Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Daniel P. Suitor, DANIEL P. SUITOR, PLLC, 331 Second Avenue South, Suite
400-3099, Minneapolis, MN 55401, for Petitioner.
David W. Fuller and Trevor Brown, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE,
300 	South 	Fourth 	Street, 	Suite 	600, 	Minneapolis, 	MN 	55415 	for
Respondents.
Petitioner Bounkieng S. was arrested and detained by United States Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) on February 23, 2026. Bounkieng S. petitions for a writ
of habeas corpus, arguing that he is being detained unlawfully. 	Because the Court
BOUNKIENG S.,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security;
TODD 	M. 	LYONS, 	Acting 	Director 	of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
and
DAVID EASTERWOOD, Acting Director, St.
Paul 	Field 	Office, 	Immigration 	and
Customs Enforcement,
Respondents.
Civil No. 26-1830 (JRT/EMB)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS
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concludes that his detention is unlawful, the Court will grant the petition and order that
Petitioner be released from custody.
BACKGROUND
Bounkieng S. is a citizen of Laos who entered the United States as a refugee in 1987.
(Pet. Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Pet.”) ¶ 1, Mar. 11, 2026, Docket No. 1.) He subsequently
became a lawful permanent resident. (Id. ¶ 2.) Following a criminal conviction, he was
ordered removed in 2007. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 26) Petitioner was in detention for 90 days before
being released on an order of supervision. (Id.) Petitioner has a lengthy criminal record,
with convictions spanning from 2004 to 2021. (Id. ¶ 25.) Prior to his arrest, Petitioner
never received notice that his supervised release status had been revoked. (Id. ¶ 27.)
Respondents state that ICE revoked Petitioner’s supervised release on February 20,
2026, due to “changed circumstances—namely, that the government of Laos had recently
started to issue travel documents again[.]” (Resp. Mem. at 2, Mar. 14, 2026, Docket No.
4; Decl. of William J. Robinson (“Robinson Decl.”) ¶ 11, Ex. 5, Mar. 14, 2026, Docket No.
5.). ICE arrested Petitioner on February 23, 2026. (Pet. ¶ 5.) Petitioner contends that
“agents . . . did not present any form of warrant or other paperwork to Petitioner” (id.),
but Respondents state that the arrest was effectuated pursuant to an I-200 administrative
warrant (Robinson Decl. ¶ 12, Ex. 6). Petitioner was “then afforded the opportunity to
respond to the reasons for the revocation.” (Robinson Decl. ¶ 12.)
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On March 11, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging
that his detention violated 8 U.S.C. § 1231, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the
United States Constitution, and ICE’s own regulations.
DISCUSSION
The parties agree that 8 U.S.C. § 1231 governs Petitioner’s detention because
Petitioner is subject to a final order for removal. The parties’ core dispute is whether ICE
followed its own regulations in revoking Petitioner’s supervised release, arresting, and
detaining him.
Where a noncitizen is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), the noncitizen’s detention
is governed by its implementing regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 241. Under § 241.13, supervised
release may be revoked in two circumstances: (1) if the individual violates release
conditions, or (2) “if, on account of changed circumstances, [ICE] determines that there is
a significant likelihood that the [individual] may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable
future.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(1)–(2). In either case—violation of supervised release or
changed circumstances—the regulations require ICE to notify the noncitizen “of the
reasons for revocation of his or her release” and to “conduct an initial informal interview
promptly after [the noncitizen’s] return to [ICE] custody to afford the [noncitizen] an
opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification.” 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.13(i)(3).
It 	is 	well-established 	that 	“[a]gencies 	must 	follow 	their 	own 	regulations.”
Saengnakhone S. v. Noem, Civ. No. 25-4775, 2026 WL 34132, at *3 (D. Minn. Jan. 6, 2026)
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(citing United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265–68 (1954)). Here,
Respondents concede that Petitioner’s re-detention is governed by § 241.13, and that ICE
is bound to follow that regulation. ICE argues that it complied with § 241.13 in this case
for three reasons: (1) ICE made its decision to revoke Petitioner’s release three days
before his arrest; (2) “the revocation decision was based on changed circumstances that
led the agency to conclude there was a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future”—specifically, “ICE’s pursuit of a travel document to effectuate
[Petitioner’s] removal to Laos”; and (3) Petitioner was given an informal interview to
respond to the reasons for the revocation. (Resp. Mem. at 7.)
