Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Erin Schutte Wadzinski, KIVU IMMIGRATION LAW PLLC, 222 Tenth Street,
P.O. Box 104, Worthington, MN 56187; and Rachel M. Engebretson,
ENGEBRETSON LAW FIRM, P.A., 989 118th Avenue Northeast, Blaine, MN
55434, for Petitioner.
David John Walker, FREEBORN COUNTY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Freeborn
County Government Center, 411 South Broadway Avenue, Albert Lea, MN
56007, for Mike Stanski; David W. Fuller and Joshua Sweeney, UNITED
STATES 	ATTORNEY’S 	OFFICE, 	300 	South 	Fourth 	Street, 	Suite 	600,
Minneapolis, MN 55415, for Federal Respondents.
AXEL J.M.C.,
Petitioner,
v.
MIKE STANSKI, Jail Administrator,
Freeborn Adult Detention Center;
DAVID EASTERWOOD, Acting Director, St.
Paul Field Office, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement;
TODD M. LYONS, Acting Director of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; and
TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General
of the United States,
Respondents.
Civil No. 26-2281 (JRT/EMB)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS
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Petitioner Axel J.M.C. is a citizen of Honduras who arrived in the United States in
2013 when he was 12 years old. He has no adult criminal history. Petitioner was arrested
by U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) officials on April 14, 2026. On April 18,
2026, Petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus alleging that his arrest and
continued detention violate the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution,
as well as the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and federal regulations governing
its implementation.
The Court concludes that Petitioner’s arrest and detention violate his Fifth
Amendment right to procedural due process. The Court will grant the petition and order
that Petitioner receive an individualized bond hearing. 	The Court declines to reach
Petitioner’s claims under the Fourth Amendment and the INA.
BACKGROUND
I. 	FACTS
Petitioner 	was 	born 	in 	Honduras 	and 	arrived 	in 	the 	United 	States 	as 	an
unaccompanied child when he was 12 years old. (Pet. Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Pet.”) ¶
14, Apr. 18, 2026, Docket No. 1.) He “presented himself to an immigration official at the
border” and was “briefly detained . . . in a government-run humanitarian shelter for
children.” (Pet. ¶ 2.) The U.S. Border Patrol served Petitioner with a Notice to Appear,
charging him as removable. (Decl. of John Ligon (“Ligon Decl.”) ¶ 8 & Ex. A, Apr. 22, 2026,
Docket No. 6.) Petitioner was ultimately released by the Office of Refugee Resettlement
“to the care of his biological mother in Minnesota,” after he was found to be “not
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dangerous or a flight risk.” (Pet. ¶ 2; see also Ligon Decl. ¶ 9.) “After he graduated from
school and gained a work permit, [Petitioner] fully committed himself to the various jobs
that he worked. 	He worked hard enough to secure his own apartment in Adrian,
Minnesota, while continuing to support his mother and other family members who relied
on him.” (Pet. ¶ 49.)
In 2019, United States Citizenship and Immigrant Services (USCIS) granted
Petitioner Special Immigrant Juvenile Status. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 47); see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27); 8
C.F.R. § 204.11. “A special immigrant juvenile is defined as one who has been declared
dependent on a U.S. juvenile court due to abuse, abandonment or neglect; for whom it is
not in their best interests to be returned to their country of origin; and for whom DHS
consents to the grant of special immigrant juvenile status.” 	Zamora v. Noem, No.
8:26CV79, 2026 WL 766087, at *1 (D. Neb. Mar. 18, 2026). An individual designated with
Special 	Immigrant 	Juvenile 	Status 	“shall 	be 	deemed, 	for 	purposes 	of 	[obtaining
adjustment for lawful permanent resident status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)] to have been
paroled into the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h).
Petitioner also pursued “a simultaneous asylum claim” and received a work permit.
