Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Por M.,
Petitioner,
v.
Kristi Noem, Secretary, Department of
Homeland Security; Todd M. Lyons, Acting
Director, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; David Easterwood, Acting
Director, St. Paul Field Office Immigration
and Customs Enforcement,
Respondents.
Case No. 26-cv-1546 (PJS/DJF)
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Por M.’s1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
(ECF No. 1) (“Petition”). Por seeks an order directing Respondents to release him immediately. As
discussed below, the Court finds the government failed to follow its own regulations in detaining Por
and recommends the Petition be granted on that ground.
BACKGROUND
Por is a member of the Hmong ethnic minority of Laos who entered the United States in 1989
as a refugee to escape persecution by the Laotian government due to his Hmong ethnicity. (ECF No.
1 at 1.) At that time, he just was 14 years old. (Id.) He later became a lawful permanent resident of
the United Status, retroactive to his date of entry. (Id.) On September 28, 1999, Por was convicted
in Minnesota state court of making felony terroristic threats. See Docket, State of Minnesota v. Por
M., No. 27-cr-99-030576 (Minn. Dist. Ct.). Because of this conviction, an immigration judge
entered an order of removal against Por on October 31, 2000. (ECF No. 1 at 1; ECF No. 4-3 at 1.)
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On February 20, 2001, Por filed a motion to reopen his removal, which an immigration judge denied
on May 25, 2001. (ECF No. 4-4 at 3-4.) Following Por’s release from incarceration on the criminal
charge, Immigration and Naturalization Services (“INS”)2 took Por into custody but sometime later3
released him from immigration custody on an order of supervision. (ECF No. 1 at 1-2.)
Given Por’s Hmong status and Laotian citizenship, this was not unusual. The United States
and Laos do not have a formal repatriation agreement. See Viengkhone S. v. Albarran, No. 25-cv-
01505 (KES/HBK), 2025 WL 3521302, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2025). From the date of Por’s
initial order of removal until recently, Laos rarely accepted deportees, and its acceptance of Hmong
deportees was especially rare. (ECF No. 1 at 1.) Very recently, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) has had success obtaining travel documents for Hmong refugees from the
Government of Laos, though precisely when that began is unclear. (Id. at 2; ECF No. 4-6 at 2.)
After his release, Por continued to violate the law. He was convicted of a litany of criminal
offenses, including: a sex offense against a minor in 2002; felony failure to register as a predator
offender in 2008; felony domestic assault, 3rd degree assault and 1st degree assault in 2010; and
domestic assault in 2023. (ECF No. 1 at 9, listing cases.) Despite these convictions, ICE never
asked Por to fill out applications for a passport or travel documents to facilitate his future return to
Laos during his extended period of supervision. (Id. at 9.)
On December 10, 2025, ICE arrested Por at his home. (Id. at 2; ECF No. 4-6 at 2.) The legal
justification for Por’s arrest—at the time of his arrest—is unclear. Though Por denies being shown a
1 This District has adopted a policy of using only the first name and last initial of any
nongovernmental parties in orders in immigration matters.
2 INS has been dissolved, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement performs its functions
under the regulations at issue in this matter. See Sarail A. v. Bondi, 803 F. Supp. 3d 775, 779 n.5 (D.
Minn. Sept. 3, 2025).
3 It is unclear from the record how long INS detained Por initially before his release on
supervision.
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warrant prior to his arrest (ECF No. 1 at 2; ECF No. 4-6 at 2), Respondents have produced an
administrative warrant for his arrest dated December 10, 2025. (ECF No. 4-1.) It cites “reliable
evidence” of removability as a basis for his arrest but omits any reference to his ongoing removal
proceedings as grounds. (Id.) Respondents also produced a “Warrant of Removal/Deportation”
dated December 10, 2025, which cites ongoing removal proceedings as grounds to arrest and remove
Por. (ECF No. 4-2 at 1-2.) That document is not signed, however, and it is unclear whether the
document was created before or after ICE arrested him. (Id.)
The record contains no evidence that Por ever received notice that his supervised release was
being revoked or the reasons why. Por denies receiving notification from ICE that it was revoking
his supervised release. (ECF No. 1 at 10.) And though Respondents claim in their briefing that ICE
provided Por with a “Notice of Revocation of Release dated December 14, 2025” (ECF No. 4 at 7),
they failed to attach any such notice to their response to the Petition (see Docket) and did not submit
a sworn declaration certifying this claim is true (see ECF No. 4-6). Moreover, there is no
information in the record—at all—to suggest Por was afforded an informal interview regarding the
reasons for revocation.