Petitioner bears the burden of showing that his detention is unlawful, see Aditya
W.H. v. Trump, 782 F. Supp. 3d 691, 703 (D. Minn. 2025). 	However, in this case,
Respondents bear the burden under § 241.13 of showing that “changed circumstances”
justified the revocation of release and Petitioner’s detention. See Yee S. v. Bondi, 806 F.
Supp. 3d 894, 900 (D. Minn. 2025); see also Holger P.A.P. v. Noem, Civ. No. 26-571, 2026
WL 710663, at *2 (D. Minn. Mar. 13, 2026).
The Court concludes, on the record before it, that Respondents failed to follow
their own procedures regarding the revocation of release, and that Petitioner’s detention
is therefore unlawful. First, § 241.13(i)(3) states that “[u]pon revocation, the [noncitizen]
will be notified of the reasons for revocation of his or her release.” Respondents did not
provide such notice to Petitioner until after he was arrested and thus failed to follow
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§ 241.13. (See Robinson Decl. ¶ 11, Ex. 5 (noting that the revocation notice was served
on February 23, 2026, at ICE’s field office following Petitioner’s arrest).) 	Second,
Respondents have not adequately demonstrated that their decision to revoke Petitioner’s
release was based on “changed circumstances” indicating “that there is a significant
likelihood that the alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 	See 8
C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2). The only support Respondents provide for that determination are:
(1) the Notice of Revocation of Release document itself, in which ICE checked boxes next
to the statements, “Your release has been revoked pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i),” and
“Circumstances have changed such that there is a significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future” (Robinson Decl. ¶ 11, Ex. 5); and (2) the contention that
“the Government of Laos recently start[ed] to issue travel documents” in similar cases
(Robinson Decl. ¶¶ 11, 13). 	But the Court concludes that these vague, conclusory
statements 	are 	insufficient 	to 	demonstrate 	that 	ICE’s 	revocation 	of 	Petitioner’s
supervised release was justified by changed circumstances.
Nor is the Court persuaded by Respondents’ assertion that “[o]n March 14, 2026,
ERO St. Paul submitted a travel document request to ERO HQ” and “based on
[Deportation Officer Robinson’s] experience, the request should be approved soon.”
(Robinson Decl. ¶ 13). 	These facts have no bearing on the lawfulness of Petitioner’s
detention. 	ICE’s 	own 	regulations—and, 	indeed, 	common 	sense—dictate 	that
circumstances must have changed before the revocation of release in order for those
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changed circumstances to justify the noncitizen’s detention. 	In other words, ICE
requesting travel documents for Petitioner after he had already been detained cannot
provide a lawful rationale for his detention.
In sum, because the record demonstrates that ICE failed to follow its own
procedures 	in 	revoking 	Petitioner’s 	supervised 	release, 	the 	Court 	concludes 	that
Petitioner’s detention is unlawful. 	Accordingly, the Court will grant Bounkieng S.’s
petition for writ of habeas corpus and order that he be released from custody.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. 	Petitioner Bounkieng S.’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Docket No. [1]) is
GRANTED, as follows:
a. 	If Petitioner was released subject to an order of supervision, Petitioner shall
be released from custody subject to the conditions, if any, in such prior
order of supervision.
b. 	If Petitioner is being detained outside of Minnesota, Respondents shall
TRANSPORT Petitioner to Minnesota and RELEASE Petitioner from custody
immediately. Petitioner’s release in Minnesota must occur no later than 48
hours after the filing of this Order.
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c. 	If Petitioner is being detained in Minnesota, Respondents shall RELEASE
Petitioner from custody as soon as practicable, and no later than 48 hours
from the filing of this Order.
d. 	Given the potentially severe weather conditions in Minnesota, Respondents
are ORDERED to coordinate with Petitioner’s counsel to ensure that upon
Petitioner’s release, they are not left outside in inclement weather. 	It is
preferable to release Petitioner to counsel to ensure humane treatment.
e. 	Respondents must release Petitioner with all personal effects, such as
driver’s licenses, passports, or immigration documents.
f. 	The parties shall provide the Court with a status update concerning the
status of Petitioner’s release by no later than 5:00 p.m. on March 23, 2026.
Further, 	the 	parties 	shall 	advise 	the 	Court 	whether 	any 	additional
proceedings in this matter are required and submit any proposals for the
scope of further litigation.
DATED: March 19, 2026 	_____/s/ John R. Tunheim_____
at Minneapolis, Minnesota. 	JOHN R. TUNHEIM
United States District Judge
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