Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Manuel G.,
Petitioner,
v.
Todd Blanche, Acting Attorney General;
Markwayne Mullin, Secretary, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; Todd
Lyons, Acting Director of Immigration
and Customs Enforcement; David
Easterwood, Acting Director, St. Paul
Field Office Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; and Eric Tollefson, Sheriff
of Kandiyohi County,
Respondents.
Case No. 26-CV-2385 (SRN/ECW)
ORDER
David Thomas Kubat, Zimmer Law Group, 155 Wabasha St. S., Ste. 100, Saint Paul, MN
55107, for Petitioner
Ebony Nicole Thomas and David W. Fuller, U.S. Attorney’s Office, 300 S. 4th St., Ste.
600, Minneapolis, MN 55415, for Respondents
SUSAN RICHARD NELSON, United States District Judge
Before the Court is the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) [Doc. No.
1] filed by Petitioner Manuel G. 	Petitioner seeks immediate release from detention, or a
prompt bond hearing in Immigration Court. 	Respondents oppose the Petition. (Resp’ts’
Opp’n [Doc. No. 5].)
The Court has taken the Petition under advisement on the papers. For the reasons
set forth below, the Petition is granted as to the request for an individualized bond hearing.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
Manual G. is a resident of Thief River Falls, Minnesota, and a citizen of Mexico
who has lived in the United States since April 1998. (Pet. ¶ 13.) At that time, Petitioner
entered the United States without inspection. (Id.) On March 12, 2015, he was arrested for
being an alien present without admission or parole, removal proceedings were initiated,
and he was released on his own recognizance. 	(Id. ¶ 14; Pet’r’s Reply Ex. [Doc. No. 7-1]
(2015 I-831 Record of Inadmissible Alien) at 2–4.) Immigration records indicate that on
September 24, 2021, an Immigration Judge granted his motion to administratively close
removal proceedings. 	(Sabin Decl. [Doc. No. 6], Ex. C (2026 Form I-831 Record of
Inadmissible Alien) at 3.) 	Manuel G. is not subject to a pending removal order. 	(Pet. ¶
14.)
Manuel G. asserts that he has been actively pursuing lawful residence in the United
States. (Id. ¶ 18.) On May 12, 2020, USCIS approved an initial application, Form I-130,
Petition for Alien Relative, filed by his U.S. citizen spouse. (Id.) On June 30, 2025, USCIS
also approved Manuel G.’s application for a waiver of inadmissibility, Form I-601A. (Id.)
Manuel G. states that he is awaiting scheduling for an immigrant visa interview with the
U.S. Consulate in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico. (Id. ¶ 19.) Interviews are scheduled based on
the 	timing 	of 	the 	applicant’s 	completion 	of 	pre-clearance 	processes, 	known 	as
“Documentary Qualification.” (Id.) Manuel G. alleges that he was documentarily qualified
on July 23, 2025. (Id.) He contends that recent estimated interview scheduling information
from the U.S. State Department shows that Ciudad Juarez is currently scheduling visa
interviews for applicants who were documentarily qualified in April 2025. 	(Id.) 	In
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addition, Manuel G. alleges that he has attended every immigration hearing, complied with
all check-in requirements, and responded to every agency request for information. (Id. ¶
21.)
Manuel G. has a history of driving-while-impaired (“DWI”) offenses in Minnesota
state court, some of which involve the use of his brother’s name. (Sabin Decl. ¶¶ 11–18.)
On June 3, 2025, he was convicted of the misdemeanor charge of obstructing the legal
process, and a charge of DWI was dismissed. (Pet. ¶ 22; Sabin Decl. ¶ 18.) Respondents
assert that Manuel G. has additional impaired driving convictions in Minnesota, including:
(1) a 2000 DWI misdemeanor conviction for which he was sentenced to one year of
supervised probation; (2) a 2012 DWI conviction for which he was sentenced to 30 days
confinement and one year of supervised probation; and (3) a 2014 DWI conviction for
which he was sentenced to one year confinement (stayed) and six years of supervised
probation. (Sabin Decl. ¶¶ 11–17.) For the convictions in 2000, 2012, and 2014, Manuel
G. provided his brother’s name instead of his own when he was arrested. (Id.) His 2015
Form 831 Record of Inadmissible Alien notes the convictions from 2000, 2012, and 2014.
(Pet’r’s Reply Ex. (2015 Form 831 Record of Inadmissible Alien) at 2.)