On December 19, 2025, ICE requested a travel document for Por. (ECF No. 4-6 at 2.) The
Laotian government issued the travel document on January 30, 2026. (Id.; ECF No. 4-7.)
Respondents state that Por will be manifested on an upcoming charter flight, and that one such flight
is scheduled to depart from Texas in mid-March. (ECF No. 4-6 at 2-3; ECF No. 4 at 6.) In the
meantime, Por remains detained at the Freeborn County Jail in Albert Lea, Minnesota. (ECF No. 4-
6 at 3.)
Por filed the Petition before the Court on February 20, 2026. (ECF No. 1.) The Petition
requests an order for Por’s immediate release based on Respondents’ alleged violations of: (1.) 8
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U.S.C. § 1231; (2.) Fifth Amendment substantive due process; (3.) Fifth Amendment procedural due
process; (4.) the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unlawful search and seizure; and (5.) the
Accardi doctrine.4 (Id. at 13-17.)
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standards
The general federal habeas statute empowers federal courts to release civilly-detained
individuals when that detention violates the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241; Sarail A.
v. Bondi, 803 F. Supp. 3d 775, 779 (D. Minn. 2025). It is well-established that federal regulations
are federal law. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Home Sav. of America, 946 F.2d 93, 96 (8th Cir. 1991);
Velocity Express Corp. v. Bayview Capital Partners, LP, No. 02-cv-521 (RHK/AJB), 2002 WL
980502, at *2 n.3 (D. Minn. May 9, 2002). It therefore follows that a habeas petitioner may be
released when his civil detention arises from violations of federal regulations. See In re United
States, 197 F.3d 310, 315 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing United States ex re. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347
U.S. 260, 266-68 (1954)).
II. The Relevant Statutory and Regulatory Framework
Respondents argue Por’s detention is authorized under 8 U.S.C. § 1231. (ECF No. 4 at 3.)
Section 1231(a)(2) provides that the government may detain a noncitizen who is subject to an order
of removal. But the length of that detention is subject to various limitations. With a few narrow
exceptions not relevant here, a noncitizen’s detention is limited to a 90-day “removal period.” Id.
“The removal period begins on the latest of the following: (i) The date the order of removal becomes
administratively final. (ii) If the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of
4 “[T]he Accardi doctrine bars administrative agencies from taking action inconsistent with
their internal regulations when it would affect individual rights.” United States v. Lee, 274 F.3d 485,
492 (8th Cir. 2001).
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the removal of the alien, the date of the court’s final order. (iii) If the alien is detained or confined
(except under an immigration process), the date the alien is released from detention or confinement.”
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B). “If the alien does not leave or is not removed within the removal period,
the alien, pending removal, shall be subject to supervision under regulations prescribed by the
Attorney General.”5 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3).
Since at least November 14, 2001, the Department of Justice and the Department of
Homeland Security have maintained the same regulations concerning the procedures for revocation
of supervised release under Section 1231(a)(3). See Continued Detention of Aliens Subject to Final
Orders of Removal, 66 Fed. Reg. 56967, 56979 (Nov. 14, 2001) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)).
Those regulations state that revocation may occur for one of two reasons: (1.) a violation of
conditions of release occurs; or (2.) “on account of changed circumstances,” ICE determines there is
a “a significant likelihood that the alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 8
C.F.R. § 241.13(i).
Importantly, the regulations establish not only the substantive grounds for revocation, but
also the required procedure. If ICE decides to revoke a noncitizen’s supervised release, the
noncitizen “will be notified of the reasons for revocation of his or her release.” 8 C.F.R. §
241.13(i)(3). Once the noncitizen is in custody, ICE must promptly conduct an “initial informal
interview … to afford the [noncitizen] an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated
in the notification. The [noncitizen] may submit evidence or information that he or she believes
shows there is no significant likelihood he or she be [sic] removed in the reasonably foreseeable
future, or that he or she has not violated the order of supervision.” Id. ICE then must conduct a
5 Because this language predates the Department of Homeland Security, courts now construe
the statute’s reference to the Attorney General as referring to the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security as well. See Silva v. United States, 866 F.3d 938, 940 n.2 (8th Cir. 2017).
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revocation custody review that includes “an evaluation of any contested facts relevant to the
revocation and a determination whether the facts as determined warrant revocation and further denial
of release.” Id.
