Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Byron A.,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, Attorney General; Kristi
Lynn Arnold Noem, Secretary, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; Todd
M. Lyons, Acting Director of Immigration
and Customs Enforcement; and David
Easterwood, Acting Director, St. Paul
Field Office Immigration and Customs
Enforcement,
Respondents.
Civ. No. 26-1365 (PAM/JFD)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Bryon A.’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus. (“Pet.” (Docket No. 1).) For the following reasons, the Court denies the petition.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner Byron A. is a citizen of Ecuador. 	(Id. ¶¶ 7, 14.) 	In April 2022, he was
paroled into the United States under the Department of Homeland Security’s discretionary
authority pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). 	(Id. ¶ 3.) 	He has a work permit and a
pending application for asylum. 	(Id. ¶¶ 43–44, 52, Exs. A, C.) 	In November 2025, the
Department of Homeland Security terminated Petitioner’s parole and served him a notice
to appear in immigration court, which charged him with being present in the United States
without a valid visa. (Id. ¶ 4, Ex. B.) He does not claim to have obtained any legal status
in the United States. On February 11, 2026, Respondents apprehended Petitioner after he
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appeared in criminal court for proceedings on a DUI, and he remains in ICE custody. (Id.
¶¶ 5, 14, 45.)
DISCUSSION
Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, asking
the Court to order his immediate release or grant him an individualized bond hearing under
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Respondents contend that his detention is mandatory pending removal
proceedings under § 1225(b)(2). The Court must therefore decide whether § 1225(b)(2) or
§ 1226(a) governs Petitioner’s detention.
“When interpreting a statute, [courts] begin with the statute’s plain language, giving
words the meaning that proper grammar and usage would assign them. 	If the intent of
Congress can be clearly discerned from the statute’s language, the judicial inquiry must
end.” 	United 	States 	v. 	Lester, 	92 	F.4th 	740, 	742 	(8th 	Cir. 	2024) (cleaned 	up).
Section 1225(a)(1) dictates that “[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been
admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of
arrival . . .) shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission.” There
is no dispute that Petitioner is an alien present in the United States. See id. And the record
is void of any indication that he lawfully entered the United States, i.e., an immigration
officer did not inspect him and authorize his entry. 	Id. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (“The terms
‘admission’ and ‘admitted’ mean, with respect to an alien, the lawful entry of the alien into
the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.”). 	The
statute is clear that parole does not constitute admission. 	8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)
(dictating that “such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission” and that
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when the Secretary of Homeland Security determines that the “purposes of such parole . . .
have been served the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which
he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner
as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States”).
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) instructs that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission
is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a
proceeding under section 1229a of this title.” The plain reading of the text is that detention
is mandatory. 	Other courts disagree with this reading, making distinctions based on the
length of an alien’s presence in the United States, an alien’s efforts to secure lawful status
here, or where an alien was apprehended. 	Such limitations are not found in the statute.
“What governs this case is the text of the statute, not what other district courts have
concluded.” Mejia Olalde v. Noem, No. 1:25-CV-00168-JMD, 2025 WL 3131942, at *1
(E.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2025).
Petitioner contends that because he has resided in the United States since 2022, he
is not “seeking admission,” and thus he is not subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s requirements.
Indeed, many courts agree with Petitioner. 	However, the Court determines that the
growing minority of courts rejecting Petitioner’s argument are correct. 	See, e.g.,
Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 503 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026); Chen v.
Almodovar, -- F. Supp. 3d --, No. 1:25-CV-8350-MKV, 2025 WL 3484855, *3–6
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2025); Chavez v. Noem, 801 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1140 (S.D. Cal. 2025);
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Faqirzada v. Rokosky, No. 25-16639 (MAS), 2026 WL 63614, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2026);
de Leon Lopez v. Ladwig, No. 6:25-CV-01884, 2026 WL 19095, at *4–6 (W.D. La. Jan.
2, 2026); Alberto Rodriguez v. Jeffreys, No. 8:25CV714, 2025 WL 3754411, at *11–14
(D. Neb. Dec. 29, 2025); Melgar v. Bondi, No. 8:25CV555, 2025 WL 3496721, *10–14
(D. 	Neb. 	Dec. 	5, 	2025); 	Mejia 	Olalde, 	2025 	WL 	3131942, 	*3–4. 	The 	text 	of
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) is clear that a noncitizen who is an “applicant for admission” is necessarily
“seeking admission.” See Vargas Lopez v. Trump, 802 F. Supp. 3d 1132, 1142 (D. Neb.
Sept. 30, 2025) (explaining that “just because Vargas Lopez illegally remained in this
country for years does not mean that he is suddenly not an ‘applicant for admission’ under
§ 1225(b)(2)”).
Petitioner fails to provide evidence that he has been lawfully admitted to the United
States. “Admission” means lawful entry into the United States, not merely any presence
here. 	8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). 	The statute’s plain meaning prevails: Petitioner is an
“applicant for admission” because he is present in this country and has not been admitted
or 	granted 	any 	lawful 	status. 	Respondents 	may 	lawfully 	detain 	Petitioner 	under
§ 1225(b)(2), which requires detention. Thus, as a matter of law, Petitioner is not entitled
to a bond hearing.
Moreover, Petitioner filed an application for asylum and ostensibly continues to
pursue that status. “That application seeks to allow him to remain in this country—i.e., to
be admitted.” Coronado v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-CV-831, 2025 WL
3628229, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 15, 2025). 	Even “[i]f actively ‘seeking admission’ is a
distinct requirement for mandatory detention pursuant to § 1225, seeking asylum is
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‘seeking admission,’ within the meaning of the statute, since ‘admission’ is defined in
terms of ‘lawful’ status, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A), not physical presence on U.S. soil.”
Chen, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2025 WL 3484855, at *6. Indeed, were an applicant not seeking
admission to the United States or other lawful status when confronted by an immigration
officer, then he or she would voluntarily self-deport.
To the extent Petitioner challenges the Department of Homeland Security’s decision
to end his parole, the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider that issue. The relevant statute
confers broad discretion on the Secretary of Homeland Security, stating that:
[t]he Secretary of Homeland Security may . . . in h[er] discretion parole into
the United States temporarily under such conditions as [s]he may prescribe
only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant
public benefit any alien applying for admission to the United States, but such
parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien and
when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Secretary of
Homeland Security, have been served the alien shall forthwith return or be
returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case
shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other
applicant for admission to the United States.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Thus, the statute makes clear that parole is temporary, offered
at the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland Security, and may be terminated when the
Secretary determines that the purpose of the parole has been served. 	The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals has clarified that decisions subject to the discretion of the Secretary of
Homeland Security under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) are “insulated from judicial review.”
Fofana v. Noem, 163 F.4th 1135, 1139 (8th Cir. 2026).
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Finally, Petitioner contends that his arrest was unlawful because Respondents did
not have a warrant, but “Section 1225(b) does not include a warrant or an arrest
requirement.” Melgar, 2025 WL 3496721, at *8. Petitioner’s argument fails.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. 	The Petition (Docket No. 1) is DENIED; and
2. 	This action is DISMISSED without prejudice.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: March 4, 2026 	s/ Paul A. Magnuson
Paul A. Magnuson
United States District Court Judge
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