(Pet. ¶ 49.) In other words, Petitioner has lawfully and diligently “pursue[d] all potential
forms of removal defense relief that he qualified for.” 	(Id.) 	USCIS granted Petitioner
Deferred Action in 2022. 	(Ligon Decl. ¶ 13 & Ex. E.) 	On February 12, 2023, USCIS
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terminated Petitioner’s Deferred Action status, however his special immigrant juvenile
status remained approved. (Id. ¶ 14 & Ex. F.)
In March 2026, Petitioner moved to terminate his removal proceedings. 	(Ligon
Decl. ¶ 15 & Ex. G.) An immigration judge denied Petitioner’s motion later that month
and noted that an individual hearing would be scheduled “to resolve Respondent’s
adjustment of status request.” (Id. ¶ 16 & Ex. H.)
On April 14, 2026—“without any notice or warning”—Respondents arrested
Petitioner. (Pet. ¶ 50.) On the same date, federal officials “served Petitioner an I-200”
administrative warrant for his arrest. (Ligon Decl. ¶ 17.) Petitioner’s Form I-213, “Record
of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien,” identifies Petitioner as an “alien present without
admission or parole.” (Id., ¶ 5 & Ex. C at 2.)
Petitioner is now in detention at the Freeborn County Jail. 	(Id. ¶ 19.) 	He is
currently awaiting a hearing at which an immigration judge will “adjudicat[e] [his]
adjustment of status application.” (Pet.’s Notice at 1, Apr. 29, 2026, Docket No. 11.)
II. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 18, 2026, Petitioner filed a Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,
contending 	that 	his 	detention 	is 	unlawful 	under 	the 	Fourth 	Amendment, 	Fifth
Amendment, and Immigration and Nationality Act and its implementing regulations. The
Court directed Respondents to file a reasoned memorandum responding to Petitioner’s
claims. (Docket No. 3.) Respondents timely filed their response, and Petitioner replied.
(Docket Nos. 5, 7.)
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DISCUSSION
It is well-established that “absent suspension” by Congress, the Constitution
guarantees that the “writ of habeas corpus remains available to every individual detained
within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const.
art. 1., § 9, cl. 2). District courts can provide habeas relief to persons detained in violation
of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). A petitioner must
prove unlawful detention by a preponderance of the evidence. 	E.g., Aditya W.H. v.
Trump, 782 F. Supp. 3d 691, 703 (D. Minn. 2025).
The Court will turn first to Petitioner’s claim relying on the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. 	Petitioner primarily seeks immediate release but alternatively
seeks “a full and fair bond hearing . . . based only upon his danger to community and flight
risk.” (Pet. at 25.)
A. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” 	U.S. Const. amend. V. 	“[T]he
government has more flexibility when dealing with immigration.” Banyee v. Garland, 115
F.4th 928, 931 (8th Cir. 2024). But “the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within
the United States, including [noncitizens], whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful,
temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). “[G]overnment
detention violates [the Due Process Clause] unless the detention is ordered in a criminal
proceeding with adequate procedural protections . . . or, in certain special and ‘narrow’
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nonpunitive ‘circumstances’[.]” Id. at 690 (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80
(1992)).
Here, 	Respondents’ 	asserted 	basis 	for 	detaining 	Petitioner 	is 	28 	U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), which provides for mandatory detention for “applicant[s] for admission”
into the United States. See Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128, 1138 (8th Cir. 2026) (concluding
that an individual who, like Petitioner, was already present in the United States, was
nevertheless an “applicant for admission” and is subject to mandatory detention under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A)).1 	In 	responding 	to 	Petitioner’s 	Procedural 	Due 	Process 	claim,
Respondents argue that the Constitution does not entitle Petitioner to any additional
procedural protections beyond those granted under the statute, and that § 1225(b)(2)(A)
expressly authorizes his detention without the opportunity to post bond.
Respondents rely in part on Banyee, 115 F.4th 928, in which the Eighth Circuit
rejected a procedural due process claim brought by a noncitizen detained under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c). 	In Banyee, the court construed the Supreme Court’s decisions in Demore v.
Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), and Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678, to “leave no room for a multi-factor
‘reasonableness’ test” if an individual is detained under § 1226(c). Banyee, 115 F.4th at
933. 	However, as other courts in this District have noted, it is not clear that Banyee
1 In Avila, the Eighth Circuit did not address the merits of the constitutional argument
Petitioner makes here. See 170 F.4th at 1140–41 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
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applies to the facts of this case. See, e.g., Orlando R.V.V. v. Blanche, Civ. No. 26-1903, slip
op. at 7–10 (D. Minn. Apr. 28, 2026).
The differences between this case and Banyee are stark. First, Banyee involved a
noncitizen detained pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which permits mandatory detention
of certain “criminal aliens” who have been found to be “inadmissible” or “deportable.”
Here, Respondents’ purported basis for detention is § 1225(b)(2)(A), a different provision
only recently interpreted by the Government to permit mandatory detention. 	“[I]n
enacting 	§ 	1226(c), 	Congress 	made 	specific, 	categorical 	judgments 	about 	the
dangerousness and flight risks posed by noncitizens convicted of certain enumerated
offenses,” which are not necessarily applicable here. 	See Orlando R.V.V., slip op. at 9.
Unlike the petitioner in Banyee, who was convicted of an aggravated felony, the
Petitioner in this case has been law abiding—save for one juvenile conviction 11 years
ago—since he arrived in the United States as an unaccompanied minor, fleeing violence
in Honduras.
Moreover, USCIS granted the Petitioner in this case Special Immigrant Juvenile
Status, meaning that he has been “paroled into the United States,” for the purposes of
applying for lawful permanent resident status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h). Petitioner is in the
process of diligently pursuing his Congressionally granted opportunity to seek lawful
permanent resident status in the United States and has a hearing scheduled before an
immigration judge to adjudicate his application. 	(See Docket 11 at 2.) 	This specialized
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status, when considered alongside Petitioner’s lack of criminal history, is an additional
reason that Banyee is distinguishable. 	See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 694 (noting that a
noncitizen’s protections under the Due Process Clause “may vary depending on status
and circumstance”).
In short, the Court concludes that Banyee does not foreclose Petitioner’s Due
Process arguments. The Court concludes, as other courts in this district have, that Banyee
is not binding on the question of whether this Court should assess Due Process claims
brought 	by 	individuals 	detained 	without 	bond 	under 	§ 	1225(b)(2)(A) 	under 	the
longstanding framework from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See Alicia
N.F.C. v. Blanche, Civ. No. 26-2145, 2026 WL 1005079, at *2 n.2 (D. Minn. Apr. 14, 2026).
B. 	Due Process Analysis
Proceeding to the merits of Petitioner’s claim, the Court emphasizes that “due
process . . . is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances.” 	Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367
U.S. 886, 895 (1961)). 	The Due Process Clause instead “calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands.” Id. at 902 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). “To determine whether a civil detention violates a detainee’s
due process rights,” courts apply three factors set forth by Mathews. See Alicia N.F.C.,
2026 WL 1005079, at *2. Those factors are: (1) “the private interest that will be affected
by the official action;” (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
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the procedures used” and “the probable value . . . of additional . . . safeguards;” and (3)
“the Government’s interest . . . and . . . burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
Petitioner’s private interest here is of paramount importance. “[T]he interest in
being free from physical detention by one’s own government,” is indeed “the most
elemental of liberty interests.” 	Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529. 	Petitioner, who is presently
incarcerated at the Freeborn County Jail, under conditions like those he would be
subjected to had he committed a crime, has been deprived of that elemental interest.
Gunaydin v. Trump, 784 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1187 (D. Minn. 2025) (noting that when courts
assess the first Mathews factor, they “consider the conditions under which detainees are
currently held, including whether a detainee is held in conditions indistinguishable from
criminal incarceration”). Moreover, Petitioner “has a strong interest in remaining in the
country that has been his home [since he was 12 years old] and has granted him the ability
to stay and work here [for nearly 13 years].” 	See Zamora, 2026 WL 766087 at *4
(assessing the Due Process claim of an individual detained after they received Special
Immigrant Juvenile Status). 	The Court concludes that the first Mathews factor cuts in
Petitioner’s favor.
