Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Anibal G.A.P.,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, Attorney General,
United States Department of Justice;
Kristi Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security; Todd M. Lyons,
Acting Director of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; and David
Easterwood, Field Office Director,
St. Paul Field Office, U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement,
Respondents.
Civ. No. 26-1879 (JWB/DTS)
ORDER ON
PETITION FOR WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS
Frances Ivy Mahoney-Mosedale, Esq., Gustafson Gluek PLLC, counsel for Petitioner.
David W. Fuller, Esq., and Jesus Cruz Rodriguez, Esq., United States Attorney’s Office,
counsel for Respondents.
This case asks whether Respondents may detain a noncitizen under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2) years after releasing him from custody under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and placing
him in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229. The answer is no. Because
Respondents previously exercised authority to release Petitioner Anibal G.A.P. under
§ 1226, that statute—not § 1225—governs detention while removal proceedings remain
pending.
In response to Petitioner’s habeas filing, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss or
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transfer this matter to the Southern District of Texas (Doc. No. 6), as well as a motion to
reconsider and stay this Court’s order requiring that Petitioner be returned to Minnesota
(Doc. No. 10). Respondents then submitted a status update indicating that Petitioner had
been returned to Minnesota (Doc. No. 11), rendering both requests moot. Accordingly,
this Order considers the position on the merits of Petitioner’s habeas claims that
Respondents presented in their motion papers. (See Doc. No. 7 at 6–9.)
Respondents’ position on the merits has been often rejected in this District. See,
e.g., Maldonado v. Olson, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1142–48, 1150–52 (D. Minn. 2025);
Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, 797 F. Supp. 3d 957, 968–970 (D. Minn. 2025); Mayamu K. v.
Bondi, Civ. No. 25-3035 (JWB/LIB), 2025 WL 3641819, at *7–8 (D. Minn. Oct. 20,
2025). Therefore, the Petition is granted to the extent that it requests release.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a citizen of Guatemala. (Doc. No. 1, Petition ¶¶ 2, 31; Doc. No. 7-3 at
2.) He alleges that he entered the United States in 2011 and was then apprehended and
released on his own recognizance. (Petition ¶¶ 2, 11, 31.) He now lives in St. Paul,
Minnesota, and has a pending application for asylum. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 31–33.) He alleges that he
has complied with all orders relating to his immigration proceedings. (Id. ¶ 2.)
On October 16, 2015, Respondents issued Petitioner a Notice to Appear charging
inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) for being present in the United States
without being admitted or paroled. (Doc. No. 7-3 at 2.) The Notice placed Petitioner in
removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, which governs full removal
proceedings before an Immigration Judge.
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Petitioner’s detention history shows he was detained at the Bishop Henry Whipple
building on October 16, 2015, transferred to the Freeborn County Jail that same day, and
then “Released - Bonded Out” on October 23, 2025. (Doc. No. 7-1.)
At a hearing on July 17, 2018, Petitioner conceded he was removable but applied
for asylum and other relief from removal. (Doc. No. 7-3 at 2.) Petitioner’s detention
history shows he was again detained at the Whipple building on December 6, 2018,
transferred to the Sherburne County Jail that same day, and then “Released – Bonded
Out” on December 26, 2018. (Doc. No. 7-1.)
On August 13, 2025, an Immigration Judge denied Petitioner’s asylum application
and other requests for relief. (Doc. No. 7-3 at 18.) Petitioner timely appealed the rulings.
(Doc. No. 7-2.) The record contains no evidence showing the appeal has been decided.
Petitioner alleges that masked agents arrested him without a warrant on January
20, 2026, while he was at work in Coon Rapids, Minnesota. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 15, 26, 34.) After
initially being detained in Minnesota, the next day he was transferred to detention
facilities in Texas. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 5, 14–15, 23; Doc. No. 7-1.) On March 20, 2026, Petitioner
was flown back to Minnesota and detained at the Whipple building. (Doc. No. 11.)
DISCUSSION
I. 	Legal Standard
A writ of habeas corpus may issue where a petitioner is in custody in violation of
the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The petitioner bears the burden
of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the challenged detention lacks a
lawful statutory basis. See Aditya W. H. v. Trump, 782 F. Supp. 3d 691, 703 (D. Minn.
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2025) (collecting cases).