III. Analysis
Much of Respondent’s argument focuses on the provisions of Section 1231 that prescribe
initial detention of a noncitizen upon the entry of a removal order under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678, 701 (2001). “But Zadvydas does not apply to noncitizens subject to an order of supervision,
where there has already been a determination that a noncitizen is not likely to be removed.” Tou V.
v. Bondi, No. 26-cv-1381 (DMG), 2026 WL 458195, at *3 (D. Minn. Feb. 18, 2026). Applicable
here are Section 1231(a)(3), which explicitly differentiates supervised release from initial detention
and delegates regulatory authority concerning supervised release to the Attorney General, and 8
C.F.R. 241.13, which regulates the conditions on which the government may revoke supervised
release.
Respondents’ detention of Por involves after-the-fact rationalizations for his release
revocation that plainly violate the notice and interview requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 241.13. Though
Por raises several independent grounds for his release, the Court concludes that the Petition ought to
be granted because the government failed to follow its own regulations in detaining him.6
A. Improper Notice
The most glaring problem with Por’s arrest and detention is that Respondents failed to
provide him with a Notice of Revocation of Release at the time of his arrest and did not give him an
informal interview within a reasonable period of time following his arrest. (ECF No. 1 at 10; ECF
6 The Court thus does not consider the other grounds asserted in the Petition. See Yee S. v.
Bondi, 806 F. Supp. 3d 894, 898 n.5 (D. Minn. Oct. 9, 2025).
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No. 4-6 at 2.) In fact, Respondents have not provided Por with any formal notice of revocation or
informal interview whatsoever. (Id.) The Court cannot credit Respondents’ unsubstantiated claim
that they provided him with Notice of Revocation of Release on December 14, 2025 because they
failed to support it with any evidence.7 The Court ordered Respondents to include with their
response “[s]uch affidavits and exhibits as are needed to establish the lawfulness and correct
duration of petitioner’s detention in light of the issues raised in the habeas petition.” (ECF No. 3 at
1.) Respondents are plainly aware of the critical importance of serving a Notice of Revocation of
Release and ensuring its contents provided adequate notice in cases such as this one. See, e.g., Si
T.P. v. Noem, No. 26-cv-1445 (ECT/DJF), ECF No. 9 (D. Minn. Feb. 24, 2026)(finding Notice of
Revocation inadequate because it referred to “changed circumstances” without explaining how
circumstances had changed), report and recommendation adopted, Si T.P. v. Noem, No. 26-cv-1445
(ECT/DJF), ECF No. 11 (D. Minn. Mar. 3, 2026). That they failed to produce a Notice of
Revocation strongly suggests either that none exists or that any notice given was so inadequate as to
be entirely unhelpful to Respondents’ case.
Respondents did file a Form I-200 Warrant of Arrest (“Warrant”), along with a declaration
confirming that ICE served Por with the Warrant at the time of his arrest. (ECF No. 4-6 at 2; ECF
No. 4-1.) But the Warrant alone is not sufficient to have put Por on notice of: (1.) the fact that his
supervised release was being revoked; (2.) the reasons for the revocation, including an explanation
of how he had violated his release conditions or how circumstances had changed; or (3.) his
entitlement to an informal interview and an opportunity to respond to the reasons for the revocation.
7 Even if Respondents had served Por with a Notice of Revocation on December 14, 2025,
such notice would not establish that his supervised release was revoked before his arrest on
December 10. See M.S.L. v. Bostock, No. 6:25-cv-1204 (AA), 2025 WL 2430267, at *10, 12 (D. Or.
Aug. 21, 2025) (concluding two-day delay between arrest and service of notice of revocation
violated federal regulations).
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C.f. Si T.P., No. 26-cv-1445, ECF No. 9 (citing Notice of Revocation of Release at ECF No. 6-2).
Indeed, to the extent Respondents now claim the removal proceedings against Por justified his arrest,
the Warrant was misleading because it notably omitted “removal proceedings” as a basis for it.
(ECF No. 4-1.) Respondents offer no justification for arresting Por and continuing to detain him
without formal notice of why they were revoking his supervised release.