Next, the Court finds there to be a high degree of risk, particularly given the extent
and velocity of Respondents’ immigration-related actions in Minnesota over the past
several months, of the mistaken deprivation of liberty in the name of swift immigration
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enforcement. Cf. U.H.A. v. Bondi, Civ. No. 26-417, 2026 WL 558824, at *14–15 (D. Minn.
Feb. 27, 2026) (concluding that plaintiffs, a group of refugees, were likely to prevail in
showing that their procedural due process rights had been violated during Operation
Metro Surge). 	An “individualized bond hearing,” at which Petitioner could be heard
before continuing to be incarcerated, “would alleviate these risks.” 	Abdirashid H.M. v.
Noem, Civ. No. 25-4779, 2026 WL 127698, at *4 (D. Minn. Jan. 9, 2026).
Finally, the burden the Government would bear in providing this additional
procedural 	protection 	is 	low, 	and 	“would 	impose 	minimal, 	if 	any, 	financial 	or
administrative burden on Respondents.” Id. at *5. The Court is exceedingly skeptical at
any urgent need to remove Petitioner—who, again, has resided in the United States since
2013, and has sought to pursue all lawful avenues of remaining in the country.2
Respondents identify no persuasive reason that a bond hearing is unnecessary or would
impose too significant of a burden in this case.
Because the Court concludes that Petitioner’s due process claim under the Fifth
Amendment prevails, it offers no view on the merits of Petitioner’s claims under the INA
or the Fourth Amendment.
2 See also Orlando R.V.V., slip op. at 9 (finding no evidence that the petitioner “was trying
to evade authorities” where, like in this case, the petitioner “encountered [immigration officials]
when he first entered the country,” and thereafter “did not go underground or hide from
authorities,” but rather “applied for asylum and a work permit”).
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CONCLUSION
Because the Court concludes that Petitioner’s continued detention without a bond
hearing violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth amendment, the Court will grant the
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus insofar as Petitioner seeks an individualized bond
hearing. 	Moreover, 	because 	Petitioner’s 	continued 	detention 	is 	interfering 	with
Petitioner’s ability to receive a medical exam required for his adjustment of status
application, the Court will direct that the bond hearing be provided expeditiously.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that
1. 	Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Docket No. [1]) is GRANTED as follows:
a. 	Petitioner's detention without an individualized bond hearing violates his
rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment;
b. 	Respondents shall provide Petitioner with a bond hearing in accordance
with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within 24 hours of the date of this Order, in which
the parties will be allowed to present evidence and argument about
whether Petitioner is a danger to the community and presents a flight risk
if not detained;
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c. 	If Respondents do not provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a) as required herein, Petitioner must be immediately
released from detention; and
d. 	By 5:00 P.M. on May 4, the parties shall provide the Court with a status
update concerning the results of any bond hearing conducted pursuant to
this Order, or if no bond hearing was held, advise the Court regarding
Petitioner's release. Further, the parties shall advise the Court whether
any additional proceedings in this matter are required and submit any
proposals for the scope of further litigation.
2. 	Because filings in immigration habeas matters remain accessible on courthouse
public terminals, Petitioner’s Motion for Order Directing Redaction (Docket No. [8])
is GRANTED in part. 	Respondents shall, within 24 hours of this Order, redact all
exhibits identified by Petitioner in his motion that include Petitioner’s unredacted
juvenile delinquency adjudication record; file redacted versions of those exhibits on
the public docket; and if necessary, file the unredacted versions under temporary
seal pursuant to LR 5.6.
DATED: April 29, 2026
at Minneapolis, Minnesota. 	JOHN R. TUNHEIM
7:50 p.m. 	United States District Judge
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