On January 28, 2026, when Manuel G. appeared for his required check-in with U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) in Grand Forks, North Dakota, ICE agents
arrested him. 	(Pet. ¶ 15.) 	He alleges that he was arrested without a warrant. (Id.)
Deportation Officer Ivan Sabin states that during the check-in, ICE agents conducted a
routine records check and found Manuel G.’s driving convictions, which prompted his
detention in order “to continue removal proceedings.” 	(Sabin Decl. ¶ 9.) 	Officer Sabin
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contends that at that time, agents advised Manuel G. that he was under arrest and served a
Form I-200 Warrant of Arrest upon him. 	(Id. ¶ 10; see also id., Ex. B.) 	In Petitioner’s
Reply, he describes Respondents’ assertions about the timing of the warrant’s issuance as
“muddled,” and contends that the warrant was not issued before his arrest, as required.
(Reply at 4) (citing Sabin Decl., Ex. C (2016 Form I-213 Record of Inadmissible Alien) at
2.)
Following his January 28, 2026 arrest, ICE initially detained Manuel G. in North
Dakota before transferring him to the Kandiyohi County Jail in Wilmar, Minnesota, where
he is currently detained. (Pet. ¶ 16.)
On April 27, 2026, Manuel G. filed the instant Petition in which he asserts that his
detention is unlawful under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. (Id. ¶¶ 27–
38.) 	He further contends that because his detention falls under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, his
detention is statutorily unlawful because he was detained without a warrant, as the statute
requires. 	(Id. ¶ 42.) 	Petitioner requests immediate release from detention or a bond
hearing. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 43.) The Court ordered Respondents to answer the Petition by May 1,
2026, and enjoined them from moving Petitioner from this District pending further order.
(Order to Show Cause [Doc. No. 3] ¶ 4.) Respondents timely filed their Response, along
with the Declaration of Deportation Officer Ivan Sabin, and three accompanying exhibits
[Doc. Nos. 6-1 – 6-3]. Petitioner filed a timely Reply [Doc. No. 7], and an accompanying
exhibit [Doc. No. 7-1].
II. 	DISCUSSION
A district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to any person who demonstrates
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he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(3); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).
A. Fifth Amendment Due Process
Respondents argue that Manuel G. is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), relying on the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128
(8th Cir. 2026).1 (Resp’ts’ Opp’n at 6–7.) In Avila, a divided panel of the Eighth Circuit
interpreted § 1225(b)(2)(A) to require the mandatory detention of any noncitizen present
in the United States who has not been admitted, regardless of whether they have just arrived
at the border or have been present in the interior of the country for some time, like
Petitioner. 	170 F.4th at 1135–38. 	While the Fifth Circuit has also interpreted § 1225
consistent with the Eighth Circuit, Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir.
2026), the Eleventh Circuit and Second Circuit have reached the opposite conclusion,
finding that persons who have been in the country and are not newly arrived at the border
fall under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, and are entitled to a bond hearing. 	Hernandez Alvarez v.
Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami, No. 25-14065, 2026 WL 1243395, at *5–22 (11th Cir. May
6, 2026); Cunha v. Freden, --- F.4 ---, No. 25-3141-pr, 2026 WL 1146044, at *4–23 (2d
Cir. Apr. 28, 2026).2
1 The Eighth Circuit has extended the period for Mr. Avila to seek rehearing to May
26, 2026. Avila, No. 25-cv-3248, Judge Order (8th Cir. Apr. 21, 2026).
2 A recent decision from the Seventh Circuit was divided on the §§ 1225/1226 issue.
Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., --- F.4th ---, No. 25-3050, 2026 WL
1223250 (7th Cir. May 5, 2025). In Castañon-Nava, the government challenged the district
court’s extension of a consent decree and an order to release certain class members whose
arrests potentially violated 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2). 	See id. at *1. 	Judge Lee, writing the
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While Avila addressed a noncitizen’s statutory rights, it did not address his due
process rights. 	170 F.4th at 1140 & n.8 (Erickson, J., dissenting). 	As noted, Manuel G.
invokes the Due Process Clause in support of his request for relief. 	(Pet. ¶¶ 31–38.)
Noncitizens are entitled to due process of the law under the Fifth Amendment. Demore v.
Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003); Sanchez-Valasco v. Holder, 593 F.3d 733, 737 (8th Cir.
