Thompson v. Clay County

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Joshua James Thompson,
Petitioner,
v.
Clay County,
Respondent.
Case No. 26-CV-1993 (NEB/SGE)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Joshua James Thompson’s Petition for
Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Dkt. 1 (“Petition”), and Application to Proceed
In Forma Pauperis, Dkt. 2 (“IFP Application”). For the reasons below, the Court recom-
mends denying the Petition, dismissing this action, and denying the IFP Application as
moot.
I. Background
Mr. Thompson is confined at the Clay County Correctional Facility in Moorhead,
Minnesota. See Pet. 1.1 He faces an ongoing state prosecution, State v. Thompson, No. 14-
CR-23-2031 (Minn. Dist. Ct.), charging him with one count of first-degree driving while
impaired. See Register of Action, State v. Thompson, No. 14-CR-23-2031 (Minn. Dist. Ct.);
1 Citations to materials filed in this action use the page numbers assigned by this District’s
CM/ECF electronic-filing system.
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cf. Minn. Stat. 169A.20, subd. 2(1).2
The Petition raises four grounds for relief. First, under the Fourth Amendment,
Mr. Thompson challenges his initial stop and arrest, asserting that on June 25, 2023, a Clay
County Sheriff’s deputy pulled him over because the deputy “reco[g]nized [him] and
as[s]umed [he] didn’t have a driver license;” Mr. Thompson claims that the deputy “did
not run [his] name to nor[] have probable cause to stop [him].” Pet. 6. Second, again under
the Fourth Amendment, Mr. Thompson alleges an unreasonable search and seizure, argu-
ing that officers “[i]llegally searched [and] seized [him] and [his] vehicle without the nec-
essary reasonable and a[r]ticulable suspicion to stop and detain [him].” Id. Third, invoking
the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, Mr. Thompson claims authorities violated
his rights against self-incrimination and to due process by using a monitored telephone call
with his attorney against him. See id. Finally, referring apparently to the Fifth Amendment
(the handwriting here is unclear), Mr. Thompson alleges he was denied the right “to speak
to an attorney in privat[e].” Id. at 7.
For relief, Mr. Thompson seeks release based on the alleged constitutional viola-
tions and suggests that he should be “pa[i]d for false imprisonment and for being denied
[his] constitutional rights.” Id. at 8. He also asks the Court to “stop and suppress[] all evi-
dence” based on the allegedly unlawful search of himself and his vehicle. Id. at 2.
2 The Register of Action does not appear in this action’s docket, but the Court can take
judicial notice of public court records. See, e.g., Stutzka v. McCarville, 420 F.3d 757, 760
n.2 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Eagleboy, 200 F.3d 1137, 1140 (8th Cir. 1999)).
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II. Analysis
a. Claim for monetary damages
Mr. Thompson’s request for monetary damages raises a threshold issue: such relief
is unavailable in habeas. The writ of habeas corpus tests the legality of custody; it does not
provide a vehicle for damages. See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494 (1973)
(“In the case of a damages claim, habeas corpus is not an appropriate or available federal
remedy.”). The proper vehicle for monetary compensation for constitutional violations by
state actors is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id. The Court therefore recommends denying the Pe-
tition to the extent it seeks damages.
b. Younger abstention
With the damages issue aside, the Court turns to the rest of the Petition. Two separate
problems each require dismissal; the first is Younger abstention. See, e.g., Younger v. Har-
ris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
Federal courts have consistently recognized that state pretrial detainees like
Mr. Thompson can challenge their confinement as unconstitutional under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. See, e.g., Butcher v. Clay Cnty., No. 26-CV-0801 (LMP/JFD), 2026 WL 930969,
at *2 (D. Minn. Mar. 4, 2026) (citing cases), R&R adopted, 2026 WL 928338 (D. Minn.
Apr. 6, 2026); Terry v. Ryals, No. 25-CV-1152 (BSM/ERE), 2026 WL 546489, at *2 (E.D.
Ark. Feb. 1, 2026) (citing authorities), R&R adopted, 2026 WL 544264 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 26,
2026). But the Supreme Court has warned that federal courts should not serve as a “‘pre-
trial-motion forum for state prisoners.’” Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484,
493 (1973) (quoting id. at 508 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
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Under Younger, federal courts must refrain from interfering in certain ongoing state
proceedings. See, e.g., Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013) (citing
cases). The Eighth Circuit applies “a three-part inquiry” to decide when Younger abstention
applies:
First, does the underlying state proceeding fall within one of
the three “exceptional circumstances” where Younger absten-
tion is appropriate? Second, if the underlying proceeding fits
within a Younger category, does the state proceeding satisfy
what are known as the “Middlesex” factors? And third, even if
the underlying state proceeding satisfies the first two inquiries,
is abstention nevertheless inappropriate because an exception
to abstention applies?
Wassef v. Tibben, 68 F.4th 1083, 1087 (8th Cir. 2023) (quoting 375 Slane Chapel Rd., LLC
v. Stone Cnty., 53 F.4th 1122, 1127 (8th Cir. 2022)).
Under this analysis, the Court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over the
Petition. The first Younger factor is met because Mr. Thompson’s state-court matter is an
ongoing state criminal prosecution—the paradigmatic situation where Younger abstention
applies. See Sprint Commc’ns, 571 U.S. at 78 (“Younger exemplifies one class of cases in
which federal-court abstention is required: When there are ongoing state criminal proceed-
ings . . . .”).
At the second step, the Court examines whether the relevant state proceedings sat-
isfy the three factors from Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass’n,
457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). Those factors ask whether: (1) there is an ongoing state judicial
proceeding; (2) the proceeding implicates important state interests; and (3) there is an
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adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges. See, e.g.,
id.; Wassef, 68 F.4th at 1087. All three factors are satisfied here.