Immigration detention, like all civil detention, must rest on an express
congressional grant of authority and must bear a reasonable relation to its statutory
purpose. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687, 690 (2001) (quoting Jackson v. Indiana,
406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)). Section 2241 confers jurisdiction to determine whether the
Executive Branch has statutory authority to detain an individual, including in the
immigration context. See id. at 687–88.
II. 	Analysis
Petitioner challenges only the lawfulness of his detention under federal law. He
does not contest any removal order, the conduct of removal proceedings, or the execution
of removal. Therefore, jurisdiction lies under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to review the legal basis
for custody. See, e.g., Mohammed H. v. Trump, 786 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1154–55 (D. Minn.
2025). Because the Petition is not directed at removal, statutory channeling provisions do
not apply either. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 841 (2018).
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) distinguishes between inspection,
removal proceedings, and detention authority. “Inspection” is the process by which
immigration officers determine whether a noncitizen seeking entry at the border or a port
of entry may be admitted to the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a). Section 1225
governs that process and generally requires detention in the case of a noncitizen “seeking
admission.” Id.; see also Maldonado, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 1149, 1152.
Section 1226, by contrast, governs detention of noncitizens already present in the
United States. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 846. Detention under § 1226(a) is not mandatory
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and permits release on bond or recognizance. Maldonado, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 1149–50.
Respondents assert that Petitioner is subject to § 1225(b)(2), which mandates
detention of certain “applicants for admission” pending removal proceedings. The vast
majority of district courts considering that assertion, including this Court, have
determined that the text, structure, and function of the INA’s detention provisions all
indicate that § 1225 does not apply to noncitizens released to the interior of the country
like Petitioner. See Eliseo A.A. v. Olson, Civ. No. 25-3381 (JWB/DJF), 2025 WL
2886729 (D. Minn. Oct. 8, 2025); Mayamu K. v. Bondi, Civ. No. 25-3035 (JWB/LIB),
2025 WL 3641819 (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 2025); Khalid B.Q. v. Noem, Civ. No. 25-4584
(JWB/DJF), Doc. No. 10 (D. Minn. Dec. 18, 2025); Xuseen A. v. Bondi, Civ. No. 25-
4514 (JWB/DJF), Doc. No. 16 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2025).
Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), does not alter the
result either. Respondents have previously cited to it as if it reflects an independent
adjudicatory resolution of statutory ambiguity. It does not. The Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”) is a component of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and operates
under the Attorney General’s supervisory authority. Its precedents are subject to review,
revision, and overruling by the Attorney General, who sets binding interpretations of the
INA for the Executive Branch. Yajure Hurtado thus reflects the DOJ’s adopted litigation
position concerning the scope of § 1225(b)(2), not an interpretation generated
independently of that position. See Memorandum from Rodney S. Scott, U.S. Customs &
Border Protection, Detention of Applicants for Admission (July 10, 2025) (memo from
DHS requiring that all “applicants for admission” be detained under § 1225(b)(2) during
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removal proceedings).
And even if Yajure Hurtado were such an independent interpretation, it would run
headlong into the statute’s text and structure for the reasons already explained. Where an
agency’s reading conflicts with the statute Congress enacted, it does not control. See
Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 394 (2024) (explaining that only long-
standing and consistent agency interpretations merit weight); see also Belsai D.S. v.
Bondi, Civ. No. 25-3682 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 2802947, at *7 n.5 (D. Minn. Oct. 1,
2025).
In habeas review, the question is not whether the Executive Branch has spoken
with one voice—whether through the DOJ or BIA—but whether the detention authority it
asserts is grounded in statute. That determination remains for the Article III courts. See
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688.
The analysis here is straightforward. Petitioner alleges that he was released from
custody when he first arrived to the United States around 15 years ago. Since then,
Respondents placed him in removal proceedings under § 1229a and released him from
custody under § 1226, allowing him to remain in the community for years. Records
indicate that Petitioner was detained and “Released - Bonded Out” from custody in 2015
and 2018. Nothing in the record suggests Respondents have since revoked release based
on flight risk, danger, changed circumstances, or any other reason.
Section 1225(b)(2) provides no authority to revisit those custody determinations
later. The Supreme Court has consistently treated §§ 1225 and 1226 as addressing
different populations at different procedural moments, not as interchangeable sources of
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detention authority. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 836–38. Nothing in § 1225 authorizes
Respondents to revive mandatory detention just by recharacterizing a previously released
noncitizen as an applicant for admission. See, e.g., Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, 797 F. Supp. 3d
957, 969–70 (D. Minn. 2025). The statute contains no mechanism for that switch.