2010). 	To determine whether civil detention violates a detainee’s Fifth Amendment due
process rights, courts apply the three-part balancing test in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976). 	Under Mathews, courts weigh the following three factors: (1) “the private
interest that will be affected by the official action;” (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional
or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.” 424 U.S. at 335.
Respondents argue that detention under a constitutionally legitimate statute enacted
by Congress does not violate due process, relying on Brayam G.G. v. Bondi, No. 26-cv-
1985 (DMT/EMB), Doc. No. 22 ¶ 8 (D. Minn. Apr. 15, 2026), in which the court denied a
habeas petitioner’s due process claim. Brayam G.G., in turn, relied on Demore v. Kim, in
which the Supreme Court rejected the argument that mandatory detention pending removal
majority 	opinion, 	engaged 	in 	§§ 	1225/1226 	statutory 	analysis 	and 	rejected 	the
government’s 	alternative 	argument 	that 	it 	could 	detain 	class 	members 	under 	§
1225(b)(2)(A). 	Id. at *9–21. 	However, the concurring opinion found it unnecessary to
reach the alternative argument, id. at *26 (Pryor, J., concurring), and the dissenting opinion
disagreed with Judge Lee’s statutory analysis, id. at *34 (Kirsch, J., dissenting).
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violates a noncitizen’s due process rights. 	In Demore, the Supreme Court addressed
mandatory detention pending removal under § 1226(c) involving a noncitizen with criminal
convictions for first-degree burglary and petty theft. 538 U.S. at 513. The Supreme Court
held that “detention under Section 1226(c) has a definitive end-point—the end of the
removal proceedings—and thus a noncitizen is not subject to indefinite detention.” Id. at
529. 	The court in Brayam G.G. acknowledged that the petitioner before it was detained
under a different provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), § 1225(b), but
found that provision analogous to § 1226(c). Brayam G.G., Doc. No. 22 ¶ 8.
Respondents argue that the Mathews’ balancing test is therefore unnecessary,
relying upon Banyee v. Garland, 115 F.4th 928, 933 (8th Cir. 2024), in which the Eighth
Circuit rejected a procedural due process claim brought by a noncitizen who was detained
under § 1226(c). The petitioner had a lengthy criminal history that included theft, lying to
the police, drug possession, and robbery with a dangerous weapon. Id. at 930. The Eighth
Circuit pointed to Supreme Court authority in Demore, 538 U.S. at 528, and Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 682, finding that they “leave no room for a multi-factor ‘reasonableness’ test.”
Banyee, 115 F.4th at 933. 	Thus, the court found the petitioner was not entitled to an
individualized review. Id. at 933–34.
The Court respectfully disagrees with Brayam G.G., which is not controlling
authority. As to Banyee, “it is not clear that Banyee applies to the facts of this case.” Axel
J.M.C. v. Stanski, No. 26-cv-2281 (JRT/EMB), 2016 WL 1171344, at *3 (D. Minn. Apr.
29, 2026) (citing Orlando R.V.V. v. Blanche, No. 26-cv-1903, Doc. No. 11 (D. Minn. Apr.
28, 2026)). 	Mandatory detention under 1226(c) applies to certain noncitizens who have
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committed enumerated criminal offenses and to certain categories of inadmissible people.
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A)–(E). In Demore, the Supreme Court explained that “Congress,
justifiably concerned that deportable criminal [noncitizens] who are not detained continue
to engage in crime and fail to appear for their removal hearings in large numbers, may
require that persons such as respondent be detained for the brief period necessary for their
removal proceedings” under § 1226(c). 538 U.S. at 513. Thus, the Court concluded that
detaining such noncitizens for the time necessary to process their removal, without an
individualized determination of flight risk, did not violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at
522–31.
Respondents’ purported basis for Manuel G.’s detention is § 1225(b)(2)(A), not §
1226(c), which distinguishes this case from Banyee and Demore. 	Only recently has the
Government interpreted § 1225(b)(2)(A) to permit mandatory detention. See Maldonado
v. Olson, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1150 (D. Minn. 2025); see also Matter of Yajure Hurtado,
29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). There is no indication that Manuel G., whom Respondents
have categorically detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A), has ever failed to appear in court related
to his DUI charges or engaged in violent criminal activity. Nor is there any evidence that
he has failed to comply with the check-in requirements for his immigration proceedings.