• The first Middlesex factor is satisfied because, as noted above,
Mr. Thompson awaits prosecution in a Minnesota trial court.
• The second Middlesex factor is met because states have a vital sover-
eign interest in enforcing their criminal laws, prosecuting felonies,
and protecting their citizens. See, e.g., Shaik v. Finnegan, No. 24-CV-
2625 (KMM/JFD), 2024 WL 4320260, at *2 (D. Minn. Sept. 26,
2024); Phelps-Roper v. Heineman, 710 F. Supp. 2d 890, 902 (D. Neb.
2010) (citing Taylor v. Jaquez, 126 F.3d 1294, 1297 (10th Cir. 1997)).
• On the third Middlesex factor, state courts are presumed competent to
adjudicate federal constitutional issues. See, e.g., Norwood v. Dickey,
409 F.3d 901, 904 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Neal v. Wilson, 112 F.3d
351, 357 (8th Cir. 1997)); Hahn v. Bauer, No. 09-CV-2220 (JNE/JJK),
2010 WL 396228, at *15 (D. Minn. Jan. 27, 2010) (citing Norwood),
aff’d, 393 F. App’x 413 (8th Cir. 2010).
Finally, the Court considers whether an exception to Younger abstention applies.
The Supreme Court has recognized narrow exceptions limited to situations where (1) the
state proceeding is demonstrably motivated by bad faith or harassment; (2) a state statute
at issue is “‘flagrantly and patently’” unconstitutional; or (3) a pressing need for immediate
federal equitable relief exists to prevent immediate and irreparable harm. See, e.g., Kugler
v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975); Wassef, 68 F.4th at 1086–87 (quoting Younger, 401
U.S. at 53). These exceptions are construed narrowly. See, e.g., Aaron v. Target Corp., 357
F.3d 768, 779 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 53–54); Grazzini-Rucki v. Knut-
son, No. 13-CV-2477 (SRN/JSM), 2014 WL 2462855, at *13 (D. Minn. May 29, 2014)
(citing Aaron), aff’d, No. 14-2569 (8th Cir. Mar. 31, 2015).
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Mr. Thompson fails to show that any exception applies here. Because nothing in the
Petition suggests the state court overseeing his prosecution cannot provide an adequate
remedy for his expressed concerns, Younger abstention requires this Court to abstain from
exercising jurisdiction over the Petition.
c. Failure to exhaust state-court remedies
Even if Younger abstention did not require dismissal, the Petition would still fail for
a second reason: Mr. Thompson has not exhausted his state-court remedies.
Unlike 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), § 2241’s text has no explicit exhaustion requirement.
But it is well established that a state pretrial detainee must exhaust available state-court
remedies before a federal court will consider a § 2241 petition. See, e.g., Braden, 410 U.S.
at 489–90; Sacco v. Falke, 649 F.2d 634, 636 (8th Cir. 1981) (quoting Braden); Rojas Her-
nandez v. Paget, No. 16-CV-2537 (DWF/HB), 2016 WL 7404742, at *2 (D. Minn. Nov. 10,
2016) (citing cases), R&R adopted, 2016 WL 7404683 (D. Minn. Dec. 21, 2016). That
requirement demands “appellate exhaustion of those claims, which in turn requires that
judgment be entered in the state-court prosecution—meaning, ultimately, that state pretrial
detainees usually cannot seek federal habeas relief until after they have been convicted.”
Abdikarim v. State, No. 24-CV-2013 (NEB/LIB), 2024 WL 3557772, at *2 (D. Minn. June
17, 2024) (citing Rojas Hernandez), R&R adopted, 2024 WL 3552960 (D. Minn. July 26,
2024).
Mr. Thompson’s answers about exhaustion are ambiguous. He may be suggesting
some sort of “[f]irst appeal” bearing on the Petition’s grounds; in the template form’s rele-
vant spot, he checked both “Yes” and “No.” Pet. 2. If he meant “Yes,” however, he failed
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to provide any of the template’s requested follow-up information (i.e., he did not identify
any court, filing date, docket number, or result for any appeal or administrative remedy).
See id. Mr. Thompson also states that he filed no second or third appeal. Id.
In other words, the Petition does not describe any efforts by Mr. Thompson to raise
the Petition’s arguments in state criminal proceedings through pretrial motions, or in any
other tribunals. When given a section to explain why he did not present the Petition’s
grounds in all available appeals, Mr. Thompson left it blank. This is unsurprising, of course,
because Mr. Thompson is currently in the midst of trial-court proceedings.3
Because Mr. Thompson has not exhausted available remedies in the state trial and
appellate courts, the Court recommends denying the Petition on the independent ground of
non-exhaustion.
d. Summary
Based on the discussion above, the Court recommends denying the Petition in full.
Given this determination, the Court further recommends dismissing this action and denying
the IFP Application as moot.
3 For what it is worth, the Court searched for any potential appellate-court records using
the Minnesota Appellate Courts’s case-management website (available at
https://macsnc.courts.state.mn.us), and no relevant appellate records appear.
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RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT
IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. Petitioner Joshua James Thompson’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Dkt. 1, be DENIED.
2. This matter be DISMISSED.
3. Mr. Thompson’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Dkt. 2,
be DENIED as moot.
Dated: April 29, 2026 s/Shannon G. Elkins
SHANNON G. ELKINS
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a
magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being
served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those objec-
tions within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2).
All objections and responses must comply with the word or line limits set forth in Local
Rule 72.2(c).
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