Allowing Respondents to toggle between detention regimes in this way would collapse
the statutory structure Congress enacted and render § 1226 largely superfluous.
Respondents also argue that Petitioner is nonetheless “seeking admission” because
he has a pending asylum application. (Doc. No. 7 at 8.) As this Court and others have
observed, this argument “blur[s] two distinct legal concepts” by equating seeking asylum,
which concerns status, with “seeking admission,” which concerns legal entry. Junior
O.P.V. v. Bondi, Civ. No. 26-890 (JWB/JFD), Doc. No. 9 at 5 (D. Minn. Feb. 3, 2026)
(noting that an asylum application would not make petitioner a noncitizen “seeking
admission” under § 1225); see also Gabriel J. v. Bondi, Civ. No. 26-865 (SRN/LIB),
2026 WL 295192, at *3 (D. Minn. Feb. 4, 2026); Yao v. Almodovar, Civ. No. 25-9982
(PAE), 2025 WL 3653433, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2025). A pending application for
asylum does not mean Petitioner is perpetually “seeking admission” within the meaning
of § 1225(b)(2)(A).
On this record, Petitioner’s continued detention rests on a statute and an
interpretation that do not apply and is unlawful. See Khalid B.Q., Civ. No. 25-4584, Doc.
No. 10 at 6; Xuseen A., Civ. No. 25-4514, Doc. No. 16 at 7. Thus, he is entitled to a writ
of habeas corpus that grants his immediate release subject to any previously imposed
conditions. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008) (describing release as the
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“typical remedy” for “unlawful executive detention”).
Because Petitioner has shown Respondents have not invoked a provision of the
INA that authorizes his continued detention, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is
granted, and Petitioner’s other habeas claims are not reached.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings in this case,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. 	Petitioner Anibal G.A.P.’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 1)
is GRANTED.
2. 	Release. Respondents shall immediately release Petitioner from custody.
He must be released in Minnesota, subject only to any previously imposed conditions of
release. At the time of Petitioner’s release, Respondents shall return to Petitioner all
personal property in Respondents’ custody or control, including but not limited to,
passports, identity papers or licenses, immigration records, prescribed medications, and
treatment-related equipment. Release may not be delayed for any reason related to the
retrieval, processing, or return of such property. Any delay or failure to effectuate release
in accordance with this paragraph constitutes noncompliance with this Order.
If Petitioner is currently held outside Minnesota, Respondents shall immediately
initiate Petitioner’s return to Minnesota for the sole purpose of effectuating release.
Respondents shall not delay initiating Petitioner’s return based on administrative
convenience, transportation availability, or detention-capacity considerations.
Upon Petitioner’s arrival in Minnesota, Respondents shall effectuate release
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forthwith. If, at the time release would otherwise occur, weather conditions would expose
Petitioner to extreme cold or other reasonably dangerous conditions, Respondents may
delay physical release only for the brief period necessary to effectuate release in a safe
manner. Respondents shall employ the earliest reasonably available safe means of release
and may not delay release where a safe option is available. Any such delay must be
strictly limited and must not be used to justify continued custody, supervision, or
discretionary release authority.
3. 	Notice. By 5:20 p.m. on March 22, 2026, Respondents shall file an update
on the status of Petitioner’s release. In the update, Respondents must confirm the time,
date, and location of the release or anticipated return and release. If Petitioner has been
removed from Minnesota, Respondents must file a confirmation of the time, date, and
location of release promptly upon Petitioner’s arrival in Minnesota.
4. 	Respondents may not administratively recharacterize the release granted by
this Order as grounds to impose conditions or re-impose existing conditions in
conjunction with release (including release on recognizance or similar instruments),
without prior notice to and authorization from the Court, or absent a new and
independently lawful custody decision properly executed under the law. For the
avoidance of doubt, Respondents’ compliance with this Order requires Petitioner’s
immediate release in Minnesota without any newly issued instrument that either imposes
new conditions of supervision or restraint or restates previously imposed conditions.
5. 	Respondents may not re-detain Petitioner under a statutory theory this
Court has rejected in this proceeding absent materially changed circumstances.
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6. 	Petitioner’s other claims are not reached.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Date: March 20, 2026 	s/ Jerry W. Blackwell
Time: 5:20 p.m. 	JERRY W. BLACKWELL
United States District Judge
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