Accordingly, the Court proceeds to address the merits of Manuel G.’s due process claim
under Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
B. Due Process Analysis
As to the first Mathews factor—the private interest affected by the official action—
“[t]he interest in being free from physical detention” is “the most elemental of liberty
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interests.” 	Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529, 531 (2004). 	Petitioner is currently in
custody in the Kandiyohi County Jail, at which pretrial criminal detainees and convicted
criminals are also held. 	See Günaydin v. Trump, 784 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1187 (D. Minn.
2005) (stating that under the first Mathews factor, courts “consider the conditions under
which detainees are currently held, including whether a detainee is held in conditions
indistinguishable from criminal incarceration.”). He also has a strong interest in remaining
in the United States, as he is married to a U.S. citizen and has been actively pursuing lawful
permanent residence. (Pet. ¶¶ 18–20.) He has lived in the United States for approximately
28 years, having arrived in 1998 when he was approximately 18 years old. (Id. ¶ 13; see
also 2026 Form I-831 Record of Inadmissible Alien at 1 (listing date of birth)).
Respondents cite Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103,
139–40 (2020), for the proposition that Petitioner’s private interest is limited by his status
because he is not a lawfully admitted noncitizen challenging his discretionary detention
after lawful entry. 	(Resp’ts’ Opp’n at 8.) 	But Manuel G., unlike the petitioner in
Thuraissigiam, challenges his detention, not his expedited removal. 	Thuraissigiam, 591
U.S. at 118 (noting that Thuraissigiam failed to seek release or dispute the legality of his
confinement). 	Also, Thuraissigiam concerned an as-applied challenge to the expedited
review process, filed by a petitioner who was apprehended 25 yards from the border and
was thereafter continuously detained. 	Id. at 119. 	By contrast, Manuel G. squarely
challenges his detention, and he has been living in the United States for approximately 28
years, and only recently appears to have been held in immigration detention.
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Given the significance of the private interest at stake, the Court finds that the first
Mathews factor favors Manuel G.
As to the second Mathews factor—the risk of erroneous deprivation—courts must
“assess whether the challenged procedure creates a risk of erroneous deprivation of
individuals’ private rights and the degree to which alternative procedures could ameliorate
these risks.” Günaydin, 784 F. Supp. 3d at 1187. 	Given the “extent and velocity of
Respondents’ immigration-related actions in Minnesota over the past several months,”
there is a high degree of risk of the erroneous deprivation of Manuel G.’s private rights.
See Axel J.M.C., 2026 WL 1171344, at *4.
Respondents return to § 1225(b), however, and argue that the risk of erroneous
deprivation turns on objective statutory predicates—that Petitioner entered the United
States without inspection and lacking lawful status. (Resp’ts’ Opp’n at 8–9.) They contend
that discretionary findings of danger or flight risk are not material to detention under §
1225, relying on Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 4 (2003)
(“DPS”). 	(Id. at 9.) 	DPS involved a procedural due process challenge to Connecticut’s
sex offender registry statute that required all sex offenders with prior convictions to
register. 	538 U.S. at 1162–63. 	The Supreme Court held in that context, procedural due
process did not require a pre-registration hearing to determine an offender’s current
dangerousness because the statutory registration requirement depended on the fact of
conviction alone. Id. at 1163-65 (stating that the Due Process Clause “does not require the
opportunity to prove a fact that is not material to the State’s statutory scheme.”). Further,
the Court observed that sex offenders had already been afforded procedural due process in
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their underlying proceedings leading to their convictions. 	Id. at 1164 (“As the DPS
Website explains, the law’s requirements turn on an offender’s conviction alone—a fact
that a convicted offender has already had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to
contest.”). The situation here is different than in DPS. Respondents are detaining Manuel
G. pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A), under which no analogous underlying proceeding has
afforded him an opportunity to contest his detention. 	Moreover, in 2015, ICE released
Manuel G. from immigration custody on his own recognizance, with full knowledge of
three prior DWI convictions. 	Presumably, he was deemed to pose no danger to the
community and was not a flight risk.
Providing Manuel G. a bond hearing is an alternative procedure that would
ameliorate the risk of erroneous deprivation. The Court finds that this factor also favors
Manuel G.
As to the third Mathews factor—the burden the Government would bear in affording
additional 	procedural 	safeguards—Respondents 	claim 	their 	interest 	is 	substantial.
