn Mario A. C., pro se.
Carl Berry, United States Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Respondents.
Petitioner Delvyn Mario A. C.2 brings a petition for writ of habeas corpus,
challenging the legality of his detention. Delvyn is a citizen and national of Mexico who
appears to have been in the United States since at least 2021. ECF No. 7-1 at 3. He was
1 	When used in this Order, “Respondents” or “Government” refer to the federal
officials named as Respondents. 	Respondent Eric Tollefson, Kandiyohi County Sheriff,
has not participated in these proceedings.
2 	The Court uses Petitioner’s first name throughout this order to comport with this
District’s practice of using only the first name and last initials of any non-governmental
parties in immigration cases. No disrespect is intended in doing so.
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arrested in Bismarck, North Dakota, on July 28, 2026, as part of a “targeted operation”
between U.S. Border Patrol, Homeland Security Investigations, and the Bismarck Police
Department. 	Id. at 2. 	But Delvyn appeared to be “collateral” to the target of the law
enforcement operation. 	Id. 	Upon arrest, Delvyn had in his possession a “Green Card,”
which was determined to be fraudulent. Id. at 3. He also had an Oregon identification card
and Social Security card that were associated with a different person. Id. Delvyn also has
a misdemeanor conviction in Oregon for “hit and run.” Id.
Delvyn is currently in custody as removal proceedings go forward against him in
immigration court. 	His next hearing is scheduled before Immigration Judge Jared L.
Grimmer on October 19, 2026, at 8:30 a.m. ECF No. 7-3. In his petition, Delvyn argues
that he should not be detained because he is not a danger to the community and because
his detention is causing severe hardship to his family. 	See ECF No. 1 at 6. 	Delvyn
represents that he is a father to a four-year-old daughter who is a U.S. citizen and is
expecting the birth of another child in January 2027 with his life partner who is a U.S.
citizen. 	ECF No. 1 at 6; ECF No. 1-1. 	Delvyn also argues that his continued detention
without having been given a bond hearing before the immigration court violates his
constitutional due process rights. See id.
The Government was directed to file a response to the habeas petition, which it has
done. 	See ECF No. 6. 	After reviewing the habeas petition, the Government’s response,
and the documents submitted, the Court concludes that Delvyn’s continued detention
without a bond hearing violates the Due Process Clause and that Delvyn is entitled to
present evidence to an immigration judge regarding his amenability for release on bond.
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The Government is correct to point out that, pursuant to Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th
1128 (8th Cir. 2026), Delvyn is subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) while his
removal proceedings remain ongoing. 	The Government is also correct to point out that
detention under Section 1225(b)(2) is, on the face of the statute, generally mandatory. See
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Nothing in Section 1225(b)(2) itself entitles Delvyn to a bond
hearing 	to 	determine 	whether 	his 	release 	from 	detention 	is 	appropriate 	under 	the
circumstances.
Delvyn, however, does not claim that Section 1225(b)(2) itself entitles him to a bond
hearing. Rather, Delvyn contends that the Due Process Clause requires that he be afforded
an opportunity before an immigration judge to establish the appropriateness of his release
on bond as the removal proceedings against him go forward. 	See ECF No. 1 at 6. 	The
Court agrees. 	As has been explained in further detail in prior cases, see, e.g., Jesus
Alejandro G. A. v. Blanche, No. 26-cv-1932 (LMP/ECW) (ECF No. 17), 2026 WL
1383138 (D. Minn. May 18, 2026) vac’d on other grounds (ECF No. 21), detention during
the pendency of removal proceedings implicates Delvyn’s protected liberty interests. The
Due Process Clause therefore requires that Delvyn be afforded adequate procedural
protections before being deprived of that protected liberty interest. 	The Court has
previously determined that a bond hearing consistent with 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d) is
adequate to safeguard that protected liberty interest without imposing a substantial burden
upon the Government. See Jesus Alejandro G. A., 2026 WL 1383138, at *11–13.
The 	Government’s 	arguments 	opposing 	this 	conclusion 	have 	already 	been
addressed in prior cases in further detail. To summarize here: the Government is wrong to
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suggest that because there is no dispute that Delvyn is subject to Section 1225(b)(2), a bond
hearing would be meaningless. The question to be decided at the bond hearing will not be
whether Delvyn is subject to Section 1225(b)(2), but rather whether Delvyn is a flight risk
or danger to the community. Moreover, Delvyn’s situation differs from that of immigration
detainees subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) because Delvyn
does not have a qualifying criminal record. See Banyee v. Garland, 115 F.4th 928, 931–
34 (8th Cir. 2024). For detainees who have been convicted of a serious criminal offense,
“any due process concerns regarding mandatory detention without a bond hearing . . . [are]
mitigated because those noncitizens, as part of securing their criminal convictions, would
have received the ‘full procedural protections our criminal justice system offers.’” 	See
Jesus Alejandro G. A., 2026 WL 1383138, at *7 (quoting Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510,
513 (2003)). 	Delvyn, by contrast, has been afforded no procedural protection since his
July 28, 2026 arrest.
This does not mean that Delvyn’s detention necessarily is unlawful. Delvyn offers
several reasons, including his ties to the community and relative lack of criminal history,
as grounds for concluding that release on bond would be appropriate for him. 	See ECF
No. 1 at 6. 	An immigration judge may disagree though, and, if the immigration judge
denies release on bond, then Delvyn will have received the process that he is due. 	But
Delvyn is entitled under the Due Process Clause to the opportunity to present his arguments
at an individualized bond hearing, and his habeas petition is granted insofar as he requests
such a hearing.
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ORDER
For these reasons, and based on all the files, records, and proceedings in this matter,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. 	Delvyn Mario A. C.’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) is
GRANTED;
2. 	The Government is ORDERED to provide Delvyn Mario A. C. with a bond
hearing consistent with 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d) no later than 5:00 p.m. on
October 20, 2026. This deadline may be waived by Delvyn’s consent; and
3. 	The 	Government 	is 	ORDERED 	to 	file 	a 	status 	report 	certifying 	its
compliance with this Order no later than 5:00 p.m. on October 21, 2026.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: October 13, 2026 	s/Laura M. Provinzino
Laura M. Provinzino
United States District Judge
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