Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
David J.C.P.,
Petitioner,
v.
Todd Blanche, Acting Attorney General;
Markwayne Mullin, Secretary, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security;
Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
and David Easterwood, Acting Director,
St. Paul Field Office Immigration and
Customs Enforcement,
Respondents.
Civil No. 26-2181 (DWF/ECW)
MEMORANDUM
OPINION AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner David J.C.P.’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus (the “Petition”). (Doc. No. 1.) Respondents filed a response asserting
authority to detain Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). (Doc. No. 6.) For the reasons
set forth below, the Court grants the Petition and orders Respondents to provide
Petitioner with a bond hearing.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a citizen of Ecuador and resident of Minneapolis, Minnesota. (Doc.
No. 1 ¶¶ 7, 14.) Petitioner has lived in the United States for over four years. (Id. ¶ 14.)
He is married, has a three-year-old daughter, and he and his wife are expecting a baby in
May. (Id. ¶ 17.) Petitioner alleges that he entered the United States through a port of
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entry, was initially detained, and then released with an ankle monitor. (Id. ¶ 15.)
Respondents assert that the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) encountered
Petitioner on March 13, 2022, at a place other than a port of entry, was released from
initial processing with an I-94 as an Alternate to Detention, and that as a condition of his
parole, he report to the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) office near his
final destination within 15 days or face removal. (Doc. No. 6 at 1; see also Doc.
Nos. 7-2, 7-3.) Respondents assert that his parole expired on April 5, 2022. (Doc. No. 6
at 1.)1 Petitioner, however, alleges that he appeared for his immigration meeting as
directed, at which time his ankle monitor was removed. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 15.)
On April 6, 2026, an immigration officer found probable cause to arrest Petitioner
and signed an arrest warrant. (Doc. No. 7-1.) On April 7, 2026, Petitioner was detained
and brought to the Whipple Federal Building in Fort Snelling, Minnesota. (Doc. No. 1
¶¶ 18-19.) Respondents claim that they read the contents of the warrant to Petitioner in
Spanish. (Doc. No. 7-1.) Petitioner was then moved to Freeborn Adult Detention Center,
where he remains. (Id. ¶¶ 20-21.) He is currently scheduled to appear before an
immigration judge on April 28, 2026. (Doc. No. 7-4 at 1.) The Notice to Appear was
issued on April 7, 2026. (Id.)
Petitioner filed the Petition on April 8, 2026. (Doc. No. 1 at 26.) Petitioner
asserts that his detention is unlawful because it violates the Due Process Clause of the
1 	The document submitted to show that Petitioner’s parole expiration is actually for
Dyan C.C., an eight-year-old family member who was traveling with Petitioner. (See
Doc. No. 7-2 at 2; Doc. No. 7-3.)
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Fifth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unlawful seizure, the
Administrative Procedure Act, and the Accardi doctrine. (Id. ¶¶ 53-80.) Petitioner
requests immediate release from detention or a bond hearing. (Id. at 25.)
DISCUSSION
A district court may provide habeas relief to a person who is being detained in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). That
authority includes jurisdiction to hear habeas challenges to immigration-related detention.
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); Deng Chol A. v. Barr, 455 F. Supp. 3d 896,
900-01 (D. Minn. 2020). The burden is on the petitioner to prove illegal detention by a
preponderance of the evidence. See Mohammed H. v. Trump, 786 F. Supp. 3d 1149,
1154 (D. Minn. 2025).
Respondents argue that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) and point to Avila v. Bondi, No. 25-3248, 2026 WL 819258 (8th Cir.
Mar. 25, 2026). (Doc. No. 6 at 3-4.) In Avila, the Eighth Circuit interpreted
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) to require detention of any noncitizen present in the United States who
has not been admitted, regardless of whether they are arriving at the border or within the
interior, if an examining officer determines that the noncitizen seeking admission “is not
clearly . . . entitled to be admitted.” See Avila, 2026 WL 819258, at *3-4. Petitioner
acknowledges the Avila decision but clarifies that he challenges his detention on
constitutional grounds not foreclosed by Avila. (See Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 30-32.)
Specifically, Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of his detention under the
Due Process Clause. (Id. ¶¶ 33-36.) Respondents argue Petitioner is not entitled to
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federal due process protections (i.e., a bond hearing) because that analysis is legally
irrelevant post-Avila. (Doc. No. 6 at 5.) Specifically, Respondents argue that the
Mathews factors (discussed below) are irrelevant for application for admission under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) and any such constitutional analysis would exceed the Court’s authority
to review Congress’s statutory judgment. The Court disagrees. The Avila opinion did
not address the issue of due process. See 2026 WL 819258, at *8 & n.8 (Erickson, J.,
dissenting). Nothing in the Avila opinion, which was decided exclusively on statutory
grounds, suggests that any constitutional review is “legally irrelevant.” The Court,
therefore, considers Petitioner’s due process arguments.
No person within the United States—including noncitizens who entered
unlawfully—shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
U.S. Const. amend. V; see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. Civil detention violates the Due
Process Clause unless there is a “special justification” that “outweighs the individual’s
constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S.
at 690 (citation modified). To determine whether a civil detention violates a detainee’s
due process rights, courts apply the three Mathews factors.2 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see, e.g., Maldonado v. Olson, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1148 (D.