Respondents’ failure to provide notice of the reasons for revocation is a significant omission
because it prevented Por from challenging the revocation. Respondents’ regulations dictate that a
detainee must be apprised of the specific reasons for revoking his supervised release so that he can
present rebuttal evidence and argument at an informal interview. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3); see also
Sarail A., 803 F. Supp. 3d at 781 (“notification ‘of the reasons for revocation’ requires ICE to do
more than state that circumstances have changed.”). Here, Respondents do not even imply that they
provided Por with the required interview. Respondents’ failure to follow their own regulations in
arresting and detaining Por deprived him of an opportunity to mount a defense, and that deprivation
establishes grounds to release him. See Sarail A., 803 F. Supp. 3d at 781-84 (granting habeas
petition based, in part, on government’s failure to provide adequate notice of the reasons for
revocation); Dusan C. v. Bondi, No. 26-cv-620 (JRT/ECW), 2026 WL 458128, at *4 (D. Minn. Feb.
13, 2026) (same); Xayakesone v. Noem, No. 25-cv-2995 (JES/BJW), 2025 WL 3229102, at *4 (S.D.
Cal. Nov. 19, 2025) (same).
B. Grounds for Revocation
Respondents also have not established they had grounds to revoke Por’s release when they
arrested him. Respondents argue revocation of Por’s supervision was appropriate given “changed
circumstances,” due to an increase in repatriations to Laos. (ECF No. 4 at 5-6.) It is Respondents’
burden to establish that changed circumstances warrant the revocation of Por’s release. See Yee S. v.
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Bondi, No. 25-cv-02782 (JMB), 2025 WL 2879479, at *4 (D. Minn. Oct. 9, 2025) (“section 241.13
regulations place the burden on ICE to establish that ‘changed circumstances’ justified the
revocation of release.”) (collecting cases). Under the regulations, a revocation of release must be
grounded in more than generalized assertions that removal is now likely. See id. at *5 (finding the
Government’s “vague and conclusory assertions” that removal was significantly likely soon are
insufficient evidence of changed circumstances); see also Vu v. Noem, No. 25-cv-01366, 2025 WL
3114341, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2025) (same). Section 241.13 requires ICE to consider several
factors in assessing the likelihood of removal, including:
[T]he history of the alien’s efforts to comply with the order of removal, the history of
[ICE]’s efforts to remove aliens to the country in question or to third countries,
including the ongoing nature of [ICE]’s efforts to remove this alien and the alien's
assistance with those efforts, the reasonably foreseeable results of those efforts, and
the views of the Department of State regarding the prospects for removal of aliens to
the country or countries in question.
8 C.F.R. § 241.13(f).
Respondents argue that, when Por’s release was revoked8, changes in the Laotian
government’s repatriation policies constituted “changed circumstances” sufficient to justify it. (ECF
No. 4 at 9.) Due to this change, Respondents argue, “ICE personnel determined that they would be
able to remove Petitioner from the United States because Laos is accepting individuals for
repatriation.” (Id.)
Respondents proffer no evidence showing an uptick in successful removals to Laos when Por
was arrested on December 10, 2025, however. They rely on the travel document Respondents
obtained for Por’s removal to Laos (ECF No. 4-7). But ICE did not apply for the travel document
8 This argument begs the question of exactly when Por’s release was revoked, since
Respondents never produced any formal Notice of Revocation. Since Por was arrested and detained
on December 10, 2025, the Court deems his arrest a de facto revocation on that date.
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until December 19, 2025, nine days after Por’s arrest, and did not receive it until January 30, 2026—
almost two months later. (Id.; see also ECF No. 4-6 at 2-3.) Respondents also cite the Declaration
of Deportation Officer William J. Robinson, which states that Por “will be manifested on an
upcoming scheduled charter flight” to Laos. (ECF No. 4-6 at 3.) These documents would appear to
support an argument that circumstances have now changed. But the Court is unconvinced by the
paucity of evidence pre-dating December 10 that a likelihood of Por’s successful deportation to Laos
existed before he was arrested. See Moussa S., v. Bondi, No. 26-cv-1408 (PJS/ECW), 2026 WL
622680, at *1 (D. Minn. Mar. 5, 2026) (order adopting report and recommendation recommending
release) (“under § 241.13(i)(2), ICE must determine that changed circumstances exist before re-
detaining an alien”).
Nor is the Court convinced that a change in the Laotian government’s repatriation policy was
the actual reason for Por’s arrest. As previously discussed, Por still has not received a formal Notice
of Revocation, and neither the arrest Warrant nor any of the other immigration documents
Respondents prepared at the time of his arrest identified an increase in successful deportations to
Laos as grounds. Officer Robinson states that ICE executed a “targeted arrest” on Por. (ECF No. 4-
6 at 2.) But Officer Robinson does not actually state what “targeted” means or why Por was
“targeted.” The Court cannot conclude from this vague statement that officials targeted him because
he was subject to an order of removal and officials believed his imminent deportation was likely.