(Resp’ts’ Opp’n at 9.) 	They contend Manuel G.’s criminal history “demonstrates a
persistent pattern of alcohol-related offenses, deception, and disregard for legal authority
spanning more than twenty years.” 	(Id.) 	In addition, as a general matter, Respondents
argue that Congress has a strong interest in the uniform administration of immigration laws,
and “in avoiding the administrative burdens of grafting onto § 1225 a bond-hearing regime
Congress did not create.” (Id. at 10.)
While the Court appreciates the importance of ensuring attendance at removal
proceedings and protecting the public, those interests are not subverted by requiring the
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minimal procedural safeguard of a bond hearing. Given Manuel G.’s regular attendance at
immigration check-ins (Pet. ¶ 21), ICE has known of his circumstances, his criminal
history, and his whereabouts for some time. (See Pet’r’s Reply Ex. at 2.) An immigration
judge will consider Manuel G.’s particular circumstances, along with the Government’s
interests, in determining whether release on bond is appropriate. 	Thus, a bond hearing
will reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation without imposing significant burdens on
Respondents. 	The Court finds that consideration of the third Mathews factor favors
Petitioner.
In sum, the Mathews factors weigh in Petitioner’s favor. As courts have found, the
appropriate remedy is an individualized bond hearing. See, e.g., Heriberto R.E. v. Blanche,
No. 26-cv-2227 (JWB/LIB), No. 12 at 8 (D. Minn. May 1, 2026); Axel J.M.C., 2026 WL
1171344, at *4; Orlando R.V.V., Doc. No. 11 at 20–21; David J.C.P. v. Blanche, No. 26-
cv-2181 (DWF/ECW), 2026 WL 1102725, at *3 (D. Minn. Apr. 23, 2026); Osman J.M.A.
v. Blanche, No. 26-cv-2123 (DWF/DJF), 2026 WL 1005056, at *3 (D. Minn. Apr. 14,
2026). 	While Petitioner requests immediate release under § 1226, arguing that he was
arrested without a warrant, the Court declines to grant such relief for three reasons. First,
the sequence of events (warrant, followed by arrest versus arrest, followed by warrant) is
not entirely clear from the record, which does contain a warrant bearing the same date as
Manuel G’s arrest. 	(Sabin Decl., Ex. B.) 	Second, under Avila, Respondents contend
Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). 	Third, Petitioner’s
claims arise under the Fifth Amendment, for which a bond hearing is the appropriate
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remedy. Accordingly, the Court grants Manuel G.’s Petition as to his request for a bond
hearing.
III. 	ORDER
Based on the submissions and the entire file and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that
1. 	The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Doc. No. 1] is GRANTED as
follows:
a. 	Petitioner’s detention without an individualized bond hearing violates his
rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
b. 	Respondents shall provide Petitioner with a bond hearing before an
Immigration Judge in Minnesota within 7 business days of this Order.
c. 	Respondents 	remain 	ENJOINED 	from 	removing, 	transferring, 	or
otherwise facilitating the removal of Petitioner from the District of
Minnesota before the bond hearing and the Immigration Judge’s ruling.
d. 	If Respondents do not provide Petitioner with a bond hearing as required
by this Order, Petitioner must be immediately released from detention.
(1) 	In the event that Respondents release Petitioner, they must do
so: (a) in Minnesota; (b) with all personal documents and
belongings, 	such 	as 	his 	driver’s 	license, 	passport, 	other
immigration documents, and cell phone; (c) without any new
conditions on release, including but not limited to requiring
Petitioner to sign a new “Order of Release on Recognizance”
or 	requiring 	Petitioner 	to 	enroll 	in 	and 	complete 	an
“Alternatives to Detention” program; (d) without any tracking
devices or use of a tracking application; and (e) with all
clothing 	and 	outerwear 	he 	was 	wearing 	at 	the 	time 	of
detention, or other proper attire.
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(2) 	In addition, Respondents shall provide reasonable advance
notice to Petitioner’s counsel to arrange for his safe release.
Petitioner’s counsel is David Thomas Kubat and can be
reached at 612-436-7105; dkubat@zimmigration.com.
e. 	By 5:00 p.m., two days after the bond hearing, the parties shall provide
the Court with a status update concerning the results of any bond hearing
conducted pursuant to this Order, or if no bond hearing was held, advise
the Court regarding Petitioner’s release. Further, the parties shall advise
the Court whether any additional proceedings in this matter are required.
Dated: May 7, 2026 	s/Susan Richard Nelson
SUSAN RICHARD NELSON
United States District Judge
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