Minn. 2025). The three factors are: (1) the private interest affected by the official action;
2 	Use of the Mathews factors is appropriate here despite the Eighth Circuit’s
decision to bypass this test in Banyee v. Garland, 115 F.4th 928 (8th Cir. 2024). Banyee
analyzed the mandatory detention of a noncitizen pursuant to § 1226(c). See id. at 930.
Here, Respondents invoke § 1225(b)(2)(A) to detain Petitioner.
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(2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest, and the probable value of additional
or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest, including the
burden of those additional or substitute safeguards. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. These
factors favor Petitioner.
First, freedom from detention is a central due process protection. See Zadvydas,
533 U.S. at 690 (“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or
other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process]
Clause protects.”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (“[T]he most elemental
of liberty interests [is] the interest in being free from physical detention by one’s own
government.”). Further, Respondents assert that Petitioner’s parole expired and that
Petitioner violated his parole conditions by continuing to remain in the United States.
(Doc. No. 6 at 4, 6.) These assertions, however, are contradicted by other evidence in the
record and the allegations in the Petition. Instead, Petitioner submits that he was released
on parole with an ankle monitor with the condition that he report to ICE within 15 days,
and that he so appeared and had his ankle monitor removed. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 15.)
Presumably, at the time the ankle monitor was removed, Respondents concluded that
Petitioner was neither a flight risk nor a danger and therefore released him on his own
recognizance. Moreover, there is no evidence that Petitioner failed to update his address
or otherwise meet the terms of his release. Indeed, Respondents were able to locate him
at his residence without any asserted difficulty when they detained him. Because the
record shows that Petitioner was released previously on his own recognizance when his
ankle monitor was removed, the government cannot revoke that status without due
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process. See, e.g., Dos Santos Silva v. Warden, Lincoln Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 26-cv-131,
2026 WL 926725, at *1 (D. Neb. Apr. 6, 2026) (explaining that the government cannot
recategorize immigrants released pursuant to § 1226 without due process).
Second, without an individual assessment, the risk of erroneous deprivation is
high. Cf. Abdirashid H. M. v. Noem, No. 25-cv-4779, 2026 WL 127698, at *4 (D. Minn.
Jan. 9, 2026) (granting habeas relief under § 1226, in part, because lack of process
created a high risk of erroneous deprivation). And providing an individualized
assessment as to the government’s interest in detaining Petitioner would ameliorate that
risk. See id.
Third, the government’s interest in detaining Petitioner is weak because they have
not established that Petitioner is unlikely to appear or that he poses any threat to the
community. See Maldonado, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 1153-54 (granting habeas petition in part
because there was no showing that public safety or attendance concerns required
detention). Respondents previously determined that Petitioner was not a danger when
they removed his ankle monitor and released him. See Alvarez-Rico v. Noem,
No. 26-cv-729, 2026 WL 522322, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2026) (requiring a pre-
detention showing of changed circumstances to revoke an OREC). Respondents have not
demonstrated that Petitioner is now a danger or a flight risk. Finally, the burden of
providing a hearing is low, especially considering that Petitioner is set for a hearing on a
Notice to Appear later this month. (Doc. No. 7-4 at 1.)
The Mathews factors weigh in favor of Petitioner. The Court finds that requiring a
bond hearing will balance the interests of Petitioner and Respondents.
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ORDER
Based on the foregoing and the record in this case, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that:
1. 	Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. No. [1]) is
GRANTED.
2. 	The Court DECLARES that Petitioner’s detention without an
individualized bond hearing violates his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
3. 	Respondents are ORDERED to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing
before an immigration judge in Minnesota within seven (7) days of the date of this Order.
4. 	If Respondents do not provide Petitioner with a bond hearing as required by
this Order, Petitioner must be immediately released from detention.
a. 	In the event that Respondents release Petitioner, they must do so:
(1) in Minnesota; (2) with all personal documents and belongings, such as his
driver’s license, passport, other immigration documents, and cell phone;
(3) without any new conditions on release, including but not limited to requiring
Petitioner to sign a new “Order of Release on Recognizance” or requiring
Petitioner to enroll in and complete an “Alternatives to Detention” program;
(4) without any tracking devices or use of a tracking application; and (5) with all
clothing and outerwear he was wearing at the time of detention, or other proper
attire.
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b. 	In addition, Respondents shall provide reasonable advance notice to
counsel to arrange for a safe release of Petitioner. Petitioner’s counsel is Claire
Glenn who can be reached at 651-343-4816.
5. 	Within ten (10) days of the date of this Order, Respondents shall provide
the Court with a status update concerning the results of any bond hearing conducted
pursuant to this Order or, if no bond hearing was held, advise the Court regarding
Petitioner’s release.
6. 	Respondents, or anyone acting in concert with Respondents, are
ENJOINED from removing, transferring, or otherwise facilitating the removal of
Petitioner from the District of Minnesota prior to the ordered bond hearing.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: April 23, 2026 	s/Donovan W. Frank
DONOVAN W. FRANK
United States District Judge
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