Courts in this District have repeatedly rejected the government’s attempts to rely on ex-post
facto justifications for revocation in circumstances nearly identical to Por’s. See Tou V., 2026 WL
458195, at *3 (finding respondents could not rely on a post-detention change in circumstances,
including receipt of Laotian travel document, to justify release revocation) (“The government
detained the petitioner first, and asked questions later. That’s not how this works.”); Yeng X. v.
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Noem, No. 26-cv-1399 (DMG), 2026 WL 465220, at *1 (D. Minn. Feb. 18, 2026) (same); Chou T. v.
Noem, No. 26-cv-01432 (SHL/ECW), 2026 WL 607413, at *6 (D. Minn. Feb. 20, 2026)
(same), report and recommendation adopted sub nom., Chou T. v. Noem, No. 26-cv-01432
(SHL/ECW), 2026 WL 613575 (D. Minn. Mar. 4, 2026). Respondents had the burden to establish
changed circumstances before Por was detained, and the Court concludes they have failed to carry
that burden.
C. Remedy
Respondents argue that “[i]f the Court concludes that ICE’s re-detention procedures were
deficient, then the solution is for the agency to redo the process and correct any deficiencies—not
release Petitioner from detention outright.” (ECF No. 4 at 8.) But Respondents cite to no case law
to support this proposition. Release here is the proper relief. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693
(2008) (noting that release is the “typical remedy” for “unlawful executive detention”). Courts in
this District have repeatedly found that the government’s failure to follow its own requirements
under Section 241.13 warrants release, not a “re-do” of Section 241.13 procedures. See Tou V., 2026
WL 458195, at *4 (“But the government's custody of a person without regard for its own regulations
is an unlawful detention indeed.”); Yeng X., 2026 WL 465220, at *1; Chou T., 2026 WL 607413, at
*6 (report and recommendation adopted); Garrison G. v. Bondi, No. 26-cv-172 (JMB/DJF), 2026
WL 157677, at *4 (D. Minn. Jan. 17, 2026); Jor Y. v. Noem, No. 26-cv-1210 (JMB), ECF No. 6 at 7
(D. Minn. Feb. 11, 2026); Tong X. v. Noem, No. 26-cv-1548 (JMB), ECF No. 6 at 7–8 (D. Minn.
Feb. 23, 2026); Si T.P., No. 26-cv-1445, ECF No. 9 at 11 (report and recommendation adopted);
Mong C. v. Noem, No. 26-cv-1541 (JWB), ECF No. 7 at 6 (D. Minn. Feb. 24, 2026).
In their apparent rush to arrest and detain Por, Respondents violated their own legally
dictated procedures. Though there might now be legitimate grounds to revoke Por’s supervised
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release, the Court cannot draw a firm conclusion because the administrative process failed. Had he
been given proper notice and an opportunity for an informal interview, Por might have submitted
evidence refuting the government’s claim that circumstances have changed, and a revocation custody
review might find continued supervision is warranted. But to sanction Por’s continued unlawful
detention under procedures provided three months too late would render the procedural safeguards
set forth in the regulations meaningless. Respondents must adhere to the regulations they
established. The Court therefore recommends that the Petition be granted.
V. Objections
Given the expedited nature of these proceedings, the Court is altering the standard timelines
for Respondents to file objections to this Report and Recommendation. See L.R. 72.2(b)(1) (“A
party may file and serve specific written objections to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings and
recommendations within 14 days after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition,
unless the court sets a different deadline.”) (emphasis added). Respondents must file any objection
to this Report and Recommendation on or before March 11, 2026. Por may file a response to any
objections on or before March 12, 2026.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. Petitioner Por M.’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) be GRANTED.
2. Respondents be ordered to release Petitioner Por M. from custody:
A. As soon as practicable;
B. Inside the State of Minnesota;
C. At a safe time and place communicated in advance to counsel; and
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D. With all of Petitioner’s personal effects in Respondents’ possession, such as
driver’s license, immigration papers, passport, cell phone, and keys.
Dated: March 9, 2026 s/ Dulce J. Foster
Dulce J. Foster
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. For
the reasons previously stated, Respondents must file any objection to this Report and
Recommendation on or before March 11, 2026. Petitioner may file a response to any objections on
or before March 12, 2026.
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